(9 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a very good question. A strengthened action plan—a strengthened sentence plan for each IPP prisoner—is an essential part of the wider IPP action plan. That is currently being worked on so that each IPP prisoner still in custody will have a personalised, updated and—we hope—effective sentence plan eventually leading to their release if that is at all possible. The newly established IPP progression board dealing with this matter now includes stakeholder representatives, who met in September and just before Christmas and will meet again in March, when we will report a full update on how the action plan is progressing.
My Lords, I reinforce the suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Clarke. Has the time not come to provide a presumption that all IPP prisoners who have served the tariff should be released unless there is robust evidence tendered to the Parole Board that they are unsafe to be released?
My Lords, that is, in effect, the present position. The Government have no interest in holding these prisoners, especially given the pressure on the prison system generally. The Government’s fear, worry and concern is public protection, for the reasons I have given.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, does my noble and learned friend agree that in principle, an interim order should be made only after a hearing at which both parties are present and can make their case? If, in exceptional cases, an interim order is made on an ex parte basis, does he agree that the return date should be a swift one and that both parties should then be able to make their representations to the judge?
My Lords, I agree in principle with the comments made by my noble friend.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberOn the question of numbers and definition, what is the essential definition of exceptional case funding and how many cases have given rise to such a relief?
I do not have the exact definition in front of me. It is a matter for the director of the Legal Aid Agency to decide. There is guidance on this, which applies in particular to cases of inquest and other areas where convention rights are at issue. I can supply my noble friend with further details in due course.
I do not have that information with me, but about three-quarters of applications succeed.
At the risk of disturbing the atmosphere of good will that has, to an extent, prevailed this afternoon, your Lordships would have expected me to explore with the Government whether there can be any further movement on this clause and I am sorry to say that, subject to the important exception for victims of domestic abuse in relation to family and housing matters, they adhere to the clause and respectfully present it to the House.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seek to remove these clauses from the Bill altogether. The Government’s position is that the measures are necessary to ensure that our limited resources for legal aid funding are not directed towards individuals who attack society and democracy and, through their actions, commit acts of terrorism that seek to threaten and undermine the very democratic institutions which provide the benefit of legal aid. It is right that access to legal aid should therefore be subject to the provisions of this clause. Again, I understand that the Labour Party, in principle, accepts that approach.
It is certainly possible to argue, as the noble Baroness did, that if this applies to terrorism, why does it not apply to murder, the abuse of women, drug trafficking and other offences? Certainly, one can always advance an argument about where you draw the line. The line is drawn here at terrorism because of its particular threat to our society and democracy; that is the Government’s reasoning. As I have just said, it is not a blanket ban on civil legal aid because the exceptional case funding route ensures—in compliance with our obligations under the convention—that legal aid remains available when it is most needed to ensure access to justice.
Amendment 188, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would limit the restriction to where an offender has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years or more. I acknowledge of course the noble Lord’s concerns, but the Government oppose this amendment on the following grounds. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, introduced following the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham Hill terrorist attacks, expanded the sentencing powers of courts in relation to terrorist offenders and created more restrictive provisions for terrorist offenders whose offences carry a maximum sentence of more than two years. So, the two-year benchmark is already baked into legislation, and the Government feel that it is the appropriate benchmark in this instance.
The noble Lord’s seven-year sentence proposal would mean that a number of quite serious terrorism offences would escape: for example, the breach of a TPIM notice. It would also—by reference to sentencing, as distinct from the statutory definition of an offence—create quite a subjective difference between offenders when one has got more than the other: one is a bit above and one is a bit below, perhaps because one has had more previous convictions than the other, or for whatever reason. So, the Government think that the two-year benchmark in existing legislation is logical, defendable and clear and that it should remain. So, with regret, the Government are unable to accept Amendment 188 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Amendment 187, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make the restriction not apply if the terrorism offence of which the individual had been convicted had no relevant factual connection with their application for legal aid. We quite understand the noble Lord’s intention behind that amendment, but, again, the Government cannot accept it. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, this is a point of principle. The Government have considered with great care the proposal put forward and consider that the fact of a conviction for a terrorist offence carrying a sentence of more than two years is a ground for restricting the route by which legal aid is granted, so we are unable to accept this amendment.
However, we have tabled government Amendments 182, 183, 184 and 186 to create an exception so that the restriction will not apply where a terrorist offender is a victim of domestic abuse and is applying for legal aid related to family and housing matters within a relevant time period. That would include such matters as pursuing protective injunctions in child custody cases, as well as the loss of a home or homelessness. Again, the question arises: if you have extended it there, why do you not extend it somewhere else? The answer, I think, is that one has to draw a line somewhere. Those are particularly serious issues in society as it stands, and that seems to the Government to be a sound basis for making an exception. It is not our position that it is relevant or wise to create any further exceptions.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt also clearly extends to statute-based law. Is that not a case for bringing the courts into expressing a view as to what is essentially the function of Parliament?
My Lords, the courts are always astute. They sort of intuitively know where they have to stop and where Parliament has to take over. That is a process that has been honed and refined for the past 100 years at least, but it does not prevent the courts moulding, refining and developing the common law. There comes a point where you cannot go further, but quite often in a court you can, especially when you have existing jurisprudence. It is quite early on in the development of a new technology. In the Warner case, we were talking about hyperlinks, graphic interfaces and all sorts of high-technology things with which I am sure your Lordships are extremely familiar, but it is a new area of law, and the courts, generally speaking, work with that until they find that they have gone as far as they can as a court and then Parliament takes over. With respect, I would not completely accept the observation of my noble friend Lord Hailsham that this is usurping Parliament.
I am sorry. I am rather nervous when noble Lords come at me from all directions, especially the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham.
That is quite all right.
This is the logic of the approach. It is a cross-UK approach and not a Scotland-specific approach. It does not seem appropriate that the previous functions of the Lord Advocate, so far as they have been retained, should change.
I thank the House for its welcome. As the House knows, this afternoon we have an Oral Statement during which we can go into some of these questions in more detail. If I may at this stage confine myself to general terms, the Government’s view is that this Bill will strengthen our human rights framework in this country, in particular—and these are the key words I would like to introduce—by introducing a better balance in the human rights framework, a better balance between the judiciary and the legislature, a better balance between UK judges and Strasbourg, and a better balance between rights and obligations. We stay in the convention; the rights in the convention are still there in UK statute; but we seek to rebalance and clarify, in the words of the Act, and thereby restore public confidence in our human rights framework.
My Lords, I also welcome my noble and learned friend to his present place; he is very welcome. Would he agree that in a parliamentary democracy there is a great deal to be said for leaving to the Supreme Court of this country the ultimate interpretation of the meanings of rights and their applications? If Parliament happens to disagree with that interpretation, Parliament can reverse or modify it, whereas if the ultimate arbiter is the European court, that is not possible. Is that not a serious democratic deficit?
My Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the general position articulated by my noble and learned friend, and I expressed my reasons earlier. If we transfer to the Supreme Court the role of the ultimate arbiter of the convention rights, what impact does that have on obligations overseas and international obligations we have already undertaken? Would he give this House, either today or more fully later, a fairly comprehensive statement on the impact on our international obligations so that noble Lords can take a considered view on where the balance of advantage lies?
I thank the noble Viscount and gratefully accept his invitation to give such a considered and more detailed view at a later stage.