1 Lord Boyce debates involving the Cabinet Office

Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons

Lord Boyce Excerpts
Thursday 29th August 2013

(10 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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My Lords, my interests are as declared in the register.

I should like to focus on the proposition that military action should be taken if it is clear that Assad has used chemical weapons. I believe that there is a need for a far greater clarity about the thinking behind such proposals before we can have a sensible discussion about its merits. If military action is not backed up by a UNSCR, what is the legality of such a step in this case? Why is it thought that a limited strike would prevent further humanitarian disaster? I will return to that point in a moment. It is that—not the breaking of the chemical warfare convention; the legal advice we have had this afternoon is silent on that—that is the only real justification here for military action.

I pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, and the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, about the need to reassure our servicemen taking part in this proposed action. The legal case needs to be explained and made particularly clear to them.

What will be the objectives of such an attack? The noble Lord, Lord Wright, provided us with a list of examples earlier on. Let me concentrate on just a couple. Is it to punish Assad and thereby deter him from the further use of chemical weapons? If so, what is the assessment of how this can be achieved against a man and a regime hardened by years of brutal civil strife? Why on earth do we think that he will care? Are we judging that he has the same standards and morals that we have?

Is the objective to target chemical warfare dumps? If so, how convincing is the evidence that we know where they all are and whether they are in penetrable bunkers? What will be the measure of success? Chemical weapons are extremely difficult to destroy completely. The most common method is incineration at very high temperatures over a sustained period in contained systems. Munitions used by the military almost never reproduce such effects, especially the ones designed to penetrate hardened structures. Another problem is the sheer volume of material. Estimates put Syrian stockpiles in the hundreds of tonnes of various types. What considerations have been given to collateral damage from chemical weapons released by a strike, possibly generating a worse humanitarian problem? The fact is that chemical weapons are extremely difficult to destroy. It can be done effectively only by having boots on the ground.

Assuming, therefore, that we are furnished with some sort of clear objectives, where is the lay-down of the consequences of an attack? I believe that the Government have said that this will not be about regime change. But what happens if Assad is killed? We have normally failed to kill the leaders of unpleasant regimes in the past. This time, accidentally, we will probably kill Assad.

Notwithstanding the opening comments of the noble Lord the Leader of the House, we can be absolutely certain that within the region we will be judged as having taken sides in a civil war and that the attack by us will be seen by many as giving succour to the opposition. How is it intended that we will handle the view that we have allied ourselves to some extremely unpleasant actors playing for the opposition in Syria?

We can also be pretty certain that any attack will have collateral damage in which innocent civilians will be killed. What is the Government’s view on the proportionality of such an eventuality? In other words, what number of civilians killed will be deemed acceptable in, say, the punishment of Assad?

What estimates have been made of the likely reactions of Syria’s neighbouring states and Hezbollah, and how will these be managed? The noble Lord, Lord Williams of Baglan, made some telling points here. Especially, what is the estimate of what might be the nature of any retaliation from Syria or surrogates? For example, there is evidence today that Syrian-inspired cyberattacks are already escalating. They are very competent at this. Are we ready for a full-scale cyberattack? Should there be any post-strike analysis? How will this be achieved, given the sophistication of Assad’s air defences?

Do the Government have an exit strategy for any military adventure? If Assad brushes off the attack and uses chemical weapons again, what will be the next move? A “shot across the bows” implies sinking the ship at the next shot. Will the Government say whether it has been determined what will be the nature of that follow-on shot? If it is going to involve serious commitment of our Armed Forces, I hope that the Prime Minister will reflect on the damaging and strategically dangerous cuts that he has made to our defence capability over the past three years.

Finally, if the inspectors’ report leads to the conclusion that—contrary to what we have been told today—it is in fact the opposition in Syria who have deployed chemical weapons, what will be the Government’s course of action?