Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government (1) what assessment they have made of the conclusion of Professor Fraser Sampson that "the need for a review [of surveillance cameras] is supported by the evidenced risks”, and (2) whether the Paymaster General will respond positively to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s request for a meeting; and whether such a meeting can be held before the Procurement Bill is given further consideration in the House of Lords.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Statement by the then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on 24 November 2022 (HCWS386), how they plan to implement the cessation of the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government which locations they believe to be 'sensitive sites' where surveillance cameras with links to the People’s Republic of China should not be located; how many such sites exist; and how many cameras are involved.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The Cabinet Office has been working closely with government departments to implement the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Written Ministerial Statement of 24 November 2022. I can confirm that departments have ceased the deployment of visual surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China onto sensitive sites.
The statement also asked departments to consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades. As the Parliamentary Secretary confirmed in the other place, the Government will set out the timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China from such sites within six months of the Procurement Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Cabinet Office has been working closely with Departments on this and I can confirm that good progress has already been made.
It is a longstanding Government policy that specific security arrangements regarding the Government estate, including any lists of sensitive sites and their locations, are withheld on security grounds. Security teams within government departments are responsible for identifying which of their locations are defined as sensitive against a common set of criteria.
Since the Written Ministerial Statement, we have also been working at pace to prepare for the implementation of the Procurement Bill, when it finishes its Parliamentary steps. Our efforts have focused on the setting up of the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which will administer the new national security debarment and exclusion powers that the Bill will provide.
The measures we have already taken on surveillance technology demonstrate that we will always put national security first and we will continue to keep risks such as this under close review. We will respond to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s letter on public space surveillance in due course. The Cabinet Office continues to monitor Government policy in this area, and is currently engaging with the Commissioner on this topic.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the BBC Panorama programme ‘Is China watching you?’, broadcast on 26 June; and what plans they have, if any, to bring forward further amendments to the Procurement Bill to address the dangers to national security and privacy identified in the Panorama documentary.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The Government introduced new measures ahead of the Commons Report stage to strengthen the Procurement Bill's provisions on national security.
The Government will create a permanent National Security Unit for Procurement within the Cabinet Office which will play a vital role in minimising the risk of suppliers that pose a threat to national security, winning public contracts. Underpinning the Unit will be a new legislative duty on ministers to keep under review suppliers for investigation for potential debarment on national security grounds. The Government will also introduce new, mandatory debarments for specific types of contracts. The new clauses will enable Ministers to mandate that a supplier is excluded from specific types of contracts (for goods, works or services) where the supplier poses an unacceptable risk.
We will lay before Parliament, within six months of Royal Assent, a timeline for the removal of any surveillance equipment provided by suppliers subject to the National Intelligence Law of China from sensitive sites. We will explicitly commit to remove the equipment from sites where the risk is most acute and ensure the Government can be held to account on its promises.
Taken together, these measures ensure both that current equipment will be removed and that there will be stringent security mechanisms applying to any future contracts.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether all Hikvision camera-operated government departments have been updated to fix a known ‘backdoor’ hacking vulnerability identified by BBC Panorama, published on 26 June.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The government keeps the risk associated with technologies such as visual surveillance equipment under close review. The installation of firmware updates to address known vulnerabilities forms part of routine departmental security procedures.
In December 2022, the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Statement before Parliament which instructed government departments to cease deployment of such equipment onto sensitive sites, where it is produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. The WMS advised that no such equipment should be connected to departmental core networks and that they should consider whether they should remove and replace such equipment where it is deployed on sensitive sites rather than awaiting any scheduled upgrades.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether Hikvision Cameras within the UK contain ‘ethnicity alerts’ algorithms that have been used to (1) target, and (2) detain, Uyghur Muslims in China.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The UK has serious concerns regarding the Chinese State’s use of technologies in ways that violate human rights and harm individuals and societies, including China’s use of high tech surveillance to disproportionately target Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. We are aware of a number of Chinese technology companies reportedly linked to violations taking place in Xinjiang, and are monitoring the situation closely. However, we are unable to comment on specific security arrangements or procedures.
We will always put national security first, and we have a range of measures in place to scrutinise the integrity of our arrangements. On 24 November 2022, the Government announced that Departments should cease deployment of visual surveillance systems produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law onto sensitive sites. In June 2023, we committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of this equipment.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether Hikvision cameras in the UK contain any software to track ethnoreligious individuals targeted by the Chinese State.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The UK has serious concerns regarding the Chinese State’s use of technologies in ways that violate human rights and harm individuals and societies, including China’s use of high tech surveillance to disproportionately target Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. We are aware of a number of Chinese technology companies reportedly linked to violations taking place in Xinjiang, and are monitoring the situation closely. However, we are unable to comment on specific security arrangements or procedures.
We will always put national security first, and we have a range of measures in place to scrutinise the integrity of our arrangements. On 24 November 2022, the Government announced that Departments should cease deployment of visual surveillance systems produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law onto sensitive sites. In June 2023, we committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of this equipment.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government why they proposed an amendment to the Procurement Bill to delete the requirement for a timetable to be set for the removal of Chinese-made security cameras with potential links to slave labour and with implications for national security.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
The Procurement Bill contains a robust and comprehensive framework of exclusion grounds, including new grounds on both modern slavery and national security, together with groundbreaking provisions for a centralised debarment list. This is sufficient to ensure that suppliers and subcontractors which are involved in forced labour, or which pose an unacceptable security risk, are prevented from competing for public contracts.
Separately, following a review of security risks, the Government has instructed departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on sensitive sites, where it is produced by companies that are subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Implementation of this instruction is already underway.
We will continue to keep the situation under review, and are ready to take further steps if necessary.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what is their timetable for the removal of Hikvision cameras from all buildings in public ownership in the UK.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Shadow Minister (Treasury)
On 24 November 2022, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) instructing departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on sensitive sites on the government estate, where such equipment is produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Departments have been advised to consider whether there are sites outside the definition of sensitive sites to which they would wish to extend the same risk mitigation.
Wider public bodies generally operate with some independence from central government and are free to make their own choices around purchasing and contracting. We encourage all organisations to follow NCSC supply chain security guidance when selecting a technology supplier. This guidance clearly sets the security standards that suppliers should meet and the considerations that organisations should be making during the procurement process.
Specific details regarding the use of security systems by government departments are withheld on national security grounds. This has been the case under successive administrations. Government keeps the security of our personnel, information, assets, and estate under constant review.