Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I want to speak briefly in firm support of this suite of amendments, because they do not obstruct compassion but restore clarity and protect the vulnerable. As many noble Lords have said, the Bill leaves crucial decisions to discretion and delegated guidance. As my noble friend Lord Deben said, it is not precise.

Where I slightly disagree with my noble friend Lord Harper is that I am worried not about the judges moving the goalposts on the main Act of Parliament but because I believe that there will be more than 40 regulations, of which we have seen neither hide nor hare. We will not even see a draft before the Bill becomes law, and every single one of those regulations will be wide open to judicial review. That is where the judges will not have to move goalposts but have to fill in gaps on issues that neither House of Parliament has considered. They will have to decide whether the goalposts are for rugby or football, which neither House will have determined. I am deeply concerned that the Bill is not precise enough on the details that noble Lords have specified.

That imprecision leaves a big legal vacuum, where the most sensitive judgments about life and death can be initiated or driven by others, where serious mental illness can be overlooked and where people in care homes or in poverty can be pushed towards an irrevocable choice without robust, statutory safeguards. The amendments in this group are practical, proportionate and targeted fixes to those gaps.

First, the amendments make it clear that only the person themselves may initiate a request and that lasting powers of attorney cannot be used to start the process. That is essential, and I believe the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, agrees. If he does, let us put it in the Bill. The law must not be ambiguous about agency of any sort. Where the law is silent, pressure and expediency will fill the silence. We have seen in other jurisdictions how a third party can accelerate a fatal outcome; the Bill must not replicate that risk.

Secondly, the amendments addressing severe mental health are not an attack on autonomy; they are recognition of clinical reality. A person can meet the narrow legal test of capacity while still having a treatable or episodic mental disorder that drives suicidal ideation. Excluding those with a history or pattern of suicidality from eligibility, or at least requiring a specialist psychiatric assessment, protects people whose wish to die is a symptom rather than a settled, autonomous decision.

Thirdly, the Bill must provide an independent, neutral route for information. Many doctors will rightly decline to participate. Patients must not be left to navigate a black box where the only signpost is a clinician who may be unwilling or conflicted. An independent local service or register would ensure that information was unbiased and accessible, and that the pathway into assessment was not covertly steered by those with other motives.

Fourthly, care home residents deserve heightened safeguards. Undiagnosed dementia and fluctuating capacity are common in residential settings. A single visiting doctor cannot reliably detect these risks in one brief encounter. Requiring a specialist assessment for care home residents is a modest, necessary step to prevent tragic mistakes.

These amendments would not create delay for those who are clearly eligible. They would create clear, statutory thresholds and processes so that clinicians, patients and families knew where they stood. They would reduce litigation risk, prevent inconsistent local practice, and ensure that the law aligned with the seriousness of the act that it permitted. If this House is to legislate for assisted dying, we must do so with precision. These amendments are not obstructionist; they are the scaffolding of a safe, humane system. I urge noble Lords to support them so that the Bill protects autonomy while safeguarding those most at risk of being failed by ambiguity, poverty or untreated mental illness.

I conclude in a more inadequate way than my noble friend Lord Deben did, on the point that he also made to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. If he cannot produce an assurance of amendments on the Bill that will implement some of the concerns of the royal colleges and of the three Select Committees of this House, some will be left with the impression that his strategy is not to accept amendments but to beg for more time and drive through the Bill, line by line unamended. That would be unacceptable. I hope that that is not the noble and learned Lord’s intention, but he could reassure us all by coming forward with revisions to the Bill and amendments that seek to implement the safeguards for which many organisations outside the House have been calling.

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to three amendments in this group—Amendment 38, in the name of my noble friend Lady O’Loan, to which my name is attached, and Amendments 39 and 68. Amendment 38 seeks to address the challenges of those who have bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder or other conditions associated with episodic suicide ideation, who face a higher baseline risk of self-harm and suicide. Research indicates that suicidal thoughts and behaviours are significantly more prevalent among people with these diagnoses, even without terminal illness, as reported by NICE in 2022 and Public Health England in 2021. Critically, evidence also shows that suicidal ideation tends to increase following a terminal diagnosis, so without the safeguard of this amendment, the Bill risks enabling assisted dying decisions to be influenced by pre-existing mental health vulnerabilities exacerbated by the receipt of a terminal diagnosis.

I support calls in the Chamber today to look at the benefits system. It is a really complicated process, whether you have a terminal diagnosis or not. It is important to learn from other jurisdictions. The 2024 Oregon official report cited that 9% of those who requested to end their lives did so for financial reasons and 42% requested it because they were felt a burden. I think it has already been quoted that in 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, with the Demos report, said that no remedial mental health condition should be eligible for assisted suicide. I do not expect an answer in the Chamber on this question this afternoon because it might take a long time—I am very happy to meet outside—but I am interested to understand what has changed from his view in 2011 to thinking that this would work in the Bill now.

Many of the amendments talk about a settled wish. I could almost see how somebody could try to justify that, for someone with a terminal condition and suicide ideation, requesting assisted dying might be a form of suicide prevention. I feel like I am tying myself in knots with this argument, but I think when we hear the argument that people are already dying, we need protection for those groups of individuals. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, who I do not think is in her place—I am sorry, I do not have my glasses on—raised evidence given in the Select Committee and talked about paternalism. My personal experience is that I do not see much paternalism in the health service. What I do see is an awful lot of ableism, and I think that if we are talking about paternalism, we should be talking about ableism as well. From a disabled person’s perspective, this recognises the intersection between disability, chronic illness and mental health vulnerability.

The panel has already been raised in the Chamber this afternoon. The panel is a really important part of the eligibility determination and deciding whether somebody can go forward. I think that one of the only things that the noble Lord, Lord Winston, and I could agree on today is that words are important. This relates to the place of the panel. I draw your Lordships’ attention to the clarification statement that was issued by the Association for Palliative Medicine this week. Because words are important, I am going to read it. It states:

“In Friday’s … debate (9/1/26), Lord Falconer cited, and misrepresented, expert evidence presented to the Terminals Ill Adults committee last year by the Association for Palliative Medicine … Crucially, panel members would not be required to meet the patient. They would, therefore, have no individual clinical perspective to bring to bear on the person applying for an assisted death. This renders the panel a mere administrative review, stripping it of the very nuance and human understanding that defines robust, compassionate decision-making at the end of life”.


This is why these amendments are even more important in terms of what we are trying to do.

I have previously discussed suicide among unpaid carers and the pressure on them. In Canada, there is a case of a man who had carer burnout and arranged for an urgent assessment for his wife. She died that day. That is listed in the Ontario coroner’s report. There is also written evidence to show that two men who had caring responsibilities for their partners ended up doing a mercy killing, which is often, strangely, very sympathetically portrayed in the media.

Amendment 39, in my name, is about recognising where an assisted death could take place and who will be most directly affected. The settings that could be affected include care homes or nursing homes—communities that care for those living with dementia, frailty, disability or advanced illness, where dependency is a condition of daily life rather than an exception.

It is important to recognise that a significant proportion of people living with dementia or cognitive impairment remain undiagnosed until the later stages of the disease. On average, people with dementia live with symptoms for three and a half years before receiving a diagnosis. Current NHS England and Alzheimer’s Society data show that only about two-thirds of those with dementia receive a formal diagnosis. The diagnosis rate in Wales is even lower. This further underscores the need for a specialist clinical assessment before any conclusion about capacity is reached. If one in three people with dementia are never diagnosed, one in three potential applicants under the Bill may have an unrecognised impairment in capacity. This is not a margin of error that any legislator can reasonably accept.

A recent report by the whistleblower charity Compassion in Care further illustrates the heightened vulnerability of care home residents. Based on evidence submitted by over 1,000 care workers who called the charity’s helpline to express their concerns about the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, the most predominant issue raised in 97% of cases was that of fluctuating capacity, which is common among those residing in care homes. The British Geriatrics Society, which gave evidence during the Select Committee, estimates the prevalence of delirium among care and nursing home residents to be as high as 60%.

Amendment 68 is about protecting autonomy. It would ensure that the right to request assistance to end one’s life remains solely with the individual who is terminally ill. It would prevent any surrogate, family member or medical professional making that decision on their behalf. By explicitly prohibiting third-party decisions, we safeguard vulnerable individuals from coercion or misinterpretation of their wishes.

Finally, I would like to ask the noble and learned Lord a few questions. How will he specifically seek to protect those who are in care homes or who may be vulnerable? How will the Bill protect those individuals who have had previous suicide ideation? Where does the Bill seek to understand the intersection of those with suicide ideation who then receive a terminal diagnosis and whether this is a genuine, settled wish? How, through the Bill, will we be able to offer protection to those who have a previous history of self-harm?