Commission Work Programme 2015

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Monday 9th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend is right in every respect and we have all the transcripts to prove it, including from various Secretaries of State. It is effectively an example of decisions being taken behind closed doors in smoke-free rooms. Those are the new modernising methods of government. I disapprove of them and so does my Committee, as shown by the fact that we tabled this amendment.

Let us move on and accept that we are now able to debate free movement; I particularly want to concentrate on EU migration and benefits in that context. I wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on 18 November, which was 10 days before he made his speech at JCB in Staffordshire on the question of free movement, and I drew attention to the fact that I believed we were faced with a real problem. However much we might want to make certain changes, unless we were prepared to dig in and make this Parliament supreme on matters of such vital national interest, we would not get the necessary changes because some of them required treaty change and others required overriding the charter of fundamental rights. Although the Prime Minister accepted in questions after his speech that some of those matters would require treaty change, in reality that is not on offer in any substantial way from the other member states.

The principle of free movement is embedded in the ideology and principles of the other member states, and particularly the European institutions and European Commission, despite how that may affect us as a small island with a greatly increasing population and pressures on social housing and education—the list is endless. Unlike other member states such as France, Germany and Spain that have large land masses and can absorb many more people, we simply cannot do so. It is therefore a matter of vital national interest—quite apart from questions that I will mention in a moment about abuse of the system—that has led us to a position where we have desperately wanted to put our foot down. Some of us believe that we should override European legislation and the charter of fundamental rights by using the “notwithstanding” formula—that is notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972, which is past legislation as I have said many times before—so that we can ensure that our Supreme Court obeys the laws of this Parliament which is elected by our voters in general elections.

When the election comes—it is only a matter of 60 days or so—this issue will be at the centre of gravity in that election, and we will be asked whether we will take the necessary steps in line with what voters insist on. I am afraid the answer to that question is that there will be no treaty change or overriding of the charter, and when I have asked Ministers and the Prime Minister whether they will use the “notwithstanding” formula, I have been told no.

[Mr Redwood]

On the narrower point of benefits, the Minister gave us encouraging news that we have control of our benefits system, as that is a reserved matter under the treaties. Does my hon. Friend recollect that on several occasions Ministers have been unable to change our benefits system in the way the British public want because of European legal blockages?

[Sir William Cash]

That is completely right. People think—in elements of the BBC and elsewhere, I suspect—that this is somehow a matter of policy, and that by using the right words one can change the effect of European law. No, we cannot. We have to pass legislation. There has to be a majority in this House to override European laws and regulations. It is, ultimately and tragically, a legal framework rather than just simply a question of policy based on the wishes of voters, as expressed by their representatives in Parliament. This has only fairly recently begun to gain traction with some people in the public arena, but not sufficiently, I am afraid, to achieve the kind of impartial analysis I believe is needed, for example in the BBC. Without going into this now, I have invited—in fact, I have effectively forced—the director-general and the editor-in-chief of the BBC to appear before my Committee to explain this problem in the kind of language that ordinary people can understand. That will take place on Wednesday afternoon at 2.30 pm, for those who want to take note.

The Prime Minister’s speech had a lot in it, which demonstrated the extent to which he wants to try to resolve many of these questions. That is undeniable, but the question we have to address, and to which I now turn, is the extent to which it would require treaty change or otherwise—that is the acid test.

My first general remark is that the package includes only one proposal that directly limits or imposes a quota on the number of EU migrants. This would relate to future accessions and so could be part of normal negotiations. However, to impose a direct limit on migration from existing member states would certainly require treaty change.

My second general comment is that many of the relevant treaty obligations have already been interpreted in this context by the European Court of Justice. The Court plays a huge, vital and exceptional role, and cannot be appealed against. It has already interpreted these matters as providing limitation on the action that member states can take in this area. Indeed, the recent case of Dano, which is frequently referred to—the Foreign Secretary referred to it on “The Andrew Marr Show” only this weekend—demonstrates that the Court can change its approach.

However, some of the judgments mentioned are long-standing, well-entrenched and engage charter rights. Any change along the lines suggested by the Prime Minister would therefore not be sufficiently strong, to the extent that they rely on the Court of Justice changing its established jurisprudence. That is why we want the Commission to take account of these points—these are the issues. The European Commission is the legal guardian of the treaties. The point I am making in this speech is that, in order to change the law to ensure that we can actually deal properly with the problems that come from free movement, we have to persuade the Commission, in its work programme, to take account of such relevant questions. It could be inferred from what the Prime Minister had to say that he accepted that some treaty change would be required—and in fact, when he was asked questions, he accepted that towards the end—but there are a number of real problems, and I will now turn to them.

The first problem that the European Commission will have to consider in its work programme is a stronger power to refuse entry and to deport criminals. The free movement directive, which the European Commission has to enforce, requires decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis on the grounds permissible by the treaty. That provision reflects Court of Justice jurisprudence extending across a wide range of treaty rights, including the freedom to travel to other member states to receive services, which is highly relevant to the work programme. It is likely that any significant stronger action will require treaty change, particularly if it detracts from the requirement derived from the principle of proportionality to look at each individual case.

Secondly, I believe a ban on re-entry for those who have abused EU rights may be possible, as this falls within the public policy exception to the treaty right of free movement. However, there are again questions of proportionality.

EU Reform

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Germans’ problem now is that to make a success of their single currency, they need a political union with massive transfers of money from the rich parts to the poor parts of the union, as we have in the sterling currency union or as exists in the dollar currency union, but that is exactly the kind of system that the United Kingdom would never accept, and that is why, at the crossroads, we need a different relationship?

[Sir William Cash]

That is completely right. We need a different relationship with the EU as a whole that also includes the eurozone, because the eurozone, which is causing so much of the dislocation in Europe, is dominated by Germany, and the German financial and fiscal policies, which I have described already, have that enormous impact in destabilising the eurozone.

This is where I really part company with statements made by some members—senior members—of our Government. I am referring to the consequences of the eurozone. We were told at the time when it was evolving, with the banking union and all the rest of it, that it was, in effect, a natural course of events that we could not prevent. Actually, it has created the very instability that is most likely to lead to the destruction of the European Union itself. That is the problem. It is not just a negative view that I am trying to put across; it is the fact that it is destabilising Europe. It is creating problems of a kind that can get completely out of control, with catastrophic consequences not only for this country but for Europe as a whole. That is why the argument that I am seeking to advance is that actually this is a real problem for Europe as a whole. It is not anti-European to be pro-democracy.

The UK’s Justice and Home Affairs Opt-outs

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Thursday 10th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

This issue is not at all about shaking off Eurosceptics; it is about deciding what is sensible for the United Kingdom in line with our values, our traditions and our own rule of law. As many right hon. and hon. Members have indicated, there is no reason for these provisions that could not have been achieved by other means. Furthermore, I have still not had an answer to the question: what is so special about the European Union and the cross-border arrangements that operate within it, compared with anywhere else in the world, where we will find murderers, traffickers and all the other problems that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary mentioned? The problems are found in the rest of the world and in Europe, yet we have these special arrangements for Europe alone. The answer is simple: it is about sovereignty.

This is all about giving in to the European Union, through the European Communities Act 1972. Watching both Front-Bench teams is rather like watching an attempt to get out of a paper bag—except for the fact that this paper bag is a steel mesh. The steel mesh is the European Court of Justice and sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act. I respect what the Home Secretary is trying to do because she is stuck and trapped in arrangements that are being dictated by the very people—Mr Juncker, for example, who came forward with these proposals from the European Commission, and Viviane Reding, another European Commissioner of the first order—who are committed to driving forward these arrangements in the belief that if they manage to secure a EU-wide criminal justice system, they will make further progress towards the European political union that they want. That is really what it is all about. It is simply naïve and disingenuous to put it any other way.

[Mr Redwood]

Does my hon. Friend remember that when we had Conservative Governments, we always understood that, and it was a fundamental principle that home affairs and foreign affairs had to be kept outside the treaties and outside the purview of the European Court of Justice through the three pillar structure?

[Sir William Cash]

That is absolutely right. I have followed these matters with what could be described as a mild degree of interest since the Maastricht treaty, in which we were promised all these pillars, but they have all now collapsed as though Samson had stretched out and pulled them down, bringing the whole of the criminal justice arrangements we had previously enjoyed crashing down with him.

Despite all the promises that were made, during the Lisbon treaty debates my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench and I, who were then in opposition, voted against every single measure. We were completely united as a party, not just as Eurosceptics but as sensible people—rational people, if I may say so to the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson). The bottom line is that we have now completely reversed our position and are in the process of accepting 35 measures that we would not have contemplated when the Lisbon treaty was going through.

Many of the issues that have already been raised and will be raised later during the debate are of deep concern not only to many Conservative Members but, I would say, to many people throughout the country, as the votes in the European elections indicated. I think that this is just another example of our giving in to European measures when there is no real, rational reason for doing so, given that there are criminals—murderers, traffickers and so forth—throughout the rest of the world.

From 1 December 2014—the right hon. Member for Delyn mentioned this, but I want to reaffirm it from this side of the House—the Court of Justice will exercise full jurisdiction over all EU police and criminal justice measures. As a result, the Commission will be able to infract member states—bring them before the Court, because we have allowed it to do so—and request a fine if they fail to implement the measures correctly. National courts will be able to seek preliminary rulings from the Court on their interpretation or validity. That is a matter of grave concern to the United Kingdom. The European Scrutiny, Home Affairs and Justice Committees —the Chairmen of all three are present—were concerned about the 2014 block opt-out decision, and every one of us, including all the members of my Committee, was critical of the Government’s reluctance to engage fully with Parliament. All the Committees’ reports are tagged to this debate.

The history of the issue has not been by any means a happy one. In their response to the reports, the Government stated:

“ For the avoidance of doubt, we reaffirm our commitment to hold a second vote in both Houses of Parliament before making a formal application to rejoin any measures. We continue to believe that in order for this vote to be as informed as possible, it should be held after we have reached an ‘in principle’ agreement on those measures we will seek to rejoin.”

The problem is that this debate—a general debate—is not meeting what we understood would be the case. I remain somewhat surprised that we are engaging in this debate when the timing of and procedure for the real debate have not yet been spelt out. I hope that, when he winds up today’s debate, the Justice Secretary will give us a clear, factual indication of when that vote and that debate will take place, because that is what the Government have committed themselves to doing.

Justice and Home Affairs Opt-out

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Monday 7th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Before I get into the substance of the arguments on the matter before us, I would like to refer to the letter that the Chairmen of the European Scrutiny Committee, the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee received yesterday. It is addressed to each of us and it comes from the Secretary of State for Justice and the Home Secretary. It begins by saying that they would like to express their gratitude for the continued work of our Committees with regard to the 2014 opt-out decision. It then says:

“We have noted and considered your joint report. We deeply regret your collective view that the Government’s engagement has not been satisfactory on this matter. However, our view on the Government’s engagement with Parliament has not changed.”

There we have it. The letter goes on to say:

“As you will know, we intend to hold a general debate on Government time on 7 April”—

that is today. The letter continues:

“For the avoidance of doubt, we reaffirm our commitment to hold a second vote in both Houses of Parliament before making a formal application to rejoin any measures.”

However, it may be noted that that does not state that the second vote would take place before the negotiations have been finalised. I will come on to that in my subsequent remarks.

The difficulty that we face is that this matter has, to a very considerable extent, been a poor substitute for the debate that the European Scrutiny, Home Affairs and Justice Committees requested. This is the first time ever that all members of three independent, all-party Select Committees have unanimously agreed to a joint report on an unprecedented scale. The debate would give Parliament a genuine say and vote in determining which measures the Government should seek to rejoin before—I repeat, before—embarking on negotiations with the Commission and Council.

The motion that we are invited to support today merely refers to the consideration of the United Kingdom’s

“2014 justice and home affairs opt-out decision.”

That decision was considered in Parliament last July, when the Government secured a majority for their recommendation to exercise the UK’s block opt-out of around 130 pre-Lisbon police and criminal justice measures. The real question for us now, surely, is what the Government—a coalition Government who are largely taking account of considerations on EU matters which have been pushed forward by members of the Liberal Democrat party—will do about the 35 matters that are now up for rejoining.

The Prime Minister formally notified the Council of the UK’s decision to exercise the block opt-out on 24 July 2013. All the measures subject to that block opt-out will, as a result, cease to apply to the United Kingdom on 1 December 2014, unless, crucially, the United Kingdom submits a formal application to rejoin some of them.

Command Paper 8671, which was published merely a matter of days before the debate last July, includes a list of 35 measures that the Government say they seek to rejoin. I have to say, without prejudice to my differences of opinion with the shadow Home Secretary, that some of the cases that she put forward demonstrate that the issues are, in many instances, not quite as substantial as some might have imagined.

The motion that the Government wanted the House to approve last July would have endorsed the Government’s recommendation to enter into formal negotiations with the Commission and the Council on the list of the 35 measures, pre-empting any further consideration of the content and significance of those measures by the House and its Select Committees.

The Home Secretary came to the Floor of the House and I said at the time that I thought she was making the problem considerably worse by what she was saying. My intervention as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, together with the Chairmen of the Home Affairs and Justice Committees, ensured that the House had the opportunity to consider the matter further, and was informed by the reports that all three Committees undertook to produce.

The need for further detailed consideration by Parliament cannot be doubted. The report by my Committee concluded that the list of measures was “incoherent”, and that it bore all the hallmarks of coalition politics rather than a serious analysis of the merits of each measure, or a careful balancing of the benefits of participation in extremely sensitive areas affecting fairness, liberty and justice, which are and should be accorded to individual United Kingdom citizens, and that the benefits of that participation should be set against the risks associated with accepting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.

[Mr Redwood]

Will my hon. Friend confirm that this is a desperately serious matter, because if we opt in to any of these things, those subjects are no longer under the control of the House and the British people?

[Mr Cash]

Indeed, and not only that. Those people are no longer able to have recourse to our courts system in the same way that they would have done because the European Court of Justice, once it has made an adjudication and a judgment, binds our Supreme Court. Moreover, under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, it also binds this Parliament. That is why, with respect to the charter of fundamental rights, we said in a report that we published only last week that the situation was so serious. We voluntarily entered into the Act in 1972, and I emphasise the word “voluntarily” because what is entered into voluntarily can be adjusted later. Those two features led us to conclude, in respect of the conflict on the perception of the charter of fundamental rights, that the then Prime Minister, who specifically stated on 27 June 2007 that it was absolutely clear that the charter of fundamental rights was an opt-out, was wrong. Furthermore, he was not only wrong but, in effect, contradicted by the Attorney-General of the time when he gave evidence to us only a few weeks ago.

The consequence of this, which is extremely serious, is that we have an Act of Parliament that is covered in confusion, with some judges saying one thing and other judges saying another. As there is no doubt that the charter applies to the United Kingdom, the only way of dealing with this is not, with respect to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Justice, by having another legal challenge, as he proposes, but by amending the 1972 Act, because the situation is so serious that we have to bring in primary legislation in order to get it right in the interests of the people of this country. All the rights contained in the charter overlap with rights of the sort that people in this country, as citizens of the United Kingdom, would expect to be accorded to them. These are the kinds of matters that arise in respect of what we are considering as a result of the whole question of the 35 measures.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

I do not think so. The driving force behind the arguments being made by the Conservative part of the coalition from the Back Benches is based on objective analysis in the interests of democracy, transparency and accountability in Parliament. Mr Farage cannot deliver anything, because he does not have one Member of Parliament. He cannot change one word of legislation—he can do nothing about any of this. I know that the situation is uncomfortable for the Secretaries of State at this moment in time, but I know for a fact that they will agree emphatically that the United Kingdom Independence party can achieve absolutely nothing. They know perfectly well that Conservative Back Benchers can achieve something. As in relation to many other European matters, Conservative Back Benchers can, by doing what we are doing now—working towards, we hope, a listening Government and listening Secretaries of State—achieve the results that we need, in the interests of the country as a whole. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s very useful question.

[Mr Redwood]

So do not make that mistake.

[Mr Cash]

Let us be in no doubt about that, as my right hon. Friend and distinguished colleague says—and more power to his elbow.

Let us for a moment return to first principles and remind ourselves why the United Kingdom, alone among member states, has a block opt-out. In this context, it is worth remembering that we do not of course have a written constitution, and that gives us flexibility, unlike every other member state. We are not therefore insular or isolationist in taking such a view; as I know both Secretaries of State will appreciate, we are exercising our democratic right to express our views in a free forum—this House of Commons, to which we are elected to represent our constituents—and, as Chairmen of three significant Select Committees, we have worked together on an all-party basis to agree a view on a matter of such importance.

United Kingdom Governments of all political persuasions have been wary of extending the full jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to EU police and criminal justice measures—that has been true of Governments of all parties—because they have recognised that conferring primacy on a court beyond the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, and of our Supreme Court and of this Parliament, is a very profound and grave constitutional step.

Whatever views may be expressed in the debate—some will perhaps advocate opting back in to a far wider range of measures, while others will say, “None at all”; and when it comes to the vote, there may be splits and fragmentations in political parties on both sides of the House—I say to the Secretaries of State that surely we can all agree on the significance of the negotiations on which the Government are about to embark and the vital need for Parliament to have a genuine say and vote at the right time, before the negotiations have been concluded, on a matter of profound practical and constitutional significance, which bears very heavily on the liberty of the subject. What matters now is not what we have opted out of, but what measures we propose to rejoin. I ask my right hon. Friends to consider this very carefully: this is the time for the Government to think again.

On the basis of the leaks and information about the discussions that come through to us in various shapes and forms, I have referred to what has been happening in many countries throughout the European Union, and I understand that very little headway has been made in negotiations so far. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary shakes her head. Perhaps she would like to get up and tell us that everything is going fine.

I trust that today’s debate will cause the Government to think again and allow Parliament to vote on these important measures before the negotiations are concluded. This matter of principle needs to be settled not after the horse has bolted, but now, so I tell my right hon. Friends that this is the moment. This serious matter is of grave concern to many of our citizens, and this is the time to think again.

2014 JHA Opt-out Decision

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Monday 15th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I take a strong view on these matters not only in respect of the importance of scrutiny as a matter of principle, but because, as I have said so often, this House should make the decisions. We should not have them imposed upon us.

[Mr Redwood]

I am very attracted to amendment (b), standing in the name of my hon. Friend and the other two Committee Chairmen. I note that we have three senior Committee Chairmen, all of different parties, supporting it, and I think I heard those on the Labour Front Bench implying that they, too, supported it. Can my hon. Friend say whether this is now the view of the House?

[Mr Cash]

It would be difficult for me to presume to know what the view of the House was, but I earnestly suggest that our amendment should be accepted. I am looking for a nod from the Justice Secretary—

Financial Transaction Tax and Economic and Monetary Union

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 18th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I thank the Financial Secretary for his extremely diligent approach to the debate. He has dealt with all the arguments on the financial transaction tax and I leave those on the record. It is extraordinary that the Opposition should promote the idea, but there is no need for me to go into that this afternoon. I am primarily concerned about the other aspect of the debate and the report, which is the question of primacy. Without primacy, there is no democracy in the House, and without going back to the financial transaction tax, that is a subset of the question of primacy, which is why the Scrutiny Committee insisted on having this debate. I do not think my right hon. Friend will mind my saying that there was a little uncertainty about having it, and I am indebted to him for the clarity with which he has understood this vitally important question.

Our democracy and legitimacy as a Parliament in this House is the basis on which we decide questions of taxation and spending. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, in the Bloomberg fourth principle, national Parliaments are at the root of our democracy. Therefore, it is absolutely fundamental that we stand by that. I veer away slightly from the trajectory of my right hon. Friend—which he takes for perfectly sensible reasons, but which I disagree with none the less—that somehow the blueprint, which is described as “launching a European debate” is somehow just a piece of blue- sky thinking. It is not. It is absolutely fundamental to the one question that lies at the heart of the Bloomberg speech, in the light of what is said in the Commission document and in the van Rompuy conclusions, both of which put the prime emphasis on the European Parliament, to all intents and purposes at the expense of national Parliaments. They use the word “commensurate”, but it is not commensurate. We cannot have two Governments dealing with the same subject matter. We cannot have two Parliaments dealing with the same subject matter. It is impossible, which is why we have to assert the primacy of this House, and, as the Prime Minister rightly said in the Bloomberg speech, it is at the root of our democracy.

[Mr Redwood]

I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting this crucial issue and bringing it to the attention of the House. Will he accept that those of us who will not have time to speak today are fully behind him in wanting to re-establish and re-assert the primacy of this House in all matters that are important to the British people, and we have a long way to go to do that?

[Mr Cash]

We have a long way to go, and in fact the journey is becoming longer. I am extremely glad that we are having a proposal for a referendum Bill, which will enable us to decide these questions, if it comes off. I also believe that there is an understanding among possibly 240 Government Members that there is a serious problem in relation to the EU. There are some who take a different view, but it is a tangential question for them. For us it is fundamental. The biggest demonstration of the problem is this fundamental relationship, which turns on primacy. That is what the Scrutiny Committee focused on, and that is what I will speak about, somewhat briefly.

Basically, the landscape involves a two-tier Europe. I am astonished that the shadow Minister should have said, in parenthesis, that he did not really want to go into—I paraphrase—the rather self-indulgent ruminations on institutional differences with monetary union and the like. I am certain that if the primacy question were properly explained to the hon. Gentleman and Opposition Members, they would appreciate that it is fundamental.

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) because he understands that. I am sure that he will not mind me referring to an interesting altercation the other day with Olli Rehn in a committee meeting that we had in Brussels. The hon. Gentleman made it crystal clear with regard to this idea of the centralisation, with the contracts that he referred to in an intervention, when he was rather abruptly caught short, The reality is that he understands that it is an infringement of our democratic relationship with the electorate. It is about the person in the polling booth voting and making a decision about the kind of Government that they want, and the kind of economy that they want. He and I may have a difference of view about whether there should be adjustments to the public purse. I would argue that if there is a black hole out there in the EU and the black hole prevents growth in the EU and we trade 50% with it, we cannot pay for the public services. The hon. Gentleman understands that.

This goes right to the heart of the issue of whether we are prepared to accept, at this fork in the road—which is what this document represents—this launching of the European debate, which we must carry forward to ensure that we retain primacy in this House over taxation and spending. The shadow Minister nods, so now he concedes that it is not a matter of self-indulgence, but a matter of significance. That is why the debate has to take place. I am afraid to say that the black hole, and the direction in which it is going—because of the two-tier arrangement that is being created, on which they are determined; I could quote from the documents, which talk about political integration that is needed within the hard core and they know what it means—will lead to a German Europe. They will control that hard core. The bottom line is that we cannot be part of it. That means that there is a change in the fundamental relationship, not merely for monetary union reasons, not merely for reasons of remorseless logic, but for political ones.

Europe

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Wednesday 30th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I will make one further point before I give way.

I have just come back from Dublin, where, in my capacity as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, I met the other 27 national chairmen. There was no doubt whatever in the statement made by the chairman of the Bundestag’s European affairs committee that, as far as he and Germany were concerned, delay was unacceptable. We also know, from listening to him and to the German ambassador, that there will be no cherry-picking and no negotiations of the kind that are being contemplated. The French take a similar view; I have had meetings with them, too. The reality is, therefore, that there is a serious requirement to make the decisions earlier rather than later.

[Mr Redwood]

I quite agree with my hon. Friend’s central point. Does he agree that the reason that we have this tragedy in Britain over our relationship with Europe is that more than 100 vetoes in important policy areas were given away at Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon, against the wishes of the loyal Opposition in this House and probably against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the British people, who were never consulted about the way in which their democracy was taken away and trashed?

[Mr Cash]

I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend, and I will add another point. The recent analysis by VoteWatch Europe, which has been through every decision taken by the Council of Ministers in the past three years, demonstrates that in 91.7% of votes taken in that forum, the UK Government—under the aegis of UKRep and through the Council of Ministers itself—have voted in favour of the proposals in question. That is effectively a forced consensus, because we have only 8% of the votes in the Council of Ministers. When I hear Ministers and others talking about the degree of influence that we exercise in relation to qualified majority voting, I say yes, we have to have alliances, but we know that if others are not going to be in alliance with us, we will not get the kind of result that the British people deserve.

Ultimately, this is about one fundamental question. It is not just about the word “democracy”; it is about democracy in action and its impact on the daily lives of the people of this country. The reality is that someone goes into the ballot station, votes in secret and casts his or her vote based on a manifesto in which they are told what the party in question is offering them in a general election; that is what democracy is all about. When they cast their vote, they expect the legislation to follow what they have been promised. The reality is that, under this system, the whole of Europe is becoming increasingly dysfunctional, with riots, unemployment and the rise of the far right. Let us face it: we have to get real. The fact is that it is not working. That is why our debate is so important.

Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Wednesday 29th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

It is quite right to have this debate as it is urgent and on a matter of great moment. Does my hon. Friend think that there is any way in which 25 countries can construct a treaty that presumes to use the EU institutions that belong to the 27 member states as a whole, without having an adverse or substantial impact on the UK? Should we not be warning our Prime Minister of that threat before he negotiates?

[Mr Cash]

Absolutely. Given that the Prime Minister is going to the Council tomorrow, where it is inconceivable that this matter will not be raised, and that the ratification process is under way, it is important to get that point on the record. I believe the arguments to be self-evident.

European Union Fiscal Union

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Wednesday 14th September 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr Cash]

I endorse entirely what my hon. Friend has said. We are at a crossroads and it is a very dangerous crossroads. We have to get it right. It simply is not good enough to appease the European institutions by going along with their ideas when we have our own national interest to stand by, support and protect. We are not just talking about institutional arguments; we are talking about real people, their real daily lives, the unemployed and the people who cannot increase the enterprise of their businesses.

I was deeply concerned in my exchanges with the Prime Minister. I put a question to him on the question of the single market. In reply, he made it clear that he was conscious of a fact, which I had put in a pamphlet that I had published the day before. The pamphlet, by the way, is called “It’s the EU stupid”, because we have got to a stage where it is obvious that the EU is at the root of so many of these problems.

On the question of the single market, I pointed out to the Prime Minister that if there is a fiscal union of certain member states it is inevitable, as a matter of solidarity, that they will use the treaties to transfer their own wishes, through majority voting and a block vote, in a way that will be contrary to our own domestic economic interests. What would be the point of a fiscal union if, when it came to questions of legislation relating to the economy, the member states were not prepared to vote together? They will. When they do, and they outvote us, that will gravely undermine our competitiveness and our ability to grow small and medium-sized businesses. It will affect our growth. It will damage and destroy our prospects of reducing the deficit, because it will lead to a reduction in growth, which is already stagnant.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend think that we should allow the fiscal union to go ahead, for those who wish to join it, if our Government negotiated for us independent democratic control over everything here that mattered to us as the price for making that sacrifice?

[Mr Cash]

The short answer is that it would depend on how the renegotiation went. If the renegotiation was entirely in line with protecting fully our own interests, if it were guaranteed that we were not tied to the existing arrangements by a treaty that drew us in to all the adverse consequences of being part of this overall European Union in the shape and form that it has at the moment and if we could manage to achieve the perfect answer, then that would be a good idea. However, I do not think that that is the way it is going to go. I think that we will put forward positions, if we ever get to the point of renegotiating the treaties. A meeting took place a couple of days ago in which it was clear that a very large number of MPs in the Conservative party want renegotiation. Some of us have been arguing for that for 20 years. However, the fact is that that is the position in the party as a whole. The question is not only whether we want to renegotiate, but how that would be done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Redwood]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the situation causes the electorate to believe that we have a dishonest political debate in this country? We are having a big argument over the Vickers report and how and when it should be implemented, whereas it will all be settled under the capital requirements directive, CRD IV. I do not see the point of the Vickers report.

[Mr Cash]

That is all part of the problem. I have been on the European Scrutiny Committee for 26 years now, and over and over again I have found that legislation brought to this House is based on European legislation, but that is never disclosed. People do not say, “Oh, by the way, we have got to do this, therefore we are going to,” so we go through a charade of passing legislation as if we have control over it. The Whips move in like the clappers, saying, “You can’t possibly vote against this, because it’s all based on European legislation that we have already agreed to under the European Communities Act.” In reality, we are being governed by Europe, and that is my greatest objection—plus the democratic question, which the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton has mentioned—and why I got so exercised about the Maastricht treaty. We have gone beyond that now, and what we are faced with is much more critical, but we can remedy it if we renegotiate the treaties.

Eurozone Financial Assistance

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

The Government amendment—they have not tabled it in their own name, but that is what it is, to a great extent—reflects badly on the integrity of the coalition. It has nothing whatever to do with the national interest. It also says a great deal about a commitment to Liberal Democrat ideology, and it is primarily about numbers. The Liberal Democrats, and certain elements in the Conservative party at a very high level, are quite prepared to allow further European integration. There are alternatives that would allow us to renegotiate the treaties and/or to say no, but they are simply not doing so.

Indeed, only a few days ago, the Prime Minister made it abundantly clear that the object of the coalition was to stabilise the economy. We understand that. The problem is that this is about numbers, not about principles or policy. There are many people in the Conservative party, outside and inside the House, who know that the arguments we are seeking to address in a reasonable fashion are in the interests of the country. There is no question about that; the press outside believe it as well. The bottom line is that those of us who have relentlessly pursued the issue of the eurozone bail-out and have tabled many questions have invariably received what could reasonably be described as somewhat evasive answers.

Why should the British taxpayer or British hospitals and schools in our constituencies in any way underwrite what goes on in Portugal, or indeed any other country in the eurozone, particularly in times of austerity? It is nothing to do with the question, as suggested on a number of occasions, of qualified majority voting. This is completely contrary to the assertion made in reply to me today by the Financial Secretary. Article 122 is not compatible with the treaty and cannot possibly be used to support the European financial stability mechanism. Indeed, in their acquiescence, as shown in the amendment, the Government accept that the position is legally unsound. By saying that, they completely undermine their position. The Government know it and everyone knows it: it is not compatible with the treaty, and the Minister is wrong.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful legal point. Does he agree that what these states in trouble need is a work-out, not a bail-out? We do not give alcoholics more drink; we cure the alcoholism. We should not give the over-borrower more borrowing.

[Mr Cash]

I could not agree more, and a course of Alcoholics Anonymous would not be out of place.

It is not just the European Scrutiny Committee that said the position was legally unsound or unlawful. Madame Lagarde herself, the prospective head of the IMF, said on this issue on 17 December:

“We violated all the rules because we wanted to close ranks and really rescue the eurozone.”

This is a stitch-up of the British people to maintain the so-called solidarity for further integration of a failing European project. That is what lies at the heart of the matter.

Why are people protesting and rioting all over Europe —in Madrid, Greece, Italy and the list is growing? What is not growing is the European economy and the reason is that the sort of policies needed—here and in all the other countries—to engender growth to deal with the deficit that the Government rightly say we have to address are impossible to achieve without generating the growth that is needed by repealing legislative burdens and generating policies that the integrationists in Europe simply refuse to allow. I would go further and say that the coalition in this country cannot achieve growth simply because the Liberal Democrats, as part of the coalition, have silenced the Prime Minister’s promise to repatriate burdens on business. It is called 56 votes and the keys to No. 10.

Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Wednesday 11th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Tonight’s debate should be a vital one because, after all, it is about sovereignty; it is about power. The might of this House of Commons in its great years was based on one very simple proposition: that only a vote of the House of Commons could impose or remove a tax on the British people. It was that power which our predecessors fought for and achieved, and it was that power which was crucial to grant the supply to the Government, who could then choose how to spend it, on the advice and with the votes of the House of Commons.

We have been assured and reassured by countless Ministers of the Crown since we joined the European Economic Community in the 1970s that taxation was always a matter for unanimity; that we would always have a veto over any tax matter; and that there was no question of the European Union interfering and choosing taxes for us or running our tax system. Under the previous Labour Government, tax was said to be a defensible red line, which they always told us they had always protected. Under previous Conservative Governments, Ministers could rightly then say that it was always a matter entirely for the jurisdiction and decision of this House of Commons.

Yet tonight, in this small and short debate, we are presented with a 102-page draft law which is a comprehensive new corporation tax system for the European Union, including the United Kingdom. Worse still, we have been warned in a friendly way by the Minister that if this country disagrees with it, a group of countries may go ahead under some other procedure and create it anyway, and they will then exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the UK because they will try to tempt our companies away from our system to their system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) has just said, tax advisers and accountants will be able to play all sorts of games under this complicated system so that companies that have some activities in Britain could be tempted into the European Union opt-in system. That would mean that the British Treasury and British Ministers would no longer have jurisdiction over them; we would get back only what the sharing formula allowed, which the European Union would be in charge of.

I assume that it is because the Minister is worried about that eventuality that she has not come here with a straightforward proposal just to veto the whole thing. My advice to the Government is that this should be the issue we fight over. This proposal is so outrageous, it is such a comprehensive violation of subsidiarity, as they call it, and it is such a U-turn from the proposition that a member state has control over its own tax affairs that surely we should veto it. If we vetoed it and other countries still wanted to go ahead as a lesser group than the European Union, we should follow things through and say that it therefore does not apply to the United Kingdom and we will not operate it in respect of companies that are properly domiciled here and should be taxed here under our rules. We should set the rules for organisations and companies undertaking activity in Britain, making money in Britain and employing people in Britain. If we cannot do that, what is the point of this House of Commons? I think the Minister is in a stronger position than perhaps her officials and advisers have suggested.

We have heard, I think rightly, from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) that the legal base is not correct. In order to justify all the statements that this is a matter for unanimity, it must come under that measure in the treaty that states that other proposals can be produced but that they require the unanimous consent of all member states. It must come under a unanimous base. Once it is a matter to be decided under a unanimous base, we can then save the European Union a lot of time, trouble and money because we can simply say that we do not wish to have a collective corporation tax system and that Britain is going to use her veto. For once, surely, the United Kingdom could have some influence over the agenda of the European Union and we could show that we mean it when we say that taxation is for national decision—that it is a matter for subsidiarity, in the EU’s language, or a matter of sovereignty, in my language.

I would like to ask my ministerial friend what the point was of this House solemnly legislating to maintain, uphold or reaffirm the sovereignty of the British Parliament if we cannot even choose our own corporation tax regime. What is the point of our going along with the negotiations to try to ameliorate, improve or abate the severity of this draft law if we are doing so in the spirit that we will end up with a law of sorts anyway? We will then hear from the Minister that instead of it being something that we have vetoed, it is something we have taken the worst out to make it a bit more tolerable so that we can go along with it. It will not be necessary for the other member states who want the measure to use a special procedure to get it, and there will be no need for us to say to them that we refuse to go along with it or comply with it.

[Mr Cash]

Does my right hon. Friend recall the words of Chancellor Kohl, who, only 10 or 15 years ago, made it clear that, on the question of the speed of the convey, which is what this is all about, he would want the front of the convey to go ahead, led by Germany, and for the other Member states to be left in such a parlous condition that they would eventually, in his words, have to catch up?

[Mr Redwood]

My hon. Friend is quite right. That also explains why the European Union is so keen to try to get the Irish rate up, because if it is to have a common system such as this, it would not want a weak link. The EU would see a weak link as a state that dared to set a more realistic and lower rate in order to attract business.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I am fascinated by the line that the Opposition are taking. I am not impressed, if I may say so, by the line being taken by the coalition Government. It is difficult to resist the idea that a referendum is necessary in certain circumstances, so I rather anticipate that there will not a Division this evening, since the Bill is associated with what is really no more than the unlikely event of a referendum being called in respect of any of the provisions contained in it. The circumstances and the facts that we have had the opportunity to examine in the course of proceedings on the Bill, and indeed the trend, as I said in my earlier speech, of the UK being drawn in to the legal framework of a two-tier Europe but actually being neutered at the same time, increase the necessity of a proper referendum—an in-or-out referendum—so that the British people can decide whether they want to be Europeanised or absorbed, like ectoplasm, into the strange new world being created, over which we have increasingly little influence, let alone control.

This is, fundamentally, about a democratic deficit. I do not believe that the Bill will make any substantial difference to the landscape to which I referred in my previous remarks to the Foreign Secretary. A strategic mistake is being made in respect of Europe. Europe is failing. There is incredibly high unemployment in other member states: Spain’s youth unemployment, for example, is 43%. Very serious damage is being done by burdens on business—50% of all our economic regulation comes from the EU—and there is a failure to provide oxygen for the small business community in this country. The Bill does not, in my opinion, make any difference to those matters.

We have faced for some time now an economic crisis in Europe, but none of the measures—including the 2020 strategy, which will be no more successful than the Lisbon agenda, which had to be abandoned—will make any substantial difference to the mistakes and distortions associated with the European Union as it now is which continue to affect the United Kingdom. We need to renegotiate the treaties, and the Bill will not change that fact.

At the beginning of our debates on the Bill, the European Scrutiny Committee proposed to have a proper investigation into it. I am sorry that the Foreign Secretary did not feel that he could attend, but I am glad that the Minister for Europe came to see us, albeit somewhat late in the day. The Committee gave careful consideration to the Bill, but it is not evident that the Government paid very much attention to what has been described in many quarters as one of the best Scrutiny Committee reports produced in recent years. I am afraid that they have substantially ducked the issue.

I shall address a number of the points as they cropped up. Much play was made of the idea that the Bill would reaffirm the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, but when I tabled a motion to that effect the entire Conservative party, with some honourable exceptions, voted against it, which struck me as somewhat bizarre and extremely dangerous.

The European Scrutiny Committee report, which took evidence from many of this country’s pre-eminent constitutional experts, came to certain very clear conclusions. First, we noted:

“Clause 18 did not address the competing primacies of EU and national law”,

which is a matter of grave concern, and that on the evidence we received, clause 18 was “not needed”. We also concluded, on the evidence that we received, that

“If Parliament wills it may legislate to override the European Communities Act 1972 or the EU Treaties by repealing them, amending them or any provisions in them, or by clearly and expressly legislating inconsistently with them in respect of EU legislation or generally.”

That is a very important statement from the European Scrutiny Committee, because for many years it was asserted that, owing to the nature of the European Communities Act and the treaties on which it is based, with their amendments and their additions, it would not be possible for Parliament to legislate “notwithstanding the European Communities Act”. There was a movement towards the assumption—it was a dangerous habit of thinking and attitude of mind—that somehow we were locked into a situation that would never allow the United Kingdom to reassert its sovereignty in respect of European legislation.

For reasons that I have given, including the burdens on businesses, which are costing about 4% of gross domestic product, and the fact that since 1999 as much as £128 billion—it might be more now—has been lost to the British economy through over-regulation, we have to deal with these questions. That is the flipside of the idea of having a referendum on any further transfer of competences or powers. We have to deal with the existing European Union, not any future EU or any future extension of powers or competences. That is something for the future; we have to deal with the EU as it is now, and it is doing great damage, in many respects, to the UK’s national interests.

[Mr Redwood]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who as always is doing a great job on this issue. Will he agree that the legislation would be much more convincing if the very huge transfers of power now taking place—the power to regulate all our financial and banking services, the power in criminal justice and, soon, economic governance powers—were to be the subject of a referendum as a result of the Bill?

[Mr Cash]

Indeed, it would. For example, the fact that the City of London and its jurisdiction has legally been transferred to the EU is an indictment of the trends in the wrong direction. The landscape is changing in the wrong direction. With respect to the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and other Ministers, I say that these matters need to be very carefully reviewed. All is not lost; the Bill is now going off to the House of Lords, and as I said earlier this evening, I hope that over the next few months serious consideration will be given to the impact of the European proposals on the competitiveness package, and the encroachments of European economic governance. I hope that these matters will be tackled. We need to ensure that we not only deal with future referendums, which we have been told will not happen until the next Parliament anyway—that is some years away—but tackle the crisis and the danger that we should be addressing now.

I trust that the House will not mind me mentioning that today I published a new note—perhaps I might even call it a pamphlet—entitled “Saving the British economy for the British people”. It sets out the history of the stabilisation mechanism and how it has drawn us into a dangerous situation regarding bail-outs. However, I will not go down that route now, because I want to return to what the European Scrutiny Committee said about the Bill. We concluded that

“if the legislative supremacy of Parliament is under threat, it is from judicial”

supremacy. That is the problem. It is a British constitutional problem, not only one of the assertions of the European Court of Justice; it is an internal domestic constitutional question, as Professor Tomkins made clear in his superb evidence. We said that:

“we attach weight to the warnings expressed by Professor Tomkins if the Government maintains clause 18 in the EU Bill.”

He spoke of the Bill overall as going

“out of its way to invite litigation”.

That is precisely the direction in which we do not want things to go. We need to be certain that the sovereignty of Parliament is a matter for Parliament and the people, not the judiciary or the Supreme Court, particularly in the light of the trend shown in assertions by the likes of Lord Steyn, Lady Hale and Lord Hope of Craighead, all of which we looked at in detail in the evidence that we received and the judgments reached when we concluded our review of that evidence.

Furthermore, we concluded:

“Clause 18 is not a sovereignty clause in the manner claimed by the Government, and the whole premise on which it has been included in the Bill is, in our view, exaggerated.”

We were also concerned about the manner in which the explanatory notes had been devised. We debated the matter at length, concluding:

“The Explanatory Notes present as fact what the evidence we have received tells us is disputed, viewed from any perspective.”

In other words, we were deeply dissatisfied with the way in which the explanatory notes dwelt on the idea of the common law principle. Indeed, I moved an amendment to clause 18 in an attempt to remove it from the framework of judicial interpretation, but that amendment too was defeated by the Government. In fact, I would say—I say this with respect to the Foreign Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe—that despite the soft words that the Foreign Secretary offered at the beginning of this debate, he knows well enough that we will not be put off or seduced by any flattery; we are interested in the arguments and the facts.

The European Scrutiny Committee analysed this Bill and found it wanting in many different ways. The other thing to say about clause 18 is this:

“The real point is whether a government can, in law, make it difficult for a future Parliament to amend or repeal the legislation it has passed”—

in a word, the point that the shadow Foreign Secretary made just now. We concluded firmly that

“in our view it cannot. Our conclusion therefore is straightforward—that an Act of Parliament applies until it is repealed.”

Sovereignty is not an arcane, theoretical or abstract question; it is, as I said in opening the inquiry, about the vast array of activities and functions that have been conferred on the authority of the European Union by the Lisbon treaty—a treaty that was passed by the previous Government but has since been adopted by our Government, despite the fact that we opposed its passage through the House tooth and nail when in opposition—and how they affect the daily lives of the people and businesses of this country in such a wide variety of ways, making it essential that we reassert the right of Parliament to override those provisions if they are deemed not to be in our national interest.

There is no presumption that merely because of the European Communities Act 1972 we have to accept as a matter of compulsion whatever is served up to us by the European Union. If it is not in our national interest, we must repudiate it. I see the Minister for Europe shaking his head. He knows that this is an important question, but he disagrees with me on it. I do not hold that against him; I simply say that he is wrong. There are those who will continue to argue that there is no way in which we can override European legislation, but no way will those of us who take the view that we do change our minds. We put the national interest first, and if what is being done under European Union proposals is not in the national interest, we will have to override it.

There are many aspects of the Bill, including the whole problem of the creation of a two-tier Europe and the extent to which a referendum is being denied to us under clause 4, that will cause grave difficulties for us over the next few months as we deal with the question of the eurozone and the countries that are not part of it. I regard this as a matter on which we will be judged as time goes on. On the exceptions, including clause 4, that preclude a referendum on matters that will dramatically affect the United Kingdom—such as a two-tier Europe or an accession treaty—the Committee concluded:

“the exceptions…have been drafted to allow the Government to support certain EU policies, such as strengthening of the eurozone, including through harmonisation of economic, fiscal and social measures if necessary…or enlargement, without triggering the referendum lock.”

The reality is that we will need a referendum if the creation of a two-tier Europe affects the United Kingdom in the way that we anticipate. If we are so affected, and we are put at a grave disadvantage, the responsibility will lie with the Government for refusing to allow a referendum. We are not only moving towards a situation in which the creation of a new kind of Europe is in prospect; we are on the brink of it. That landscape will not be an attractive one unless we move down the route of an association of nation states. The Foreign Secretary knows perfectly well that the arrangements in the Bill do not deal with the present. They deal only with the future, but we are confronted as I speak with the present danger of a European system that does not serve our national interest. We must meet that challenge, and meet it now.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 25th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

Indeed. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend, who, as a member of the European Scrutiny Committee, played an important role in the preparation of its report. As I am sure he will speak in the debate, and given his expertise as a member of the Select Committee on Home Affairs, I shall restrict my own remarks, and leave it to him to deal with these questions in his own time and his own way.

I simply make the point that these are well-founded concerns, and I can think of no reason on earth why the Minister would not want to accept these amendments. Perhaps he will, but while the Government have had regard to what the European Scrutiny Committee has said in a report that has been universally welcomed—by both Front-Bench teams and by all those with the competence to understand these matters—they have tended to ignore that almost entirely in considering our recommendations. I shall return to that issue later, but not today.

I turn to the reasons that we gave in the European Scrutiny Committee report regarding questions of criminal law:

“To be consistent with the extension of shared competence under clause 4”—

we debated that yesterday—

“the application of both of these provisions”—

the two provisions and the amendments relating to criminal procedure and serious crime—

“should be premised on a referendum and Act of Parliament, as in clause 6; not an affirmative vote before the Government’s opt-in decision and an Act of Parliament before it agrees to the adoption of the legislation.”

The fact that the report states that ought to be put on the record. Our view is that family law

“is…of similar if not greater importance to social or environmental policy and ought to come within clause 6, triggering a referendum as well as an Act.”

We can see no reason for not doing all those things.

On opt-in decisions, I defer entirely to my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere. Our conclusion is that it

“would seem to us consistent with the aim of Part 1…for all opt-in decisions to be subject to formal Parliamentary approval.”

My hon. Friend the Member for Witham referred to fishing, and there she was in sensitive and deep waters. She explained very well the six-mile limit, the fisheries limit of up to 12 miles, the 2002 regulation and the associated issues, but that does not alter the fact that this is a serious problem for the fishermen of the United Kingdom. In considering the idea that there should be any restriction of our sovereignty and territorial limits in these matters, we should remember that the entire fisheries policy, which we shall not debate in detail today, I can assure you, Mr Caton, is a complete travesty. There is no question about it: it constitutes the most monumental waste of good fish, which are thrown away and literally left to rot. It is pathetic, and I need say no more than that. That we should regain a degree of sovereignty and territorial competence in relation to fishing is to my mind a given.

[Mr Redwood]

My hon. Friend has made a very powerful comment. Many of us have felt for many years that the fisheries policy was a scandal. Successive Governments have said that they would do something about it; none have yet succeeded. Does this not show why we are also worried about the surrender of criminal justice powers? We are surrendering them to the very people who have made such a mess of our fisheries.

[Mr Cash]

Absolutely, and the same problem permeates so much of what goes on in the European Union. I am anxious not to get into discussing the merits of the European Union as a whole, and I shall certainly ensure that I keep to the amendments; but I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. I will come on in a moment to the financial stability mechanism, and try to demonstrate exactly how wrong I think the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) is about the broad questions attached to it. I shall also deal with the mistaken remarks of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) regarding the necessity for my amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

Absolutely, and I shall elaborate on that very quickly. Article 122 concerns matters of emergency and natural disasters, and its use for the purposes of financial stability is clearly—as the European Scrutiny Committee has said—not based on a sound legal footing. That is the issue. I had made that point, but I am happy to repeat it. However, it goes further: because of the failure of the legal base, the whole deal is vitiated. That is the problem. The deal was done in an interregnum and by consensus between the two Chancellors, but it ends up being vitiated as a matter of law. That is very serious given that the whole deal is for €60 billion—£52 billion—but according to the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), the United Kingdom is exposed to a risk of £8 billion.

[Mr Redwood]

Although we must ask the former Chancellor and the Chancellor to speak for themselves, as I understand it the former Chancellor quite properly consulted the then shadow Chancellor, who said, “You are the Chancellor”—he could not be sure at that point that he was about to become the Chancellor, because there was no coalition agreement—“and it is for you to make the decision.” It is also fair to say that I do not think that the present Chancellor objected to the proposal or sought to block it. I think he felt that it was not his decision to make. It was not a co-decision; it was a decision by the former Chancellor, which the present Chancellor knew about.

[Mr Cash]

It was indeed. Furthermore, this is not just a bit of esoteric dancing on the head of a pin. The Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform has examined the matter and I happened to be watching its proceedings when there was a discussion involving Professor Hennessey and two other eminent professors, Professor Hazell and Professor McLean. My hon. Friend the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Turner) asked a perceptive question about the status of the arrangement in the context of the Cabinet manual, which, as we know, is now out in the open and being discussed by that Committee in relation to caretaker Governments. The conclusion was that it was within the province of the incoming Chancellor to enter into such a bilateral arrangement in that context, in which he made his decision based on the information he was given by the outgoing Chancellor. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) is right. The problem is that, if that was unlawful, there was no basis on which either of them should have come to that conclusion.

[Mr Redwood]

As I understand it, the current Chancellor refused to make a decision. It was not a co-decision. He did not object or support it, but said that it was for the outgoing Chancellor to make the decision. Of course, in practice, if he had not agreed he would have unscrambled it when he got into office, because he had the majority and the outgoing Chancellor did not.

[Mr Cash]

I am very happy for that matter to be looked into further. My right hon. Friend might well be right, but I have an article that quotes the outgoing Chancellor of the Exchequer on the BBC’s “Today” programme, saying:

“Overall it is a very good deal for all of us in Europe but also for the wider world. It is”—

something for us “together”. He also said:

“Our exposure for the additional amount of money could be £8 billion”.

The article also states that he

“confirmed he had spoken to Shadow Chancellor George Osborne and Lib Dem Treasury spokesman Vince Cable about…responsibility for it”

and goes on to state:

“All three had agreed ‘there was no way Britain was going to underwrite the euro’.”

When he was pressed, he said:

“I am not going to disclose the conversations we had, because we had them on the basis that they were private and confidential.”

The article goes on:

“A statement issued after the talks confirmed that the new fund placed the potential risk squarely with the eurozone.”

That worries me. I do not know where that came from, because it most emphatically is not the case, as we are not part of the eurozone.

I hope that the Select Committee on the Treasury will look to considering all that. We are talking about substantial sums of money, about an interregnum period and about a rather unusual situation. We might be talking about errors of judgment involving considerable exposure for the taxpayer. For all those reasons, it is very important that we get to the bottom of this. We do not need to turn it into a witch hunt—I do not believe in those sort of things—but as regards scrutiny and accountability, this is an important matter that needs to be resolved properly and efficiently.

Proper answers need to be given, the Treasury needs to put forward the arguments that it presented and it should disclose the papers. We know perfectly well that, in the kerfuffle of 9 May and the days leading up to it, the then Chancellor might understandably have had a lot on his mind. In the circumstances, all sorts of things could have gone wrong. That is the moment, as I see it, when important strategic decisions involving enormous amounts of money and affecting the taxpayer on what I would term an unlawful basis—a basis that certainly is not legally sound—need to be considered very carefully.

It might not surprise some hon. Members that I tabled amendment 8. In all such circumstances, other than the situation vis-à-vis the Republic of Ireland, attention should be drawn to these matters, but under no circumstances whatsoever should we give money to Portugal or Spain when there is a facility, agreed at around the same time, for €400 billion to be available for the eurozone. Now a new arrangement has emerged which will be made available permanently after March 2013. If Portugal and Spain are going to go under, however, they will definitely go under before March 2013.

[Mr Redwood]

On the important point raised by the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell), is it not the case—my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) would know—that the German Government are so worried about the legality of what was done under article 122 that they think we need a new treaty to cover that point?

[Mr Cash]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I have here an incredibly interesting article from this week’s edition of Newsweek. It is headlined, “To Rule the Euro Zone”. Hon. Members will know that I have tried to take a mild interest in European matters since I came to the House—I notice that one or two people are quite surprised—and I do so for good reasons. Indeed, in the first book I wrote on the subject, “Against a Federal Europe”, I drew attention to what I then perceived to be a significant danger that Germany would take a disproportionate and predominant role in European affairs, for which I received a great deal of censorship and some abuse. It was suggested that I was talking about the Germans in rather disrespectful terms, which was quite untrue. However, the sub-heading to an extremely interesting article by Stefan Theil, dated 23 January 2011, reads:

“The unified currency was supposed to limit German power. Now the Germans are in charge—and no one is happy, not even the Germans.”

The article merits careful reading.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I shall deal with that point shortly, but—with respect to the right hon. Gentleman—he will have to be a little patient.

As Members will have noticed, I have sought only to strengthen clause 18, which, as it stands, merely refers to the “Status of EU law”. We were promised a sovereignty clause, and my amendment would achieve that. The clause as it stands would be subject to statutory interpretation, and it would be strange, uncertain and hazardous not to insert this provision in the framework of the European Communities Act 1972 itself. Clause 18 is a stand-alone clause. It refers to the “Status of EU law” and to section 2 of the European Communities Act, but it does not amend the Act. I am talking here about section 2 through section 3, when the judges apply themselves to any law. The clause is only six lines long, but it incorporates and absorbs within it every single piece of European legislation, so it applies to everything. However, although we know that law from the European Union emanates through from the 1972 Act, this measure does not amend the Act when incorporating the status of EU law. I am extremely concerned about that and find it very strange. In fact I will go further and say that I think the measure is deliberately contrived to make sure it is not an amendment to the 1972 Act.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for drawing the House’s attention to this crucial matter. As I understand it, he, like many of us, rightly wants to reassert the sovereignty of Parliament and make it clear that Parliament remains sovereign in all circumstances, and as I understand it, those on the Treasury Bench have the same aim. Given that his proposal seems to be stronger in this regard, can he think of any good reason why they should refuse it?

[Mr Cash]

No, I cannot. I am a bit puzzled by that, but as I develop my speech I hope to be able to explain where I think the origin of the problem lies.

The Government and the Prime Minister fail either to explain why the 1972 Act was not amended in the way I have just suggested or to follow the route I have provided in my sovereignty Bills, and which has also been provided by the Bills that have followed from colleagues over the past few years. I have to say, however, that my sovereignty proposals of 2006 in relation to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill were accepted by the current Prime Minister when he was Leader of the Opposition and by the party Whips. Indeed, I might add that the Minister for Europe voted for those arrangements. I am glad that he smiles, because the smile is on the face of the tiger.

The fact is that we went through the Lobby then. The Whips came up to me in the middle of the afternoon and said, “Bill, will you please be good enough to allow us to adopt your amendments and put in Tellers?” I was extremely impressed, and slightly flattered. They decided to do that, and then, having accepted that and having faced down the then Government with such incredible force, they went off to the House of Lords and whipped it through the Lords six weeks later. A degree of conviction clearly lay behind that, and it matches up rather nicely with the manifesto promises about the sovereignty Bill and so forth. We were nearly getting there—we were on the brink, it might be said. The question is: where are we now?

As I have said, it is well-established that there is an historical and constitutional tension between the courts and Parliament because of the democratic basis of parliamentary sovereignty, not by virtue of a common law principle, and I have also proposed an amendment to prevent that principle from being subject to judicial application. It is also necessary to include the reaffirmation of Parliament so that the courts would not be able to ignore those words, which are lacking in clause 18 as it is currently drafted, and in order to address the problem relating to the 1972 Act.

In one of the Prime Minister’s letters to me—he has written two letters in the last few days—he claims:

“I can, of course, assure you not only that we have no intention to affect adversely the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, but also that we do not believe that Part 3”—

that is a reference to clause 18—

“runs this risk. As you would expect, we made sure we looked at this matter very thoroughly.”

My letter to the Prime Minister of 13 December, which I have sent to a number of colleagues to ensure fairness and transparency, indicated that I thought that in the light of his previous observations and assertions about a sovereignty Bill, not to mention the manifesto and so on, this principle of parliamentary sovereignty was a given and that the drafting of clause 18—this is so in the light of the evidence given to the European Scrutiny Committee and our conclusions—had demonstrated that the Government’s intentions had merely produced unintended consequences. I went out of my way to say that I was sure that he did not intend this. However, our European Scrutiny Committee was doing what he has continuously said it should do: improve the scrutiny of European legislation. That is one of our fundamental principles; we are going to make sure that European legislation is looked at properly. That is what we have done, and we have reported. We revealed, after four weeks of taking evidence and engaging in cross-examination, that, unbeknown to others, this clause will have unintended consequences.

So our Committee came up with its conclusions, as a result of having followed the Prime Minister’s advice to scrutinise as well as we have done, and he then turns around and says, through his Ministers and in letters to me, that

“we looked at this matter very thoroughly”

and that, “We do not believe that part 3 runs the risk that you are identifying.” Basically, he said that we were wrong. It is a serious matter for a Prime Minister to say that to a Select Committee, which is one of the reasons why I am taking these steps. I hope that I am doing so with a good sense of timing and humour, because it is very important that we do not turn this into something more difficult.

However, I have to say that his reply of 10 January shows that the Government stand by the wording, having made sure that they examined the matter “very thoroughly”. I must say, on behalf of myself and others, that I am afraid that the consequences remain damaging for parliamentary sovereignty, for all the reasons that I have been setting out. He goes on to say that

“the words you have suggested would create uncertainty, because the term ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ is not defined. There are no precedents for…referring to Parliamentary sovereignty in Acts of Parliament.”

He also says that attempts to define it will be “difficult and complex”.

With respect, that does not take us anywhere, because the expression “sovereignty of Parliament”, which is the one I have used, does not require definition in statute, as any examination of constitutional authorities makes abundantly clear. Some of those authorities prefer to use the expression “legislative supremacy of Parliament”, by which is meant that there are no legal limitations on the power of Parliament to legislate. I return to the words of the late Lord Bingham:

“The bedrock of the British constitution is…the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament”.

In the words of one of our greatest constitutional authorities—according to Dicey—under our constitution, Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law whatever and, furthermore, no person or body has the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. There is no definition of “the primacy of European law”, nor, as I have just said, is there any definition in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 of “the rule of law”. The fact is that certain expressions do not require that degree of definition, so I do not agree with the Prime Minister or with the Ministers on that point.

One of our witnesses, whose evidence the Committee did not accept, argued that Dicey’s exposition of sovereignty has been based on assumptions about representative democracy that, in his view, were flawed even in 1885 and could not be made today. That witness happens to be a proponent of and is in agreement with the views of other witnesses who promote the common law principle, such as Professor Trevor Allan. We rejected that view, distinguished as those people are, as we rejected the common law principle as set out by the Government in their explanatory notes—but merely removing them from the notes will not influence this kind of thinking in the Supreme Court or in influential academic circles. One has only to see the amount of time and effort that has been expended on this in learned journals to realise that they are not going to be pushed out of thinking the way they do merely because we correct them in the explanatory notes.

The same could be said of Lord Justice Laws’ views on constitutional statutes, which do not have special status in the traditional sense against any other statute. All are subject to repeal where Parliament so decides in the national interest. That is an advantage of our organic, unwritten constitution, so that we can, in a Burkean sense, adapt as and when necessary on firm and principled foundations. As Bradley and Ewing indicate by contrast to written constitutions such as that of the United States, the legislative supremacy of Parliament amounts to a fundamental rule of constitutional law and this supremacy includes the power to legislate on constitutional matters.

Loans to Ireland Bill

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I have just abstained on Second Reading for one simple reason. I had intended to vote for it, but I remain gravely dissatisfied by the answer that I received from the Chancellor regarding the increase in the amount specified in clause 1. I do not want in any way to misrepresent what he said, but as I understood it, it was that that was all right because it was about exchange rates. However, anybody who examines clause 1 carefully will notice that subsection (4) states:

“The Treasury may by order made by statutory instrument substitute a greater amount for the amount for the time being specified in subsection (3)”,

which is £3.25 billion.

The next two provisions simply determine whether any increase will be subject to affirmative or negative resolution. An order would be made under the negative resolution only if the increase is to do with exchange rates, but I can see nothing to say that an increase under subsection (4) would be affected by subsequent provisions. I was bound to take great exception to that. It is a serious matter, because we simply do not know what the greater amount would be. We are totally exposed, subject only to affirmative resolution, which cannot be amended. Such a measure would simply go through on a whipped vote, just as the rest of the Bill doubtless will. That is why I abstained on Second Reading.

Amendment 3 addresses the definition of “Irish loan”. I was staggered when I looked carefully at the Bill, because clause 1(2) states that “Irish loan” means simply

“a loan to Ireland by the United Kingdom.”

The background is the recent debates on economic governance, and the origins of the European financial stability mechanism and the alternative eurozone facility, which as someone pointed out is as much as €440 billion, which is easily enough to cope with the Irish situation. There is a very close interconnect at all points between the so-called bilateral loan proposed in the Bill and the mechanism that I described.

The difficulty is that there is an overall determination to do as much as possible by way of integrating with Europe when it is quite obvious to anybody that this is the time for us not only to step back, but to desegregate from the European venture. I believe very strongly that the technique that is consistently employed in all spheres of activity is to say, “We don’t like what goes on in the EU, but we can just go along with it. Alternatively, to satisfy the Eurosceptics or Eurorealists, as they prefer to be called, we can make parallel arrangements along the lines of what we would have done if we were in the eurozone.”

The research paper helpfully supplied by the Library states:

“It is worth noting that the bilateral element”—

assuming that that is what the Bill is—

“of the UK’s support is broadly equivalent to what the UK would have provided if it were part of the eurozone-only EFSF.”

In other words, we would have provided the loan anyway. The Minister may well say that that is not his intention, but that is what Library researchers believe, and they are often right.

[Mr Redwood]

A portion of the total loan package is contingent money for Irish banks—they may or may not need it. Is my hon. Friend worried that they could come back for even more, and that clause 1(4) could allow an extension of our loan for Irish banks?

[Mr Cash]

Yes I am. Treasury civil servants are exceedingly clever and may know of pitfalls, but they might not fully explain them to Ministers. Of course, the Minister takes ultimate responsibility, but the question is: what is the effect on the daily lives of the people whom we represent? That is the issue on which we have to concentrate.

Under the circumstances, I am extremely dubious about the way in which the whole thing has been put together. In particular, I would mention what I will call the mechanism, as compared with the facility. I had an exchange earlier about the mechanism with the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), who said, “This is all going to be done by qualified majority voting.” However, that is not the case. Within the mechanism as it is set out, the request comes from the member state; it is only the final arrangement that requires qualified majority voting. Indeed, the EU sent in the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund in flagrant contradiction of the provisions of article 3 of the regulation in question.

In fact, the EU was operating the provision as if it were already law, when it was not. That it is typical of the European Union. It keeps on telling us about the rule of law, but when it suits, it completely ignores the law. What happened was unlawful. I also believe that it was unlawful in respect of article 122, which was the legal basis used to create the mechanism. I do not need to go into detail, but article 122 concerns natural disasters, energy supply and things of that kind. Anyone who looks at article 3, article 122 and the other provisions that they mention would reasonably conclude that they should not be used for the purposes of sorting out an unmitigated mess that was created by banks, as well as by the Government of Ireland and other parts of the European Union. Therefore, I am afraid that the answer that I received from the former Chancellor—that there really was no alternative to what was done, because such decisions are reached by qualified majority voting—does not stack up. If what happened was unlawful, it should have been resisted and, because of the consequences, it should, if necessary, have been taken to the European Court.

[Mr Redwood]

My hon. Friend has great legal expertise. I understand that the European Union is trying to negotiate an amendment to article 122 of the treaty in order to put the matter beyond doubt. Would that be retrospective, or could that undermine the current position?

[Mr Cash]

That is a very good question. I doubt very much whether an attempt to make the provision retrospective would remedy the mischief.

I am afraid that the question of illegality taints the Government’s position as well, and I shall explain why—the Minister will know all the detail, because I think that he was the Minister responsible. There is provision for the European Scrutiny Committee under Standing Order No. 143 regarding scrutiny and scrutiny reserves. It so happens that the European Scrutiny Committee was not set up until November—a few weeks ago. However, I have here a table setting out the dates that shows that the date of deposit was 25 May 2010. The decision was taken on 9 May at ECOFIN, which happened to be 48 hours before the coalition was pushed through. In the case of ECOFIN’s decision on the financial stability mechanism, the table states unequivocally that there was an override of both the European Scrutiny Committee and the Lords. On both counts, the then Government and the current Government breached the scrutiny arrangements. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary that the explanatory memorandum that accompanies the documents in question, and which should have been presented much earlier, was presented on 15 July. I know that the Minister will not dispute that, because it comes from Government documents. There is a serious worry about the manner in which this matter has been manipulated.

Just before the proceedings began, we were presented with another document, which reinforces my concern. If my amendment 3 were accepted, the Bill would read: “In this Act, ‘Irish loan’ means a loan to Ireland by the United Kingdom other than a loan by virtue of any provision by or under the European Communities Act 1972.” I am very familiar with the way in which interweaving goes on, not only as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee but because, for the past 26 years, I have watched this process of integration and the manner in which, by extremely clever and adroit manoeuvring, we get further and further integrated into these arrangements. The mechanism is an open-ended invitation until 2013, as I ascertained during an exchange with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Until 2013, we are stuck with the present arrangements.

I am sometimes a bit of a Cassandra, in that I make prophecies—more like predictions—about certain events, find out that I was right and then find out that nobody took any notice until they had happened. On this occasion, I am going to say that it is extremely likely that, if Portugal gets into really deep trouble—and perhaps Spain, too—that will happen before 2013. If this greater amount is interwoven into the stabilisation mechanism, or even if it is not, the mechanism itself will entrap us in the arrangements which, although not yet permanent, will go on until 2013.

I also think that the Government are struggling a bit in relation to article 122, under which this measure was introduced—unlawfully, in my opinion—because the Commissioner responsible, a Mr Sefcovic, has stated that the Commission is still considering whether to use article 136 or article 122. Against that background, the Van Rompuy Committee is sitting and might already have concluded that it would be appropriate to have a permanent mechanism in place only under article 136, and therefore only by reference to the eurozone. That would be a plus, but it would not alter the fact that, between now and 2013, we are at risk.

I am concerned about the deficient wording in clause 1(2), because not excluding what might be done under the European Union effectively leaves it open to the European Union’s continuing to weave its way into the arrangements, despite the fact that they are described as a bilateral loan. Some people might say, “Ah, but you have to understand that when the explanatory notes talk about a bilateral loan, they mean that.” It does not say that in the Bill, however. Furthermore, we have had some unpleasant experiences with explanatory notes in the European Scrutiny Committee recently, as anyone who wants to read the report that we have just issued will see. The explanatory notes in question were positively misleading, and distorted the legal position. That is a matter that we will be pursuing in Committee, when we ask whether parliamentary sovereignty or judicial supremacy should prevail. I do not need to go into the detail of that now, but the fact that a bilateral loan is mentioned in the explanatory notes has been severely vitiated by our experience of the explanatory notes to the European Union Bill.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Tuesday 7th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Redwood]

It means that when a British Foreign Secretary makes foreign visits, he or she will be kept waiting while the EU ambassador is received and considered, because the latter will speak with more authority on behalf of more people and more states.

It is the third area that we have always reserved for national veto and national competence—central economic policy making—to which I shall address the remainder of my brief remarks in this truncated debate. Literally as we meet here this afternoon, crucial and massive issues are being hammered out in secret around the Council table in Brussels. Quite likely to be on the agenda is the issue of European sovereign bonds and the effective creation of a European sovereign in financial matters that issues debt and guarantees debt on behalf of member states. Do we want that? Are we in it? Is it not a transfer of power if we go along with it? Is it not an issue on which we should be invited to express our views?

Another item on the agenda may be the future membership of the euro. The Council could be considering in secret whether all member states are able to stay in the euro and whether the strong or the weak members should leave. If they are to keep the euro area together, what will be the arrangements for the large transfer payments that need to be made if the single currency is to have some hope of a decent life in the future, as all successful single currency areas have much bigger transfers of tax revenues, subsidies and money around them than the euro area currently has?

[Mr Cash]

My right hon. Friend portrays so accurately the realities that lie behind this Bill, which is about the economic crisis in Europe as well as many other matters. Does he agree that one serious current problem is the financial stability mechanisms and that if we do not assert our rights in this House and make certain that the courts cannot get their hands on an interpretation that would go the other way, we could end up paying for other countries beyond Ireland—Portugal, Spain and others?

[Mr Redwood]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, which is why the transfer of power, if not of competence, is such a crucial issue and why we need to engage in a public debate at this very moment about how far this should go.

I hasten to stress to the House—particularly to my critics, who like to misconstrue what I say—that I wish our partners every success and prosperity with their single currency. I know that if that is the way they choose to run their economies, it is in our interests for it to work. We want them to be happier and more prosperous, and we like to benefit from trading with them, just as they like selling us a lot of their products. My worry is that in the process of our enthusiasm for that, we will draw in Britain—with her rather stretched budgets, even after the changes that the Government have rightly and wisely made—at a time when we do not have the financial strength to go to the aid of all these other euroland countries that are in some difficulty under the euro scheme.

I am a critic of the Irish loan. Of course I do not want to see the Irish economy go down, but I do not happen to think that lending the country lots of money at that juncture, as a result of a crisis deliberately created by the European Central Bank, was a terribly good way to behave. I do not believe that if Britain had declined to make some money available, the Irish loan would not have been negotiated. It would have been negotiated quite successfully by the architects of it—the powers behind the European Central Bank, who literally decided to withdraw funds from the Irish banks at a difficult time and made that decision public, thereby precipitating the crisis. We were engaged in a refinancing package for the European Central Bank. I think we should be told the truth; we should be told why it was a good idea for a country that rightly stayed out of the euro because it did not want the financial risk and hassle, to be drawn into helping finance the consequences of an ill-judged currency without a political union.

A successful currency needs a sovereign to love it and support it. That is why the sovereign’s face traditionally appears on the coinage and why there has to be a symbol to show that the whole weight of legal and economic authority stands behind a currency. If Europe is to have a successful euro, she needs a sovereign. I do not want my country to be part of the euro, and I think that around 80% of the British people agree with me. I think that even Opposition Members temporarily agree with me on this issue; they are not rushing to say that now is a good time to join the euro. We should be open and honest with the British people and say, “We wish the euro well.” We are doing it a great favour by not trying to join it—we would have been an over-mighty subject in it, which might even had led to its toppling earlier—and we are not currently in a financial position to make all the transfer payments available that are necessary for full members of a single currency area.

The House needs to understand that while we are debating some abstruse language and pledging this and future Governments to hold a referendum on treaties unknown about competences unspecified, a potentially massive transfer of power is under way yet again from the member states to the centre. There has to be; the thing cannot work without more central power behind the banks and the economic institutions.

The British Government say that they will accept a treaty extending the centralising powers in the economic sphere because the penalties on these will not apply to the UK Government. Well, I am delighted that the penalties will not apply, but I see no reason why the requirements should apply either, because we are not part of the euro. We should offer our support for a strengthening of economic governance for the euro area alone and make it clear that all the regulations and the directives apply only to that area. I think that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary got it wrong when he said that none of those applies to Britain; several of them do, although without the ultimate penalties. There could be other penalties, incidentally, which might apply to Britain.

When we surrender our veto and allow this treaty to go through on that condition—that it applies only to euroland—we should say that we want something back. We should seek to establish that we believe the European Union already has too much power and that we want something back. Do we want our fisheries back; do we want control over our borders back; do we want control over elements of taxation that have already gone to Europe through common taxation and a series of court judgments?

Power is seeping away as we meet. A massive debate is under way. Will the Government please take this Parliament and the British people into their confidence? Will they take us seriously? Will they give us an adult debate on the reality rather than this show Bill?

European Union Economic Governance

Debate between Lord Redwood and William Cash

Wednesday 10th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

rose—

[Mr Redwood]

rose—