Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(7 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
The point that I have made already and will make again is that as I understand it Sir John has not identified lack of remit as the reason why he has given no opinion on the legality of the war. He has identified a lack of appropriate skill sets in the inquiry, and he suggested that it should be a matter that is dealt with by a properly constituted and internationally recognised court. As I have said already, the Government in looking at the report of the Iraq inquiry—it will take some time to do that—will consider all these matters, including questions that the right hon. Gentleman is raising about whether any further documents can appropriately be declassified and made available.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
Obviously, John Chilcot’s report is masterful in its description of the formal records and the detail, and in the lessons he very wisely draws. However, will the Foreign Secretary, as a politician, look at the political context for a moment? Does he agree that the background was clearly that the Americans and the Blair Government wished to invade Iraq to change the regime and get rid of Saddam Hussein? However, that would have been illegal regime change, so what my right hon. Friend has just gone through—people’s desperate desire to find evidence and to persuade themselves that there were weapons of mass destruction, that Saddam was not co-operating with the inspectors, that there was a risk of terrorism and so on—was mainly, and no doubt subconsciously, motivated by a desire to give the Attorney General some basis on which he could say that this action was legal?
Mr Hammond
My reading of the inquiry report is that it does indeed identify that regime change as an objective would be illegal in UK law, but I think the suggestion is that, through a process of group-think, the people who were involved in this process came to see regime change as a means to deliver the legitimate objective, which was compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. A fair reading of the report suggests that that is the process of mind that is being spelled out by Sir John.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
The decision to invade Iraq was the most disastrous foreign policy decision taken by this country in my lifetime. It did not cause, but it greatly contributed to, the extraordinary problems that have persisted in the middle east and the wider world ever since. I fear it will continue to have tragic consequences for some years to come.
First, we all owe a debt to Sir John Chilcot for producing what will undoubtedly be the most authoritative analysis of how on earth such an appalling blunder came to be made. I certainly have not had the chance to get much beyond the executive summary and just a little bit of the rest of it. It will take a long time before anybody in this House gets through the millions of words that have been produced. The lessons for the inquiry into the Iraq war will be of benefit in particular to specialists: those in the military, the intelligence service, the diplomatic corps and politicians—Ministers, shadow Ministers and those who hold the Government to account—for many years to come. It is too soon to follow up on his extremely formidable findings, which I am sure are correct, but there is a role for this House to begin to consider, as we are, its political aspect.
Sir John Chilcot has examined the formal records, meetings and processes. He analysed them to see what happened, but he is not a politician. The House of Commons and the Ministers involved are able to look at this with a slightly different eye. Why did people reach particular decisions? What is it that makes us want to reach those decisions? Where did it go wrong, in particular as far as the collective system of Cabinet Government is concerned, and the accountability, through Parliament, to the wider public? Because Sir John Chilcot is not a politician, I am not sure that he is able to answer on the wider perspective.
I would like to begin by agreeing with one point made by the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) and say how irrelevant it has been to try to turn all this into a witch hunt against celebrity individuals who were involved at the time. That is one of the great failures of political debate in our day. As far as the wider media and the world were concerned, the recent referendum debate was largely the Dave and Boris show. It is quite pointless to say, “Let’s persecute Tony Blair. He was in charge. Are we going to censure him? Is he going to be prosecuted as a war criminal?” and all the rest of it. That is also true for all the other individuals involved.
The one thing the report makes quite clear is that nobody has committed any crime. As one who was present at the time, I have absolutely no doubt that anybody acted on any other basis than that they believed passionately they were acting in the public interest. One of the great things about Tony Blair was that he did believe passionately in what he was doing at the time. That was very evident on the Floor of the House. He never had a doubt about what he was doing, so I am not surprised that he continues to protest as strongly as he does. He has not changed his mind. He believed he was acting in the national interest in cementing our alliance with the Americans. He thought that was absolutely key to our security. He thought that a British contribution would help the Americans with planning, advocacy and so on. He firmly believed that just removing Saddam Hussein was a virtuous act that would make the world a better place—he still does.
Then, as now, regime change is the point on which he gets most passionate. He really thinks—he is probably right; I agree with him, actually—that he got rid of an evil regime. I agree with those who say that that was not in itself a totally adequate achievement. He certainly believed that the regime had weapons of mass destruction. I faced him in the House, intervening on him and so on. I remember one day thinking, “This is the last man still living who still believes they are going to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.” It was increasingly obvious to everyone else that no such material was going to be found. Pursuing Tony Blair is a complete irrelevance to what the House should be looking at.
Caroline Lucas
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way and agree with him on the dangers of focusing on just one person. We need to focus on that person, but we also need to focus on the system. However, I worry about the way in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman appears to be letting that one person off any real responsibility for misleading the House. We only have to read Chilcot to see, for example, how Blair misled the House about the position of the French. The motion Blair moved in the House stated that,
“it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances”.—[Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 760.]
Yet within a few minutes, even before Prime Minister’s questions, the French were on the phone to Tony Blair saying, “You are deliberately misrepresenting our position.” This happens time and again in the Chilcot report, so while we should not focus only on one man, let us not let him off the hook completely. That does not do any of us any good.
Mr Clarke
I certainly did not rise to defend Tony Blair, but he is not the first politician to make a mistake and he will not be the last. If the hon. Lady believes the French, she believes the French. The French were able to exercise a veto in the Security Council. It was a mistake at the time to try to blame the French entirely. They were never going to get a majority in the Security Council, but the French were adamantly—[Interruption.]
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Speaker
Order. The House must come to order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has made it perfectly plain that at this point he is not giving way. Therefore, the House must listen to the development of his argument.
Mr Clarke
Mr Speaker, I have already spent more time than I intended to on Tony Blair. Members who wish to argue about the French veto in 2003 can do so between themselves.
The political background to what was being decided and what the politicians wanted to do was key. I was a Back-Bench Opposition Member at the time, but I followed the events with some care. I had one advantage: I did not have access to what was going on inside the Government, but I knew a lot of American, as well as British, politicians. At various political gatherings—Bilderberg, Davos and so on—I knew and was on friendly terms with quite a few of the key American neo-cons. I was arguing against the merits of the invasion of Iraq before the debate ever even started here.
That is important background. In the Bush Administration, the key policy makers wanted to invade Iraq immediately after 9/11. By 2001, there was not the slightest doubt but that they would invade. They had a rather naive, idealistic approach that faintly shocked me: they thought the previous Administration had not used American military power for all the benefits it could produce in the world, but they were going to use it for good, and they thought they would be treated as liberating heroes when they arrived in Baghdad and set up a better regime.
They thought that a man called Chalabi would win the election held thereafter. I met Chalabi once or twice. He once got about 2% in an Iraqi election. They thought he would be in charge but that he would need supervision, so there was going to be a US general—constant comparisons were made with General MacArthur turning Imperial Japan into a democracy after the war. Much was also made of the importance of denazification following Hitler’s fall, hence there was going to be de-Ba’athification in Iraq to get rid of all these people in the army and the security services and so on. The House will be reassured to know that I fiercely disagreed. I liked these people, but my thought, during such a discussion, was always, “One of us isn’t on the same planet.” I formed a fairly hostile view, therefore, long before it arrived here.
If I knew in 2001 that the Bush Administration was going to invade Iraq, I am quite certain that Tony Blair and the British military knew, and that they had a long time to work out how they were going to join in. That explains a lot. Why did the Americans want the British to join in? They did not need us for military purposes. They could defeat the Iraqis without our military assistance. They did not rate our military that highly—although they thought our special forces and intelligences were very good—but we were a very valuable political ally. They thought that the presentation would be greatly improved if the British, of all people, were at the heart of the alliance, and as I have said, Tony Blair was very keen to join them. I doubt he bought all the neo-con theories, but he clearly thought that getting rid of Saddam Hussein’s regime was one of the best contributions he could make to the future of the Iraqi people and he was determined to join in.
Reading these mysteries, one must ask, “What was the snag for Tony Blair and the Government?” I am confident I knew enough, through my contacts, to know that the snag for Tony Blair, who wanted to take part and who—it seems—had already told George W. Bush that he wanted to take part, was that it was not legal for the UK to take part in a war being launched for the purpose of changing the regime in another country. When he received that advice, with which I think every lawyer in the place agreed, it was undoubtedly right.
As somebody said, however, that was not the view the Americans took. American neo-cons are not so impressed with international law. Their constitution does not constrain them. I once had a key American official tell me, “We have all the legal authority we need to invade: we have a large majority in both Houses of Congress.” And that was it. But they were so keen to have the British that they were prepared to give Tony Blair some time to tackle this problem of whether it was lawful for him to take part, and to work out a basis upon which the British could join.
At this point, I think, these people’s motives were virtuous. They believed all this. They were making the world a better place by removing a tyrant and installing a pro-American, pro-western, pro-Israeli, democratic Government in a liberal society. They were going to change the regime, and we were going to do it lawfully, so we had to turn to the question of the dreadful weapons that Saddam Hussein undoubtedly had used against his own people years before, and whether they had all been disposed of or whether we could demonstrate that he was a continuing threat. If we could demonstrate that he had weapons of mass destruction, that they were a threat to British interests and our neighbours, and that he was not co-operating with weapons inspections and so on, and if we could get a UN resolution, then we had a legal basis for invading.
Once one realises that that was the—perfectly worthy and well-intentioned—mindset of most of the British people taking part in the process to intervene, one can understand why some of these extraordinary processes happened. I personally believe that the American Administration delayed the invasion for a month or few—
Mr Clarke
Two months, says my right hon. Friend. They delayed the invasion to give the British more time to get through this convoluted legal stuff—I use sarcastic words of the kind the occasional impatient American used at the time—before they could join in. The problem was that the Americans, although they went to the UN and got resolution 1441 and all the rest of it, began to lose patience, seeing that this could go on forever, and it reached the stage where they were going to invade in March 2003. They could not wait any longer. The Blair Government—those who knew what was going on—had to speed the thing up a bit, realising that if they were not careful, they would fail to get there in time.
One thing that surprises me in the Chilcot report concerns the advice the Government got from the Joint Intelligence Committee, which eventually produced enough intelligence that was plausible and no doubt believed by those putting it in the reports for the Attorney General to be persuaded—obviously quite reluctantly—that there probably was a basis for going ahead. The urgent debates then took place in this House, the last one being about two days before the date when everyone knew the troops, already in battle positions in the middle east, were about to go ahead with the operation.
We should learn the political lessons from all that. One of the first lessons relates to the ever-increasing rush to get into the position of being able to invade lawfully, so that everybody wanted to be persuaded that various things were correct and that various steps had been taken. If they had submitted themselves to slower, more challenged and more careful consideration, however, it would have led to a different conclusion.
What, then, is the outline of the main political lessons to be learned from all this? First, the American alliance should not be entered into blindly. Let me say briefly that I am as passionate a believer as Tony Blair that our alliance with the United States is crucial to this country’s future security and role in the world. There is not a trace of anti-Americanism in what I am saying; our alliance is one of the most valuable features of our foreign policy. That does not mean, however, that we should allow ourselves to go along blindly and always—right or wrong—with what the American President of the day wishes to do. I take that no further, but we might have a President Trump, so it is a question worth bearing in mind. I agree with the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) that the American alliance will not be destroyed—it might be damaged for a month or two—if we do not absolutely go along with what the American President wants us to do.
Let me move on to something that is clear in Chilcot—though I have not made the point much myself—and was plain to see in how the Ministry of Defence behaved at the time. The advice of our defence chiefs is hugely important, and I share the support for and pride in them that keeps being expressed in these debates. Yet—subconsciously, I am sure—they always want to take part in any military activity that the Americans want them to join. It might be considered advice, but it always comes down to “We must ask the Americans to let us make as big a contribution as we can”. A trained military man is trained for the purpose of using military force in the national interest and further worthwhile objectives, and cannot help thinking, “This is our moment; this is the great action in which we must take part.”
It is the same with the intelligence services. They prize their relationship with the Americans above all other relationships they have with the outside world. They are dependent on co-operation in some ways, but they are anxious to please and to do what they think their American colleagues wish them to do. In this particular case, we had a Prime Minister and a Government who wanted to enter the war, so everybody was extremely anxious to find the facts, to be convinced of the situation and to enable the Prime Minister to go ahead and do what he wanted. That is an essential point, but it requires a simple politician like me to make it; it does not appear in the pages of the Chilcot report. When one is raising one’s eyebrows at what happened, I think that that answers a lot.
Particularly at the time we are talking about—and sometimes still today—there were not enough diplomats involved. There was not enough looking at the expertise of the Foreign Office. We had a lot of Arabists. The Americans had some, but they got rid of most of theirs and brought people in who had been involved in the Nicaraguan episode because they were seen as being ideologically more sound. Americans did not like the Arabists we had in the Foreign Office because they kept complicating things by talking about tribes and different sorts of Muslim, which the policy makers in Washington thought were irrelevant to the new era of western democracy in which they thought they were going to take the country.
Mr Clarke
I am sorry, but I do not have the time.
I shall not go on by adding more to the strictures about the Attorney General—[Hon. Members: “Go on!”]. The Attorney General was obviously giving the right advice. I am sitting alongside someone who was a very tough Attorney General—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—who would not give the advice that eager Prime Ministers sometimes want, and neither would Michael Havers or quite a few others I recall being in government with. As has been said, that is what the Attorney General is for. I know Lord Goldsmith and he is perfectly all right. He must have felt so exposed in the end that he gave into the temptation to say, “Well, it’s just about lawful; it is just about satisfactorily proved.”
I am sorry to have taken a little longer than I intended, but let me conclude with my main point. The big thing that matters—and it matters very much as we are having a change of Government today—is how the Cabinet and Government processes come into the equation. What about accountability to Parliament? It was obvious at the time, obvious if anyone listened to what the Foreign Secretary said publicly, obvious in what half the Labour party said and obvious from listening to officials that Cabinet Government was not working properly in Tony Blair’s Government. He went in for sofa government. Margaret Thatcher got keener and keener on sofa government towards the end of her time, but Tony Blair had taken it to an art form by the time he got into issues such as Iraq. It was the same with Parliament. There was a reluctance to come to Parliament. Both were essentially seen as hurdles to be surmounted. Once you had your policy, how were you going to get it through the Cabinet and how were you going to get it past Parliament?
My suggestion for the future is that we should all agree that that is not the mindset that people should have. They should set the proposition, and, of course, advocate it to the Cabinet, and then, with the benefit of proper information, they should listen to it being debated and examined by those who have time to do so. Similarly, Parliament should be consulted when it can be, and given proper information. One should not rely on clever timing of the debate and the work of the Whips to get it through and afterwards say that there is a democratic endorsement. I have no time to apply all my strong strictures to the circumstances of the time, but I think that, if read with my arguments in mind, the Chilcot report feeds the impression that I had then, as someone who participated in debates.
Military action is difficult. There is no point in politicians being lightheartedly irresponsible and saying, “We have got to be involved in every decision.” There will be occasions when that is not possible. There will be occasions when someone has just attacked a British interest, and we have to fight back. You can tell the Cabinet and you can tell Parliament afterwards, and any sensible Cabinet and any sensible Parliament will of course endorse it. But this was not an emergency. For two years our allies had told us that they were going to invade Iraq. It had been planned. It had been worked on. It had been discussed. The reason there was not full Cabinet discussion, and the reason there was not timely parliamentary debate, was that someone who did that might not get it by them. We did not start debating the issue until Parliament until February 2003, and the final, key vote took place when the troops were in the field. That put a lot of Conservatives off the idea of voting against it, when they might otherwise have done so. Our boys were about to go into action, the next day—which is what occurred.
Some of those matters have been addressed. The National Security Council is a hugely beneficial innovation introduced by my right hon. Friend the outgoing Prime Minister, who is probably already the ex-Prime Minister. Now is not the time to debate it, but it still needs to be improved. It has not covered everything, although it is a lot better than it was. As for Cabinet government, I think that my right hon. Friends should ask themselves— if they are still in office under the next Prime Minister—whether they can ensure that adequate time is given to discuss things, and adequate information is given in advance. Cabinet government does not mean moving quickly from item to item; people must have some papers beforehand so that they can consider the issues properly.
The National Security Council is very valuable, because it contains defence and intelligence people alongside the politicians. I genuinely congratulate the outgoing Prime Minister: some of the best discussions in which I participated took place in the National Security Council, with my total approval. However, although I may be too sensitive, I think that it could be improved sometimes. There are occasions when a fait accompli is brought there and explained to you, and the defence and intelligence people explain why you should agree, and off you go.
I think it right to look into why we might have avoided what happened in Libya. The whole history of the middle east and north Africa involves our removing fascist dictatorships of the most poisonous kind from country after country, and then being surprised when they have been replaced by a situation that is, in some instances, even worse than the one that we have removed. A continuing answer to that problem needs to be sought, although at present we may have to confront even bigger problems.
I began by saying that this was the biggest foreign policy disaster of my time. We all have to ask why the institutions of the United Kingdom failed even to develop a hint of that. It was not particularly courageous for the House to vote in favour. Opinion polls showed that 70% of the British public supported the invasion. For the first week or two it was extremely popular. Had we held a referendum, which is now the fashionable way of governing the country—compared with this old-fashioned parliamentary democracy—it would have sailed through with an enormous majority. The danger of following opinion polls is shown by the fact that a year later I could not find a member of the public who had ever met anybody who agreed with the invasion of Iraq, because in the light of better information people suddenly realised it had been a terrible error.
There are Members sitting here now who were here at that time. I remember the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) organising some of the opposition on the day I spoke in February. We voted against it, and we spoke against it. Needless to say, I have looked at my speech, and I am very sad to say that I think I predicted quite a lot of the consequences and what would happen. We all agree that, “Never again if we can avoid it,” but this is a big subject and it is no good reading the report and just saying we should have a look at the intelligence arrangements; we should have a look at other arrangements as well, such as the way our Government are run, the way this Parliament organises itself, and how we get sensible accountability to the House of Commons the next time the Government have to engage in such difficult decisions.
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
It is a privilege to follow the right hon. Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett), although I felt that at the end she destroyed her own argument by attributing to other people views that nobody holds: that somehow IS is allowed off the hook of blame because of the weaknesses and failures of the British Government.
Let us be clear what those failures are: 150,000 deaths by violence, a large majority of them innocent civilians; over 1 million deaths, on medical estimates, as a result of this war; and a destroyed country. Iraq was a nasty dictatorship, but containment—sanctions, inspections when they were allowed, and no-fly zones—was broadly working. There was damage to the stability of the middle east. Of course it is not the entire story, but let us not forget that IS started in an American prisoner-of-war camp in Iraq. That is where its high command comes from, so let us not put that to one side either. There has been a significantly increased terrorist threat worldwide, something that was known and warned about before we took this action. That is what we are talking about. That is what the worst foreign policy mistake in our modern history means for many, many innocent people in the world.
In the 1990s, before that happened, I had responsibility for counter-proliferation in the Conservative Government of the time. I accept that the behaviour of the Saddam Hussein regime was peculiar to say the least. As far as we could tell from inspections and our intelligence, it did not have WMD or a workable WMD programme but was deliberately trying to create confusion about that, by not co-operating from time to time, by moving trucks from one site to another before inspectors arrived, and so on. It was probably doing that to keep Iran convinced that it had a WMD programme. That was what it was worried about—not us, but its next-door neighbour against which it had fought a massive war shortly before. That explains some of the strange behaviour of the regime.
At that time and—I guess—up until just before 2001, the general belief was that this was a moderate and controllable threat. Indeed, Carne Ross, the middle east specialist among our delegation to the UN, said that when he first took the job he was briefed:
“Basically we don’t think there’s anything there. We are justifying sanctions on the basis that Iraq has not answered questions about its past stocks”.
Since then, all the JIC, SIS and GCHQ reports have corroborated that. It was considered a moderate and controllable threat at that point.
Then what happened? We had 9/11, which, quite properly, shocked the world: 3,000 deaths in a hideous terrorist spectacular. Of course, Tony Blair justifies his actions on that basis, but I have to say to him that this was a reason for getting it right, not an excuse for getting it wrong. There was understandable paranoia that something like it might happen again, either here or somewhere else, but then there came a dangerous and simplistic conflation of the real, present and continuing threat from al-Qaeda and Iraq—the axis of evil nonsense that President Bush generated at the time. This fiction was reinforced in February 2002, when the Americans rendered to Egypt somebody called Sheikh al-Libi, who was tortured on the question of whether there was a chemical and biological weapons relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Essentially, he was tortured until he said yes, and that was the evidence that Colin Powell cited at the United Nations—the House might remember—when he talked about having “substantial evidence”. Of course, it was a fiction obtained under torture.
I am quite sure that that intelligence was shared with Mr Blair, who, not knowing the source, would have found it persuasive, as something told to the Americans by an al-Qaeda commander. It seems from the Chilcot report that, at some point between December 2001 and possibly March 2002 but certainly by July 2002, Mr Blair effectively signed Britain up to the American military effort. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said, the issue was not our soldiers but our reputation. It was our involvement that legitimised the American action.
This, however, produced a problem for our Prime Minister. Under American law, to go to war on the basis of regime change is entirely legal. They do not recognise the international laws that render it otherwise, so for them regime change is a perfectly legitimate casus belli. From comments made and the items to which the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) referred, it seems that Tony Blair agreed, but he had a problem, because our law and international law did not allow it. He therefore saw his role as building a coalition to support the Americans.
There was nothing dishonourable in that, if Tony Blair believed the aim, but to do it he had to achieve a number of things. He had to create a casus belli under international law, and for that he needed proof of weapons of mass destruction and of a terrorist threat, and a UN resolution and thereby proof of legality. The result was UN resolution 1441, the thrust of which was that it was the final opportunity for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations. The vote was 15:0 in favour. As the right hon. Member for Derby South said, it did not include a deliberate trigger to war; it required a further resolution. The UN inspectorate went in and did 700 inspections of over 500 sites. Interestingly, it went to three dozen sites given to it by the CIA and MI6, who thought that was where the weapons were located. The inspectorate found not a thing—over three and a half months, it found nothing whatsoever.
Then the American President set a timetable, creating a real problem over and above the United Nations—war by March. That is why Chilcot said that going to war was not the last resort. It was not. It gave Mr Blair a problem. What should he do? Many other countries, including France and Russia, viewed the inspection process as incomplete—and, of course, it was. The UN vote was then lost by 11 to four, so when Blair returned to the UK, he had to win a debate and vote in the House of Commons. He made what some people think was the greatest speech of his life, but in order to persuade us, he had to say five things that were a clear misrepresentation.
Mr Blair accused France of saying that it would never vote for war. That was simply not true, and he knew it was not true. I refer to an interview given on Radio 4 in the last year by Sir Stephen Wall. As a Foreign Office adviser in No. 10, he was privy to what was going on and clarified what was really said, which was that, effectively, “As of now, France will vote against”. When he was asked whether Downing Street deliberately lied about Chirac’s statement, he said yes, it deliberately lied.
The next two misrepresentations were quotations from the UN inspectors’ reports. Time is short, so let me read briefly what was said by Hans Blix, the head of the inspectorate. Speaking of the British Government, he said:
“If they had gone to the British Parliament in 2003 and said that we have a lot of things unaccounted for here, and we suspect there may be something, and we think it is safer to invade them, would the British Parliament have dreamt of saying yes to such a thing? I don’t think so. I think in order to go ahead they needed to make the allegations which they made and which were not sustainable…In substance yes they misrepresented what we did and they did so in order to get the authorisation they shouldn’t have had.”
That was Hans Blix’s view of what Tony Blair did in the House of Commons. Mr Blair also misrepresented what Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, had told the allies about the WMD programme.
Mr Clarke
I had it in mind that my right hon. Friend would get a bit more time.
Does my right hon. Friend think, with hindsight, that given that Hans Blix was perfectly willing to carry on with inspections, if the Americans could have been persuaded to delay for another month, all this could have been avoided? The Americans dismissed Blix, however, and regarded him as a waste of time; they were trying to get him out of the way.
Mr Davis
That is exactly right. That should have been the stance that Mr Blair took, but he did not. He chose instead to come to Parliament to misrepresent the case.
Mr Blair also misrepresented the line put forward by Mr Hussein Kamel, who was later killed by Saddam Hussein, to claim that the WMD programme was continuing. What was, in fact, said in an interview with the inspectorate, was that the WMD had all been destroyed by 1991.
Finally, Mr Blair was asked by Tam Dalyell about the risks of terrorism arising from the war, but the Prime Minister did not give him an answer—despite having been told by the JIC and by MI5 that it would increase both the international and domestic risk of terrorism and would destabilise the states in the area.
On five counts, then, Mr Blair misrepresented to this House the substantive aspects of the argument for the war. If this House is to contribute to decisions on war in the future, it must be able to rely on being told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth by our Prime Minister.
Europe, Human Rights and Keeping People Safe at Home and Abroad
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(7 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Hammond
I agree with a lot of what the hon. Gentleman says. The specific allegation is that British-made cluster munitions, which will have been made and delivered probably 30 years ago, may have been used. We do not believe that that is the case, but the Ministry of Defence—he will have heard a Defence Minister say this from the Dispatch Box today—is carrying out an urgent investigation. It will look at the evidence and then decide how to move forward. We have a high level of confidence that British-made cluster munitions have not been used in this conflict, but we must of course look at the allegation that has been made, and any evidence presented in support of it, and respond appropriately.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
My right hon. Friend mentions Libya. With hindsight, it is clear that after the fall of Gaddafi we did not really give enough support to the Government we then recognised. The place collapsed into anarchy and is a possible base for ISIS. About half an hour ago, the Secretary of State for Defence said we were offering security assistance to the Government we now recognise, if and when they request it. Will the Foreign Secretary tell me whether his Department and other Departments are giving every other possible diplomatic and political support to that Government? Until they can establish themselves as a real Administration capable of delivering services to their public and of winning public support, we run the danger again of having a slightly fictional Government in Tripoli, while the rest of the country falls prey to anarchy or even ISIS.
Mr Hammond
As I am sure my right hon. and learned Friend would readily agree, hindsight is indeed a wonderful thing. [Interruption.] The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), reminds me that elections were held in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. It is since then that things have gone wrong.
On support to Prime Minister Sarraj and the Government of national accord, yes, we are providing technical, diplomatic and political assistance. My right hon. and learned Friend will recall that I visited Tripoli a few weeks ago. We are working very closely with Prime Minister Sarraj, both bilaterally and through the European Union. Prime Minister Sarraj was at the meeting in Vienna last Monday in which 20-odd countries got together to discuss how we can best support what that Government are doing.
The situation in Libya is complex, but I think Prime Minister Sarraj is approaching it in the right way— a bottom-up approach. He is not trying to create a Government who can rule Libya in some monolithic fashion, because that is not practical. He is trying to create an umbrella Government within which municipalities are empowered to deliver the services and run the structures that people need. We have considerable experience of that approach—including, indeed, in Syria—working with devolved levels of government in small areas to try to establish good governance from the bottom up. I suspect that that will be a more realistic approach than a top-down approach.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
I propose to resist the temptation to give the House my arguments in favour of Britain remaining in the European Union. [Hon. Members: “No!”] Those Members of Parliament who find it irresistible to hear me on the subject made their way to the debate in Speaker’s House last night, where I debated against, among others, my old colleague Lord Tebbit. On this occasion, I agreed so completely with what has been said by both the Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary that I thought I might desist, particularly as over the next 30 days I shall be making many more speeches on the subject.
This afternoon, I look forward with a certain amount of relief, after this interminable campaign, to the fact that this House and the Government are going to return to the government of the country on domestic issues. We can return to an agenda that will spare us from the fear of millions of criminal Turks coming to this country, our sovereignty being sacrificed to faceless men in Brussels and all the rest of it. A lot of serious issues are facing this country at home. They are described today as, “How to keep people safe at home and abroad, and how to protect our human rights”, so I shall turn to that.
Mr Clarke
With great respect, I am trying to keep my remarks short. As I become more long-serving, I find that I get ever more garrulous, and I know that huge numbers of Members wish to speak in this debate, so if I may be allowed to, I will resist the temptation to give way, much though I normally enjoy it.
When I looked at the Queen’s Speech, listened to it and heard it being analysed afterwards, it seemed to me that the Prime Minister was rather looking to his legacy. He has already become one of the longest-serving Prime Ministers since the war and he has announced that he is not going to be Prime Minister into the next Parliament, so this Queen’s Speech has rather more of a theme than most Queen’s Speeches have. He described it, using the slogan that we are all supposed to use now, as a “progressive, one nation” theme. I do not like slogans, but I can hardly object to that, as I have been trying to describe my own political views in those terms for years. But it also looks at disadvantage in society and improving the life chances of those who have disadvantages, and, in effect, tries to address the still weak state of meritocracy today. I was one of those who benefited from the brief window of meritocracy and social mobility that this country enjoyed quite a long time ago as a result of the Butler Act of 1944, although I hasten to add that I would not go back to that old system nationally or anything of that kind.
We all know that one of the worrying things in our society is a growing awareness of widening inequality, both of incomes, thanks to the absurd levels to which some corporate salaries have been allowed to rise over the past 10 years, and of opportunity for those born in the less advantaged parts of the country. The thing that I was mainly impressed by in looking at the contents of the Queen’s Speech is how we are seized of that. This growing inequality is sensed by more and more people, and it is very real for many of our younger generation. Inequality of opportunity and of income is a subject that has always concerned those of the left, but in my opinion those of us who believe in free market economics should be just as concerned by this threat to the stability of our society as our socialist opposite numbers are. It behoves us to do something about it.
I therefore hope that the Children and Social Work Bill, which contains proposals to tackle the inadequacies in what we do for children in care and improve the operation of the adoption system, will be one of those measures—I will not go through the whole Queen’s Speech—that gives positive effect to the agenda of recreating a fairer society in which opportunities are much more widely available to all sections of society.
The most prominent Bill in the Queen’s Speech was on prison reform. Obviously, I very much welcome that. I say “obviously” because the Secretary of State for Justice and the Prime Minister, who made a very noticeable speech, have reinforced an agenda that our party first set out when we were in opposition before 2010. It is an agenda that I propounded and tried to give effect to as Justice Secretary for the first two and a half years of the Government.
I congratulate the Secretary of State for Justice, who I regret to say is not in his place, because he appears to have achieved more success in overcoming the hesitations in practice of some of the more senior members of the Government than I did. He has been able to promise things that I wish I had achieved and has a much bigger agenda than I was able to deliver. I got rid of indeterminate sentences and did a great deal to improve training for work in prisons by outside employers, among other things, but it looks as though there are things that will at last be tackled.
The problem is always that we have a fear in this House of the reaction to anything entitled “prison reform”, because it is seen to be dangerously wet. In recent decades, both parties have been subject to the fear of the right-wing tabloids every time they have looked at this subject. It is not wet; it is part of protecting people from harm in this society that everything should contribute to the reduction of crime. When people are rightly sent to prison for criminal offences, it is an achievement if most of them do not return to crime, but become honest citizens when they are released.
I think that we can get public support for these changes, so long as we emphasise the fact that at the moment 48% of prisoners are convicted again—they return to crime—within 12 months of being released. That shows how little progress we have made in dealing not with the hard-core criminals who will be in prison for long periods of their life if the police succeed in catching them, but with all those who suffer from drug abuse and mental health problems; those who have never had a basic education and are not numerate or literate; and those who could benefit from training, preparation for work and rehabilitation to return them as honest citizens. I hope, therefore, that we implement these changes, as well as legislating for them.
I welcome Dame Sally Coates’s report on education, which addresses the fact that although we have always tried to educate prisoners, what is delivered is very patchy and limited. I hope that we implement all of it. I welcome the interesting idea of the six reform prisons, but I hope that it does not mean that the most adventurous reforms are confined to those six prisons. I think that we should keep an eye on the 48% figure and judge our progress in a few years’ time on whether we are able, at last, to reduce it.
Jenny Chapman (Darlington) (Lab)
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Mr Clarke
No, I will not.
I do not think we will deliver much in this area unless we tackle one other problem, which is the enormous number of people we incarcerate. In large part, that is a response to the populist demands that have led to our toughening up sentencing for the past two decades. We now have 86,000 prisoners, which is about double the figure of 20 years ago when I was Home Secretary. As Justice Secretary, I signed up to quite substantial reductions in public spending in my Department on the basis that we would reduce the number of prisoners to something like the level that we ought to have in our jails. I was not able to deliver that and after I left, the number started drifting up again. That has the effect that we do not have the money to deliver programmes in areas such as education, which I have mentioned.
Mr Clarke
No, I will not give way; sorry.
Between 2012-13 and 2014-15, there was an 85% fall in the number of prisoners taking A-level-standard qualifications and a 42% drop in those going for Open University qualifications. When we lower the number of prisoners, we will be able to finance what we wish to do. In my opinion, proper rehabilitation programmes cannot be delivered in overcrowded slums.
If I went through all the other topics in the Bill that I would like to support, I would start to exclude other Members from the debate, which, as I have said, I am anxious not to do and which I promise you, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will not do. However, may I briefly welcome the criminal finances Bill?
On the fight against crime—I think my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is replying to the debate—we in this country are very bad at dealing with white-collar crime, and there is growing awareness of that. If someone wishes to rob a bank, they go to the LIBOR market; they do not put on a balaclava and pick up a shotgun—that is much less profitable. At last we are starting to do something about that, and I hope I can be reassured that the Bill will tackle not just tax evasion, which is quite rightly high on the public agenda, but money laundering. London is still the money-laundering capital of the world. For an African despot or a serious international criminal, London is the best place to put their money, because they can trust the bankers to look after it and not to steal it from them. I welcome the fact that we are going to improve the reporting of suspicious activities. I hope we will also impose a duty on those at the head of the institutions involved to ensure that they take positive steps to stop those working for them encouraging such activities.
I will continue to follow progress on the Investigatory Powers Bill. We have to get the balance right between the powers our agencies must have in order to deal with the threat of terrorism and crime, and the privacy that we retain in our society to defend the freedoms we want.
I particularly welcome the fact that there was no mention whatever in the Queen’s Speech of repealing the Human Rights Act or any legislation on human rights. I hope that means we are proceeding on this front with very considerable caution. I looked at the speech by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in which she was reported to have said things on the subject of the European convention on human rights. Actually, what she said was rather ambiguous; it was not a change of Government policy. I hope I am correctly reassured that there is not the slightest question of our giving up the convention or trying to weaken the jurisdiction in Strasbourg.
I wait to hear a good reason for getting rid of the Human Rights Act and for stopping British judges applying the principles of the convention. When we are taken to Strasbourg, which is where people will go again if we get rid of the Human Rights Act, we lose only 2% of cases. I do not get frightfully worried about air hostesses being allowed to wear crucifixes with their uniform, which is the kind of case we actually lose. As someone has rightly pointed out, the Council of Europe has systems, so we are not in fact being forced to give prisoners voting rights.
Our reputation for human rights will be damaged if we are seen to retreat from where we are. The Court in Strasbourg and the convention are the best levers we have to make sure that liberal values are defended in Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia and other countries, which do abide by the judgments in Strasbourg—and they get defeated many more times there than we do. I therefore trust that very considerable thought is being given to this subject. I am not aware of any harm being done at the moment.
Of course I believe in the supremacy of Parliament, but even Parliament must pass legislation consistent with the high standards of human rights that we have always had. I see no harm whatever in British judges, or judges in Strasbourg, being allowed occasionally to challenge the way in which our legislation is interpreted by officials in the Home Office or elsewhere, and even occasionally by Ministers, when that interpretation really ought to be reconsidered.
Subject to that, and assuming we are all putting human rights in our foreign policy, as the Foreign Secretary eloquently said we are, for which he has my full approval, I think we will see, once the slight madness of this referendum is over—I am of the generation who do not think that referendums are the best way of determining this country’s foreign policy or the basis of its trade and economic prosperity in tomorrow’s world—that this is not the programme of a Government who have been driven off their agenda, but the very solid reforming programme of a Government who have the best interests of the country in mind. We should be able to achieve some very real social advances if we implement it.
Government Referendum Leaflet
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(8 years ago)
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Mr Lidington
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her words of support. On the specific questions she posed, I can certainly confirm that, since we are outside the Schengen no borders area, we can and do apply border checks to people seeking to enter this country, including EU nationals and, as she said, UK nationals as well.
It is indeed the case that, where other countries—the hon. Lady cited Norway—have sought and obtained access to the European Union’s free trade single market, that has come at a price. That price has included acceptance of the principle of freedom of movement for workers, an obligation to pay into the European Union’s budget and, critically, an acceptance that the country concerned will implement European Union rules, including on product standards, without being present at the table, having a say or having a vote on how those rules should be made. Part of the Government’s case is indeed that the interests of British business and the interests of jobs and growth in the United Kingdom are served by our having a role in leading and shaping the direction of the single market, not by simply accepting rules that have been worked out by other countries in our absence. She is also right that, in the case of Canada, we are looking at seven years so far and still no final agreement. It is a mistake to underestimate the complexity involved in a free trade agreement negotiation, particularly if it has to be conducted in the circumstances of the UK having decided to withdraw from the European Union.
No one could be in any doubt that the leaflet being distributed this week represents the views of the Government. As I said earlier, the Government are not neutral on this issue. We accept that this is an issue on which there are long-standing differences of opinion honourably held by people of different political parties and of none. I have always respected the views of those who differ from my own on this matter, but I believe that the Government have not only the right, but a duty to explain to the electorate, when faced with a decision of this gravity, the reasons why the Government have come to the recommendation that we have come to.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is an absurd proposition to argue that the Government of the day are not entitled to form an opinion or a policy on the role of the Government in the modern world, or are not allowed to communicate the reasons for having such a policy to the electorate? As the general public appear to be demanding more calm factual statements about the issue, rather than less, does he agree that those who disagree should come out with a calm description of the factual basis on which they believe they can negotiate some alternative role for this country, not just resort to blustering about fear-mongering or claiming that we are bending the rules of some sporting jape, which they seem to think the referendum represents?
Mr Lidington
The Government would be abrogating our responsibility to the electorate were we to decline to communicate our views and the reasons for our views. There is an equal obligation on those championing a British exit from the European Union to spell out both the arguments to which my right hon. and learned Friend refers, and, critically, the future relationship they are seeking with the European Union. Having taken part in many debates and exchanges on the subject of the European Union in the past few years, I have found that there are almost as many visions for the future relationship of the United Kingdom with the European Union when outside it as there are advocates of a British exit.
UK’s Relationship with the EU
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(8 years, 3 months ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr Lidington
What my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is seeking through these negotiations is to secure a better deal for the United Kingdom in Europe and to secure agreement to measures that will make the whole of Europe better at creating jobs, growth and prosperity than it has been in recent years. The British people will then be given their say over our future in Europe, which they were denied for 13 years while the right hon. Gentleman’s party was in government, despite three different treaties being enacted in those years which transferred further powers from this House to the institutions of the European Union.
It has always been my right hon. Friend’s intention to make a statement, subject to permission, after Prime Minister’s questions tomorrow. The timing of the release of the documents was in the hands of the President of the European Council. The draft text of those documents has been changing over the weekend, and as recently as yesterday. Clearly, until President Tusk published, we could not come to the House to answer questions on them.
I have been at debates and in evidence sessions before Select Committees when I have listened to complaints from Members from all parts the House that they were being given insufficient time to look at the detail before they had the opportunity to question Ministers about it, so the Prime Minister’s approach has been deliberately to give that opportunity to right hon. and hon. Members and then make himself available to answer questions. The fact that the right hon. Gentleman focused entirely on the choreography of this morning and asked not one question on the substance makes that point for me.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
My constituency office has been able to obtain a copy of a letter sent by President Donald Tusk to Members of the European Parliament, which the Leader of the Opposition does not seem to have been able to obtain. It sets out the broad description that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe has just given.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the encouraging progress on issues such as Britain’s possible opt-out in future from ever closer union, the relationship between eurozone members and non-eurozone members, and the ability of national Parliaments to veto proposals from the Commission to member states, are crucial questions that have a big bearing on Britain’s future changed relationship with the European Union? Does he accept that the big issue of how far the British tax and benefits system should be enabled to discriminate against foreigners working alongside British workers in this country—no doubt other member states would be entitled to discriminate against British workers working there—needs to be settled on a satisfactory basis, and then we can get back to the big issue of Britain’s full relationship with the Union and the role Britain wants to play in the modern world?
Mr Lidington
My right hon. and learned Friend is right to say that the issues addressed in the drafts and which are a response to the four issues raised by the Prime Minister in his letter to President Tusk last December do tackle the very important issues that challenge every country in Europe and which are of the greatest concern to the British people. The one area where I would differ from my right hon. and learned Friend is that in the eyes of the people whom we are sent here to represent, the question of the abuse of free movement and access to our welfare systems is a very important one, and it is right that that is part of the renegotiations.
Europe: Renegotiation
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Speaker
Order. A very large number of Members are seeking to catch my eye, and that was entirely to be expected. In order to have any chance of accommodating them, brevity will be of the essence.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the big issue that will be settled in this forthcoming referendum is how best this country is to protect its national interests and security in the modern world and how best to enhance our prosperity for the next 30 or 50 years? Will he seek to ensure that we do not lose sight of that when we address current events?
While our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is embarking on very important negotiations—and I wish him success on competitiveness in particular—will the Minister for Europe ensure that when we are negotiating the benefit rights of those foreign nationals who work alongside British people in employment in this country, we remember the interests of the 2 million or so British nationals who live and work in the EU and do not wish to see those Governments start to discriminate against our nationals in their tax and benefits systems?
Mr Lidington
The answer to my right hon. and learned Friend’s second point is certainly yes, the interests of British people are always at the heart of this Government’s thinking about any area of policy, and we will certainly continue to treat the national, economic and security interests of the UK as the core objective of every aspect of this European negotiation.
European Union Referendum Bill
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(8 years, 8 months ago)
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Mr Lidington
In answer to my hon. Friend’s last point, if the House is dissatisfied with any regulation that the Government put before Parliament, it can reject the statutory instrument. In that case, the default position under the package that I am proposing to the House would be to revert to section 125 without the exemptions being made by regulation. There is, therefore, the safeguard that Parliament will have the final say.
I hope that my hon. Friend will listen when I address the concerns in more detail, but I say to him first that I have been present at a number of debates in the House when he has said that a legal opinion that he has received is of weight and importance. I think that the Government are entitled to take seriously the arguments that Treasury counsel have put to them.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
I realise that I should not be interrupting the flow of people to whom the Government are only too anxious to make any concession that is demanded and who are obviously quite clear about what result they want from the referendum—indeed, they are rather more concerned about the result than the process—but will the Minister confirm that, whatever further concessions he is now making, it will still be possible for Ministers to give a clear and authoritative opinion on whether, according to the constitutional Government of the country, it is in the best interests of the United Kingdom in respect of its political future in the world and its economic prospects to be in or out of the European Union, and that little things like being allowed to take advice on the factual accuracy of what they are saying on behalf—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. [Interruption.] Order! The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that interventions have to be short. We cannot have speeches at this stage. [Interruption.] I will make the decision. I am sure that the Minister will want to reply. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman needs to intervene again, he may do so, but we cannot have speeches or long interventions.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. [Interruption.] Order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will have to sit down for a moment. He is well known as the big beast and I am certain that he has never worried about the number of people around him who may not be on the same side.
Mr Lidington
I will come to the detail of our proposal, because in doing so I hope to answer my hon. Friend’s points.
Mr Clarke
My right hon. Friend is so desperate to give way to everything put to him, I do not think I am his friend at all. In my opinion, he has already given away far too much. I quite understand why: the opportunism of the Opposition parties, which do not agree with the hard-line Eurosceptics in my party but which are determined to vote with our rebels to force this preposterous situation on us. Will he assure me that if, two weeks before the campaign ends, a decision is suddenly taken to finish health and safety or food safety regulations in some key area, because a judgment of the European Court has meant that hundreds will die or the horticulture industry will be wiped out, a Minister will be allowed, in these complex trade matters, on TTIP and so on, to consult officials and give some authoritative, clear description of what the decision or proposal actually means? I do not think that most of our right-wing newspapers would report what he would say based on factual advice, but could we leave open the possibility that he can at least consult experts on the negotiations before giving statements on behalf of the Government?
Mr Kenneth Clarke
My right hon. Friend seems very nervous about expressing an opinion on that, which would perhaps not be necessary if we had a more representative body listening to the debate than we happen to have in the Chamber at the moment with this selective group. The Government, who will be the Government at the start of the referendum and after it—[Interruption]—and during it, as the Foreign Secretary rightly says, should not have a period of four weeks during which they cannot check the factual accuracy of anything the Minister says on a controversial European subject. The Government will be unable to use the resources of the civil service to put out statements, including factual statements, on what propositions are correct, and they will be unable to use any Government resources to explain the merits or otherwise of what will be the Government’s position on a particular issue. We have not covered this problem; we have already gone—farcically—too far in neutralising the ability of the Government to give an authoritative opinion and explanation of the facts and the issues in the course of the campaign.
Mr Jenkin
And indeed in our own country—it was the conduct of the Welsh referendum in 1997 that led the Committee on Standards in Public Life to bring forward its proposals for purdah, which the then Labour Government accepted and which the Labour party consistently supports today. Those arrangements were good enough for the north-east referendum, the alternative vote referendum and the most recent Welsh devolution referendum. Indeed, in the view of some Members, they were probably not strong enough in respect of the Scottish referendum last year.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) said, the purdah proposals were designed for a referendum on the euro, so the idea that the European Union was not considered when the arrangements were formulated is just not correct. Tony Blair’s Government introduced the 2000 Act in order that there could be a fair referendum on the euro, which was his ambition. If these arrangements were good enough for Tony Blair, why are they not good enough for our own Conservative Government?
A referendum should be a solemn and carefully regulated constitutional procedure, not a ploy or device to get a particular outcome and fix a political problem. Abuse of the referendum by less scrupulous Governments in the last century famously led Clement Attlee to describe referendums as
“a device of demagogues and dictators”.
Other countries, such as Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland, have much tougher purdah regimes. The Government’s proposals take us backwards, as we have heard from those who have participated in referendums, such as Nigel Smith, a well-known referendum expert who was chairman of the Scottish yes campaign. He has been appalled by the proposals, and he gave evidence to our Committee about them.
It has been suggested that the precedent for the forthcoming referendum should be 1975. I do not know whether Members have read the 1975 Cabinet minutes, but they show how the Government were set to run a parallel campaign to the yes campaign. That is not the precedent that we should follow in the last 28 days of campaigning. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary could bring forward a White Paper before the start of the 28-day period, just as the Scottish Executive brought forward a comprehensive White Paper about their proposals for Scottish independence, although it was lacking in detail and a little bit partisan—we had some comments to make about that. There is nothing to stop the Government bringing forward as much information as they want before the purdah period. Incidentally, the Electoral Commission thinks that 28 days is far too short for a purdah period and we are not debating that today. If the Government, with all the advantages that Governments have, cannot win the referendum just because they will be restricted for the last 28 days, what kind of referendum do we expect to have?
I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) and I really think he wants to go back to a 1975-style referendum where the Government are used as an instrument of campaigning in what should be a fair fight. What is the point of having spending limits on the yes and no campaigns if Ministers can use the machinery of Government in an unrestricted way, which is what the abolition of purdah would mean?
Mr Kenneth Clarke
I have never known a referendum of any major consequence in which the losing side has not followed up its defeat by saying it has been cheated and that the electorate has just been misled. That has been said ever since the 1975 referendum, and the Scottish nationalists have said the same thing ever since the Scottish referendum. The Government have no intention of putting out publicity, as they have said. The basic proposition should be that the Government of the day, when putting out a statement of their policy or an explanation of their position on a particular proposal—such as whether or not we as members of the European Union should be party to a TTIP with the United States—should be entitled to use the civil service and their press office as a source of advice and checking the factual accuracy of what Ministers are saying on behalf of the Government. The alternative is preposterous: under my hon. Friend’s proposition, for three weeks there would be no Government.
Mr Jenkin
That is absolute nonsense. Even in a general election, Ministers can get advice from their Departments. Ministers also take advice during local government elections. If something happens that is unconnected with the referendum, Ministers will be able to take advice. I have heard it said that Ministers want to use their private offices to organise their speaking tours and to use their special advisers, who are paid for by the taxpayer, to campaign in the referendum. That is not an acceptable use of public money. What is the point of placing spending limits on the yes and no campaigns if the Government are going to avail themselves of all those advantages? My right hon. and learned Friend could persuade the Government to produce a White Paper to set out their case well in advance of the purdah period. That is an unimpeded advantage of which the Government can avail themselves. All we are saying is that there should be something of a level playing field in the last 28 days.
I regret that the Opposition accept new clause 10; nevertheless I am grateful that they support amendment (a) in order to create a framework for the creation of regulations. I am very unhappy with amendment 53. As the Opposition spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), made plain, to have amendment 53—which already adulterates section 125—without the scrutiny process of regulations and a specific debate about what Ministers actually want to exempt is a shot from a double-barreled shotgun against section 125 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. If the Government want to provide exemptions, they should introduce the amendments under regulations rather than under amendment 53.
The advantage of defeating amendment 53 is that we will be able to have amendment 4 instead. It was the unanimous view of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee that section 125 and its effect on this referendum should be restored unimpeded. That would be the effect of amendment 4, but there may be some tidying up to do.
European Union Referendum Bill
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(8 years, 11 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
I am going to make a little progress, bearing in mind Mr Speaker’s exhortation.
It is almost four decades ago to the day that I, along with millions of others in Britain, cast my vote in favour of our membership of the European Communities, and like millions of others I believed then that I was voting for an economic community that would bring significant economic benefits to Britain, but without undermining our national sovereignty. I do not remember anyone saying anything about ever-closer union or a single currency. But the institution that the clear majority of the British people voted to join has changed almost beyond recognition in the decades since then.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
There must have been some strange juxtapositions in the campaign held in the 1970s, in which I took a very active part. Most of the debates I took part in were about the pooling of sovereignty and the direct applicability of European legislation without parliamentary intervention, which was a very controversial subject, and, besides, ever-closer union was in the treaty to which we were acceding.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
I have to tell the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) that, though I enjoyed his speech very much, he has not persuaded me to support the SNP amendment tonight. That is not because I no longer have fundamental doubts about referendums. Like every politician of my generation, I prefer parliamentary democracy, but we are where we are and it is obvious that we will have a referendum. I probably will not vote in favour of the Bill tonight, but I shall do nothing to stop it going ahead in principle.
I would only warn my right hon. and hon. Friends that since Harold Wilson made the unwise decision to introduce the institution into our British constitution it has never yet been used to settle any question. The question of proportional representation, for example, is very much alive and kicking. The question of elected mayors does not seem to have been totally resolved by all the local referendums. The future of Scotland, and what I hope will be its continued relationship with the United Kingdom, has been enlivened, not quietened, by the result of the recent referendum. Now we are to have one on Europe again.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that politicians of conviction fight in referendums and accept that they have lost them, but they do not change their fundamental views. I do not believe that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson) will become an enthusiastic Europhile if he is on the losing side of the referendum, and he will not be surprised to learn that I am likely to be found supporting the yes campaign, but I hope that the referendum campaign will be of the same extraordinarily high quality as the Scottish one, in which I took some small part. I have never known the population be so politicised or have such an intense debate. So far, I have been on the winning side in all the important referendums, and I hope that I will be so again after an interesting campaign.
Mr Owen Paterson
I think that I have one over my right hon. and learned Friend in that I have been the president of a European trade association and he has not. He really must not muddle the idea of the European Union, which is a political and judicial organisation, and the European market, of which I am a most enthusiastic proponent.
Mr Clarke
My right hon. Friend appears to believe that we can somehow have all the advantages of the European Union and the market without complying with any of the obligations. I know of no trading bloc that allows anybody entry to its markets on the basis that they will decide whether to comply with its rules.
I approve of the form of words in the Bill for the question but I hope, as the campaign goes on and we all form all-party campaigns, it becomes crystal clear what the question actually means. It is not solely about the negotiations for reform. Personally, I completely concede that the European Union has a lot of defects and is ripe for reform, and I approve very strongly of some of the measures, particularly those in the Bloomberg speech, which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is pressing for—if he can achieve them. However, the yes vote involves a decision on the future role of the United Kingdom in the modern world: how we are best able to further the interests of our citizens, defend our security, develop our economy and bring prosperity. That is the big question.
Mr Clarke
I will not, because we are under a time limit and other people want to speak. I apologise to my hon. Friend. He and I have debated this frequently.
We are 1% of the world’s population and we represent 3% of the world’s GDP. As a proportion, we are declining yet further. On the question of being in the European Union, we need to get across to people that our effective voice in the world, insofar as we have one, is best deployed as a leading and influential player in the European Union. There will be less interest taken in British views by the United States, Russia, China, India and other emerging powers if we go into splendid isolation. As I have already said, the idea that we can somehow advance our future prosperity by withdrawing from the biggest organised trading bloc in the world, while at the same time, as a Conservative party, advocating wider free trade wherever it can be obtained, is an absurdity.
That leads me to the other argument: what does “out” mean and what does a no vote mean? I look forward to my Eurosceptic friends providing an answer to that, because Eurosceptics have always given different answers. My former hon. Friend who is now in the UK Independence party, the hon. Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell), has a quite different view of what a no vote means compared with some of my no voting colleagues on the Government Back Benches. Does it mean the Norwegian option? Do we stay in the trading area? That would mean we pay a large subscription, accept free movement of labour—Norway has a higher proportion of other EU nationals compared with Norwegians than we have compared with Brits—and comply with all the legislation, rules and regulations of the single market without having any say in them.
Do we go further than that and have the Swiss model? The Swiss model means we would have some access to the single market. However, in those areas we would have to comply with all the laws and rules that would be directly applied and have no influence on what they are.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
Mr Clarke
I cannot as there is a time limit.
The Swiss do not have access to large parts of the market, although I would add that they accepted the free movement of labour. They have no access to European financial services, or any other services. Swiss banks are providing investment and employment in the City of London because Switzerland is excluded from the extremely valuable part of our financial services industry, on which a lot of our prosperity depends. Normally, I find that Eurosceptics do not address that.
Do Eurosceptics wish to go into the wide blue yonder and leave the trade area altogether? That would involve tariffs. That would involve 10% tariffs on vehicle exports to Europe. I doubt whether my hon. Friends are advocating that we should cease to have any access to the market at all. We need to be absolutely clear that the Eurosceptic case is usually that we are so important to Europe that the other countries, if we negotiate strongly enough, will allow us to keep the benefits of membership and give way on the obligations.
As I have said, there are some things that we ought to negotiate. However, we should be wary of getting too carried away by freedom of movement of labour, which is desirable in a trading area. It is a benefit to all members, including the United Kingdom. We should, of course, stop benefit tourism. Benefit tourists are unwise if they come here, because benefits are more generous in Germany, Sweden and in many other places. No doubt they will agree with us on clarifying the exclusion of benefit tourism.
What we need to bear in mind about seeking to go further is that 2.2 million British people are living and working in the rest of the European Union, and about 2.5 million EU citizens are living and working here. If we are going to demand treaty change to permit us to discriminate against European foreign nationals—not other foreign nationals, but European foreign nationals—in our employment laws, our tax system or our benefit system, are they going to forgo doing the same thing to British residents in other countries? There are more British people drawing unemployment benefit in Germany than there are Germans drawing unemployment benefit here. I think that an Englishman working alongside a Frenchman in an international company in France should, if he is doing the same job, have the same take-home pay. I find it difficult to argue why an Englishman and a Polish person working alongside each other doing the same job in Britain should not have the same pay either. Freedom of movement of labour benefits us.
Eurosceptics love to demand treaty change. They do that because they know it is not possible to get treaty change to a complicated 28 nation state treaty before 2017. It takes five or six years. We can have legally binding protocols on particular matters, which has been resorted to, and I am sure ingenuity in the Foreign Office and in the corridors of Europe will produce legally binding protocols for anything we produce. To make a touchstone of treaty change, when there are 27 other Governments who will follow our lead in the process and all start demanding things, is not worth pursuing.
The key issue is to have a campaign, as well as a question, that is absolutely clear. This is about Britain’s role in the modern 21st-century world of interdependent nations. How do we maximise our influence? By using our powerbase in Europe. The alternative, I am afraid, is a fanciful escapist route into isolated nationalism which would greatly diminish our influence in the world and greatly damage our economy.
Sir William Cash
My hon. Friend is absolutely right.
Removing the words “ever-closer union”—which have never been specifically adjudicated on by the European Court of Justice, and merely form part of the preamble to the treaties—will not solve the problem. It does not change the legal obligations of the accumulated treaties, from Maastricht to Lisbon. Notwithstanding their protestations, it will not be the establishment, the EU, the BBC or the self-appointed multinationals with vested interests who will decide these matters. None of those multinationals has advanced a rational argument to support their determination to stay in the EU. That is my response to what was said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, who asked the same question of us from the other side of the argument. They were hopelessly wrong about the euro, and have been hopelessly wrong about so many aspects of European debate.
It is the voters who will give their verdict by the end of 2017. It is the voters, and the voters alone, who will decide it, not the massed ranks of the Europhiles. The rolling back of the treaties is imperative to our national interest. Indeed, the 1971 White Paper, on which the European Communities Act 1972 is still founded, clearly stated that we must keep the veto precisely because it was in our national interest to do so. It went on to say that to do otherwise would
“imperil the very fabric of the Community.”
I look at my right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe because he knows that he supported that at the time, in 1971.
Mr Kenneth Clarke
My hon. Friend is quite right. In 1971 we had unanimity when making European laws, but once made, they were directly binding. It is the second issue that my hon. Friend is trying to reopen. In the Lisbon treaty, we went for weighted majority voting, because, with 28 member states, giving every Government the right to block any proposal would prevent any decisions from being made.
Sir William Cash
It was for precisely to deal with that problem that I set up the Maastricht referendum campaign. My right hon. and learned Friend and others have persistently and continuously opposed a referendum, because they have not wanted these matters to be reopened. However, they have been reopened by virtue of this Bill.
I was concerned to hear the Foreign Secretary say on Sunday that the unilateral repeal of EU legislation at Westminster was unachievable, and would lead to our leaving the EU. Of course, the second part of that proposition is inherent in the referendum itself; the voters will decide. The Foreign Secretary invoked the analogy of the yellow card, which has been a dismal failure. When it was applied in relation to the the European Public Prosecutor, the Commission simply ignored the result.
During the Maastricht debates, we were told by the then Foreign Secretary that the Maastricht Treaty was the
“high water mark of federalism”.
That was patent nonsense, as has been demonstrated by so much of the Europhilic commentary that has poured out in a relentless tide of enthusiasm for European integration, and which has engulfed the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole, causing protests, riots and massive unemployment. It will drag Europe down, and will create the very instability that the project after 1945 was intended to avoid.
We need amendments to this Bill, relating to matters such as the purdah arrangements, the question of prohibiting European or governmental money, the question of the impartiality of the broadcasting authorities, the level of expenses, the timing and also, perhaps, the question in the referendum. According to recent opinion polls, trust among the European voters is at an all-time low, and that trust is what lies at the heart of the whole debate. In the words of Lord Randolph Churchill, we must trust the people.
Ukraine
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(9 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
I am afraid that the reality is that, if the United States decides to supply lethal aid, there will be two policies within the NATO alliance, because the German Chancellor could not have been clearer about her position, which she set out on Saturday, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said. This is a matter for individual national Government decision, and individual countries will make their own decisions. As far as I am aware, no countries within the NATO alliance apart from the United States are actively contemplating the supply of lethal assistance to the Ukrainians.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend stick to his opinion that, however well trained and equipped the Ukrainian army is, it is inconceivable that it could resist the Russian army, or even slow it down significantly, so long as President Putin determined that he was going to put in the necessary resources? Does my right hon. Friend therefore agree that the British contribution must be to remain resolute and comparatively hawkish on stepping up economic sanctions if Putin maintains his present stance of military aggression, because the President of Russia cannot protect himself against economic sanctions, and it is the only reasonable response we can make?
Mr Hammond
I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. That is indeed the role we have defined for ourselves, being the most forward-leaning partner within the European Union, urging, cajoling and persuading the others about the need to remain robust. When I say that we are the most forward-leaning country, I mean that we are the most forward-leaning large country—some of our small Baltic partners are very much forward leaning on this issue.
The underlying truth is this: hon. Members know, and the history of the Soviet Union reminds us, that, in the end, we cannot ignore the economics. Russia spends something like 20% of its GDP on defence and security. That is unsustainable in the long term. A small and shrinking economy—it is much smaller than the UK economy—attached to a very large military force is ultimately an unsustainable and unstable situation.
Iran (Nuclear Talks)
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
I am sure that everybody who wants one day to see a return to stability in the middle east will be hoping for eventual success in these negotiations. No one wants to see sanctions maintained on Iran and the Iranian people for any longer than is necessary. Will my right hon. Friend assure me, within the sensible constraints of what he can say during negotiations, that any eventual solution must include a system of inspection and monitoring that will continue for the indefinite future so that every interested party can be reassured that any deal will not be slid back on either by the present Iranian Government or any future regime in that country?
Mr Hammond
I can reassure my right hon. Friend that transparency and an inspection and verification regime are at the heart of these negotiations. The Iranians understand that the regrettable but none the less undeniable lack of mutual trust between the two sides means that there will have to be robust inspection and verification procedures in place throughout the duration of any agreement. Indeed, there will have to be proper transparency and inspection arrangements in place beyond the duration of any agreement under the usual terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in respect of a non-nuclear power.
Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security
Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts(9 years, 8 months ago)
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Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
This debate covers four of the most complicated, most grave and serious threats to our well-being and security that this country has faced for a very long time. I congratulate those who spoke before me on their brilliance in covering all four topics in such restricted time. Three quarters of an hour is not really long enough to do so from the Front Bench. I know my limitations; I have strong views on all four, but I propose to confine myself to the problems in Iraq and Syria and to jihadist extremism, which is probably, in a competitive field, the most current and pressing problem and the most dangerous situation that we face at this very moment.
It seems to me that a great deal of attention is being paid, outside the House and in this debate, to whether or not the Government will be supported if they decide to use armed force and take part in the air strikes in which the United States is currently engaged. That is a very important question, but in my opinion it is somewhat putting the cart before the horse to make that the main question. An answer to that question depends on all kinds of other things being satisfied.
I suspect that my view coincides with that of the vast majority here—that we would of course support the use of British armed force if it was essential, unavoidable, in support of some crucial national interest and in pursuit of some well thought out and credible policy objective. We should have learnt in the last 15 years—when on the whole, American and western policy in the entire middle east has been a catastrophe—that leaping into military activity without a well-judged policy, a well-judged diplomacy and a well-judged strategy has contributed to the extraordinary state of anarchy that has now broken out across the region.
Those problems were not caused by our military activity or by our armed forces; they were caused by the disastrous politics of the decision to invade Iraq for rather naive ideological reasons as far as the Americans were concerned, and rather contrived and almost bogus ones as far as the British and some of our allies were concerned. We have not achieved striking success in the odd ventures we have made in the use of military power occasionally in north Africa and the middle east since. Before we use any armed force, we need to know exactly what medium and long-term strategy lies behind the politics of the immediate steps that we are going to take.
One thing I greatly welcome in the Foreign Secretary’s excellent speech was what I thought was his pretty clear undertaking that we would not take part in any military action without a debate and without the approval of Parliament. It is possible to contrive a rather childlike version of our constitutional position and say that the royal prerogative controls the use of military forces. That is very attractive to Governments who are a little uncertain of their majority in the House of Commons when they want to take action.
It is true that if there is a sudden surprise attack on a British possession or on the British military, the Prime Minister can use the royal prerogative to respond instantly, without having to wait to recall Parliament, and to order his troops to defend themselves against whatever the threat may be, but the idea that we work out with our allies a comprehensive policy and strategy and then join in military action in support of it without a pretty convincing vote of approval from the House of Commons would certainly be a political outrage. I think that it would be of very dubious legality too.
Mr Gray
I intend to return to the point that my right hon. and learned Friend is making in my subsequent remarks. However, does he agree that over the last 1,000 years, the House has had only two such votes before action has been taken? The first such vote was over Iraq, which I think we are all agreed was a disaster, so a vote in the House of Commons does not necessarily lead to a worthwhile war. The second was this time last year over Syria. All the other wars—the Falklands, the Gulf, the first world war and the second world war—were conducted by the Prime Minister and the Government without approval of the House of Commons.
Mr Clarke
I am grateful to my hon. Friend—and I am sure the research behind his point will be checked—but I really think that in 2014, in the circumstances of today, to assert that the Executive has the unfettered right to take part in military action without getting the approval of the House is simply indefensible. I would personally be outraged by it.
Mr Redwood
I am grateful, but surely the point is that on the previous occasions of great wars, the House was in agreement, so there was no need for a Division. If the Opposition had opposed the decision, there would have been a vote.
Mr Clarke
I hope that on this occasion, too, we could reach such a political consensus in the House of Commons and across the country and that our debates about the use of armed force would lead to no significant division. That would be an ideal outcome, but I think that a controversial use of military force in yet another attempt to intervene in the Arab spring—whether it be this time with Shi’ite allies, this time with Sunni allies or this time with whatever outrageous group has emerged—requires a vote.
In principle, I am all in favour of using military force when it is unavoidable and in the vital national interest. I agree that ISIL is one of the most barbaric and outrageous organisations that has emerged on this planet for some considerable time, so I have no moral scruple whatever about the proper use of military force against them. I would like to see them degraded and destroyed. However, when the House votes and debates this sort of action on whatever occasion, experience shows that we must now have a much clearer idea of our objective. Our objective is not only to protect our security; it involves consideration of what will contribute to the restoration of stability and normality across the region. It means consideration of what will command the support of sane Muslims, sane Shi’a and sane Sunni; what will get sufficient support from the regional powers, as well as from the western powers; what kind of order we are trying to put in place. I hope that that does not get narrowed down to consideration of whether or not we should join the Americans in air strikes on particular installations before or after the mid-term elections in the United States.
John Kerry is engaged in a vital mission which goes to the heart of what I have just said. He is trying to put together a regional alliance. In that regard—I agree with those who have hinted at this—we have to rethink where we are starting from. A regional alliance must include some people with whom we have been enemies, and with whom we have very serious issues on other fronts, because the widest possible support is required.
The key players, obviously, are Iran and Saudi Arabia. They are the two great powers of the region. Many of the troubles have actually been caused by people acting as proxies for the interests of those two states. They have far more influence on the ground, and on events, than we in the west are likely to have. They know far more about what is going on. I have been a member of the National Security Council for the last two years, and I know the limits of our actual knowledge of events on the ground in this region. I know that we are constantly surprised by the latest utterly extraordinary and unpredictable turn of events that sweeps over what we have done. With Iran go Assad and Hezbollah, which is a close ally. The Shi’ite militias in Iraq, which we call the Iraqi Government, are also very influenced by the Iranians..
We just have to accept—without in any way resiling from our criticism about getting involved—that the Saudi Arabians really must deal with the Qatari problem of the people whom they support, and also—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames) said a moment ago—make absolutely clear that they are not supporting, in any way, fringe groups which, in the long term, are as much of a danger to Saudi and Gulf interests as they are to our own.
Turkey is a vital player. It is still the nearest that we have to a moderate Islamic Government. It has huge direct interests; it is threatened; and it is essential to have at least its complicity in what we do, and, I would hope, its support as well. Egypt is also a vital player. It has recovered from the outrageous threats of the Arab dawn by restoring political dictatorship, but it is nevertheless a key player. Russia must be kept onside, because it is also of influence.
I am not sure that the states of Iraq and Syria will ever exist again as we know them, but I do think that we need a political strategy in order to ensure that some kind of long-term stability will replace the anarchy that we have helped to create so far.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has used up his time.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)
It is an honour to follow that distinguished speech by my constituency neighbour the Defence Committee Chair, the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart). I wholeheartedly endorse his analysis of the need to repair our nation’s capacity to act. In the short time available to me, I shall focus on why I think that is important.
A year on from Parliament rejecting action in Syria, here we are again, wracked with uncertainty and warning ourselves of dire consequences if we intervene or if we sit back, and we have a Prime Minister who has seemed trapped by the fiasco of the chaotic vote last year and his hasty decision to rule out all military action in its aftermath. Some are attempting to rewrite history on that vote, suggesting we were being asked to intervene on the side of the murderous butchers who have now gained a foothold in Iraq. Some, such as the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), have made the argument that every time we go in we seem to make it worse, so better to leave well alone, but that is a counsel of despair.
By failing to intervene in Syria when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people we abandoned the moderate, democratic Syrian opposition who were bravely fighting both the brutal regime and the ISIL insurgency that was, at that time, being covertly bolstered by Assad himself to cloud the thinking of the west and distract his main internal enemy.
Mr Kenneth Clarke
I must have expressed myself very badly, given the hon. Gentleman’s parody of what I said. The gravity of the problem is such that we are fully justified in using military force in support of international order and, in particular, of our own interests. What I said was that that would work only when accompanied by a background of well thought-through policy and diplomacy leading to long-term stability. The failure in the past has been to leap into military action first and then find that events have run away from us. It is wrong to suggest that I have suddenly become a pacifist and isolationist. The worry is that, if we are not careful, all our failures will make the public become more isolationist and pacifist.
John Woodcock
I offer my humble apologies to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I think I got carried away by the melody of his words, and I am glad that he has set the record straight for the House.
Leaving the moderates to their fate allowed ISIL to pour into rebel-held areas in north-east Syria and establish a stronger base from which it has been able to spread and grow into the monster that we see today. Perhaps most importantly of all, it sent a message to the extremists that we simply no longer had the will to take a stand. President Obama drew a red line over chemical weapons use, and it was crossed. What happened? Not a great deal.
Let us remind ourselves of what has happened in Syria over the past year. About 10.8 million people now require humanitarian aid and 9 million have been displaced. Also, 3 million refugees have spilled over to the country’s neighbours, overwhelming Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, and winter is coming. The public are understandably weary of perpetual conflict, but they also rightly demand that we do what is necessary to keep Britain safe. That is necessary if we value our way of life, our personal security and our living standards sustained through trade with other nations. If we value those things, we have no choice but to confront this evil, this perversion of the true faith of Islam.
The only choice will not be whether we intervene, but when and how. The longer we delay, the greater the threat will become and the more we will ultimately have to sacrifice to defeat it. The next 9/11—or worse—will come, and it will happen with us knowing that, had we acted sooner, we could in all likelihood have prevented it. That would be the real betrayal of those who have lost their lives fighting for their country. It would also be an abdication of our responsibility to lead.
Britain should therefore be at the forefront of efforts to engage in an international coalition to prevent ISIL from creating a permanent state intent on jihad against the west. We should be planning not only for the military action that is needed to beat back the immediate threat but for a concerted international effort to create the environment that moderate forces in the region need to bring greater stability to the middle east, and we should be helping them to eliminate the social, economic and political conditions that allow the extremists to thrive. ISIL’s twisted ideology is the greatest threat to global security and to our values since Nazi Germany and, as happened at the time of the rise of the Nazis, we will all ultimately be held to account for what we did, or did not do, to confront the threat when we had the chance.