UK-India: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, it is good to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who was a highly respected and highly successful Minister; I salute him for that. I congratulate my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, the former chairman of the relevant committee. I also thank the secretariat for what was a superlative first draft—in fact, the best that I have personally seen.

The context is clear: India has been highly protectionist from independence in 1947. On the OECD scale of high trade barriers, India is 43rd out of 51. Yet there have been a recent series of trade deals that show a historic shift on the part of India. I will not claim that the dam has burst, but there are very major cracks in that dam. In 2022, India had deals with the UAE and Australia, in 2024 with EFTA, in 2025 with the UK and New Zealand and, in January this year, with the EU. It will also have a deal with Canada by the end of the year. Why? The Indian Government and Premier Modi wish to integrate into the world economy. That change has also been accelerated by the US tariffs and the unpredictability of President Trump’s Administration.

There have been positive advances in areas such as procurement under this deal, but there are still protectionist elements, such as in food grains and other areas. There are also missed opportunities, as my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith has said, in terms of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and particularly in legal services. I recall our meeting with the chair of the Bar Council and the failed opportunity for that “noble profession”, as they call it in India, the legal profession.

Briefly, I will raise two questions. First, are the benefits mutual? Secondly, would the UK have had a better deal if it were not for Brexit and if we had remained within the European Union?

Many of the Indian concessions are phased over a number of years, whereas those for the UK are bunched at the beginning of the process, so it is clear that India will gain most in the short term. However, we have gained access to a dynamic growing market. Indeed, we should have done far better because of the very skilled diaspora in our own country; we start with a major benefit in that sense. In effect, both sides are winners, even if there are differences in the phasing between the two.

Would we have done better if we were within the European Union, given the EU’s greater clout in negotiation? Of course, the EU now has its own deal, after relations between the EU and India on an FTA had been becalmed for decades. Could we have done better? It is difficult to compare the two deals—those with the UK and with the EU—and it is possible to argue that the UK has different priorities from members of the EU, and that the priorities that are reflected in the current deal might not have been reflected in quite the same way had we remained members. I hope the Government are now comparing our deal to that with the EU to see to what extent it builds on our own.

I noticed with interest two articles in the Financial Times. The first, by Mr Marshall—a Brexiteer—on 19 December of last year, argued that the real problem is the lack of implementation of Brexit. The second was a reply by Professor El-Agraa on 16 January, who argued that deals such as this offer only a marginal contribution to the UK economy and that we would have obtained a better deal had we remained within the EU. The jury is still out. As Mrs Malaprop said, comparisons are odorous.

Prima facie, there are areas where the EU has a better deal. I think, for example, of spirits. Tariffs on spirits in the deal with the EU will be concluded far more quickly than for Scotch whisky, but the problem here is surely the question of volume. Scotch whisky is the drink of choice for Indians, so it is no surprise that there is a longer timescale for tariffs on Scotch whisky in our deal.

There are other examples, such as lamb and mutton, on which our farmers lost out substantially in the Australia and New Zealand deals—indeed, imports from Australia and New Zealand have soared, to the detriment of our own farmers, as a result of the deals reached with them. So the Government clearly need to undertake to monitor these deals very carefully.

Think also, for example, of the deal on social security payments: monitoring is again very important, because of the effect on His Majesty’s Treasury. I hope the Government undertake to carry out regular monitoring exercises in this respect.

There is a clear prospect of progress on bilateral investment deals for both us and the EU. I hope that, in time, the UK and Indian legal professions will bilaterally negotiate acceptable deals.

I have two final observations. First, there are perhaps only two cheers for the deal generally, but it is a living instrument and, with good will, the joint committees will ensure a dynamic implementation. Secondly, in her speech at the LSE on 11 February, the Chancellor made an interesting comment and put the deal in perspective. She hailed bilateral deals such as this one but stated that the proposed deal with the EU is the big one because it covers 47% of our trade; that is the big one, but these are indeed important bilateral deals.