Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Bew and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bew (CB)]

We are in a situation now where in Dublin it is accepted by those involved in the negotiation that they achieved a one-sided appropriation of this agreement. This then flows into the agreement of 2019. It was because of our weakness. We cannot undo it and we signed up for it—I get all that—none the less it is accepted by them that there is a problem. The problem cannot be met by saying “You signed up for it”, “Boris was a fool” or anything like that. It is a real problem at this moment. That is the key thing we are stuck with.

This agreement and the protocol say in numerous places—the former Lord Chancellor said it in the other place, so the Government have argued this very clearly—that it is about protecting the Good Friday agreement and for good measure protecting the integrity of the UK single market. This debate is rather different from the terms it has been couched in. I keep saying that the reality is about the interaction of a prior international agreement and the protocol agreement. There are different views of this.

While we are on this subject—regarding the evidence of Sir Jonathan Jones that was cited earlier—the Attorney-General in 2019 explicitly said in the other place, and it was repeated in this place, that there is a problem: where the protocol conflicts with the Good Friday agreement, the UK reserves the right to operate the existing prior international agreements. Who was working in the Attorney-General’s office then? I am certain there were some quite good lawyers when that happened.

We heard about Professor Mark Goldie’s observations, and they are absolutely true. He is a professor in public law in Cambridge who came to our committee in the Lords. I think Professor Boyle came to both committees. Professor Goldie listened to Professor Boyle, who I am certain does not support this Bill and who is much more open in principle to the arguments regarding international law, that the prior international agreement weighs heavily here. In the interaction of the two of them he personally argued Article 16 should be applied because you cannot demonstrate necessity unless it has been applied. I have often been attracted to that argument, but I am astounded by the number of Peers in this House who are mad keen for Article 16.

I am a historian, not a lawyer. I remember a few months ago when every civilised person was regarding the application of Article 16 and no one was saying “Oh, it’s in the treaty.” I remember the intensity of emotions—that this would be another foul act of disgraceful behaviour by the Government, even though it clearly is in the treaty. I am delighted there are so many converts today. I am not even sure; I think they might be right. It is a fashion change, not an international law change. The mood of the House has changed on this point, and nothing has changed in law.

I am not saying that Professor Goldie supports the Bill; I am certain he does not. As I said, I am not sure that Professor Boyle does either. Professor Goldie accepted the burden of Professor Boyle’s argument that it is very important to have upfront protection of the Good Friday agreement. The story about what international lawyers say—I am certain this will become even more complicated in this Chamber before this Bill finishes its passage—is a little bit more complicated. That is all I want to say. I am not saying that I know. I could not possibly say that sitting on this Bench with two very distinguished lawyers.

I am not making a claim about law but about history and what actually happened, how we got here and the mood on this, because that does rather matter. What I am saying is that the Government would be within their rights to say that there is a debate on this subject and there is a real problem. If you are not even talking—as most speakers today have not—about the interaction between the Good Friday agreement, the prior international agreement, and this agreement, then you are not even in the debate in any realistic way. They would have the right to say that.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, and in due deference to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I will now inject the perspective of an economist and businessperson.

I support Amendments 3 and 67 and will try to inject a different perspective here. The arguments about protecting the Good Friday agreement are of course important and real. However, it seems that, despite arguing that the UK has contributed to the problem—which is essentially part of the reason why the doctrine of necessity seems unable to be applied here—there are options open to the United Kingdom to respect the Good Friday agreement, including maintaining regulatory alignment. Were regulatory alignment to be maintained, the east-west problem would not necessarily arise—because the EU could be reassured that there is less of a threat to its single market—and the north-south element would also not arise. If the UK wanted to diverge regulatorily, it has the option to negotiate that. So there are practical resolutions within our power to protect the Good Friday agreement and the protocol.

If we cast our minds back to the awful Brexit and post-Brexit periods, an assurance was given to noble Lords, including myself, that there would be technical arrangements—alternative arrangements—that would permit the flow of goods across the border that could be tracked, with trusted traders and technology being introduced, that would mean that we would not have these problems of customs procedures. If those arrangements were to be in place, the problem would not arise. So again, the UK Government have the option of saying, “We will maintain regulatory alignment until we have introduced those arrangements”. That would allow us to be in a position where we would not be breaking international law.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bew, when he said that, if there is a problem, we should try to find a compromise, but that again means negotiation and using the facilities we have signed up to ourselves rather than threatening to blow up the whole agreement. I urge my noble friends on the Front Bench to try to get away from the magical thinking that we can somehow square this circle by threats or by breaking international law—or even by threatening to break international law—and instead to get around the table and negotiate a reasonable way forward that gets away from this kind of argument.