Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Minutes of Proceedings - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, like others, I think that this has so far been an excellent debate, and I shall try not to spoil that record. It is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit. His views and mine do not normally coalesce in any way whatever—except on terrorism.

As far as I can see, I welcome the Bill in its entirety. We all remember with sadness the lives lost and the lives horrifyingly changed by the attacks in Britain in 2017. This Bill is part of our nation’s response to those events. I thought that the decision by the Government, MI5 and the police to put in train the operational improvement review—carried out by the then David Anderson QC, now my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich—was wise and proportionate, and this Bill reflects that position.

In the same way as the noble Lord, Lord King, said, I appreciate the bipartisan approach taken by both Houses to this matter. It has not always been thus. As a rather famous namesake of mine once said, I have “scars on my back” from the times in which there was not a bipartisan approach to terrorism.

The Bill recognises that terrorist behaviour and terrorist threats are changing, particularly, as my noble friend Lady Manningham-Buller said, in the way in which terrorists are using less sophisticated methods, radicalising more quickly and more often acting alone. The Bill takes account of the increasing number of ungoverned spaces in the world and of the evolving nature of the internet, from downloading to streaming. In addition, the background to the Bill is that not all the changes in circumstance represent the new. We are seeing old threats returning, particularly the rise of the far right, which we should not underestimate, and the presence on British soil of state agents with malign intent.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Bill, however, is its implicit recognition, as the present Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and the noble Baroness both said, that what is happening in the UK is not a spike in terrorist criminality but a shift to what appears to be a long-term, higher intensity of activity, with more than one arrest a day for terrorism occurring in the year to March 2018. Even with all the passion and doubts expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, I welcome the way in which the Government, faced by this and by the speed with which individuals can move from being at risk of radicalisation to direct action, have continued to support the Prevent arm of the world-leading Contest strategy. I really look forward to the involvement of non-central parts of government in that endeavour. I thoroughly agree with that proposition and I will explain why.

I was involved at the very beginning of the discussions about what became Prevent. I passionately argued that it was inappropriate for the police to have fundamental responsibility outside government for making Prevent work. It seemed to me absurd that communities, especially at that time Muslim communities in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, should be asked to report suspicious behaviour to an arm of the police when that might mean that another arm of the police—literally an armed unit of the police—might eventually respond to what they had said. I argued fiercely that local authorities and education authorities should be co-responsible for Prevent, and I am really glad to see that happening.

However, in addition to that, our past comes back to haunt us as previously convicted terrorists are now being released, having served prison sentences for which too short a maximum sentence had been prescribed in earlier legislation. I welcome the increasing length of sentences for preparatory behaviour short of actual action. I am not normally in favour of lengthening maximum sentences for anything, but I am when we talk about terrorism. Beyond that, I still believe that the terrorist prevention and investigation measures, TPIMs, remain of too short a duration, and I hope that the Government will look again at that issue during the passage of the Bill through the House.

I congratulate the Government on their decision to keep this important legislation coming through both Houses in the middle of the tensions of Brexit, and I hope that the Bill completes its full legislative passage as soon as possible. I also hope that, by the time its provisions come into effect, they do not do so in a Europe in which Britain has lost most of its ability to co-operate effectively with EU countries on security and policing, particularly on the European arrest warrant, Schengen and the Prüm arrangements—but that is probably for another day.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord reminds us about the draft code of conduct. It spells out considerations that relate to the threat of hostile activity and lists a number of factors, one of which, in the context of the stop not being arbitrary, is to have consideration of “possible current, emerging … hostile activity”, which is understandable, and “future hostile activity”. Can the Minister explain the distinction between emerging and future hostile activity?

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

I support the words of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. As long as these powers are restricted to the extreme circumstances of national security and are not a passport to a widening of stop and search without justification, I think this is about hanging a notice around the UK—particularly, as he said, in relation to clean skins and travelling companions—saying that this is a hostile place for people with deeply malign intent.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have raised a number of important issues relating to the ports and border powers under Schedule 3 to the Bill and Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. While it is incumbent on the Government of the day to keep the people of this country safe and respond to a range of evolving threats—as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, says, that is what it is all about—it is also critical that we are mindful of the wider impact that these measures can have if exercised arbitrarily or without due care.

As noble Lords will be aware, the powers under Schedule 3 have been introduced to address a gap in our capability to tackle the threat posed by hostile state actors. As with the equivalent powers under Schedule 7 for counterterrorism purposes, they will provide the police with the tools that they need to counter the threat from hostile states. I have listened carefully to the points made at Second Reading and today about the powers and the concerns about how they might be used. The Government share the view that the arbitrary use of any police power is objectionable, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, which is why they will be subject to a number of checks and balances.

Amendment 64 would ensure that an examining officer may exercise examination and detention powers under Schedule 3 only where he or she has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is or has been engaged in hostile activity. Amendments 42 and 46 would make similar changes to Schedule 7. Noble Lords may recall that in relation to the powers under Schedule 7 the Government have consistently rejected the introduction of such a threshold. We share the view of our operational partners that to amend the legislation in this way would fundamentally undermine the utility of capabilities that the police rely on to keep the public safe.

There are three key reasons for that and they apply to Schedule 3 in equal measure. First, we would risk disclosing to hostile actors the extent of our intelligence coverage and capabilities, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out. These powers are and will be used to examine individuals who have been identified by operational partners as working with or for terrorists or hostile actors, which could also include foreign intelligence operatives or agents of a foreign intelligence service. Any person examined under a power subject to a suspicion threshold could infer that they were of active interest to the police and intelligence agencies and the tradecraft behind that intelligence coverage. Port officers may also be required to explain to these individuals the reasons for stopping them. In such an event, it is likely that terrorists or hostile actors would use this information to reverse-engineer our methods, bypass future security checks and increase their reliance on clean skins, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out.

Secondly, requiring grounds for suspicion would in effect remove a key tool to identify and disrupt previously unknown terrorists or hostile actors. In giving evidence to the Commons Public Bill Committee, Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu explained that the police are often in possession of intelligence that is “fragmented” or “incomplete” and is not always focused on a specific individual. Such intelligence may instead point to trends or patterns of travel, or an active threat linked to a particular destination and timeframe. The introduction of a suspicion threshold would limit the availability of these powers to known individuals, or those who have demonstrated suspicious behaviour at a port. It would prevent port officers from selecting individuals for examination who are potentially exploiting travel routes that have been uncovered by intelligence or are heading to a specific destination within an identified threat window.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 3rd December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, in considering the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we have to look at the two new paragraphs (a) and (b) together. In the Bill, the Government seek to eliminate various routes by which an ingenious individual who wants, in effect, to incite people to support a terrorist organisation might create a defence. It is a combination of the two new paragraphs that seems to me to be important. An individual might claim that that they are not supporting a terrorist organisation, but merely supportive of its objectives. They might express that supportive nature of the objectives in such graphic and bloodcurdling terms that it might be deemed to have an effect on those listening to those descriptions. But of course, if they then went on to claim that they had no intention of making people act and follow that particular terrorist organisation, they would be permitted to do so.

By including both being “supportive of” the general objectives and at the same time being reckless as to the consequences of that, the Bill seems to attempt to avoid those ingenious individuals proclaiming that in fact they are not encouraging people to join a particular terrorist organisation, but are merely being supportive of the objectives of that organisation and have no intention at all of making people take action on that. The fact remains that that they have been supportive of the organisation and at the same time reckless as to the consequences. My concern with the amendment is that it actually allows two routes by which people can claim a defence when they have clearly, in the most common terms, been trying to persuade people to support a terrorist organisation. That is why I think the combination of “supportive” with the reckless intent makes a degree of sense.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to say that it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and that I completely agree with him.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I too agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris. It seems to me that this clear provision provides four steps which have to be proved before somebody can be convicted of the crime set out in Clause 1. The first step is that they must say something deliberately, whether orally or in writing in some form, including on the internet. That requires them to act purposefully—it is a deliberate expression. Secondly, it must be supportive of something. Thirdly, it must be supportive not of anything at all but of a proscribed organisation—one that is forbidden by law to join in any event. Fourthly, they must consciously disregard the risks flowing from their action. That is the component of recklessness. So, with great respect to the noble Baroness who moved the amendment, I fear that she may have misunderstood what is provided by assuming that some vague general expression might be taken as committing the offence.