Russia Debate

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Monday 29th January 2018

(6 years, 3 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Earl of Oxford and Asquith Portrait The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (LD)
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My Lords, whatever one’s view of the state of our bilateral relations with Russia, and despite the overheated rhetoric that prevails in London, there are some objective issues which have to be recognised. The noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, whom I congratulate on securing this debate, has mentioned some of the main points.

First, there is the Litvinenko case. Then there are the allegations of Russian interference in political campaigns, referenda and elections and so on. Thirdly, there are some aspects of Russian foreign policy—Syria, for example—and, finally, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the intervention in the Donbass. Those are four genuine obstacles which the British Government encounter in their bilateral relations and they need to be addressed in this debate.

Because of the Litvinenko case, our Government will no longer engage in liaison with the Russian security services—the FSB in particular—and that effectively blocks off counterterrorist and related police co-operation. Other countries which do not have a comparable problem consequently find themselves in a more advantageous position, but I do not think that this House has a role to play in recommending how to resolve or ameliorate the problem here.

There are so many lurid allegations of Russian political interference that, frankly, I am a little sceptical of what we are being told at the moment, and I sense that this is a subject best left to the cyber experts to sort out between themselves. It would probably help to clear the air if a working group could be formed to engage in direct dialogue with the Russians—dialogue in which British concerns could be addressed. The worst scenario is to persist with allegations and scare stories that somehow imply that the health of our democratic institutions is so fragile that a spate of Russian-sourced tweets can subvert or discredit them.

On the broader issue of Russian espionage in this country and whether the recent remarks of our Secretary of State for Defence were well or ill considered, I think it is quite strange to affect surprise that the Russians snoop around our infrastructure: it is what they have done for decades, and actually for a century. If they are not able to mix in polite society, as it were, they do not have anything better to do.

On the matter of Russian foreign policy in Syria and elsewhere, our Government may disapprove but I doubt whether this should be a real blocker to dialogue, any more than it was in the days of the USSR, when Soviet activity around the world was, if anything, more interventionist than Russian policy is now. No, the real problem for us is Russia and Ukraine. I believe that there is no more likelihood of the Russian annexation of Crimea being internationally recognised than was Stalin’s annexation of the Baltic states in the 1940s. Perhaps I should declare an interest here because I was the first drafter of the Budapest memorandum back in 1992. The move into Crimea was and is a strategic mistake by Putin, and maybe it cannot be undone except through the passage of time and history, and when circumstances have fundamentally changed. Putin will not leave Crimea but one day lack of recognition will ultimately have the effect that we must desire. It could take a long time.

That leaves Russian aggression in Donbass. This is one issue that is resolvable by engagement with the Russians. Without a resolution there can be no stability and no serious reconstruction in Ukraine. It is a drain on Russia and a disgrace to her reputation, and it is of strategic concern to the European continent. This is not the place to suggest how a resolution could be achieved: in the final resort, the Ukrainians and the Russians are the ones who have to sort it out between themselves. France, Germany and the US have failed so far to effect a breakthrough, but I believe that there is a specific role we can play here and that Britain should become engaged. Until we do, we cannot expect to have any influence on the matter at all.

That is the simplest lesson of all. Russia has plenty of potential partners and interlocutors to act with and talk to. However, as one eminent Russian recently said to me, the Russian relationship with Britain resembles a marriage which no longer works: at least when there were daily rows and arguments, it meant that the couple retained an interest in each other; when indifference sets in, the relationship is dead. I fear that indifference is setting in. Very simply, if we do not engage, we do not have any influence.