Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 376. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Empey. Last Friday, like many of your Lordships, I sat here all day and did not say a word. My amendment was in the following group, but sadly we did not get to it. However, there was an excellent discussion, and I want to pay tribute to some of the contributors: my noble friend Lord Deben, the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, and indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

The noble and learned Lord said something that rang a bell; he referred to studied diligence, and how healthcare professionals and the whole system will study how best to conduct these assessments. When he said “studied diligence”, it reminded me of some experiences that I had as a Member of Parliament in helping people in very distressing circumstances with the healthcare of loved ones and trying to navigate the system. The thing that struck me was studied neglect. Studied neglect is quite difficult to detect, because it is not always obvious.

Many of us in this House have a routine, which is what makes us get up every day, and as you get older, that routine becomes very important. You have a good night’s sleep, you wake up in the morning, you shower, you clean your teeth, you exercise and you go to work, or to functions in the community. You eat well—you eat healthily. You can lead a normal life, as many of us do in this House, but something may happen to you—you may slip, trip and fall, and you may find yourself in hospital. That is when things can go wrong, because you are out of that routine of a good night’s sleep and getting up in the morning. For every week that you lie in bed, you lose 10% of your muscle strength. You do not get up, you do not do your routine, you do not shower and you do not clean your teeth. Things start happening to you, and you can go downhill very quickly.

Those things can happen through daily life—but the thing that really concerns me about this Bill, and the reason why I tabled this particular amendment insisting on face-to-face diagnosis from the healthcare professionals having to make this decision, is based on my experience as an MP. Close family and friends can have a malign influence by slowly but surely—this is why I referred to it as studied neglect—not encouraging a loved one to get out of bed in the morning, so that routine declines. They stop showering in the morning; they do not go for their manicure or pedicure or to get their hair done, and they start to decline. People who we always regard as very smart for their age can decline very quickly. The loved ones around them can engineer that, so that when social workers and healthcare professionals meet those people, it is not obvious what is happening. They are not sleeping properly, not looking after themselves properly and not eating properly, and therefore they decline. Nutrition is very important. You also have medication, and there can be no clear care plan; as one grows older, we take lots more medication, and that medication can be increased when it does not need to be increased or indeed not given at all.

That is why I am using the phrase “studied neglect”, to the “studied diligence” of noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. We really have to look very carefully at the malign forces that, I am afraid, are out there in society. They look at granny and, as my noble friend Lord Deben says, the £2 million house sitting there, and can slowly but surely—but still relatively quickly—see the demise of granny and realise those capital assets. That is the reason why I put this amendment forward.

Crucial steps in the assisted dying process should be undertaken with direct, in-person interaction, to increase the likelihood that the individual’s request is truly voluntary, informed and free from coercion. The necessity for direct interaction with a person, particularly through face-to-face contact, is driven by the importance of rigorous safeguards and scrutiny, and of upholding patient autonomy in a process that culminates in an irreversible outcome, called death. I could use many more examples but, in the interests of time, I beg to move this amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 320B and three others in my name in this group. The first clinical gateway in this Bill is the most important moment any of us will ever legislate for: the moment a doctor begins the process that can lead to a life being ended. That gateway must be treated with the utmost care; it should not be reduced to a convenience-driven video call.

My amendment is simple and proportionate: it creates a presumption that the co-ordinating doctor’s first assessment takes place in person, and it asks only that, if the presumption is displaced, the doctor records why an in-person meeting was not possible for medical reasons. That is not micromanagement; it is common sense. It is the minimum standard of human contact that we should expect before opening a pathway that is irreversible.

Why does this matter? First, capacity and voluntariness are relational judgments. Clinicians do not assess capacity from words alone: they read people’s faces; they notice the hesitation; they observe the environment and see who else is present. They pick up the small, telling signs of distress or coercion that a screen can hide: a hand hovering off the camera, a whispered instruction, a look that does not match the words. Remote consultations blunt those senses. If we are serious about preventing coercion, the law should make face to face the default, not the exception.

Secondly, this is a narrow safeguard, not a prohibition. The amendment allows remote assessment where it is genuinely impossible for medical reasons. It recognises that there will be rare cases where a patient is too frail to be seen in person; in those cases, the co-ordinating doctor must set out the reasons. That requirement creates an audit trail and accountability. It deters the normalisation of remote practice for administrative convenience and gives panels, the commissioner and, if necessary, later reviewers, a clear record of why the presumption was set aside.

Thirdly, the evidence is clear: leading geriatricians and psychiatrists have told committees that assessing capacity remotely for complex patients is nigh on impossible. Telemedicine studies and the experience of courts show the limits of video for detecting vulnerability. We should legislate to reflect clinical reality, not hope that guidance will be followed uniformly across hundreds of clinicians and thousands of cases. Some will say that this amendment would delay access or over-engineer the process, but I disagree. A single in-person assessment at the outset is a modest investment of time that dramatically reduces the risk of error. If the system is robust, it will absorb that step without undue delay. If the system cannot, then speed is being prioritised over safety, and that would be a real problem.

Finally on this amendment, will the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, accept that a life-ending pathway should begin with human contact, with a clinician who has seen the person in the flesh—smelled the room, so to speak—and observed the context in which that wish has arisen, or does he prefer a default of pixels on a screen? When the outcome is death, convenience must never trump clinical rigour. I urge the Committee to support my Amendment 320B.

My Amendment 347A would ensure that the second assessment—the final medical safeguard—is conducted in person. The Bill currently allows the independent doctor to assess the patient entirely by video. That is extraordinary for a life-ending decision. Experts told the House of Lords Select Committee that assessing capacity remotely is, as I said, nigh on impossible for complex patients. The subtle signs of confusion, fear, coercion or cognitive impairment are often visible only in person. Remote assessment hides the environment. Who is in the room? Who is influencing the patient? What pressure are they under? Kim Leadbeater MP herself said she was uncomfortable watching Oregon’s remote assessments, describing them as “tick-box”. If the sponsor is uncomfortable with death by Zoom, Parliament should not legislate for it. This amendment of mine is modest, proportionate and essential for safeguarding.

If remote assessments are permitted at all, my Amendment 406A would introduce the bare minimum safeguards: the doctor must verify that the patient is alone and speaking freely. Coercion, as we know, is often silent. Abusers can sit off-camera, and patients are coached. A Michigan prosecutor famously spotted a domestic abuse victim being coerced during a Zoom hearing. If trained lawyers and judges can miss coercion on video, how can a doctor reliably detect it in a single remote consultation? My amendment would not ban remote assessment but simply prevent the most obvious and dangerous form of abuse. Without it, the Bill’s coercion safeguards are meaningless.

My Amendment 415B would ensure that remote assessments are tightly controlled, used only when appropriate and subject to independent oversight. The Bill currently allows remote and even pre-recorded assessments without any statutory framework. A protocol approved by the commissioner would ensure consistency, transparency and accountability. It would prevent remote assessment becoming the default due to NHS pressures or simple convenience. Without this amendment, I suggest, the Bill creates a system where lethal decisions can be made based on pre-recorded video clips. That is indefensible.

In summary, my four amendments form a single, focused package of safeguards to ensure that human judgment, not administrative convenience, governs a life-ending pathway. Amendment 320B would make the first assessment face to face by default—the minimum human contact needed to test capacity and spot coercion. Amendment 347A would extend that presumption to the independent second assessment so that the final clinical check is equally robust. Amendment 406A would require a simple verification when assessments are remote—a recorded confirmation that the patient is alone and speaking freely. Amendment 415B demands a statutory protocol for remote or pre-recorded assessments so that exceptions are tightly controlled and independently verified.

These are modest, proportionate measures. They do not block access where an in-person assessment is genuinely impossible, but they stop convenience becoming the norm when the consequence is irreversible. If this Bill is to be the safest system in the world, will the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, accept these targeted protections so that speed and convenience never replace clinical judgment and human scrutiny? I urge the Committee to support my amendments.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Obviously, you cannot ask questions under subsection (6), so it is exactly the same point. The point being made in subsections (5) and (6) is that the panel recognises that there are circumstances in which questioning is not possible. I do not know what additional point the noble Lord was making.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I acknowledge that he has accepted that something else needs to be added to the Bill, possibly along the lines that I was suggesting. That comes on top of the dozen new clauses that he is already planning to add to the Bill, so I ask him to help me understand something. If the noble and learned Lord is therefore admitting that the Bill is fundamentally flawed, to a greater or lesser extent, and that it needs to be amended, how on earth can he reconcile that with what he said a couple of days ago? He said that he would seek to drive the Bill through, unamended from the House of Commons—the Bill that is so fundamentally flawed that he is now trying to move amendments to correct it. That said, I am grateful for his concession this morning.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I would not look a gift horse in the mouth if I were the noble Lord. First, I do not regard accepting amendments in Committee of the House of Lords as indicating that a Bill is fundamentally flawed; I regard it as listening and making appropriate changes. Secondly, in relation to the question of the Parliament Act, the last thing I want is for this to happen through the Parliament Act. I want this House to do the job that it is supposed to do, which is do scrutiny and then send it back to the Commons.

In the debate on 8 January 2026, I gave in detail the reasons why I thought we were not going about it properly, and I thought that the House agreed with me when it said that we needed to move quicker. The problem is not that everybody does not have good ideas; the problem is that it is taking not just far too long but disproportionately long. My experience of the Lords is that we can do this, and we can do it much quicker than we are doing it and there still be quality. That was the point I made on 8 January and that I understood the House to have accepted.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I beg the indulgence of the Committee to raise what I think is an important point; I hope the Committee does not think it pedantic. I had not intended to speak but was prompted to by the excellent speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and by my noble friend Lady Coffey’s reference to the lack of insight provided by the Government—I will not criticise the sponsor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. This—our deliberations, scrutiny and oversight of the Bill—is a moveable feast, so we need information in real time.

My specific point is not just about freedom of information but about Written Questions that the Government have received and not answered. On 1 December 2025 my noble friend Lord Kempsell asked His Majesty’s Government a very reasonable Question. He asked, with regard to the Bill and its impact assessment,

“what assessment they have made of the effectiveness of judicial approval as a safeguard in countries with assisted suicide regimes, including the proportion of applications refused in those countries and the reasons for refusal”.

Two months on, that Question has not been answered. That is unacceptable, because scrutiny and oversight require us to have all the information in our hands, including comparative legal, regulatory and medical regimes.

By comparison, the very sensible Question from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—I do not want to embarrass him because he is in the Chair—about the use of the Parliament Act was asked on 26 January and answered promptly on 29 January. The point is that there should be equality and a level playing field on Questions asked, irrespective of the position on the Bill of the noble Lord asking it.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am another Member who had not intended to say a single word on whether the clause should stand part; I am rather relaxed about it. The Government Whips must blame their noble friend Lord Rooker, who provoked me into commenting because I agree, once again, with every single wise word he said.

The noble Lord referenced the Delegated Powers Committee, of which he was a distinguished member at one point. I was the chair of the committee when we produced the Democracy Denied? report. It highlighted the fact that every Government over the past 30 years—Tory, Labour, Conservative-Lib Dem and Conservative again—took more and more powers away from Parliament via delegated powers. The delegated powers in the Bill are excessive and have rightly been criticised.

The noble Baroness is also right that no Government in any democracy in the world can function unless there are delegated powers; not everything can be in Bills. The questions here are: how many delegated powers are appropriate; and what will they contain? The trouble is that we have more than 40—48, I think—possible delegated powers, including Henry VIII powers. That seems excessive.

I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for producing some amendments that would implement the delegated powers recommendations, but I think he knows that if he did not produce them, this House, on Report, would implement every single one of the delegated powers recommendations; we would gut those bits of the Bill that did not implement them. So, although he has generously provided some amendments regarding the delegated powers recommendations, he knows full well that this House will implement all of them in any case.

That is all I want to say on the Bill. Delegated powers under all Governments have been increasing and ought to be diminished. Although I have some concerns about the contents of the Bill, I have many more concerns about the 48 powers that will be written by civil servants in the Department of Health. At the moment, they are unable to tell the difference between a man and a woman; I do not want them writing up how I will die in future.

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[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for advancing Amendments 70 and 78, which I drafted. Unfortunately, I was unable to be here last week when I thought they would be debated. I disagree with nothing that the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Sandhurst, said.

The purpose of Amendments 70 and 78 was to broaden the definition of “disease” to include “injuries”. It is completely illogical that people who are facing death within six months because of some untoward event, such as contracting an illness, being hit by a car or suffering an injury at work, should not be in the same position. One thinks about injuries at work, in particular: if inhalation of asbestos fibre, silica or cotton results in asbestosis, silicosis, byssinosis or mesothelioma, they would be covered by the legislation currently proposed. But inhalation of a poisonous gas at work, causing an injury that is likely to result in death within six months, would not be covered. There does not seem to be a logical distinction there.

The law also does not regard there being a distinction. The common law of negligence requires one not to harm someone else, whether by an injury or causing that person to contract an illness. That is particularly evident in the field that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, developed; namely, injury at work. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and the common law of workplace negligence all require that the employer keeps the workplace safe and they make no distinction between whether the danger arises from a risk of injury, such as getting an arm mangled in a machine, or the risk of disease, by the inhalation of noxious particles causing lung disease. There is no logical distinction to me and it would be right for the Bill to extend the scope of “disease”—illness and disease are not defined in the Bill—to cover “illness” as well.

I turn to the main point that the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Sandhurst, developed. The risk, as the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Carlile, put in their explanatory statement and which the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, developed, is that the dependants

“will probably lose their right under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 to sue the alleged tortfeasor said to have caused the disease, unless the Bill specifically provides otherwise (which currently it does not)”.

I agree with his legal analysis. It is likely that insurers will say, “No, the cause of death here was not the underlying mesothelioma. It was the fact that this person opted for an assisted death”.

The noble Lord developed the consequences for the family. I just want to add: what about the consequences for the injured person? Are they going to think to themselves, “Well, if I opt for an assisted death, I’m going to deprive my family of extensive damages that they will not enjoy”? Of course there will be considerable pressure on that person to say, “I’m going to put up with the suffering as long as I can until I die to make sure that my family get the money”. I do not want to be rude to insurance companies, but they have to do what they can to safeguard their assets and avoid paying out what they do not need to pay out; they will fight these cases. Therefore, it seems important that the Bill, to quote those words, “specifically provides otherwise”, which it does not currently.

I am very grateful for the interview that I had with my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to discuss these matters a week or so ago. I had mistakenly thought that the power of my oratory was such that my noble friend was convinced by my argument, but he was not. It is quite clear from his Amendment 718C, which he has tabled today, that he does not accept that the Bill should provide a measure that would protect the victim in the circumstances that we are discussing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and I tabled Amendment 717, which is obviously not before the Committee today, which seeks to redress this by requiring that the coroner records that the cause of death was the underlying disease, while noting that the death was one by assisted dying. I do not know whether that would go far enough to protect these victims from the insurers who claim that the death was not caused by the underlying disease, but it goes a bit further than the amendment proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Carlile. In my view, it is essential that the Bill protects against the danger that I have outlined.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am very concerned by my noble friend Lord Harper’s amendment to extend the Bill’s definition of terminal illness to include simply the one word, “injuries”. I agree entirely with my noble friend Lord Sandhurst and with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, may propose to ensure that those who have suffered an industrial injury are not deprived of their rightful compensation. I support entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, said on that, but I disagreed with his general thesis that the Bill should be extended to include all other injuries, because that could take us in a rather dangerous direction.

We all know that some injuries are awfully catastrophic, relentlessly painful and leave no prospect of meaningful recovery. For those individuals, the desire for control over the timing and manner of their death is understandable and deeply felt. If the law permits assisted death for terminal illness, it is in some ways emotionally coherent to ask why a grievous and irreversible injury that will inevitably lead to death should be treated differently. I think the amendment from my noble friend and the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is born of a humane impulse: to extend compassion to a group whose suffering can be as severe as that of the terminally ill. However, compassion must be married to clarity and caution when Parliament contemplates measures that permit an irreversible outcome. Extending the definition to “injuries” raises serious legal, clinical and ethical problems. I will set out the principal flaws and risks that I see flowing from the proposed change.

First, the term “injury” is legally and clinically vague. What counts as an “injury”? Does the word encompass acute trauma, chronic sequelae, surgical complications, other serious harm, or the long-term consequences of an earlier wound? Without precise limits, the category could sweep far beyond the narrow cohort the amendment’s proponents intend. Vagueness at this threshold invites inconsistent application and litigation.

Secondly, I suggest that the proposed threshold—that the injury be “reasonably expected to result in death”—is problematic. Prognosis after severe injury is often uncertain, as it is with terminal illnesses, and can change with treatment, rehabilitation and time. Modern trauma care, reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation can alter trajectories in ways that are difficult to predict at the bedside. Using “reasonably expected to result in death” without a clear evidential standard hands clinicians wide discretion and risks premature decisions made on the basis of an evolving clinical picture.

Thirdly, there is a real danger of premature decisions in acute settings. Many catastrophic injuries occur in emergency contexts where prognosis is evolving and where immediate stabilisation, surgery or intensive rehabilitation may change outcomes. Allowing assisted death on the basis of an early prognosis risks decisions taken before full treatment options have been explored and before the patient has had the opportunity to adapt to new circumstances or to benefit from specialist rehabilitation.

I will not talk about civil law and compensation, because that has already been expertly covered by my noble friends and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. My noble friend also mentioned the coronial and investigatory consequences which arise, so I will not elaborate on those.

There is a “slippery slope” argument here. Once “injuries” are included—just that one, simple word—pressure may grow to widen eligibility further to chronic disability, psychiatric consequences or non-combat trauma. Experience from other jurisdictions shows how initial expansions can lead to broader reinterpretation over time. Parliament must be wary of opening a door that cannot easily be closed.

The clinical complexity of catastrophic injury demands multidisciplinary expertise. This is not one GP giving an opinion here. Assessing such cases properly would require trauma surgeons, rehabilitation specialists, pain teams, psychiatrists and a whole range of different medical specialities. The Bill’s processes must ensure that such expertise is mandatory before any irreversible step is taken, otherwise we risk decisions being made without the full range of clinical knowledge that these cases demand.

In conclusion, if Parliament is to consider injuries within scope, it must do so with surgical precision, so to speak. It needs narrow definitions, higher evidential standards, mandatory specialist review, and explicit protections for families and compensation rights; only then can we balance mercy with the safeguards that such irreversible decisions demand. I urge the House to reflect carefully on the human impulse behind this amendment and on the legal and clinical realities that make adding it to the Bill as currently drafted—with just one word, “injuries”, as my noble friend proposes—deeply problematic.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I return us to Amendment 829, to which I put my name and which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I added my name because I share experience with the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Sandhurst. We have all seen cases in which a potentially huge claim arises under the Fatal Accidents Act which will provide a family with a payment for their dependency on the deceased for many years to come, so these are very substantial claims.

Probably all three of us have done cases for both claimants and trade unions on the one side, and for insurance companies on the other. Insurance companies are very business-like and accurate, but they are not social services organisations. One question they ask their counsel—particularly their leading counsel, their KC—in such cases is, “Are we liable to pay? Is there a point we can make, saying that it does not arise because the death was caused by some other means?” There have been many cases in which novus actus interveniens, which the noble Lord, Lord Harper, referred to earlier, has been cited as a reason for not paying.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Well, there we are: we know that the noble Lord adheres to the cab rank rule.

We have heard three very cogent speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Frost, Lord Carter and Lord Taylor, about the suffering point. If we look at the discussion we have had this afternoon, we now have a clear and stark difference between assisted suicide based on suffering and assisted suicide based on choice. I agree entirely with the noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Taylor: the public expect this Bill to be dealing with suffering. The public understand this Bill to be dealing with great suffering. They understand that the choice to have one’s life ended is based on great suffering, although it does not say so in the Bill. That must be clarified by the sponsor.

On the other side of the argument, we heard a very eloquent speech from my noble friend Lord Pannick, with whom I have a lot of sympathy. It is not generally known that, as he said, he has very personal experience of the issues arising from this Bill. However, the choice he is suggesting comes very close to being a choice for anyone who is seriously ill, not just someone who is seriously ill with an expectation of death within a certain limited period, whatever that happens to be. I fear that those of us who, like the noble and learned Lord the sponsor, are trying to reach the end of our process in the House of Lords on the basis that there will be a Bill, so it must be the best it can be, are not focusing on what choice really means.

We are talking about informed choice, accurate choice, if we can achieve it. I bear in mind very much what my noble friend Lady Finlay said. We are talking about a protective choice: the duty of the state to protect the citizen, even when they are making a choice. We do not, as citizens, have unlimited free choices in what we do; therefore, protection is important. It must be a morally sound choice, because that is part of our polity. We do things that are morally sound, and the Government protect us from those which may not be. It must be a choice founded on medical and scientific integrity: and there is the rub, going back to the points my noble friend Lady Finlay made about the uncertainty of the scientific and medical integrity of what is proposed.

For those reasons, I support the amendments that are focused on choice. I will mention three other amendments that I also support. The first is Amendment 76, which is not in my name but in that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, but he is not able to be here for the latter part of today’s proceedings and I agreed to mention it at his request.

Amendment 76 would do something very simple. In Clause 2(1)(b), it would add one word, “direct”, so that a person is terminally ill if, in the amended paragraph (b), their death as a direct

“consequence of that illness or disease can reasonably be expected within six months”.

It may not be the perfect word, but it is about facts and the consequences of those facts. I agree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that if there is to be a death of someone through the assistance of a third party, which is what the Bill is fundamentally about, then it cannot be just a consequence, or one of the many consequences, of the illness. It has to be the, or at least a, major consequence of the illness. That is the purpose of that amendment: there has to be a bond, as it were, between the illness or disease and the death which ensues.

The next amendment is Amendment 93. It suggests leaving out Clause 2(3) altogether as it lacks clarity as to when an assisted death would be permitted. The subsection says that

“treatment which only relieves the symptoms of an inevitably progressive illness or disease temporarily is not to be regarded as treatment which can reverse that illness”.

What if the relief that is provided for an inevitably progressive illness provides not only relief from the symptoms but extra time to the person who is suffering from the illness or disease? I argue that if it allows extra time, the individual concerned will be having a new experience: they will be seeing what can happen if their symptoms are relieved. They need to discuss with their medical advisers whether they can have that relief of their symptoms again and whether it will prolong their life if they do. The relief may cause a fundamental change of heart by the individual. Therefore, I do not believe that there should be any possibility of the six-month period being elongated in any way by that relief. Indeed, I believe that the period should start again if such relief is given so that the person concerned can have an informed choice.

The third amendment is Amendment 96, which suggests leaving out Clause 2(4), which says:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder (or both)”,


followed by an important further sentence that I will not read out because of time. This subsection fails to deal with the proportionality between the disease, which is the terminal illness, and the disability or mental disorder, or both, from which that person also suffers. It is a complex little conundrum, but a very important one. I believe that proportionality needs to be clarified so that the Bill can be the best possible Bill we can have.

We have much still to learn about the issues that have been under discussion. I invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to consider these carefully and present some draft amendments to us before we meet again in a week’s time.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I seek a cast-iron assurance from the Government Whip that those of us whose speeches will be delayed till next Friday are recorded by the Government and will be allowed to speak. That is all I want to say at this stage. We want an assurance that we will be allowed to speak next Friday if we delay our speeches from today.

[Baroness Wheeler (Lab)]

I will shortly make an announcement to that effect.