Fixed-term Parliaments (Repeal) Bill
Debate between Lord Johnson of Marylebone and William Cash(9 years, 2 months ago)
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Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I wish to put on the record the fact that having opposed this Bill—not the one before us, but the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, before it was enacted—at every point on the compass, I entirely support what my right hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Sir Alan Duncan) is proposing and I am entirely unconvinced by the arguments that there has been a substantial amount of movement by the Government on any of these matters.
Joseph Johnson
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. Obviously, it is now on the record that he previously opposed this Bill—
Joseph Johnson
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.
Let me return to my thread. Half of the business of Parliament is now decided by Parliament rather than the Executive—far more than ever before. Before 2010, Back Benchers controlled no time at all and could not initiate substantive motions or debates. Now, most Thursdays are taken up by debates chosen by the MPs who form the Backbench Business Committee, not Ministers. Back Bencher-initiated debate on questions such as cervical cancer, contaminated blood and mental health have ensured that unfashionable but vital issues are properly aired on the Floor of the Commons. Of course, a significant amount of time allocated for Commons business is also given to the Opposition for the debates they choose on the questions they consider vital.
The Procedure Committee recommends that there should be broadly 150 days in a Parliamentary Session. Of these, 20 days are allocated to the Opposition, 27 to the Backbench Business Committee, three to estimates, five to the Queen’s Speech, four to the Budget and 13 for private Members’ Bills. That leaves 78 of the 150 days in Government control, but some of that will include House business, which the Government introduce. As a result, in this Parliament the Government have controlled just over half the time allocated for debate, a lower percentage than ever before. That is not a zombie Parliament. It is a democratic Parliament, in which the power of the Executive is limited and the role of those holding the powerful to account is augmented.
On top of the amount of time that the Government allocate to others for debate is the amount of time that Mr Speaker allocates to others to hold the Government’s feet to the fire. This is not a zombie Parliament when it comes to how Mr Speaker and his Deputy Speakers have used their power to grant any Members the right to ask urgent questions, initiating mini-emergency debates on any topic or issue by calling the relevant Minister to the Floor of the Commons. So far in this Parliament, there have been 148 urgent questions. In the 2005 to 2010 Parliament there were 50, and in 2001 to 2005 there were just 40. So, there has been a 270% growth in that use, the opposite of what one might expect in a zombie Parliament.
Sir William Cash
I hear what my hon. Friend the Minister says, but there is a need to reform this Parliament as well. Some of the things that he is saying might be of some interest to some people, but there are those of us who believe that the whipping system, which results in Bills not being properly considered and being given programme motions that prevent Members from debating essential questions, is a complete travesty. When he is considering these matters, will he propose reforms to deal with the Whip system as well?
Joseph Johnson
Bills not receiving proper scrutiny, if that is indeed the case, lies to a great extent in the hands of the Opposition rather than the Government, in the sense that 70% of Bills have completed their passage through the House without having exhausted the time available to them in Committee. The Government are making plenty of time available for scrutiny, but the Opposition are failing to take advantage of it.
In addition to all these merits, the Act provides a number of useful advantages to Government, Parliament and wider society. It provides greater predictability and continuity, enabling long-term legislative and financial planning. It gives those institutions whose work is affected by Parliament or Government much greater scrutiny. The timing of polls is now known and there will be less concern about policies or procedures being implemented that might only have a short-term or rather narrow self-interested objectives.
The Act also brings to an end the political and media speculation about the likely date of the next election, a feature of previous general election build-up periods that has all too often been an unhelpful distraction to the work of government.
Is the Fixed-term Parliaments Act too prescriptive? That question was asked, and although the Government are of the view that early or late general elections should be avoided, the Act is sufficiently flexible to cater for those rare but unavoidable situations in which an earlier or later general election is required. Under the Act the Prime Minister of the day can lay an order before both Houses to extend the date for a maximum of two months to deal with unexpected developments, although they must spell out their reasons for taking that step.
In addition, the Act provides for early elections to be called if a motion is agreed by at least two thirds of the House or without Division, or if a motion of no confidence is passed and no alternative Government are provided by the House within 14 days. This procedure builds in the necessary safeguards that will avoid future Prime Ministers routinely attempting to call early elections.
Although early evidence shows that the certainty that the Act brings has many benefits—for example, in work planning—it will be for the next Government to examine how the Act has operated in this Parliament. Not only will such an appraisal help the next Government in their own work planning, but it will help to inform any amendment that might be needed—
Eurozone Financial Assistance
Debate between Lord Johnson of Marylebone and William Cash
Joseph Johnson (Orpington) (Con)
It is critical that we put into perspective UK taxpayers’ exposure to the bail-out mechanism. No Government Member relishes having to put the faith or the credit of Her Majesty’s Treasury behind the bail-outs of profligate peripheral eurozone countries, especially at a time of austerity at home, but the coalition Government inherited this situation. The temporary bail-out mechanism, which runs until 2013, was agreed on 10 May 2010 by European Finance Ministers at ECOFIN—after the general election, but before the coalition Government were formed. As the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) admitted in Parliament, the Chancellor opposed the mechanism at the time, as was clearly recorded in Hansard on 15 December 2010. [Interruption.] Any Labour Members in doubt about that can verify it for themselves.
Joseph Johnson
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I have been led to understand that the Government took the position that there was no strong legal case to support any such challenge.
None the less, it sticks in the craw of many Government Members to be in this position and, like them, I have my doubts about whether the mechanism is being applied in exceptional circumstances beyond member states’ control, which is the test for triggering the deployment of financial assistance powers under article 122(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Government bond yields in the eurozone periphery are trading at the level they are in some countries because of the reckless management of public finances and the political gridlock in those countries, and because of backsliding on long overdue structural reform. In Greece’s case, Government bond yields are trading at about 20% because of Athens’s lack of progress towards meeting the pledges it made last year as part of the EU-International Monetary Fund bail-out. That is a case in point.
Painful though it was for the Government to be saddled by the outgoing Labour Administration with an indirect contingent liability through their involuntary participation in the mechanism, the truth is that our overall exposure is a rounding error when compared with that facing Germany and other northern European countries in the core euro area. The debts of the eurozone periphery are being progressively socialised by European Central Bank financing operations that could, in time, be seen as the forerunner of an effective eurozone bond. In the meantime, the €60 billion mechanism is just part of a far larger package of measures to preserve financial stability in the EU to which we have no exposure, except indirectly through our share in the IMF. We are on the hook for a share of €60 billion out of an overall package of €750 billion. Our share, which is about 12.5% of that €60 billion, is just €7.5 billion, or 1% of the €750 billion package.
We do not wish to throw away that 1% lightly, of course, but happily, for that exposure to crystallise, all the countries that have thus far subscribed to the mechanism would have to default in totality. IMF data on the history of sovereign defaults around the world suggest that that is highly unlikely. Even in the unlikely event of a domino series of defaults across the countries that have subscribed to the mechanism, it would be extraordinary for there to be a 100% default rate. The pattern of defaults around the world suggests that losses from default are normally between 25% and 35% of the total losses to which countries or investors have exposure.