(8 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord for seeding that thought in my mind and I am glad to take it away and consider it between now and Report.
Amendment 7 also relates to Clause 2, which provides a statutory requirement that public authorities must consider all three of the privacy duties listed in subsection (2). It is not an exclusive list—there are other important principles that public authorities will have regard to—but it does make clear the principles that sit at the heart of this Bill and that underpin the exercise of functions under the Bill. And it is of course the case that the judicial commissioner will look to see whether these principles have been satisfied—when, for example, he or she reviews a Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant.
The noble Baroness expressed some concern about the phrase “have regard to”. In bringing forward the privacy clause, the Government responded to concerns raised by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as well as by the Opposition and the Scottish National Party in the other place. The language of “have regard to” is drawn from amendments tabled by the Opposition and the SNP in Committee. It reflects the language of Clause 1 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, which was held up by those parties in Committee as an exemplar of how such a clause might operate. That is the basis on which we have included that particular form of words. In short, while I am sympathetic to the concern raised in this area—
I am grateful to the noble Earl. Those precedents do not amount to what is really needed, which is full compliance with Article 8 of the convention and the Human Rights Act. In my opinion—it is no more than my opinion—the words do not satisfy that, whatever the precedents relied on may be in amendments tabled in other Bills. It is no use saying “have regard to”; it is necessary to ensure that what is in A, B and C happens in practice. “Have regard to” is rubbery and illusive and will not pass muster under the Human Rights Act or the convention, in my opinion.
I promise not to speak again on any amendments until we reach those covering legal professional privilege, as I do not intend to be even more of a human rights bore than I am at the moment. However, before the Minister sits down, since he has the great advantage of not being a lawyer, may I explain why the Government need to think again about the language that is being used currently?
The problem is that any mismatch between the wording of the Bill and the convention or the Human Rights Act would lead, necessarily, to a legal challenge, which would go probably all the way to the Supreme Court. At the end of the day, the court will say that it cannot do much about it, because the Act is clear, but that it will give a declaration of incompatibility. That will then cause the Government of the day to have to decide what to do about the language—whether they amend it or let it go to Strasbourg.
I want to avoid all that. Every time I see something in the Bill that seems to me to be a mismatch—for example the part which suggests that there are other unspecified relevant circumstances, which seems to violate the principle of legal certainty—I think, “Oh dear, this is going to lead to litigation and to a challenge”. I am begging the Government to make absolutely sure that the language of the Bill as it leaves this House cannot be challenged as being a mismatch with the European convention and the Human Rights Act.
The problem with the Human Rights Act is that it allows those challenges, quite rightly, to be made, along with declarations of incompatibility. That is why I really hope, when the Bill comes to Report, we can have language which, if not identical to these amendments, will achieve that objective.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for expressing his expert opinion so clearly. I can undertake only to study carefully what he has said between now and Report. Clearly, the Bill has been drafted by expert hands, but I am the first to say that there is no monopoly of wisdom on the Government’s side, and I am sure we need to taker full account of what he said.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to the other amendments in my name in this group. They respond to the excellent report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and follow discussions that I have had with the noble Lord, Lord Low, and others. I am grateful to the Joint Committee and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Low, who unfortunately is not able to be here today. I extend my thanks to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, my noble friend Lord Lester, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Warner, with whom I have had constructive meetings.
As has been said here and in the other place throughout the passage of the Bill, this Government need to send out a strong message to the sector not to allow abuse, neglect or harm. Our priority must be preventing harm, abuse and neglect happening in the first place.
However, Clause 48 as inserted by this House went too far. It applied the Human Rights Act to all provision of CQC-regulated social care. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights acknowledged, the Human Rights Act is not intended to cover entirely private arrangements. If Clause 48 became law, it would have been the first time that the Act applied directly to purely private arrangements where there is no state involvement. It could have led to other interest groups arguing that they should also be able to challenge private providers on human rights grounds in other spheres.
We still believe that much stronger deterrents are available. Many of the Care Quality Commission’s fundamental standards will include human rights dimensions. These standards will apply to all registered providers of health and social care, and failure to comply with them could be a criminal offence.
However, as I have just said, I am aware of the strength of feeling on this matter and that is why I am today prepared to offer a government amendment which I hope this House can support. The amendment would make it explicit that care providers who are regulated by the Care Quality Commission in England or by equivalent bodies in the rest of the United Kingdom, when providing care and support arranged or funded in whole or in part by local authorities, are exercising a public function for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this amendment meets the objectives of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It makes it clear that providers of publicly arranged or funded care and support, both residential and non-residential, provided on behalf of a local authority to an individual, are bound by the Human Rights Act.
The Government were unable to accept the JCHR amendment as it was drafted for technical reasons. The Human Rights Act is an entrenched enactment which the devolved legislatures cannot modify, but its application should be the same across the UK. Government Amendment 11B therefore applies the legislative clarification to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
It is important to bear in mind that the scope of application of the Human Rights Act matters to lots of other people beyond the care sector. The Government believe that it is not appropriate to pick and choose which people or bodies are expressly made subject to the Human Rights Act. That is why I want to make it clear that this amendment would not set a precedent for any future occasions where there are perceived to be gaps in the coverage of the Human Rights Act. I hope that this amendment will be welcomed. I beg to move.
My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend for having missed the first few sentences of his speech. However, I heard the substantive part of it.
First, may I say on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which met this morning, that the committee is absolutely delighted by how the Government have reacted to the problem that was raised in this House by the noble Lord, Lord Low, and many others, and which led to an amendment that—on reflection—was too strong? The amendment now tabled meets the problem admirably. The problem was created by an unfortunate decision of the Law Lords—by three to two—in the case of YL. As the Minister will know, the previous Government, like the present one, had been looking for an opportunity for that unfortunate judgment to be reconsidered in a suitable test case. However, no such case has arisen. The pity of it is that the whole point of the Human Rights Act was not to have a list of bodies that would be subject to the Act but to have a good, flexible test that would be fact-sensitive and would apply without the need for amendments of this kind. Unfortunately, no such test case has arisen where the matter could be properly decided, and therefore one has in a sense to use Elastoplast—sticking plaster—to deal with particular problems.
We quite understand the Government’s reservations about this being regarded as a precedent. As the Minister knows, ideologically there are some for whom the words Human Rights Act are almost anathema; that is why it required a certain amount of discussion to get to the present situation.
The Joint Committee sought clarification on just one matter. I do not think there is a problem; it is rather a matter of seeking confirmation that the Government intend the amendment to cover social care provided by a regulated provider and paid for by direct payments. It is not absolutely clear from the amendment that that is so. We think that it is so but is that correct? Do the Government intend the amendment to cover social care paid for by direct payments, provided that the care is purchased from a regulated provider? I am speaking extremely slowly, in order that others may be able to answer. No doubt others will want to say something about this amendment as well, but if that point could be confirmed in the Minister’s reply it would be very helpful. Nothing that I have said, however, should mask the delight we feel that this problem has been solved in this manner.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberBefore my noble friend replies, perhaps I may have a go as well. The problem is that the more specific the amendment, the more the Latin maxim applies that says that, by expressing something, you are deemed to exclude something else. Therefore there is a great danger in ambiguous specificity.
My noble friend expresses the position exactly. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Wills, if a court in the future were to arrive at a judgment that all of us here would consider adverse, of course the Government would intervene. However, in our view, it is now highly unwise at this point to try to frame an amendment to put these matters beyond doubt in the way that the noble Baroness seeks to do because any attempt to do so is almost certain to lead to ambiguity and doubt about the applicability of the Act in other areas. That is the point. Of course I can pick holes in the drafting of this amendment, but that is not the central issue. The issue is the wider one to which I alluded earlier.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as my noble friend has correctly reminded us, the next debate will give us the opportunity to discuss the package of amendments designed to clarify the Secretary of State’s accountability for the health service. I recently completed a series of meetings with Peers from across the House to understand their concerns about this and related issues. Thanks to the efforts of so many here today, including the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, I am pleased to say that we have sufficient consensus to table a series of amendments on this matter. I very much look forward to discussing them when we reach subsequent groups.
Amendments 3 and 4, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, seek to reinstate the duty to provide. I do not wish to dwell too long on what I have said on previous occasions, but the noble Baroness will be aware that we are retaining the wording of the NHS Act 1946, where appropriate. For example, the Secretary of State retains his duty to,
“continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service”,
and his duty to,
“secure that services are provided”.
The reason for our removing the 1946 duty on the Secretary of State to provide services himself is that it fails to reflect the reality of the way that NHS services are delivered. In general and for many years, the Secretary of State has not himself exercised functions of providing or commissioning services. The functions are delegated to SHAs and PCTs. Under the Bill, however, this function will be conferred directly on a dedicated NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs.
Indeed, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern has pointed out previously, there has never been a straightforward duty to provide services. The requirement was framed as a duty to,
“provide or secure the … provision of”,
services. In practice, Ministers or the NHS bodies responsible for exercising the Secretary of State’s functions have usually exercised the second option, securing the provision, rather than the first, actually providing. The Secretary of State—that is, the Department of Health—has not provided NHS services directly for many years. Our policy is that the Secretary of State should neither provide nor commission NHS services.
It is clear from these amendments that the Opposition are harking back to a centralist, top-down approach. They sometimes say that they want clinical commissioners, but these amendments contradict that. They would not create a system of clear responsibility but instead one where Richmond House was always right. That model has been tried to the point of exhaustion and has been found wanting. In contrast, the Bill establishes a framework in which the Secretary of State no longer has the powers to provide or commission NHS services. Instead, those functions are conferred on other bodies in the system. An amendment to Clause 1 to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to provide services—or a duty to exercise his functions so as to provide them—is simply not consistent with that framework.
When this issue has been debated previously, one of the main arguments against losing the duty to provide was that it would result in reduced accountability to Parliament for provision. Although that has never been our intention, we have, as I said, tabled amendments to put beyond doubt the matter of ministerial accountability. Given that the Secretary of State does not provide services directly, and that the amendments we will debate shortly clarify beyond doubt the Secretary of State’s continued accountability to Parliament, it is not clear what an amendment to reinstate the duty to provide would achieve in practice.
If these amendments are about ensuring that the Secretary of State takes the steps required to secure the proper provision of NHS services, I simply reassure the noble Baroness that the Bill already does this. It requires the Secretary of State to,
“exercise the functions conferred by this Act so as to secure that services are provided”.
That is a strong and onerous duty, sufficient to ensure that the Secretary of State discharges his responsibility for the NHS.
In explaining these amendments, the noble Baroness repeated her call for the Bill to be withdrawn on the grounds that nobody supports it. I acknowledge that there are opponents of the Bill but she must also acknowledge that many in the medical community and in the wider public support our reform programme. We know that clearly from the listening exercise last year when many thousands of people contributed their views. Those views about the principles of what we are trying to achieve came through loud and clear. In the main, the concerns revolved around implementation. We believe that we have addressed those concerns in amendments to the Bill and in other announcements that we have made that are non-legislative in nature. We continue to believe that our plans for modernisation are essential if we are to put the NHS on a sustainable long-term footing. I will explain a few ways in which that is true, and will try to do so in clear, layman’s language without resorting to departmental technical speak.
Without the Bill, Ministers would remain free to continue to micromanage the NHS. There would be no legally enforceable duties to tackle health inequalities as the Bill introduces such duties for the first time in this country. There would be no legally enforceable duties on quality improvement because it embeds quality improvement throughout the system. There would be no duties on NHS organisations to involve patients in decisions about their care. Failing organisations would continue to be propped up using taxpayers’ money—the Bill tackles that problem in a creative way. Governments would be able to prioritise the private sector over the NHS—the Bill ensures that such behaviour is prohibited. Patients would continue to lack the means to hold the NHS to account because the Bill gives patients real power by establishing HealthWatch so that the interests of patients and the public can be championed throughout the NHS. Withdrawing the Bill would cause disruption and chaos at a time that the NHS most needs certainty about the future. As has been said today, the NHS is already in a state of change. That cannot be sustained indefinitely because it puts additional strain on management capacity and creates additional cost.
Does my noble friend agree that one of the vices in the amendment is that it would encourage judicial review proceedings and legal uncertainty? I say that as somebody who has taken advantage of the old wording to bring successful judicial review proceedings in Northern Ireland. The advantage of what we now have in the Bill is that it will not place judges in the position of seeking to run the health service, instead of Parliament, Ministers and the health authorities themselves.
I defer completely to my noble friend, who is right to point out that one thing that we wish to avoid is a charter for a legal action and judicial review. I believe that we have avoided that because of the way in which accountability is now described in the Bill—or will shortly be described, when the amendments are passed. It is accountability primarily through the Secretary of State to Parliament. I thank the noble Lord for his observations.
(12 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hesitate to intervene on the noble Earl, who knows I hold him in the highest possible esteem, but I think he is now treading on some contentious legal issues. Bearing in mind the wonderful consensus that we have now reached, I would just ask him to consider whether, at this stage, some of those issues are really helpful because the noble Earl will know that the Secretary of State does, by his servants, agents or otherwise, provide services and, indeed, there have been times when there has been a pandemic when the Secretary of State has had to make such provision. These are contentious issues which I am sure could intrigue us for many hours, but since we have happily come to the conclusion that we have had a surfeit of such happiness and wish to go forward, I gently say to the noble Earl that this might be a moment when we could swiftly do that.
My Lords, I would not have intervened otherwise, but I respectfully disagree with what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, has just said. I am finding it very helpful to listen carefully for this reason: it seems to me that the Secretary of State must have a duty to secure the provision, as has been said by the Minister, for the purposes of giving effect to our international treaties, including those on human rights. Therefore, what he is saying at the moment is very important to me in trying to see how one can get wording that will include that as well.