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Written Question
National Security
Monday 27th July 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government how the power to designate an entity involved in foreign power threat activity in accordance with the National Security Act 2023 differs from the power to proscribe an organisation in accordance with the Terrorism Act 2000; and what extra powers, if any, are available to them in respect of proscribed organisations that are unavailable in respect of designated entities.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 provides a power for the Home Secretary to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, where it is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

The designation power and its associated offences are modelled on terrorism proscription. However, the power to designate is fundamentally different to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000 in the type of harm it addresses and given the different nature of state bodies and terrorist organisations.

This difference is reflected in the offences available under each regime. There is no membership offence in the new Act, reflecting the need to comply with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.

The new support offence captures, activity where the person engaging in it does so for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. This reflects the fact that there will be some cases where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity. The ‘prohibited purpose’ test protects legitimate conduct without creating loopholes that can be exploited by hostile actors.

In addition, the designated body condition unlocks the offences and powers in the National Security Act 2023, allowing them to be used against designated bodies and those who support them. That means that those carrying out state threat activities such as espionage and sabotage for designated bodies will now feel the full force of the law, including sentences of up to life imprisonment.


Written Question
Immigration Controls: British National (Overseas)
Thursday 16th July 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government when they intend to let British National Overseas passport holders use e-Passport Gates at UK airports.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The Government keeps eGate eligibility under review to ensure we are balancing border security and passenger flow. We have recently passed legislation to lower the eGate eligible age from 10 to 8 years old for those nationals who can currently use eGates to enter the UK.

We are continuing to explore options to increase the use of automation and eGates at the UK border, including to British National (Overseas) passport holders.


Written Question
Shipping: Disclosure of Information
Wednesday 15th July 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government whether they hold shipping manifest data; and if so, why they do not publish that data.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The Home Office receives shipping manifest data from parts of the maritime sector. However, coverage is not universal, and the use of such data is governed by legal and operational requirements.

The Government recognises the importance of tackling forced labour in supply chains. However, shipping manifest data may contain personal information protected under data protection legislation, as well as commercially sensitive information. There are currently no plans to publish detailed shipping manifest data.

Home Office does not routinely assess whether goods entering the UK may have been produced using forced labour. However, Home Office works closely with law enforcement and other government partners to share intelligence and support compliance activity where relevant information is identified.


Written Question
Shipping: Forced Labour
Wednesday 15th July 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the merits of publishing detailed shipping manifest data, as opposed to the aggregated customs data HMRC currently releases, so that instances of forced labour in supply chains could be more readily identified and addressed; and what plans they have, if any, to begin such publication.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The Home Office receives shipping manifest data from parts of the maritime sector. However, coverage is not universal, and the use of such data is governed by legal and operational requirements.

The Government recognises the importance of tackling forced labour in supply chains. However, shipping manifest data may contain personal information protected under data protection legislation, as well as commercially sensitive information. There are currently no plans to publish detailed shipping manifest data.

Home Office does not routinely assess whether goods entering the UK may have been produced using forced labour. However, Home Office works closely with law enforcement and other government partners to share intelligence and support compliance activity where relevant information is identified.


Written Question
Asylum: Ukraine
Wednesday 15th July 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the recommendations of the report by researchers at the University of Birmingham, Displaced Ukrainians in the UK: Experiences and Future Intentions, published in October 2025, particularly those related to (1) a timely and affordable pathway to permanent residence for displaced Ukrainians, and (2) a national programme drawing on local best practices, including English language support.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The Government welcomes research that helps improve our understanding of the experiences of Ukrainians in the UK, including the University of Birmingham’s report Displaced Ukrainians in the UK: Experiences and Future Intentions. We continue to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, including researchers, local authorities, charities and Ukrainian community organisations, to inform our understanding of the needs and experiences of those affected by the conflict.

The Government notes the report’s recommendations, including those relating to longer-term immigration status and support for integration, as part of its wider engagement with stakeholders on support for Ukrainians in the UK.

The Ukraine Schemes were established to provide temporary sanctuary to those displaced by Russia’s illegal invasion. As a result, the schemes do not lead to settlement and time spent on them does not count towards the long residence route. To ensure Ukrainians can continue to live, work and study in the UK, the Government has introduced a further 24 month permission to stay through the Ukraine Permission Extension Scheme.

The Government recognises the importance of supporting integration. Ukrainians in the UK have access to public services and support, including English language provision funded through local authorities. This includes Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government providing £11.5million of funding for English language courses and employment support for over 13,000 Ukrainians across the UK through the ‘STEP Ukraine’ programme.

We continue to work closely with stakeholders and partners to understand emerging needs and share effective practice, helping to ensure support remains responsive to both Ukrainians and host communities.


Written Question
Police: Telephone Services
Monday 8th June 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of reports that a public service interpreter working for 101 made political remarks about China in a call with Hong Qi, a Chinese pro-democracy activist; and what action, if any, they plan to take.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

Matters relating to the conduct of individual police officers, staff, or those working on behalf of the police are for the relevant police force to consider through established complaints procedures. It would therefore not be appropriate to comment on the detail of the case raised.

If an individual believes that a public service interpreter has acted inappropriately during a police interaction, they can make a complaint directly to the relevant police force or via the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC).

Information on how to do so is available on the IOPC’s website at https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/complaints/submit-a-complaint, including an online complaints form and guidance on the complaints process.


Written Question
National Security
Friday 22nd May 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what progress they have made in implementing the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report Transnational repression in the UK, published on 30 July 2025.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The Government carefully considered the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on transnational repression (TNR) and responded formally on 30 October 2025.

We continue to engage with international partners, victims and civil society organisations to build a fuller picture of how transnational repression manifests in the UK and to ensure our response is grounded in lived experience and real-world threat patterns.

We recently updated GOV.UK guidance on TNR. Alongside this the National Security Protective Authority launched guidance on 8 May. These documents provide practical advice for individuals who believe they may be at risk of TNR, including steps to help keep them safe both physically and online.

The Government will continue to keep its approach under review to ensure it remains robust, proportionate and responsive to the evolving threat.


Written Question
Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: China
Thursday 21st May 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government, following the recent convictions of Chung Biu Yuen and Chi Leung Wai, whether they will include the People's Republic of China in the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

As set out in the National Security Act 2023, the Secretary of State may make a specification under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) where they consider it is reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. As the Minister of State for Security set out in the House of Commons on 4 March 2026, FIRS is a relatively new tool, and this Government is seeking to ensure that we can derive the maximum operational capability from it.

We look very carefully at which countries should be on the enhanced tier of the scheme, factoring in a broad range of considerations. We have not made any final decisions as to whether we will place other countries on the enhanced tier, but we keep that under very close review. Any changes to the countries listed will be brought to Parliament in the usual way.


Written Question
National Security: China
Thursday 21st May 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government, following the conviction of Chi Leung Wai for misconduct in public office, what measures they will take to ensure the better protection of (1) sensitive data, and (2) individuals most likely to be at risk of transnational repression.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

The Government does not comment on individual cases but takes any misuse of sensitive data extremely seriously. Robust safeguards are in place across Government and law enforcement to ensure that sensitive information is handled securely, with strict controls, oversight mechanisms, and proportionate action against misconduct.

More broadly, the Government continues to strengthen its response to transnational repression, including measures to better protect individuals at risk. The National Security Act 2023 provides a comprehensive framework to detect, deter and disrupt state‑directed threats, supported by enhanced training for police and improved systems to identify foreign interference.


Written Question
Terrorism: British Nationals Abroad
Tuesday 28th April 2026

Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)

Question to the Home Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of whether any British nationals are currently associated with Daesh and its ideology; and what preparations are in place for the potential return of such individuals to the United Kingdom.

Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)

It is the long-standing policy of successive UK Governments not to comment routinely either on individual cases or intelligence and security matters.

The UK remains an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. We will continue to work with all our partners in pursuit of the enduring defeat of Daesh.

We will also not hesitate to take action to protect the UK border and our national security. This can include the exercise of immigration powers; the use of domestic and international watchlists; and working with law enforcement partners to disrupt the travel of individuals who are assessed as a threat.