(3 days, 18 hours ago)
Lords ChamberOn that note, I will try to move Amendment 38 as quickly as possible to help support my noble friend. This group includes three government amendments to Clause 43. On this occasion, the Government have listened to debates that have taken place in the House. We have carefully considered recommendations in the JCHR report and listened to representations from the noble Lords, Lord Jackson and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. In the light of this, government Amendment 40 does not alter the original purpose of Clause 43 but instead sets out the limited circumstances in which an individual could have conditions such as electronic monitoring and curfews placed on their leave to enter or to remain. This includes cases where the Secretary of State considers that the person poses a threat to national security, public safety or has been convicted of a serious crime or offence.
The powers in Clause 43 are therefore in place to protect the public and to meet our obligations under domestic and international law. The clause will end the disparity in powers available to protect the public in respect of immigration bail and conditions of leave to enter or remain. I know that the Government have listened to the points made in Committee and I will therefore move the amendments on their behalf.
I note that my noble friend Lord Bach has tabled Amendment 41. I will respond to any points he raises once he has had an opportunity to contribute to the debate. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Minister is quite right. I have a short but important amendment that is very fittingly in this group. It is unusual in that lawyers who act in immigration cases and the Home Office itself are at one on the issue. Both sides agree that in paragraph 9(1)(a) of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016, “specified in the condition” should be widely interpreted to mean
“that is known at the time of the grant or variation of immigration bail, or”—
and this is the important point—
“an address that is yet to be specified”.
This has been the Home Office’s interpretation of that paragraph for a number of years. There is evidence from 2018 that that is the Home Office’s view. It has occurred in cases, and guidance was issued as recently as this summer. In my submission, it is a practical and sensible way of interpreting it.
Why, then, does this amendment, with its proposed change of words in paragraph 9(1), need to be laid and discussed in your Lordships’ House at all? The reason is that there is a Court of Appeal case in Northern Ireland called Bounar, which was decided not many years ago, in which their Lordships in that court took a different view and decided on a much stricter interpretation of the words of the schedule: for a person to be given bail by the Secretary of State, they must already have been granted immigration bail—and here are the words that matter—with a condition to reside at a specific address. So one has on the one hand the decision of the court in Northern Ireland and, on the other, I submit, a practical, sensible way of dealing with a situation that arises more often than the House might think. The Home Office has dealt with it in that way, as have the lawyers on the other side.
Why does it matter that there are these two conflicting decisions about and ways of looking at this element of this schedule? It matters, first, because it is unsatisfactory in principle to have legislation that has been interpreted quite differently in the courts and in practice in government when dealing with this issue. Secondly, who knows what situations may arise where a court, for example, would prefer the Northern Ireland precedent. Thus, a bail claimant—someone who the Home Office wants to give bail to—might lose his or her bail merely because, for good, practical reasons, the specific address is not yet known. This is what happens in a number of cases.
There are already significant delays between grant of bail in principle and people being released to Home Office-sourced accommodation. In recent months, 21 people have faced a delay of more than three months. The Home Office wanted to bail them and was happy to, but there was no specified address at that moment so everything had to start all over again. Without amending the statutory provision relied on in the case of Bounar, every individual would need an address provided by the Secretary of State prior to applying for bail, resulting in wasted places and longer delays. My invitation to my noble friend, to whom I very grateful for having taken the trouble to meet me on this issue, is to accept this amendment to the schedule. I very much hope that he feels that he can do that today.
My Lords, I shall address the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, just raised. It seems to me, from having visited Harmondsworth IRC, met people who are ready for bail and seen them held back because of the bureaucracy, that what is being described is a bit of bureaucracy that ought not to be there. I hope the Minister will be able to say that he can deal with this matter. Unfortunately, it appears that it has to be in statute rather than simply a ministerial decision. Perhaps he will tell us how best this matter can be dealt with swiftly, because it is in no one’s interest for people who have the right to immigration bail to be kept at taxpayers’ expense in immigration detention when they need not be there.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. The government amendments were tabled in response to requests in Committee, not just from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—who I hope to see back in her place as soon as possible—but the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and others, including Members from the Opposition Back Benches and Front Bench. I hope I can reassure the noble Lord that we have taken all those matters into account in bringing forward the amendment today.
On Amendment 41, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bach, I welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue with him outside the Chamber and get clarification on the points he is pressing me to examine. I hope that the explanation I give him now will meet his points of concern, but we will see whether that is in fact the case. We believe that the amendment, while testing the Government, is ultimately dealt with in other ways, and would make no material difference to the operation of the legislation. The Bounar case, which my noble friend mentioned, pre-dated changes to our bail accommodation guidance. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal decision was handed down in December 2024, and the Home Office guidance was republished on 31 January 2025.
There is a key extract from the guidance that I want to read to my noble friend, so I hope the House will bear with me:
“Where an individual is not subject to a residence condition, but they are applying for accommodation under Schedule 10, they may request for their bail conditions to be varied to include a residence condition on the BAIL 409 application form. Bail conditions can be varied to include a residence condition at an address yet to be specified, where the individual does not have a residence condition imposed and a refusal of accommodation would be in breach of their Article 3 ECHR rights”.
The key point for me in that extract is that in the case of Bounar the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal found that the person could not be given bail accommodation because they did not have a bail residence condition. Although that is technically correct, I believe and hope that our guidance—and I hope this satisfies my noble friend—now makes it clear that bail can be varied to impose a residence condition that will enable a person to be granted bail conditions, where to refuse to do so would breach the person’s human rights under Article 3. The key point that I emphasise to my noble friend is that our guidance is now clear that the situation in Bounar should not arise. If the person requires a bail condition in order to prevent an Article 3 breach, we will create one rather than refusing the application, and the courts can now apply that, as our guidance makes clear.
I am genuinely grateful for the discussions that I have had had with my noble friend outside both Committee and Report. He has raised these issues with me regarding the Bounar case as recently as today, outside the Chamber, prior to Report commencing. I have tried to give him an answer based on our legal interpretation of the understanding of that case in relation to our guidance, and I hope that, with that clarification, he is able to reflect on that, if not today then later in Hansard. I am happy to have further discussions with him about the application outside the Chamber at a later date, but I hope that the explanation I have given meets the objectives in his amendment, and I ask him not to press it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, as always, for his response. I cannot hide that I am disappointed by what he had to say, but I have not yet had the chance to read it in Hansard. I am sure I will want to take up his remarks with him, but I will not be moving my amendment.
For clarification, it is the Minister, with the lead amendment, who must now seek to press his amendment, if he so wishes.
(5 days, 18 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it seems appropriate that my Amendment 33 is being debated at the start of Pro Bono Week, given that it is the one amendment which deals with legal aid. At the heart of this amendment is the rule of law and the fundamental right of access to justice. As I was delighted to see in pursuing this amendment in Committee, these values are beyond party politics; they are universally accepted across the House and, I would like to think, across the country.
The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that people in the custody of the state for immigration reasons are provided effective legal advice and representation within 48 hours of being detained. At a time when we are seeing more accelerated processes—for example, the UK-France treaty—and the growth in the number of people being detained, I argue that this matter is more urgent than ever. Indeed, individuals flagged for deportation under the UK-France agreement must respond to the Home Office’s notice to remove them within seven days. As such, it is surely even more essential that legal advice is provided early and quickly, within 48 hours.
Briefly, I will remind the House of the basic problem of legal aid deserts in immigration. First, 60% of people in England and Wales are unable to access a local immigration legal aid lawyer; and, secondly, 55,000 people are unable to get an immigration legal aid lawyer when they need one. It is both the law and Home Office policy under all Governments that people should be able to receive legal advice before they are removed. There is no suggestion from any Front Bench that this should change. As such, the more effective the provision of legal advice and representation, the more effective the immigration system can become.
I want to develop three points that were raised in Committee. The first is the cost of the amendment; the second—and at the heart of the amendment—is whether the current system for providing legal advice and representation in immigration detention is working; and the third is the cost savings that will flow from improving the availability of legal aid lawyers.
First, in our Committee debate, some Peers, and the Minister himself, questioned the cost of accepting the amendment. I underline that the amendment does not expand the scope of eligibility for legal aid. Anyone who receives legal aid due to this amendment was already entitled to it. This amendment is about improving the speed and quality of that advice, which, frankly, is woeful at present.
We always understood that the amendment was, in effect, cost-neutral to the legal aid budget; it would not increase or decrease legal aid eligibility. I am grateful to the Minister for confirming this understanding in a letter that noble Lords will no doubt have seen, and which has been placed in the House of Lords Library. This is a targeted amendment meant to help the Government fix the most broken part of the legal aid system, which is liable to collapse without some fairly urgent intervention.
Secondly—and, as I say, this is at the heart of the amendment—I want to address whether the current system for providing legal advice and representation in immigration detention is working effectively. I will remind the House of the basic system. There are two schemes for providing legal advice in immigration removal centres and prisons: the detained duty advice scheme, or DDAS, and the telephone legal advice service, or TLAS.
Research going back more than a decade reveals that, since the cuts in 2011 that the House knows about well, there has been a sharp drop in people accessing the schemes I have just mentioned. A survey this year by Bail for Immigration Detainees found that only 27% of respondents held in immigration removal centres had a legal aid solicitor. This contrasts with 75% pre the LASPO Act.
Crucially, this is not because people do not want legal aid and help but because they cannot access it. In my work on this amendment, I was fortunate to speak to many immigration experts and civil society organisations, to whom I owe a great deal for their help in preparing it. These experts and civil society organisations provided many practical examples of the government schemes failing to provide the very basics of access to justice. For example, I was told of a victim of human trafficking who simply stopped hearing from his DDAS lawyer after weeks of working together. He met five other lawyers, none of whom had the capacity to take on the case. It took 15 other referrals by Bail for Immigration Detainees to secure a legal aid lawyer.
Another example is of a case concerning a vulnerable adult at risk, with serious mental health needs, who tried five times to secure a lawyer through DDAS over two months. He could not secure one and had to be supported through a charity outside the scheme. He was later granted bail by the Home Office, perhaps indicating that this was not—as some undoubtedly are—a meritless claim. The House may hear of other egregious examples during this debate.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and for what he kindly offered at the end. I particularly want to thank all those who have spoken in support of this amendment. I hope the House will accept that they carry with them a huge amount of experience in this area and should be listened to with great care.
I am afraid there is a legion of examples where the system is not working as well as the Minister suggested it was from the information he has received. The classic example is the one that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned, which refers to the first group of asylum seekers to be detained under the treaty with France. That is not a treaty I object to—in policy terms, I agree with it—but in this particular case, they were allowed seven days to make their response and representations. A seven-day notice was served on them. Presumably, they were entitled, as anyone else in their position, to the 30 minutes of free advice. However, it seems not one of those men received any legal advice in the seven-day period. Two were apparently—I emphasise “apparently”—informed that they could not have legal advice, and only two days after the seven-day period had run out was the serious error put right with an additional advice shift.
As I say, this is not an attack on the treaty or what it is trying to do. It is an attack, if I may use that phrase, on the system that allows this to happen. The speeches that were made in support, particularly that of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, should make the Government think carefully about whether this system is working as well on the ground as they think it is. I hope all the government departments involved—namely, the Home Office and particularly the Ministry of Justice—will look at the system, see how it is working, keep an open mind and make changes for the better in due course.
In the meantime, I am most grateful to the Minister for his offer of a meeting after this debate is over. I will certainly take that up and I hope others will as well. I never had any intention of calling a Division on this issue. The idea behind it was to try to persuade the Government that there is a real problem here. I hope that we have managed to do that in this debate. I seek permission to withdraw my amendment.
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 137. I also declare my registered interest as the unremunerated, non-executive chair of the board of trustees of the Leicester Law Centre. I remind the Committee that I am also the co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Access to Justice.
I thank noble Lords who have put their names to my amendment and others who have expressed their support. I also thank those from outside the House who have provided excellent briefing and particular assistance to me and other noble Lords.
In the Government’s own words, the UK’s asylum and immigration system is “broken”. In few areas is this damage more obvious than in the struggle people face accessing legal aid immigration advice, due largely to so-called “legal deserts”. This stems, of course, as so much does these days, from the drastic cuts to legal aid following the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, always known as LASPO. Immigration legal aid is, in the words of the Public Law Project,
“an advice sector that has collapsed”,
leaving individuals
“adrift in an ocean of unmet need”.
The facts are fairly brutal. In June 2025, the Law Society estimated that 63% of people in England and Wales could not access a local immigration legal aid solicitor. The result is that 50% of claimants are unrepresented in asylum claims and appeals. In real terms, this means that almost 55,000 people are left without a legal aid representative at the time they need one.
This amendment is about that crisis. Its purpose is to place a duty on the Lord Chancellor to make civil legal aid available within 48 hours to individuals in immigration detention. This will ensure that people who are perhaps in fear for their life, safety and future are supported at a time of obvious extreme vulnerability and helped to navigate the confusing—to put it mildly—labyrinth that is the UK immigration system. Importantly, it will also save taxpayer money by facilitating better decisions earlier on.
Recent announcements have made early access to legal aid more pressing than ever. The first people have been detained as part of the Government’s pilot of the UK-France migration treaty, which facilitates expedited deportations. In addition, the Government are intending to expand the “deport now, appeal later” scheme. It has also been suggested that the Government plan to replace tribunals with independent adjudicators to speed up appeals. On top of this, we are seeing an expansion of the detention estate, such as the reopening of Campsfield House immigration removal centre in Oxfordshire, enabling more people to be detained.
The recent increases in immigration legal aid fees announced by the previous Lord Chancellor—now the Home Secretary—are very welcome. She recognised herself that the changes were designed only to
“stabilise the system and prop up the bits that are most likely to experience system failure”.
As the Institute for Fiscal Studies has confirmed, the increases will go nowhere near restoring the Ministry of Justice budget to pre-cuts levels, with the legal aid budget being 36% lower than in 2008.
The increases announced also do not deal with the unique and urgent challenges of accessing legal advice in immigration detention and are unlikely to prevent system failure in that context. This amendment is a further step in supporting the Government’s efforts to prop up the most broken part of our legal aid system.
I want to address directly why the Government and the House should support making legal aid available for migrants in detention. First, it is to ensure the sovereignty of Parliament; if people cannot obtain legal advice and challenge Home Office decisions when they may be unlawful, the laws passed by Parliament are, frankly, not worth the paper they are written on.
Secondly, this amendment supports the rule of law, of which access to justice is a vital part, as the Committee will surely agree. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, put it in 2017:
“Obtaining advice and representation does not merely mean that competent lawyers exist; it also must mean that their advice and representation are sensibly affordable to ordinary people and businesses: access to justice is a practical, not a hypothetical, requirement”.
I am grateful for that intervention. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are valid and I will do my best to examine them. Some of these issues are within the Ministry of Justice, not the Home Office, but I will examine those points in detail and make sure that we respond to those who have spoken in the debate and potentially put a note in the Library of the House accordingly.
I want to re-emphasise that the Government strongly believe that there is a good offer at the moment. That offer is available to all who seek it, and there is the potential for further advice if the case merits it and for us to examine how we monitor take-up. I will certainly look at the points that have been raised, but in the meantime, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I start by reminding the Committee that in this very complicated and important Bill, this is the only amendment, and therefore the only discussion there has been, on the legal aid issue, so I do not apologise for the time this debate has taken. Everybody who has spoken, on all sides, has taken this issue seriously, as they ought to, because it is very serious, given the principles behind the rule of law. I was pleased to hear the noble Lord on the Front Bench repeat what I knew to be the case—that that side as well as this side, and all sides of this House, believe it important that the rule of law applies when non-nationals are detained, and that those people are as entitled as anyone else to have the benefit of legal advice. That is a big principle and the one behind this amendment, so I am glad it is accepted.
I am really grateful, in that no mover of an amendment could have enjoyed a more expert team of people speaking on behalf of the amendment—or, indeed, not on its behalf. Every contribution was important, not least of all that of my noble friend the Minister, who in his usual courteous way listened to the debate and answered it as well as it could be answered.
My Lords, I am not sure that the amendment in my name ought to be in this group, but it has to be somewhere, and it probably does not deserve to be on its own. I hope your Lordships will forgive me for moving away from the topic. The only link I have is that my amendment would add something to the clause that we are discussing, but that is out of convenience as much as anything else.
There seems to have been some confusion between the Home Office and those who have been advising me about this amendment. I do not think I am in a position to speak to it until my noble friend and I have had an opportunity to meet and discuss it. It is not a long amendment, but it is quite an important one. It relates to what the guidance says on immigration bail and what it should say going forward. I do not want to say much more about it now. We have lots of business to complete today and I imagine the Committee has heard too much from me anyway, so I am going to leave it there.
I do not have any intention of moving the amendment, but I invite my noble friend to meet me shortly. It would be a short meeting just to discuss whether there has been some misunderstanding between the department and those who have asked me to table this amendment.
My Lords, the Committee does not need me to repeat what has been said about Clause 43 by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Kirkhope. I agree more than I can say with what they have said. Tagging, curfew, and requiring someone to be or prohibiting someone from being in a particular place at particular times, et cetera—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has explained what “et cetera” could mean in this situation—are all huge interferences with life in practical, emotional and psychological terms. It basically means that you cannot live a normal life. For instance, how would an international student pursue a course with these restrictions?
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned, the Constitution Committee made a recommendation regarding this clause in its report on the Bill. We have had a response today from the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, saying that the person affected can make representations to the Home Office and apply for a judicial review, which the Home Office says in its letter would “provide appropriate scrutiny”. That may be the topic for a whole other, long debate. Noble Lords will understand that I do not feel—I say this personally, because the committee has not had an opportunity to discuss this yet—that that is an appropriate or particularly helpful response.
The comments—the assurances, perhaps I should call them—made by the then Minister for Border Security and Asylum have been referred to. I would be surprised if this detail had yet been discussed within the Home Office, but one never knows, so perhaps it would not be out of place to ask the Minister whether the change of various Ministers within the department means that these assurances remain in place. Is this still what the Government think? Would they be able to give some sort of undertaking to this effect? However, I do not think that would completely answer our objections to Clause 43.
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend for the experience he brings to the Question. It is certainly the Government’s wish to give flexibility to local police and crime commissioners and chief constables to determine their local priorities, but we still need to set central advice, guidance and funding. One of the key things that will come out of the December settlement will be a focus on neighbourhood policing. It was a manifesto commitment to invest in 13,000 neighbourhood police officers to ensure greater engagement at a local level on crime detection, support from the community and a wider neighbourhood policing role. Within that flexibility I am very happy for chief constables and police and crime commissioners to allow a range of roles to be undertaken to achieve the Government’s objective of reducing crime.
My Lords, as an ex-police and crime commissioner some years ago now, I agree with the Minister in his reply to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I know from bitter experience that, because of government settlements, the number of police officers went down year by year and there was nothing that a police and crime commissioner let alone a chief constable could do about it. It may not be all important but it is pretty important, so are those years over now?
We are trying to reset the relationship between central government and the 43 police forces. That resettlement includes a £0.5 billion boost to policing generally; a new standards authority; £264 million announced up front to help support police to deliver good services; a settlement in December which I am not at liberty yet to talk about, because it is right and proper that we announce that to both Houses in December; and a range of new powers on anti-social behaviour, shop theft and violence against women and girls to set the tone that we need to take action on serious organised crime, violence against women and basic neighbourhood policing issues such as shop theft. I hope that will reset that relationship and I will be held to account by this House and others in doing so.
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I should declare my interest as the unremunerated chair of the board of Leicester Community Advice and Law Centre. I particularly welcome the two Ministers who are speaking for His Majesty’s Government today. They both come with great reputations.
It may not surprise the House that my remarks will be devoted to an issue that, frankly, has not yet arisen this afternoon and does not receive anything like the notice and interest that it should, because it focuses on fundamental issues of access to justice and the rule of law: namely, the manner in which our system of early advice and social welfare law has been effectively trashed and almost destroyed over the last decade as a direct result of government legislation.
The LASPO Act removed from the scope of legal aid a huge amount of law, with the result that early legal advice, assistance and representation were no longer available in cases of debt, housing, welfare benefits, employment and immigration. Add to all that the removal of legal aid in private family cases. I am not exaggerating when I say that the consequences have been disastrous, especially for citizens who are poor and simply cannot afford to assert their own legal rights. The number of legal aid cases to help people to get the early advice they need and are entitled to dropped from almost 1 million people in 2009-10 to just 130,000 people in 2021-22.
The number of people having to go to court without representation has trebled. The number of advice agencies and law centres doing this important work has fallen by 59%. We all know that advice deserts now exist in many parts of our country. It is estimated that the number of people helped by legal aid in that period has dropped by 4.5 million. Not surprisingly in that context, by next year, according to the Law Society, a single person will not be eligible for legal aid unless he or she earns less than £9 a day, or £268 a month. That is 81% below the minimum income standard.
Over the years, the coalition parties that forced LASPO through Parliament have, to varying degrees, seen the errors of their ways. The Liberal Democrats have recanted completely, which is excellent, and from the Conservatives I want to pay credit to the last Lord Chancellor and the last Lords Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bellamy. They began the process of mitigating the effects of the 2012 Act.
I was privileged to chair a commission that reported in 2017 in a Fabian Society report entitled The Right to Justice. Its central recommendation was the establishment, perhaps in the long term, of a right to justice Act that would set up a new individual right to reasonable legal assistance without costs if they cannot be afforded. It also proposed shorter-term policy changes to LASPO that could alleviate the cruel effects of that Act of Parliament. These proposals are still necessary and relevant today, and many go to the idea, which I think we all approve of, early legal advice. If put into effect, they would save overall public expenditure as well as an enormous waste of court time.
I am particularly pleased that under the gracious Speech legal aid will be available to victims of disasters or state-related deaths. I know that the legacy bequeathed to the Government means that they have to be very cautious in this area, as in others. However, it is worth remembering that it was Labour and other Members, the Cross-Benchers in particular, who fiercely opposed LASPO and who predicted accurately its dire consequences. I ask Ministers to take this issue back to the Ministry of Justice and invite the department to look at The Right to Justice report I have mentioned, and other excellent reports that have been produced, including one by the noble Lord, Lord Low, with a view to considering putting right the worst elements of the present system. To do so would not only save overall public money but would be further evidence that we now have a Government who believe in access to justice as an essential part of the rule of law.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberAt end to insert “but this House regrets that the draft Order entails the transfer of power being completed without the consent of other relevant local authorities; and notes that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee concluded that the public consultation required by law was not commenced before an initial decision was made.”
My Lords, in short, my amendment is based on two separate but interlocked criticisms of the Government and their conduct. First, I argue that the Government, in their desire to see the current Mayor of the West Midlands add the role of police and crime commissioner to his already extensive portfolio, have deliberately subverted the principle that they themselves put into earlier legislation: that there should be real democratic support before such a fundamental change. In other words, proper consent for such a course was considered essential before such a transfer of power could take place. That has not happened here, as a deliberate part of the Government’s strategy.
Secondly—and here the Home Office is the main culprit—the timing of and background to this statutory instrument have been rightly criticised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. In an extremely critical report, the committee points out what can only be described as incompetence by the department. The headline of a release put out by the committee to accompany its 15th report put it like this: “Elections potentially undermined by poor process, says Lords Committee”. The release said that:
“The Committee expressed concern that both Orders have been laid before Parliament close to the intended date of the next election (2 May 2024), less than the minimum six months in advance that is regarded as good practice”.
These two points combined will, I hope, persuade the House to say that this behaviour all round should be deprecated.
I will give a little more detail. In exactly 50 days, on 2 May, there will definitely be an election for the Mayor of the West Midlands. The present incumbent is a Conservative. On the same day, and with the same electorate, covering exactly the same area of Britain, there may be an election for the stand-alone role of the police and crime commissioner for the West Midlands. The present police and crime commissioner, elected some years ago, is Labour.
I put it like that because, yesterday, the Administrative Court heard a judicial review brought by the police and crime commissioner for the West Midlands against the Home Office. At the end of the day, the judge reserved judgment until 18 or 20 March. I am not going to say any more about that court case, which has nothing to do with us—we are Parliament, and it is the judge who will make up his mind—but that is why the matter is not resolved legally yet, and I am here to argue that what has happened in the past means that we should regret this statutory instrument.
The mayoral election will be on 2 May but the election period, as far as electoral administrators are concerned, runs not from 2 May but from 21 March—literally eight days’ time. I am advised that electoral administrators in the West Midlands just do not know where they stand, and one can imagine their frustration.
It is obviously beyond argument that all this arises from a deal cooked up some time ago between the Government and the mayor. The mayor wants to be the police and crime commissioner and the Government want it too. Up until the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, he could have had that role if the local authorities that make up the combined authority, and the other local authorities in the West Midlands region, had given their consent. That is what happened in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, and that is what is going to happen in South Yorkshire. In these areas the combined authorities were in favour, as in fact were the police and crime commissioners, but that was not so in the West Midlands. The combined local authorities, on every occasion that they have been asked, have been opposed. So the mayor gets the Government to change the law, in a very short clause in a very large Bill—now Section 62 of the levelling-up Act.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. I will do my best to address as many of the points that have been raised as possible.
It is worth recognising the support from the Government and the Opposition in the other place for the policy of enabling more directly elected mayors to exercise PCC functions, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, just noted. As I outlined in my opening remarks, the exercise of PCC functions by the Mayor of the West Midlands will be a significant step forward to realising the Government’s ambitions, as set out in the levelling up White Paper, for more combined authority mayors to take on PCC functions, as is already the case in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, and will be the case in York and North Yorkshire from this May. We have also introduced a draft order to achieve this outcome in South Yorkshire.
It is the Government’s view that bringing public safety functions under the leadership of a combined authority mayor, where it is possible to do so, has the potential to offer wider levers and a more joined-up approach to preventing crime. It places the PCC model and functions at the heart of a wider set of responsibilities for improving public services, exercised by an individual who will be directly answerable to the community that will elect them. It not only preserves the democratic accountability that underpins the PCC model but with an expanded role for the mayor comes a higher public profile, increased visibility and a greater ability to bring about local change.
The fundamental aim of the order is to incorporate the PCC model within the role of the mayor, maintaining the core principles of governance and accountability. The Government want to seize the opportunity to bring together in one elected role the responsibility for public safety and local regeneration for the people of the West Midlands.
In areas where there is a PCC and a mayor, both elected separately by the same constituency, it can confuse democratic mandates and create barriers to joined-up delivery across a range of public services for those communities. The statistics the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, cited do not take into account local circumstances and, therefore, comparisons have limited utility. None of this means that the West Midlands could not still be safer and have less crime under the new proposed system. Incorporating the PCC functions in the office of mayor creates an opportunity to clarify and enhance the mandate of that elected individual to make a greater impact across a range of public services.
As I set out in my introductory speech, the Home Office ran a public consultation on the proposal to transfer the PCC functions. The purpose of the consultation was to provide the Home Secretary with information to help his decision on whether to proceed with the legislation before us now. While the numbers for and against the transfer were taken into account by the Home Secretary, the most helpful aspect of the consultation, for the purposes of making the decision, was the information provided in the responses. The Home Secretary’s decision was informed, but not bound by, the responses to the consultation. In making his decision, the Home Secretary also had regard to information concerning the statutory tests and duties relevant to his decision. Ultimately, the Home Secretary is satisfied that the making of this order meets the statutory tests required of him. I say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that this was not a referendum. He took note of all the information and made his decision; the information is not binding.
The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, specifically Section 62, has come up. That amended the consent requirements for the transfer of PCC functions to existing combined authority mayors and, instead of the previously required consent of the mayor, the constituent authorities and the combined authority, only the consent of the existing mayor is required to make an order enabling the transfer of the functions. This was decided by Parliament.
The Government have been clear that the PCC functions may transfer to a mayor only at the point of a mayoral election; this ensures that mayors are elected on the basis that they will be exercising PCC functions, maintaining the democratic principles of the PCC model. If this legislation is approved by both Houses, both the incumbent mayor and the PCC would complete their existing terms of office, and on 2 May the West Midlands electorate will select a mayor on the basis of them exercising PCC functions, providing them with a democratic mandate. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, asserted that Mr Street will be the PCC, and I sincerely hope the noble Lord is right, but he will have to make his case to the electorate and they will determine “who is mates with who”, to quote—I forget who.
It may already be known to this House—I think the noble Lord, Lord Bach, referred to it—that the judicial review launched by the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner on the public consultation and subsequent decision to transfer the PCC functions to the mayor was heard by the courts yesterday. Judgment will be reserved until next week, so I cannot prejudice those ongoing proceedings, but the Government strongly defended the claim made by the PCC. We are confident that the public consultation was robust and the Home Secretary’s decision to enable the transfer was lawful.
Regarding the extent to which this transfer upholds democracy, the Government have always been clear that PCC functions can transfer to a mayor only at the point of the mayoral elections, as I have just said. The way this order enables the transfer is no different; the first mayor to exercise the functions will not do so until the May 2024 elections have taken place and they have taken office—I believe on 7 May. The West Midlands electorate still has the ability to decide who they wish to see exercise these PCC functions. The Mayor of the West Midlands will be elected in May on the basis of exercising those.
A number of noble Lords raised concerns that a mayor may—I use the word “may” carefully—appoint a deputy mayor to support them in the exercise of the PCC functions. It was argued that this might be a dilution of the mandate and accountability of the role. At this point, I note that the current PCC has appointed two assistant PCCs. Mayors who exercise PCC functions can appoint a deputy mayor for policing and crime, but this is something that PCCs may also do, as I have just said. The ability to appoint a deputy does not shield mayors from scrutiny at the ballot box; the mayor will be held to account for the performance of a deputy they may appoint to support them. Also, not all PCC functions can be delegated to the deputy PCC; by statute, certain key strategic functions, such as the issuing of the police and crime plan, the appointment and suspension of a chief constable, and calculation of a budget requirement, may exercised only by the mayor themself.
All noble Lords noted the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee report on this order, and the concerns raised in that report. I know the committee has written to the Policing Minister and the Permanent Secretary to express its concerns. I understand that both the Minister and Permanent Secretary have responded to those letters. The committee raised concerns about what it considered to be the “selective reporting” within the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanies this order, and I know that the Policing Minister has responded to address these concerns directly. But I would like to make it clear that the Explanatory Memorandum did not deliberately withhold information in any sort of attempt to selectively report the responses to the consultation and the views of stakeholders. As is best practice, the documents clearly outline the views raised as part of the consultation process, both in support of the transfer and those that raised concerns. The document also signposts readers to the Government’s response to the consultation, which has been published on GOV.UK. It goes into further detail on the concerns raised by respondents to the consultation and the Government’s response to those concerns.
As regards to the timing of the order, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Sahota, I would like to address those points, particularly in relation to the Gould principle of electoral management, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sahota. Where possible, government aims to ensure that any legislative changes to elections are introduced at least six months in advance of those elections, to give all those involved appropriate notice. In the case of the West Midlands, government was not able to lay the order six months in advance of the May 2024 elections. Every step has been taken to lay as early as possible, and I know officials have been closely engaged with partners in the West Midlands Combined Authority and the office of the PCC throughout the process, to keep them informed as much as possible. I hope noble Lords will support the order, so we can get one step closer to providing clarity to the local area, and enable it to deliver orderly elections in May. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, noted, as long as that is done by 21 March, all is in order.
A question has been raised about why the Home Secretary took the original decision to proceed with the transfer before the statutory requirements were met. As soon as the Home Secretary became aware of the statutory requirements of the 2023 Act, he launched a public consultation and made it clear that he would retake his decision after he had had due regard to the responses and after he had considered whether the making of the order would meet the statutory tests. The order was therefore not laid before Parliament until the Home Secretary was satisfied that the statutory requirements of the 2023 Act had been met. I hope I have dealt with the key points that have been raised. Again, I thank all those who participated. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this lively and interesting debate. I am very conscious of the time. I particularly thank the Minister, who had a difficult case to put and did it with politeness and good humour. I also thank Members of the House who have been present, as well as those who have spoken. I will not reply to the comments as I think the case has been made. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I remind the noble Lord that I have just gone through the various forms of independent scrutiny to which this investigation was subject in some detail, and I shall not refer to it again. As I say, the IOPC and others have looked into this in some detail.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that, at the end of his response to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, he seemed to throw out just a little bit of encouraging information. I welcome that, and hope that the Minister goes back, recognising the very widespread feeling around this House that justice has not been done to the reputation of a Prime Minister who has been unfairly treated, right up to this time. It is important that justice is done soon, rather than the issue hanging on for year after year of non-action.
I can only repeat that I have said that I shall ask officials to look into the possibility or viability of this—I cannot possibly prejudge what they may come back to me with, but I shall come back to the House in due course.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, along with many other noble Lords, I am, frankly, distressed and shocked to see this proposed legislation in front of the British Parliament. To me, it is hardly credible that a British Government should ask Parliament to pass a Bill that insists on denying established facts, almost certainly breaks international agreements, lowers our reputation in the world sharply, takes away judicial powers and hands them to the Executive, and treats other human beings—including genuine refugees—in an outrageous, cavalier and reckless manner. And all this in some desperate and false attempt to fool the electorate that the Government are serious about immigration.
Yet the Bill is in front of us, and we have been warned—if not threatened by the Prime Minister, at perhaps the most ludicrous press conference ever heard at No. 10—to pass it speedily and without amendment, or else. This was surely the wrong approach and only encourages those of us who believe the Bill to be unconstitutional and not worthy of this country to be more determined.
I want to concentrate briefly on Clause 1(2)(b). I agree exactly with what the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, told the House a few minutes ago. That clause is a bold statement of fact, not of opinion—although there is an attempt at Clause 1(5) to give a ridiculously inadequate definition of a “safe country”. As a statement of fact, it is false. All the best regarded opinion is that Rwanda is, alas, not a safe country. That is what the Supreme Court unanimously found, and anyone who saw yesterday’s Observer newspaper, for example, will know that there is striking evidence that any opposition to the Government there is just not tolerated.
Again by way of example, how does the Minister begin to explain how four Rwandan citizens, all supporting the opposition party, have in the last four months all been given refugee status in this country—one of them, ironically, at the time the Supreme Court was considering the case? Does that not perfectly describe how absurd it is, in the face of so much evidence, to say that our courts and our judges have to assume that Rwanda is a safe country?
Like many others in this House, I was privileged to be at the memorial service last week for our late and much missed colleague Lord Judge. The reading was from Deuteronomy and concerned the obligations on those asked to do justice. One phrase struck me as being really relevant to this Bill. It is the direction given in the Bible—and this is the modern translation—that:
“You must not distort justice”.
If this Bill becomes law, with a plainly false proposition at its heart, how will it be possible not to distort justice? I agree with those who say that this Bill is not worthy of our country, neither its traditions nor its present, and certainly not its future.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat is perhaps the case but, of course, we still have to find parliamentary time for these things.
My Lords, why do we have to wait for the Criminal Justice Bill before the statutory instruments can be produced in this particular case? Could we not move to a statutory instrument straightaway so that this long delay, which seems to be all-pervasive here, can at least be shortened to an extent?
I would very much like to see it shortened. I do not know the answer to that but I will come back.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is quite right that these new laws have come into force in Northern Ireland, but the authorised professional practice guidance on media relations, issued by the College of Policing, already makes clear that the police
“will not name those arrested or suspected of a crime, other than in exceptional circumstances where there is a legitimate policing purpose to do so”.
In May 2018, the college updated this guidance to make it clear that it applies where allegations are “made against deceased persons”.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that many of us from all parts of this House believe it is vital that there is an independent review of the shockingly unresolved allegations against Sir Edward Heath? Is he further aware that one of the reasons for a review is that it is hard to feel complete confidence in the 2017 official review, including a senior investigating officer from Operation Hydrant, since Veale’s decisions were examined by police officers who perhaps lacked sufficient independence from him?
I say to the noble Lord that I am of course aware of this. There were three main forms of scrutiny during the investigation. There was an independent scrutiny panel to ensure proportionality; the role of the panel members was to check and test the decision-making and approach in the investigation. At the end of the investigation the panel issued a statement. The noble Lord referred to Operation Hydrant. In September 2016 and May 2017, there were two reviews which concluded that the investigation was proportionate, legitimate and in accordance with national guidance. Finally, there was a review in January 2017 by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, as it then was, of whether the resources assigned to the investigation by the Home Office were being deployed in accordance with value for money principles. The review concluded that they were.