Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Ashton of Hyde

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I turn now to an issue that is pertinent to us all: parliamentary privilege. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is paramount that both this House and the other place continue to be safeguarded in their processing of personal data in connection with parliamentary proceedings.

This issue was raised in previous debates by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, to whom I am very grateful. Those debates influenced our thinking on how the Bill currently provides for parliamentary activity, and I am pleased to announce that the amendments in this group have been tabled to ensure that privileges under the current law will not disappear when we enter the new data protection framework.

I will start with Amendments 5 to 8. Amendments 5 to 7 restrict information, assessment and enforcement notices served by the commissioner from requiring a person to comply with the notice if compliance would involve infringing the privileges of either House of Parliament. Put simply, the commissioner’s notices are “switched off” where there would be an infringement of parliamentary privilege. Amendment 8 prevents the commissioner giving the House a penalty notice with respect to the processing of personal data by or on behalf of the House. These amendments have been tabled to ensure that parliamentary proceedings will not be impeded by the commissioner and that Parliament will maintain the freedom to do its work that it currently enjoys.

Amendments 9 to 13 relate to criminal liability and seek to prevent corporate officers of either House of Parliament being liable to prosecution as a data controller. This is the current position in the Data Protection Act 1998, and our amendments seek to clarify the Government’s intention to maintain the effect of Section 63A of the 1998 Act. The amendments also make equivalent provision for government departments and data controllers for the Royal Household. It should be noted, however, that these provisions do not prevent corporate officers being liable for their own conduct when acting as data controllers on behalf of either House, for government departments or for the Royal Household. This maintains the current position, and we believe that it is an important safeguard that allows full parliamentary privilege while balancing the rights of data subjects.

Amendments 14 and 15 revert to the current position under the Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to the processing that is necessary for the functions of the Houses of Parliament or for the administration of justice by removing the additional “substantial public interest” test. On reflection, we could not see how such processing would not be in the substantial public interest, so the test appeared redundant. On that basis, the Houses of Parliament will have to consider simply whether processing is necessary for the purposes of their functions, as is the position now.

Amendments 20 and 21 make a corresponding amendment to Schedule 8, where processing is necessary for the administration of justice under the provisions in Part 3 for law-enforcement processing, to maintain a consistent approach across the Bill.

Amendment 18 is to Schedule 2 and extends the exemptions from the GDPR relating to parliamentary privilege to include an exemption from article 34(1) and article 34(4) of the GDPR. Article 34 requires controllers to communicate a personal data breach to the data subject where the breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the subject. The amendment excludes this requirement from applying to parliamentary proceedings and also restricts the ability of the commissioner to oblige either House to comply with it.

I hope that the House will agree that these amendments, taken as a package, will ensure that there will be no chilling effect on the functions of Parliament and will restore the regime that applies under the Data Protection Act 1998. It has the approval of the House authorities. I beg to move.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support this group of amendments, perhaps unsurprisingly given that they have now been brought forward in place of a series of broadly similar amendments which, as the Minister has mentioned, I tabled on Report. They achieve the same basic objective, which is to safeguard parliamentary privilege and thereby ensure that this House, along with the other place, can continue to go about its business and fulfil its vital constitutional role without inappropriate inhibitions and concerns with regard to the protection of data and privacy, which of course the Bill as a whole is rightly designed to protect.

As I made plain on Report, I was prompted to table the original amendments by and on behalf of the officials of both Houses, that is to say, the clerks and counsel, because of their concern about how, unamended as it then was, the Bill risked infringing parliamentary privilege in the various ways that the Minister has recounted. These concerns were raised and over recent months they have been discussed extensively between officials and the Bill team. Again I express my gratitude and pay tribute to the Bill team for its hugely constructive help and co-operation throughout. As now formulated, these amendments substantially and realistically meet the concerns of officials, and accordingly I welcome them.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, when I came into the Chamber, I had not the faintest intention of speaking in this debate. I do so, above all, for one reason: not because I am opposed to the amendment, although I am, very substantially, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I do so because, in my experience, it is very unusual nowadays to vote at the outset of Committee stage on so fundamental a question as that raised by the amendment. It is surely yet more unusual—spectacularly so—to do so on a manuscript amendment filed this morning, which none of us has had sufficient time to deal with, on a very tricky area of the law, which so fundamentally alters the original amendment. As we have heard, that amendment was completely hopeless. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, described it as “constitutionally illiterate”. At least this one tries to introduce the concept of a balanced right which previously was missing.

It is true that I come from a different tradition where you do not vote on anything or decide anything unless you have heard the arguments. I rather gather that there may be a whipped vote on the other side, so the amendment is going to be voted on by noble Lords who have not heard the arguments of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick, Lord Faulks and Lord Lester, and who do not recognise the difficulties and the fundamental importance of this amendment. I seriously urge that it is not pressed to a Division today.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, many of whom do not appear to support these amendments. I particularly thank the lawyers in the House, who have instructed us on the legal position. I feel slightly like the lay person who was talked about, which I am, I hasten to add.

On a political view, it is important to remember that only three weeks ago at Second Reading it was clear that the Bill was widely supported across the House. Many noble Lords highlighted areas where further scrutiny and perhaps improvement were desired, but the House was unanimous in the view that data protection laws needed updating, that the general data protection regulation standards were the right standards, and that we must do everything to maintain future free flows of data. We shared those conclusions because we understand the role and value of data in our digital world and how it is the basis of delivering education, social mobility and economic advantage. That is why it is so sad that in this first group of amendments, on the first of seven days of Committee, for a Lords starter Bill, the opposition parties have threatened to suspend the usual business arrangements whereby we can debate in Committee, meet subsequently outside the Chamber and often come to agreement before the Bill leaves our House—an arrangement which does not prevent votes when they are needed, but which has worked well in the past. I urge noble Lords not to put this at risk. The Data Protection Act has stood the test of time because it was not a partisan piece of legislation, and we must not allow this Bill to become one.

Many noble Lords have said that these amendments are made in good faith to ensure that the UK is given a data protection adequacy agreement by our largest trading partner. This is the right ultimate objective, but it is the wrong route to get there. Contrary to the charge of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, we have not forgotten the importance of a free flow of data. In fact, ensuring we maintain a free flow of data is our number one priority, and we want to achieve that from the moment of Brexit, not wait to become a third country and then start the application process for adequacy. I direct those remarks especially to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. That is why last year we committed to ensuring that the UK adopts GDPR standards. That is why in August we published our plans and ambitions for the free flow of data once we leave the EU. That is why we have presented this House with this Bill: a Bill which builds a comprehensive regulatory system for personal data that covers everything that could be scrutinised in future adequacy negotiations, including areas which are not currently subject to EU jurisdiction. That answers the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on adequacy and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.

In the past, 12 countries have negotiated adequacy agreements with the EU Commission, including Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the USA. None of these was forced by the EU Commission to put the charter into their law in order to obtain adequacy. It is not a requirement and it is peculiar to suggest that it will be. It is a myth that we need this amendment to secure a future agreement. Why is that? The GDPR itself, which will become part of our law, says in Recital 4:

“This Regulation respects all fundamental rights and observes the freedoms and principles recognised in the Charter as enshrined in the Treaties, in particular the respect for private and family life, home and communications, the protection of personal data”.


Recital 173 says:

“This Regulation should apply to all matters concerning the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms vis-à-vis the processing of personal data”.


The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was reported over the weekend to be claiming that the Government were scaremongering. We were not. We were deadly serious about the risks, so I am delighted that the noble Lord has now recognised that Amendment 4 needs further thought. What a pity, therefore, that he was unable to discuss it with the Government.

I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who addressed the original Amendment 4. The problem, which I think has been alluded to, is that subsection (3) of the proposed new clause creates an absolute unqualified right to data protection. As attractive as that sounds, it is fatal, for two reasons. First, data protection is not an absolute right, as many noble Lords have said, and the GDPR says it explicitly, too:

“The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality”.


Secondly, both the GDPR and the Bill create a number of exemptions from data rights, which we will debate over the next few weeks. However, while we may disagree on some exemptions, I think that we all agree on the important ones. Terrorists must not be given unrestrained access to information held about them by the security services. Scientists must not usually be prevented from advancing research and furthering understanding. Therefore, the original Amendment 4 creates a risk at precisely the time we need reassurance.

However, Amendment 4A is a welcome improvement. We received this amendment just before noon today. Data protection is not the simplest area of our law, and at Second Reading many noble Lords commented on the complexity of the subject. It would be irresponsible of the Government to accept an amendment of this sort with just a few hours to consider it. What does it mean for future data flows and trade? How does it interlock with the rest of our legislation on information rights? What will the courts make of it?

At best, Amendment 4A is unnecessary or may not achieve what it seeks to achieve. Two particular problems with it were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. First, it has no value, and it only creates legal confusion. Secondly, subsection (4) of the proposed new clause is unwise. Rights often conflict; the Bill and the Human Rights Act manage those conflicts, while subsection (4) does not. At worst, as my noble friend Lord Faulks, outlined, it may have unintended consequences which nobody has been able to consider. Our initial analysis is similar to that given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that Amendment 4A probably does very little. It does little other than summarise what the Bill does. The Bill protects personal data rights, and Amendment 4A reminds us of this. None the less, with so much at stake, we must give this amendment full and careful legal analysis.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has been placed in a difficult position. Labour is in a muddle over this. But that is exactly why we do not usually vote in Committee. This stage is for resolving muddles and for understanding the issues. It is not the stage for tabling amendments on the day and voting on them hours later, without even discussing it with the Government. I cannot see how this is a service to the House, which prides itself on careful reflection.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, reminded us at Second Reading about the number of Bills that he and I have worked on together. He said that this was the sixth. I pay tribute to the careful, detailed—and sometimes even enjoyable—scrutiny he has given. We have had many useful meetings. Today is the first day in Committee and the first group of amendments on the Bill. We should continue with the positive spirit that we have built together, setting out our arguments and concerns. We can continue to meet outside the Chamber, and I and the Bill team are always happy to listen to and meet other interested noble Lords. On Report, we can reflect and, where we disagree, we can divide.

Therefore, I hope that noble Lords will see that now is not the time and these are not the amendments on which we should divide at this stage. They are unnecessary and they may be deficient. This Bill is essential for our social and economic future, and we risk wrecking it at the first hurdle. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Tuesday 6th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I will address the noble and learned Lord’s amendment and the clause stand part amendment together, but will just start with the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who talked about not making any mistakes in our international obligations. I respectfully point out to him that this international obligation was made in 1954 and has therefore been an obligation for a very long time. We all agree that we should pass the Bill so that we can ratify our international obligations and bring this into domestic law.

The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, seeks to make the protection from seizure or forfeiture explicitly subordinate to any other international or EU obligations. It would enable a court to order the seizure or forfeiture of a protected object if it was obliged to make such an order by virtue of another international or EU obligation, whereas the present Clause 28 provides contains no such caveat. I understand the noble and learned Lord’s intention is to address concerns about potential conflicts with other EU or international obligations.

I also understand that, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, explained, the amendment to omit Clause 28 altogether was tabled with the same intention, but in fact I think it was really tabled so that we could have a discussion of these issues, which we are doing now. For the record, if the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, were accepted, it would in fact prevent us from fulfilling any of our obligations under Article 14 of the convention and Article 18 of the regulations.

The matter of potential conflicts with other international or EU obligations was raised, as the noble and learned Lord said, by both the Constitution Committee and the JCHR. We have replied to explain that it is, in our view, highly unlikely—as, again, has been said—that a conflict would arise between our obligations under the Hague convention and those under other international or EU laws. Clause 28 is required to implement our obligations under Article 14 of the Convention and Article 18 of the regulations for the execution of the convention. It requires us to provide immunity from seizure or forfeiture for cultural property that is being transported to another country under special protection for safekeeping in line with Article 12 of the convention. It also provides for cultural property under special protection for which the United Kingdom has agreed to act as depository in order to safeguard the cultural property during an armed conflict.

It is our view, which is supported by academic commentary, that the obligation to provide immunity from seizure contained in Article 14 of the convention is absolute. It is worth noting that no state parties, including the vast majority of other EU member states, have made any reservations in relation to the immunity from seizure obligations. We believe, therefore, that accepting the proposed amendment would be incompatible with our obligations under the convention.

It is important to note that immunity will apply only in extremely limited, prescribed circumstances, and only during an armed conflict between states. Stringent requirements must be fulfilled for cultural property to be transported under special protection. Given those extremely limited circumstances in which immunity will be provided, we think it highly unlikely that a conflict could arise in future between our obligations under the Bill and any other EU or international obligation. We note that the Convention is a specialist treaty regulating a very particular subject matter in situations of armed conflict.

In addition, if there were ever any concerns about potential conflicts, the UK could refuse to accept transport of cultural property under special protection to or through its territory. It can also refuse to act as depository.

The noble and learned Lord referred to comparisons that have been made between Clause 28 and the qualified immunity provided under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to objects on loan to museums and galleries. Under that Act, the immunity provided is expressly subject to any international or EU law obligations that would require a UK court to order the seizure or forfeiture of the otherwise protected object. We can understand the reasons for the comparison, but it is our view that to make the immunity in the Bill automatically subordinate to all other international and EU obligations is unnecessary. The 2007 Act is a purely domestic piece of legislation designed to facilitate exhibitions at museums and galleries, whereas the Bill is implementing our international obligations to protect, in very precise circumstances, the world’s most important cultural heritage in times of armed conflict.

We are unaware of any existing conflicting EU or other international law obligation and can take the necessary steps to avoid any potential conflict arising. We note that the vast majority of other EU member states will also wish to avoid such a conflict arising, given that they also are bound by absolute obligation to provide immunity. If a conflict did arise with our EU obligations, my officials advise that, if necessary, the courts would interpret Clause 28 as implicitly subject to EU law. If a conflict arose with international obligations, the UK court would be bound to apply the domestic legislation, but if the other international obligation had also been incorporated into our national law, the conflict between the two pieces of primary UK legislation would have to be resolved by the court in light of the relevant treaty obligations.

I hope that the House will understand that it is not our intention to elevate our obligations under the Hague convention above all other treaty obligations, but, equally, we do not think they should automatically be relegated to the bottom of the pile. With that in mind, I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord would feel able to withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would withdraw his objection to clause stand part.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for that full explanation of how the department sees this matter. I am reassured that it, too, would like to achieve the position where if, ultimately, in the improbable event that there is a conflict in international obligations that this country owes in respect of this property, it will be for the courts to resolve. I respectfully disagree that our amendment would make the obligations under the Hague convention subordinate. I respectfully suggest that they would have left the position substantially as the Minister says that we are now left with them: for the courts to determine any such conflict. However, I find his explanation as a whole altogether more satisfactory and reassuring, if I may say so, than that on the previous amendment and I therefore respectfully ask leave to withdraw the amendment.