Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this government amendment seeks to allow certain provisions of the Bill to be extended to the Isle of Man through what is commonly known as a permissive extent clause. This is a well-established method of enabling UK legislation to be extended to the overseas territories and Crown dependencies.

I should clarify that the amendment was explicitly requested by the Isle of Man Government due to the legislative pressures that Tynwald, the island’s parliament, currently faces. I want to be clear with noble Lords that I am moving the amendment to allow debate and to put on record the request from the Isle of Man Government. I recognise that some noble Lords expressed concerns in the earlier parts of this Committee stage about both the scope and purpose of Clause 2, to which this amendment relates. I will therefore seek to withdraw the amendment once noble Lords have had an opportunity to speak to it.

Returning to the detail of the amendment, this permissive extent clause provides for the addition of a narrow delegated power that, when activated, will allow certain provisions of the Bill to apply in the Isle of Man. The power is exercisable by an Order in Council, which can be made at a time agreed between the UK Government and the Isle of Man Government.

Once made, the Order in Council would extend the Clause 2(1) power to the appropriate authority on the Isle of Man. This would enable the Isle of Man to make its own regulations to implement international agreements on private international law. This power could be used only to implement agreements that the United Kingdom has extended to apply in the Isle of Man, which means that both the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man would be able to operate the agreement between their own jurisdictions and the other contracting parties.

In addition, the amendment would enable the Isle of Man to implement an arrangement to apply the terms of a private international law agreement, subject to necessary modifications, between the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom. Clause 2(3) already provides this power to the United Kingdom. The amendment will enable that power to be extended to the Isle of Man to give it the power to do the same, alleviating the need for it to enact its own primary legislation to implement such an arrangement. Of course, in both cases, the arrangement will be about operating a private international law agreement that the United Kingdom has joined, as anything else would fall outside the scope of the power.

The amendment would not affect the United Kingdom directly. It would require the Queen to approve an Order in Council at a meeting of the Privy Council and would allow the Isle of Man also to make use of this important legislation. Should there be any effect on the UK, it is likely that any agreed arrangement relating to applying private international law agreements between the UK and the Isle of Man could be implemented efficiently both here and in that dependency by mutual agreement.

As I have already stated, this measure is limited to the Isle of Man simply because it issued a formal request for the Bill to include this permissive extent clause. We have engaged with the other Crown dependencies and overseas territories on the Bill; they have not requested that this provision be extended to them. In these circumstances, I beg to move.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

I have an obvious question relating to what the noble and learned Lord said. Why does he think that the Isle of Man wants this power but other Crown dependencies do not?

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

On that point, of course I accept that Lugano does not go as far as Brussels Ia and IIa—Brussels restated. We are all well aware of that. As regards the interplay between Lugano and the Hague Convention 2019, one has to bear in mind that Hague has not been signed or acceded to by the EU. We do not know if or when it may intend to do so. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it took the EU 10 years to sign and accede to the Hague Convention 2005. On the other hand, Lugano is there and available as a convention. A number of noble and learned Lords have acknowledged its importance in the context of private international law. Therefore, it is appropriate that we proceed with Lugano at this stage.

[Lord Adonis]

I took the Minister’s response to my noble friend Lord Foulkes to mean that he did not recognise the constitutional doctrine that international treaties could take effect in UK law only by primary legislation. I took him to speak of “recent precedents”. Can he tell the Committee what those recent precedents are?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I mentioned them earlier in my observations with regard to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, which, by Order in Council—not even a statutory instrument—can draw these matters down into domestic law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As regards the UK-US negotiations, I say only that I am not in a position to comment on how far they have gone, or on whether they have engaged the issue of private international law at all.

[Lord Adonis]

Perhaps I may add to my earlier contribution to the Committee, since it looks as if we will vote on this issue on Report. We are all agreed that it is a hugely important constitutional issue.

The House of Commons, which has been conducting its first online votes this afternoon, has descended into complete chaos on its latest vote. I can report to the Committee that on what was, I think, the third vote it held—after its Members had had an opportunity to get to know the system—there were 22 Tory rebels, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, who accidentally voted the wrong way. The Deputy Speaker, Eleanor Laing, pointed out that some MPs are struggling with the new electronic voting system but, she added, there was no need to rerun the vote because there was a majority of 51 for the Government.

I will point out two things for the benefit of our colleagues on the Procedure Committee. First, there is no natural government majority in the House of Lords, so how are we to know whether people have voted the wrong way accidentally? The constitution of our country could be rewritten because people did not understand the system of voting. Secondly, although I have the highest regard for all our colleagues in the House, if Members of the House of Commons are struggling with the new electronic voting system, it is fair to say that some colleagues in our House may also struggle with that new system.

I see not just a flashing orange light but a flashing red light about moving to electronic voting at any early stage in our proceeding, and certainly on a matter as grave and serious as this. If this were to be our first vote and it descended into chaos, as in the House of Commons, nobody could say that we were not warned.

Cross-Border Mediation (EU Directive) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Government—in the event that we have a withdrawal agreement—will enter into negotiations on our future relationship with the EU, and that will include a desire to ensure that we have addressed the full panoply of judicial co-operation issues that exist at the present time. We cannot say unilaterally that we will secure all of those, but clearly we have an interest in carrying on that negotiation. That is why, at the end of any implementation period, it may be that we can simply revoke these instruments without them ever having to be applied.

The instrument relates to mediation, which is, as noble Lords will be aware, a structured process whereby the parties to a dispute attempt on a voluntary basis to reach an agreement to settle their dispute with the assistance of a mediator, but without a court needing to rule on the dispute. In the civil and commercial fields, such a dispute covers a wide range of contractual and other issues, but also touches on family issues such as access to children.

In 2008, the European Council agreed what it termed a “cross-border mediation directive” which sought to harmonise certain aspects of mediation in relation to EU member states’ cross-border disputes. I should note that the directive does not apply to Denmark, so when I refer to “member states” in this context, I am not including Denmark, which has an opt-out under Protocol 22 of the Lisbon treaty. The aim of the mediation directive is to promote the use of mediation in such cross-border disputes. An EU cross-border dispute can be one between parties who are domiciled, or habitually resident, in two or more different member states, or it can be a dispute where judicial or arbitration proceedings are started in a member state other than the one where the parties are living or domiciled.

The United Kingdom then enacted domestic legislation which gave effect to certain aspects of the mediation directive. I say “certain aspects” because, in many areas—such as ensuring the quality of mediation, and information about mediation for the public—our existing arrangements already met the requirements or standards set out in the 2008 directive. However, in order to implement the directive, the UK had to introduce some new rules for EU cross-border mediations involving UK parties. These new rules first specified that if a time limit, or limitation period, in domestic law during which a claim could be brought in a court or tribunal expires during the mediation process, the parties can still seek a remedy through the courts or tribunals should the mediation not be successful. Secondly, the new rules defined the rights of a mediator, or someone involved in the administration of mediation, to resist giving evidence in civil or judicial proceedings arising from information disclosed during mediation. Various changes were also made to court rules to supplement these changes and to implement the requirements of the mediation directive relating to the enforceability of agreements resulting from mediation.

Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the legislation implementing the mediation directive is retained EU law upon the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. However, should the UK leave the EU without an agreement on civil judicial co-operation, the reciprocity on which the directive relies would be lost. So, even if we were to continue to apply the enhanced EU rules to EU cross-border disputes, we would be unable to ensure that the remaining EU member states applied the rules of the directive to cross-border disputes involving parties based in the United Kingdom, or to judicial proceedings or arbitration taking place in the United Kingdom.

Accordingly, and in line with the Government’s general approach to civil judicial co-operation in the event of no deal, this instrument will repeal, subject to transitional provisions, the legislation that gives effect to the mediation directive’s rules on confidentiality and extension of limitation periods. It amends the relevant retained EU law in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and in Scotland in so far as it relates to reserved matters. Separate instruments will amend the related court rules in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Other legislation implementing the directive is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Government, and I understand that they have decided to bring forward their own legislation in this area.

This instrument is necessary to fix the statute book in the event of a no-deal exit. We have assessed its impact and have published an impact assessment. By repealing the domestic legislation which gave effect to the mediation directive, we will ensure clarity in the law applying to mediations between UK parties and parties domiciled or habitually resident in EU member states. We will also avoid a situation where mediations of an EU cross-border dispute conducted in the UK are subject to different—and arguably more favourable—rules on confidentiality or limitation than other UK mediations.

As I indicated earlier, the instrument will change the rules applying only to what are currently EU cross-border mediations, and then only in two respects: time limits and confidentiality. On time limits, claimants involved in such mediations who no longer have the benefit of an extended limitation period would, if they wanted more time to allow for mediation to take place, have to make an application to the court to stay proceedings and would have to pay a fee. We are unable to assess how many cases this would affect. Limitation periods can extend from three years, to six years, to 10 years in some instances, and can either bar a case from being brought or extinguish the claim in its entirety. They are extensive periods in any event, but they may be impacted by these changes

Overall, the instrument will ensure that, post exit, UK-EU mediations are treated consistently under the law with mediations between UK domiciled or habitually resident parties, or UK parties and parties domiciled or habitually resident in non-EU third countries.

I have set out to deal with the issue of EU cross-border mediations because, without a deal in place on 29 March 2019, such mediations involving UK-domiciled parties would no longer be subject to the mediation directive rules in EU member states. The regulations now moved will fix deficiencies and ensure that both the courts and UK citizens have clear and effective rules to follow in such circumstances.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

One of the most difficult issues that we grappled with during the passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill was child abductions and disputes about child custody. I assume that this affects that issue; can the Minister tell us how? The single most disturbing aspect that came out of that is that it might be harder to deal with cross-border issues of child abduction after Brexit. I am keen to understand whether this maintains the status quo as far as possible. Does this mean that effective remedies will be available to the court to deal rapidly with issues of child abduction?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

First, this instrument is not concerned with the role of the court: it is concerned with the role of mediation outside the court. Secondly, it is not usual to discover mediation as a form of resolving a child abduction case. The very nature of an abduction is such that the parties are not amenable to agreeing a voluntary mediation to resolve the matter. We have already made provision for civil orders in relation to child abduction.

With regard to criminal orders, it is impossible to replicate the existing provisions of EU law because, under the relevant provisions of EU law, an EU court would not recognise an order from a UK court in any event, and therefore it would give false hope to a party to grant them an order that was not enforceable. Overall, therefore, my answer to the noble Lord is that mediation does not impact directly on the sort of issue that has been raised. We recognise the importance of trying to ensure, as far as possible, that there are means of enforcing child abduction orders. The only qualification if we leave without a deal is that there would be no right of the originating court to make an order that trumps the order of the court in the country to which the child has been abducted. That is simply because in the absence of reciprocity, it is not possible to make such an order enforceable. Otherwise, my understanding is that we will be able to proceed.

Judicial Pensions and Fee-Paid Judges’ Pension Schemes (Amendment) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged for the contributions that have been made. I note the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I acknowledge that pension issues have created very real issues about recruitment, particularly to the High Court Bench. That is something of which we are conscious and have in mind and under consideration going forward. The whole question of the terms and conditions on which we seek to appoint the judiciary is critical, and I acknowledge the need to ensure that we maintain a judiciary whose expertise and integrity are regarded as pre-eminent. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, touched on the value—if you can put it that way—of legal services in an export sense. It is estimated to be in the region of £4.5 billion, so it is a significant matter in that context alone; but of course, it has a much wider resonance and importance than that.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, observed, those hearing this matter in the Supreme Court are not impacted by the transitional provisions we are concerned with in the McCloud case and the related Miller case, which is still to be heard. In any event, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, of the judicial oath and the confidence maintained in the integrity of our judiciary, which is entirely justified.

Regarding the potential cost of the McCloud decision, it is a matter of speculation. It does not refer just to judicial pensions; it is also relevant to firefighters.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, I am an avid reader of the Law Society Gazette, which says that £750 million has been provided for in the department’s own accounts as an insurance against the loss of this case. Is that correct?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to comment on that figure, but if the noble Lord is concerned about it, I will write to him after seeing what the position is in the accounts, as I do not have them to hand.

The issue of the age of retirement has been debated, and we are conscious of it. Many noble and learned Lords who find themselves retired from the Bench are able to make a convincing contribution to the affairs of this House for many years after their retirement, and it seems in one sense unfortunate that we cannot harness that expertise on the Bench as well as off it.

This is a purely interim measure, pending the final valuation which will follow the decision in McCloud, and we will therefore be taking forward the question of contributions as soon as that valuation process is completed. There is a wider interest—expressed, for example by the noble Lord, Lord Beith—in the whole question of these pension reforms, and it is underlined by the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. We have a scheme, we are implementing it and taking it forward, but this is an interim measure to maintain contributions, not to increase them.

Motion agreed.

Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft instrument forms part of our ongoing work to ensure that, if the UK leaves the EU without a deal, our legal system will continue to work effectively for our citizens. If Parliament approves the withdrawal agreement, which includes an implementation period, and passes the necessary legislation to implement that agreement, the Government would defer the coming into force of these instruments until the end of that implementation period. Once a deal on our future relationship has been reached, we envisage that they would be revoked entirely.

Your Lordships will be aware that, as part of these preparations, the Government have published a series of technical notices to outline the implications of a no-deal exit for citizens and businesses. One of these, published on 13 September 2018, was titled Handling Civil Legal Cases that Involve EU Countries if There’s No Brexit Deal. It set out the implications of a no-deal exit for the rules on how to resolve cross-border disputes in civil and commercial cases.

The Secretary of State, the Ministry of Justice ministerial team and officials have had regular engagement with key stakeholders in the field of civil, commercial and family justice, including the Law Society of England and Wales, the Bar Council, through the Brexit Law Committee, and individuals. This has included discussions on the technical notice, to ensure that our policy proposals in respect of no deal provide the best outcome for citizens and businesses. The instruments we are discussing today are designed to implement the policy outlined in the technical notice. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments reviewed the statutory instrument and had no substantive comments.

This draft instrument makes changes to the rules in England and Wales, in Northern Ireland and in Scotland that determine which courts should have jurisdiction in cross-border civil and commercial cases involving courts in EU and relevant EFTA countries—that is, those party to the Lugano convention: Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. It also changes the rules on how to ensure that any judgments or decisions can be enforced across the EU and relevant EFTA states.

It may be helpful if I explain the current effect of EU law in this area. The current principal measure in relation to civil and commercial law is known as the Brussels Ia regulation, as it replaced the so-called Brussels I regulation. Denmark has a separate agreement with the other EU member states, based on Brussels Ia, to give Denmark access to the EU’s system of civil judicial co-operation, because it does not normally participate in EU justice and home affairs measures, pursuant to Protocol 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. There is also a separate but similar agreement, the 2007 Lugano convention, based on Brussels I, between the EU and Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. It also applies to Denmark. Brussels I, as distinct from Brussels Ia, remains of some continuing relevance because it applies in respect of actions commenced prior to 10 January 2015, but it is of limited relevance to the present issue.

The Brussels regime provides clear and reciprocal rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters—that is, which court should hear a cross-border case. Its application is mandatory. There is no discretion for courts to act otherwise than in accordance with the regime. This means that if, for example, a UK consumer or business has a dispute with a party in another EU member state or a Lugano party, there are clear rules to follow to determine where the case should be heard. This negates the risks of parallel proceedings and more than one court hearing the same case.

There is almost automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments from one participating state in another. This means that if a business successfully sues a business in one participating state, it can enforce the resulting judgment where it needs to without going through costly and time-consuming additional processes. This is possible because all participating states must apply uniform rules of jurisdiction and can trust that jurisdiction was taken properly and appropriately.

The Brussels regime operates almost entirely on a reciprocal basis. Its effectiveness is founded on mutual co-operation between states. Countries respect the jurisdiction of each other’s courts and recognise and enforce each other’s judgments. However, with some limited exceptions, including consumer and employment cases, the Brussels rules do not apply if the defendant to the dispute is domiciled outside the EU. In such cases, EU member states and the Lugano parties apply their own national rules when dealing with cross-border matters.

What will change should we leave the EU without a deal? If the UK leaves without an agreement, the current EU regime for determining these matters will cease to apply to us. After such an exit, the reciprocity in the EU regime will no longer apply in relations between the EU member states and the UK, nor between the Lugano parties and the UK. Furthermore, there are no unilateral actions that the UK can take to compel the EU as a whole to continue to apply the reciprocal jurisdictional rules or to enforce judgments. Simply put, the rules under which we currently operate under the Brussels regime would cease to function effectively in the event of a no-deal exit.

For this reason, it is necessary to legislate now to provide clarity about how the UK will determine whether it has jurisdiction in a civil and commercial case and when UK courts will recognise and enforce judgments from EU countries. However, let me be absolutely clear: without a reciprocal agreement in this area, we cannot determine what rules the EU will apply. This will be down to member states’ own national laws.

As set out in the instrument before us, the Government’s response to this is, with limited exceptions, to revert to the rules on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of judgments that currently apply to cross-border disputes where the Brussels regime does not apply—that is, for disputes involving parties from the UK on the one hand and countries outside the EU and the Lugano parties on the other. This instrument is not creating new policy but transitioning to a well-developed and understood set of rules that provide an effective framework for UK courts to work with and take into account the lack of reciprocity in this area.

There are a few exceptions to this general approach. Importantly, the rules of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 will continue to apply, as the UK is acceding to it as a contracting state. This is being brought into UK law post-EU exit by a separate SI, which has been subject to the negative procedure—that is, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018. Broadly speaking, this means that the courts of a part of the UK will take jurisdiction whenever a valid choice of court agreement to which the convention applies has been made and will readily recognise and enforce a foreign judgment from a foreign court validly selected under such an agreement. Courts of other contracting states to that convention will equally recognise and enforce a judgment from a UK court to which the convention applies.

The EU was a signatory to the 2005 Hague convention on behalf of all members of the EU. It is therefore necessary that we should become a signatory to that convention as an individual state on exit. The application to do so was made on 28 December 2018. It will become effective under the terms of the convention as of 1 April this year.

Secondly, we have sought where we can to maintain jurisdictional protections for UK consumers and employees contained in the Brussels regime. These rules are not restricted to EU-domiciled defendants, so we can retain to a large degree the consumer and employee-friendly approach of the Brussels regime while restating them in a manner specific to UK-based consumers and employees. This largely obviates the need for a consumer or employee to sue abroad in these cases, with the expense and difficulty that brings.

This instrument is necessary to fix the statute book in the event of a no-deal exit. We have assessed its impact and published a full impact assessment. Broadly, we have concluded that although in certain respects the common law may operate less efficiently than the existing Brussels regime to which the UK is party as a result of EU membership, only negligible costs would arise from this SI, relative to the alternative of leaving legislation on the statute book that ceases to operate effectively in the absence of reciprocity after the UK leaves the EU.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not taking interventions during the opening speech. It is the Government’s view that removing deficient retained EU law and associated domestic legislation from domestic law will clarify the rules that apply to determine jurisdiction, recognition and the enforcement of judgments post exit. This has the benefit of protecting litigants from unnecessary expense and making UK legislation more transparent, therefore protecting its reputation. This will also ensure that the same rules apply to cross-border matters involving EU and non-EU countries.

There will be deficiencies in retained EU law, which implements the instruments of the Brussels regime, due to a lack of reciprocity. That will become obvious if we leave the EU without a deal. This SI fixes those deficiencies and establishes a practicable set of rules for dealing with cross-border disputes in civil and commercial matters in such a scenario.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I have already sat down.

[Lord Adonis]

The Minister said that he would not take interventions.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is correct.

[Lord Adonis]

That is extremely disrespectful to the Committee, if I may say so, because now there is no other way for us to ask the Minister questions before he responds at the end of the entire debate—and we will have no means to come back on his statements at that point because the Question will be put at the end.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Just to be clear, I have already sat down.

[Lord Adonis]

I am happy to take an intervention from the noble and learned Lord, even though he was not prepared to take one from me. I will speak later in the debate but I just want to put on record that I find his actions extremely disrespectful to the Committee. That alone would lead me to wish to negative the instrument, because the Minister is not subjecting himself to the proper process of interrogation and answering questions on the regulations. It is immensely disrespectful and the first time that a Minister has come to a Grand Committee and not been prepared to answer questions in the normal way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

So why does it say that they are not applicable? These issues are significant.

The final issue in the debate, to which I hope the noble and learned Lord will respond, was raised by my noble friend Lord Beecham and other noble Lords. It is about the losses to this country of not being part of the European Judicial Network. My understanding is that there is nothing statutory about the network. Am I wrong? Is the network a formal institution of the European Union? If it is an informal body, and if belonging to it brings us great benefits, why can we not continue to be members of it even after we leave the European Union? Indeed, to the lay man, being part of the network would seem positively beneficial because, presumably, the network co-ordinates and promotes joint understandings. If we will be separate jurisdictions, with neither wanting, as far as possible, to operate in parallel, is that not all the more reason for us to be part of the network and not seek to leave it? If we crash out with no deal and all losses as set out or implied in the Explanatory Memorandum, why we are not seeking to remain part of the European Judicial Network? Might it be in the country’s best interests for the Government to seek to keep us in the network?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this Parliament decided that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 29 March this year. That is the determination that has been made. That date has been set in law. The Executive must respect the law as determined by Parliament and respond responsibly to it, as laid down by Parliament. Therefore, they must address the implications of us leaving on 29 March if, as at present, we do not have a withdrawal agreement concluded with the European Union. That is what this statutory instrument seeks to address.

In that context, we must address the difference between leaving on 29 March and doing nothing about the existing state of the law—with regard to judicial recognition, identity of choice of court and law, the enforcement of judgment and so on—and doing something about it. I quite understand the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of our being in the Brussels Ia system, but we can be in the Brussels regime only as a member of the European Union. According to Parliament and the law it made, we will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019. Although the Brussels regime can be dated back to 1968, it was in that context a regime for existing European Union members and not open to non-members, to clarify a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.

The first point is that we have to consider the impact of us leaving on the date I have mentioned if we make no change to the existing law, and the impact if we change the existing law. I quite understand the point repeatedly made, that in many ways we would prefer the cake analogy: we would like to have our cake and eat it. We would like to remain within the regime, even if, as Parliament has determined as a matter of law, we are leaving on 29 March 2019. But we cannot have it, because Parliament has made that determination. Many may regret it now, and many may regret it later, but that is the law as determined by this Parliament, and we have to accept that. We can seek to change the law—of course we can—and no doubt there are many who may, even now, seek to change it. However, the law is as determined by this Parliament.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Revocation etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the House will be aware that the Government have been publishing a series of technical notices to outline the implications of a no-deal exit for citizens and businesses. On 12 October, the Government published a technical notice titled, Providing services including those of a qualified professional if there’s no Brexit deal. This notice set out the implications of a no-deal exit for professionals in scope of the two EU directives on lawyers’ services and lawyers’ establishment. The draft instrument that we are discussing today makes changes to the arrangements in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland relating to these directives. It remedies deficiencies in the relevant retained EU law arising from withdrawal from the EU. Scotland will be taking forward its own legislation on this matter, as it pertains to a matter of devolved competence.

I thought it would be prudent for me first to set out how these EU directives are currently applied in the United Kingdom and across the other members of the EU. The lawyers’ services directive allows specified lawyers to provide regulated legal services in a member state other than the one in which they qualified—termed a “host state”—without the need to register with a host state regulator. Lawyers provide services under their existing professional title, otherwise termed their “home state” professional title. The directive clarifies the regulatory rules applicable and the conditions for providing services in a host state.

The lawyers’ establishment directive allows specified lawyers in one member state to practise reserved legal activities on a permanent basis in another member state, under their home state professional title, and provides the conditions for doing so. It also allows lawyers who are practising in another member state to be admitted to the profession in that member state, after three years of practice in the law of that member state, without having to go through the usual qualification routes. European lawyers practising in the United Kingdom under the establishment directive must be registered with a UK regulator as registered European lawyers. As registered European lawyers, they have the right to own a legal business without a UK-qualified lawyer.

If we leave the EU without an agreement, the lawyers’ services directive and the lawyers’ establishment directive will no longer apply to the United Kingdom and there will be no system of reciprocal arrangements under which EU and European Free Trade Association lawyers can provide regulated legal services and establish on a permanent basis in the UK—and, likewise, UK lawyers in the EU. It is the deficiency in retained EU law caused by this lack of reciprocity that we are seeking to remedy.

First, EU and EFTA-qualified lawyers who have already successfully transferred into the English and Welsh or Northern Irish profession will be able to retain their qualification and related practice rights—but arrangements will be different in future. In the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal, our services trading relationship with the EU will be governed by World Trade Organization rules. The General Agreement on Trade in Services prohibits signatory states giving preferential market access to any other signatory state in the absence of a comprehensive free trade or recognition agreement between them. We therefore need to fix the deficiencies in the relevant retained EU law caused by the lack of reciprocal arrangements with the EU, while also meeting our international law obligations. As such, we will revoke the legislation that currently implements the EU framework, and EU and EFTA lawyers will be treated in the same way as other third-country lawyers.

The draft instrument will also provide a transition period to allow registered European lawyers time to comply with the new regulatory position. The transition period will run from exit day until 31 December 2020.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

Can the Minister tell us how many lawyers will be affected by these arrangements?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Yes, of course. I am obliged to the noble Lord for prompting me to go straight to that point. There are 680 European lawyers registered with the Solicitors Regulation Authority and up to 20 who are with the Bar Standards Board: far fewer in the latter case because, of course, most European lawyers who come to practise tend to find themselves practising in London’s large firms, rather than seeking to establish themselves as independent barristers at the Bar. I hope that that meets the noble Lord’s concern on that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

The impact assessment refers both to registered European lawyers, of whom it says there are 693, as of last July, which I take to be the group that the Minister referred me to a few moments ago, and to “registered foreign lawyers”, of whom there are apparently 2,406. But it is not clear to me what the impact is of these regulations on registered foreign lawyers and the 2,406 who are mentioned in the impact assessment. Perhaps he could tell the House.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Yes, I am most obliged to the noble Lord. Registered foreign lawyers are those lawyers of third-party countries who are registered in the United Kingdom. We have lawyers from many jurisdictions—for example, the United States of America—who practise under their foreign lawyer qualification in the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord will appreciate, London is an international legal centre as well as an international finance centre. This instrument has no impact at all on those foreign lawyers but it aligns registered European lawyers with registered foreign lawyers for the reasons that I have indicated.

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[Lord Adonis]

Before the Minister rises, I noted in his opening remarks that he did not refer to the consultation that had taken place. This is a big theme in the way that the House is seeking to scrutinise these statutory instruments, since there has been very rushed consultation or almost no consultation. Can he tell the House in his response what the consultation has been and what the response has been?

I observe, from a brief search of responses to these regulations, that they have not been particularly positive. I notice that the President of the Law Society, Christina Blacklaws, is quoted as saying that these regulations,

“will cause firms a significant amount of expense to find work arounds and, with tight margins, small and medium sized firms that employ EEA lawyers will struggle most to adapt”.

I think the House will be particularly concerned about the small and medium-sized firms. The larger firms can take care of themselves and can pay a lot of the costs and associated expenses, but small and medium-sized firms under pressure should be of concern to us. Can the Minister tell us more about the engagement there has been with such firms, how the costs might be mitigated, and tell us more about the response to the consultation at large?

I also make a general point, which is that I know that in a sense, everything we are doing in response to no deal is utterly deplorable; I do not want to repeat all the remarks I made earlier, although they apply here too, about how it is almost unthinkable that we should be making these arrangements for a cliff edge and all that goes with it. What is becoming clear again, in case after case, is not just that no deal will be deplorable but that the effects for this country over the medium term of withdrawing from the European Union will also be deplorable.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, quite rightly referred to the very large European market in legal services. We have fantastic lawyers, some of the best law firms in the world, and as the Minister said, we are a major centre for international legal firms. I do not remember whether it was the Minister or my noble friend who referred to the proportion of the largest firms that do work across the European Union, but it was a high proportion. Essentially, we are engaging in an act of self-mutilation. We are deliberately choosing to restrict the markets in which our legal firms can work and deliberately choosing to restrict the opportunities for the next generation of lawyers to be able to practise. That is, on any reading, deplorable.

Maybe the Minister, who is such a distinguished member of his profession, might rise to the occasion and say that he regrets that and wishes that we were not limiting the opportunities for our lawyers and our country in the way that we are. When the next generation of lawyers looks back and sees that their opportunities have been stunted and that the opportunities they have to practise in European markets have been withdrawn and that if they wish to do so they will need to move to the EU, maybe some of them will look back and say that the leaders of the profession who had responsibility at this period should have had a much closer regard for the interests of the next generation than they have had.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I shall begin with the observation from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, because I omitted to identify the location of the suicide pill. I am advised that the intention is that, in the event of an agreement, it will be incorporated in the withdrawal agreement Bill, and that is the mechanism that it intend to employ’s for those purposes. I apologise for not having appreciated that when the question was first raised.

Private Burial Grounds

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 18th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not in a position to give even an estimate of the number of private burial grounds in the country at present, but I will make inquiries as to whether those figures are available to the Government. In the event that they are, I undertake to write to my noble friend and place a copy of the letter in the Library.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord know whether Karl Marx is public or private property?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My understanding is that there is no right of property in a body.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this is of course an important issue that has already been covered in depth, both in this Chamber and in the other place. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, when we exchange views on the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, particularly Article 70 thereof. I acknowledge fully his interest in this area, the depth with which he has examined it and the importance that he underlines with regard to this matter.

Nevertheless the position remains, as summarised eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, that there is no provision in EU law for the concept of associate EU citizenship. It is clear that EU citizenship is tied to citizenship of a member state. The European Commission itself has referred to the additional rights and responsibilities attributed to the nationals of EU member states by virtue of EU citizenship, which they automatically attain under the provisions of the EU treaties. I emphasise the EU treaties because to take such a matter forward it would be necessary to contemplate the amendment of the EU treaties in a quite radical way, in order to attempt to confer on citizens of non-EU members the status of EU citizenship or something connected to it. However, we are willing to listen. Noble Lords may recollect that the European Parliament mentioned the idea of some associate citizenship; it has never elaborated upon that but if it wishes to, we are listening, and we would listen to that. I wish to make that clear.

The position of the Republic of Ireland emerges as the consequence of bilateral treaties that predate our entry into what was then the EEC and Ireland’s entry into the same, and that is not directly affected by our exit from what is now the EU. My understanding is that those arrangements continue in force.

With regard to the wider issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—the matter of voting rights, for example—during the course of the earlier negotiations we attempted to negotiate with regard to the exchange of voting rights, but at that stage the Commission declined to do so. That is something that we would wish to carry forward but the Commission was not prepared to engage in that discussion at that stage of the negotiation. Again, we remain open on these matters.

The citizens’ rights agreement reached in December, which is now set out in the draft withdrawal agreement, provides certainty for UK nationals in the EU regarding their rights following our exit. The agreement with the EU protects the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK on exit day and indeed vice versa. To that extent, it will give citizens certainty about a wide range of rights including residence rights, healthcare rights and pension and other benefit rights. That will mean that UK nationals who are legally resident in the EU by the end of the implementation period will continue to benefit from most of the rights that stem from their EU citizenship today. As I say, associate EU citizenship does not make up part of the citizens’ rights agreement, and indeed by attempting to make it a negotiating objective we would be setting ourselves what is, frankly, an impossible target. The consequence would be that, should the amendment pass and the Government fail to adopt such an impossible negotiating position, our entire post-exit statute book would be put at severe risk. There would appear to be no sensible point in attempting to do that.

I stress that with regard to this matter we are in listening mode. Reference was made to the suggestion of further litigation in this area. A case is going on in Holland at present. It was referred by the Dutch Government to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has heard the appeal and is due to deliver its judgment later in June. We do not believe that is going to affect the matter at all but we await the judgment of that court. At present, though, we must proceed with the ultimate goal: to deal with Brexit in the easiest manner possible so far as citizenship is concerned.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, could the Minister tell us what the case at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, it was an application about the rights of certain UK citizens resident in Holland having rights post Brexit in Holland. The objective of the case was clearly to secure a reference to the CJEU for the interpretation of certain treaty matters. When that proceeded, it is my understanding that the Dutch Government then intervened in the proceedings and they were the subject of a hearing before the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. That matter is not yet advised, so that is where it stands. I am afraid I cannot give further details of the case but I understand that it was partly funded by lawyers in the UK. I hope that assists the noble Lord.

As I say, at present we, the EU and the Commission are quite clear on what the concept of EU citizenship means, that the source is the EU treaties, and that there is no provision at present for associate citizenship. If during the course of negotiation the Commission or other bodies in the EU come forward with such proposals, we will of course listen to them. At this stage, though, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is so utterly basic to the issue that it is difficult to conceive of many, if any, people who did not understand the nature and consequences of Brexit, so I will not elaborate on that.

I want to come back to remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, in an earlier debate. We have debated this already in Committee in the context of another amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, mentioned Northern Ireland. Clearly, where one meets certain residency tests in Northern Ireland, one is eligible to apply for a passport from the Republic of Ireland Government. By that means, membership of an EU state can be retained and one can remain an EU citizen. As I indicated in an earlier debate, there are two areas of opinion in Northern Ireland: there are people who are perfectly happy—indeed, anxious—to secure a passport from Dublin and people who have no desire to do so.

[Lord Adonis]

I am afraid I must disappoint the noble and learned Lord because I think we are continuing to agree. However, I asked him why he will not extend the right to apply for an Irish passport to those of us on the mainland.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not in my gift. It would be a matter for international treaty negotiation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is for Ireland to decide who it will admit as citizens of the Republic; it is not for us to demand. That is the answer to the noble Lord’s point.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not yet a treaty, if I can anticipate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, because the position of the EU has been, quite rightly, that there is no agreement until everything is agreed. This has been a staged process. We believe that it is important that we were able to achieve the first stage and that we were able to achieve consensus. It is perhaps better to use the word “consensus” here rather than “agreement”, which can be confusing and sometimes misleading. We have achieved consensus in a number of important areas and, as we carry that forward, we proceed into the negotiation of what will be an international treaty.

As we have said before, once we have that international treaty, we can then draw down from the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by virtue of the fact that we will bring forward a withdrawal agreement Bill for scrutiny by this Parliament.

[Lord Adonis]

Can the noble and learned Lord explain to the House the difference between consensus and agreement?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

One has to be careful in the matter of language. We are at one with regard to the first part of what we want to do in the context of withdrawal, but we do not yet have an agreement that is binding in law with the other EU 27. For example, going forward, and during the subsequent negotiations, the EU may come and go as to the terms of the joint report. Indeed, we saw some indications of that when it came out with its draft recently, where issue was taken with the way in which it expressed some aspects of the joint report, particularly with regard to Northern Ireland. I appreciate that, if you want to construe the term “consensus” in that way, it involves “agreement”. The reason why I am trying to move away from “agreement” is that some see the word and infer that there is some legally binding concept. That is not yet what we have. We have a joint report and, therefore, we have consensus. We are moving on to the overall negotiations on what will ultimately be an international treaty.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am most obliged to the noble Lord, if only for the compliment. As I sought to explain, we have the joint report and we have embraced it. We go on now to the next stage of negotiation. I used the term “consensus”, perhaps ill advisedly, to underline the point that we have not yet signed a binding agreement in international law—we have not yet achieved a treaty. We strive to achieve a treaty, and in striving to achieve that treaty we have in mind what we have already achieved in the joint report. But we acknowledge, as the EU itself has noted, that we have not yet placed that in the form of a treaty that is binding in international law. Until we do that, we do not draw it down into domestic law.

[Lord Adonis]

Does the noble and learned Lord envisage that Her Majesty’s Government might resile from any of the commitments they gave in the consensus they reached at the end of last year?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not even imagine that Her Majesty’s Government would wish to do anything of the sort.

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[Lord Adonis]

Before my noble friend concludes, does he share my concern about what the Minister said about the difference between “consensus” and “agreement”? Does he agree that that is quite a significant statement on the part of the Government in the course of this debate? The only point in making the distinction, as I understand it, is that the Government do not regard themselves as fully committed to the terms of the “agreement” of last December.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is unusual for me to intervene, but I feel that if the noble Lord is going to make statements, he should make them accurately. If he is going to represent what a Minister has said, he should do so accurately. The distinction I drew was between an agreement that was now binding in international law and an agreement that was not now binding in international law. I hope the noble Lord’s recollection coincides with mine. If it does not, could he perhaps consult Hansard?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, when we last debated this issue, the Advocate-General for Scotland said that he was very attracted to the proposals published by Professor Paul Craig in his blog—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to that. I notice that Professor Craig published a subsequent blog on 26 February, also referred to by the noble Lord, in which he suggests that, once the process of transposing law has taken effect, we should assign,

“legal status to EU retained law in the UK based on the status it had in EU law”

Having read his blog as a non-lawyer, I felt that, if the intention is to give certainty, the proposals of Professor Craig would do that—except in one key respect which I hope the Minister might comment on: what process would be undergone between now and next February to allocate the huge body of retained law to one or other category if we were to adopt Professor Craig’s mode of proceeding? Since the Solicitor-General said in the House of Commons that about 20,000 pieces of EU law will be transferred, and if it were possible to establish, as Professor Craig sets out, a criterion based on the intention of existing EU law which would divide between primary and secondary legislation, can the Minister indicate, if he is minded to go down that route, what process would take place, so that, on 29 March next year, we know the status of law being transposed?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from Members of the House with regard to this issue. We are extremely grateful for the extensive work done by the Constitution Committee with regard to the Bill, as set out in the report, and for the consideration that members of the committee have given to the provisions of the Bill and some of the difficult issues that arise in transposing EU-based legislation into domestic law, because it represents something of a challenge in a number of respects.

I shall begin by referring to a matter that does not arise out of this group, or did not until the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, raised it, because it may help if I address his point about whether retained EU law is primary or secondary legislation. It is neither in the Bill. There are provisions in paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 with regard to the Human Rights Act, which is a very particular case, where it will be treated as primary legislation. There is the Constitution Committee’s recommendation that it should all be treated as primary legislation. I shall not go into detail at this stage because we will address this later, but I want to reassure the noble Lord about where we are.

That recommendation raises enormous difficulties because there are aspects of EU-derived legislation that, for example, involve the enumeration of the contents of a particular dye or chemical, and the idea that we could amend that only by way of primary legislation raises issues of its own. Nevertheless, it seems to the Government that there is some scope for considering how we can take this forward, and we are open to considering not only the recommendations of the Constitution Committee but of others. For those who have an interest in this issue, I commend for consideration, at least, the recent observations of Professor Paul Craig of St John’s College, Oxford, in a blog on the UK Constitutional Law Association site dated 26 February—only a few days ago—in which, supplementary to an earlier note that he made, he proposes a categorisation of EU-derived legislation. I cannot say that it is one that we entirely agree with, but it is certainly one that we are looking at because there is more than one route to the resolution of this issue. We are looking at that and, for noble Lords who are interested in that point, it may be worth considering.

[Lord Adonis]

For those of us who are uninitiated into this blog, what would that mean?

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I understand the question.

[Lord Adonis]

What would the new status of legislation that the noble and learned Lord has just mentioned be?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Professor Craig addresses a potential categorisation of EU-derived legislation by reference to its origins within EU law, so there is pre-Lisbon treaty and post-Lisbon treaty analysis based on the articles of the pre-Lisbon provisions and of TFEU post Lisbon in 2009. I shall not elaborate on it at this stage as it does not arise in the context of this group. With respect to the noble Lord, I simply want to reassure him that we understand that there is a debate about how we should categorise EU-derived legislation.

The second point I shall mention at the outset is the reference to the principle of supremacy. That turns on Clause 5(2), which ensures that the principle of supremacy—it currently has effect through the ECA—will continue to apply but only for the purpose of resolving conflicts which arise between EU law which is converted by the Bill into domestic law and pre-exit domestic law.

Again, we have to be clear what the purpose of that is. I acknowledge in passing that the Constitution Committee proposed a different way of addressing Clause 5, which on one view might be considered neat, in so far as it involves applying the principle of supremacy without using the word “supremacy”. We will come on to debate that in due course, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, observed, and I will not take time up with that at this stage.

I turn to Amendment 15. Clause 2 has been drawn broadly deliberately. As has been noted, it will preserve any domestic regulations made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the ECA 1972. But it also includes within its ambit any other domestic primary or secondary legislation which implements, or enables the implementation of, EU obligations and any related domestic legislation. In response to the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I make the point that enactments often contain provisions derived from EU legislation—we have to remember that what we are referring to in Clause 2 is EU-derived domestic legislation. It is those parts of Acts such as the Equality Act or the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act that are EU derived which are to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law. It is necessary to read two elements: EU-derived domestic legislation—those parts of legislation that come from the EU—and retained EU law. They are linked.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

The implementation period is a wholly distinct issue from what we have to address in the context of the Bill. The implementation period has yet to be negotiated. The outcome of that implementation negotiation has yet to be determined. In the event that we agree an implementation period, clearly there will have to be further statutory provision—a further Bill—addressing our rights and obligations during that implementation period, and it may be that that further Bill will amend this Bill with regard to the effect of the exit date on further EU legislation, whether in the form of regulations or directives, after 29 March 2019. But that is not an issue for this Bill. This Bill is dealing with the situation at exit, subject to the fact that, if there is a negotiation, things may change.

[Lord Adonis]

For those of us who have not been following the minutiae of the Government’s announcements, can the Minister say that it is an absolute commitment on the part of the Government that directives that have been adopted and for which the implementation date falls before 29 March next year will be implemented?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, my understanding is that the Government are determined, and have the present intention, to implement directives that have been adopted and which have an implementation period that expires before the exit date. I cannot give an absolute assurance to that extent but that has been and continues to be the Government’s position. Indeed, to put it another way, we will continue to perform our obligations as a member of the EU, as we are bound to do by the treaty provisions. One of our obligations is to implement directives that have been adopted in Europe within the implementation period or by the transition date that is set out.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is why Clause 7 is drafted in the terms in which the noble Lord will find it in the Bill.

Reference was also made to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Schedule 8. I am not sure how the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, interpreted that paragraph but let us be clear: it refers to existing powers, not to powers created under this Bill. Those powers already exist in respect of existing legislation. They are not being extended. If the Government truly intended to bring about wholesale change to these policy areas, and could do so on the basis of their existing powers, perhaps they might have done so already. The provision does not extend to these powers. Therefore, again, with respect, it appears to me that the matter is being taken out of context. However, I would be happy to look at the opinion on this from Pushpinder Saini referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, he pointed out that Schedule 3 is not the key—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to what this Bill is about. With regard to the charter, the point is that it does not bring anything over on its own. We already have these rights and obligations, as established by the principles of EU law, convention law and the common law.

As to a concern that something is omitted at the end of the day, as I indicated, we would address that to ensure that all rights are brought across. However, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, I do not believe that you can never have too many belts and braces. If you have too many belts and braces, eventually you cannot stand up. It is therefore important that we approach this issue with a degree of proportionality, if I may use a European term.

Following on from the point I made earlier, retaining the charter for what will become a fluid and changing category of law risks legislatively binding us to a document that would bring the illusion of clarity in the short term but serve only to undermine it in the longer term. Indeed, the other amendments in this group raise similar issues to those put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham has tabled amendments that seek to build on the amendments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. They seek to assign the status of primary legislation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For reasons that we will go into in a later group, the Government believe that the question of assigning status to retained EU law is complex and should be approached with caution. I hope that we can come back to this question when we have concluded our debate on the approach to rights protection and to status more generally. I will not seek to take up time on that issue at this stage.

I suspect that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would also add to the confusion. Seeking to afford charter rights the same level of protection as convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 is fraught with difficulty. Charter rights do not correspond exactly to ECHR rights and apply in different ways. The charter also contains non-justiciable principles as well as rights, and it is unclear what status these would have in domestic law under his amendment. Moreover, it does not deal with how explanations to the charter articles should be treated or how certain sections of the Human Rights Act would apply to charter rights. I appreciate that we are in Committee and that the noble Lord is entitled to say that he will look more carefully at the form of the amendment and perhaps elaborate upon it in due course, but there are fundamental difficulties with the approach he is attempting to take in simply trying to incorporate the charter when, as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, himself observed, the expression of rights in the charter does not coincide precisely with the expression of rights in the convention.

I would like to emphasise again that we remain committed to listening to this House and indeed to working constructively to ensure that we have a functioning statute book which maximises legal certainty. I understand the concerns expressed by some about whether some rights would somehow be left behind, but if we can and do identify a risk of such rights being left behind, we are entirely open to the proposition that we have to address that by way of amendment to the Bill, and we will seek to do that. I wish to reassure noble Lords on that point.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, can the noble and learned Lord give us any indication of when he thinks that that exercise will be completed?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The potential answer is no, and the note says that my time is up. Nevertheless, and be that as it may, we will endeavour to address these issues as soon as we can. Clearly it will require us not only to consider the position we have adopted already in the document published in December last year but to take into consideration the concerns expressed by other lawyers and in this Committee in the course of the debate. We will look at those and we will want to address them at the next stage of the Bill; of that, I am confident.

At this stage I appreciate that there are some questions which I have not directly answered in the course of my response and it may be difficult to do so in the time remaining. Perhaps I may say that I endorse entirely the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood, with regard to the potential difficulties of simply drawing the charter over into domestic law. I am not going to elaborate on the consequences of doing that, but they can be summarised as confusion, uncertainty and difficulty, and ultimately could prove to be counterproductive. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.