Voyeurism (Offences) (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, fully support the underlying objective of this legislation, and apologise for not having played a part in any of the earlier processes.

Reading these amendments today has given me pause for thought along the same lines as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. My noble friend Lord Pannick describes this as a manhole or loophole in the legislation that can be got round. However, the whole point, surely, of new subsection (2)(c) is to limit the application of this provision. You look for a purpose and then you define the purpose in new subsection (3). However, if you include within that any invasion of the privacy of B, frankly, you might as well strike out the whole requirement for a purpose. Whether, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope said, this is to be regarded as a purpose at all, if you do what is set out in new paragraphs (a) and (b), inevitably you are invading the privacy of B. Therefore that makes it otiose to have any reference to a purpose at all; it is unlimited.

As for an unlimited provision, I am agnostic—or hesitant—as to whether that is a good idea, but it is no good persuading yourself that you are consistently with a purpose and then accommodating the amendment.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I too apologise for not having been here at Second Reading, but I have had the opportunity of reading the short debate.

In Section 67 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, there is a mens rea, as it were, simply for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification. Unfortunately, one has to pose the question of why anyone is doing this at all—I think it used to be assumed that it must be for some form of rather strange sexual gratification—and this addition of “humiliating, alarming or distressing” is added to cover the possibility that there might be some other motive. Those words are familiar and often interpreted in one context or another in the criminal law, whereas I am unaware—I will be corrected if I am wrong—that the concept of invading privacy finds much resonance in the criminal law, although of course it is reflected in other aspects of our law, not least in Article 8 of the European convention.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly said that we do not want anyone who should be capable of relying on a defence to have one in circumstances where it would be unattractive if they did, and he cited a particular instance of someone having a laugh. He then gave the game away by saying it would be unfortunate if they could say this despite the distress that might be caused to the individual who had been the victim of this. Whose laugh are we talking about? Presumably we are talking about misjudged humour on the part of the perpetrator, not the amusement of the victim of this invasion. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, that if there is to be a purposes clause, it is sufficiently wide. I think a magistrate directing himself or herself with the addition of a clerk would have no difficulty in considering this; nor would a recorder have any difficulty in directing a jury to consider this, so that if somebody said in their defence, “I was only doing it for a laugh”, they simply would not be believed.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I understand that the clear purpose of Part 1 of the Bill is to discourage false claims for whiplash injuries in road traffic accidents. The proposed method, besides wisely insisting henceforth on medical reports, is essentially by substantially reducing the damages recoverable in such claims to, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has just explained in some detail, figures well below those that are suggested in the 14th edition of the Judicial College guidelines, based as they are on typical court awards for such injuries.

The real question raised here is whether it is right to create especially low awards and, if so, how much lower than the norm for this particular injury suffered in this particular way specifically because disproportionate numbers of this sort of claims are likely to be false, not least because it is highly subjective and very difficult to establish objectively the reliability of the complaints. These are essentially political questions. It may be addressing the next group of amendments to say that it would make no sense whatever to involve the judiciary in answering these political policy questions. We know what the courts regard as the appropriate levels; we have those from the Judicial College guidelines.

As to what the political answer is to the precise level of damages proposed and whether or not it should be on the face of the Bill, I am essentially agnostic—although if anything I would favour that it should be. What rather surprises me is that, as I understand it, none of the amendments to the Bill is designed to challenge the whole Part 1 approach, which inevitably involves discrimination against those genuinely claiming for whiplash injuries in this context. Is the problem, one may ask, despite a number of improvements in the overall legal landscape over recent years—and indeed, no doubt consequentially, some reduction in the level of these claims—really bad enough to justify that whole approach? That does not seem to be squarely addressed in any of the amendments.

That said, I would add that I am in broad agreement with the whole idea of tariffs for injuries, certainly for lesser injuries, and indeed even of reducing awards in respect of a number of these lesser injuries. When I used to practise in this area decades ago, I used to think even then that lesser injuries were altogether too generously compensated, certainly in comparison to the graver injuries, which were not. Tariffs promote certainty and predictability, although of course always at the cost of some flexibility. That very predictability and certainty cuts down the enormous expense, the worry, the concern, the delay and the hassle of litigating expensively—as it invariably is—in this field. Indeed, that is also the effect of raising the small claims tribunal limits. I therefore also tend to support that to some degree in respect of these lesser injuries.

Overall, one must recognise that this is par excellence a policy issue, and it is for the Crown to justify Part 1 in the way that I have indicated. Part 2 raises very different questions, and to that I give my total support.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, seems at least to question the underlying premise behind these reforms. I respectfully suggest that the Government have established the premise. The Minister set out the Government’s case, as it were, at Second Reading, and the statistics seem to lead ineluctably to the conclusion that there is widespread abuse of the whole whiplash claims system. The solution, though it is inevitably somewhat rough and ready, is that there should in effect be a reduction in what claimants might have been able to claim under the system that currently obtains, although that is in relation only to damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity and excludes loss of earnings or any other consequential losses. It is a reduction but a fairly modest one and we are speaking of injuries at the lower end of the scale, although I do not downplay the discomfort that can follow from whiplash injuries. However, the purpose behind the reforms is surely, first, to provide certainty and, secondly, to make the awards reasonably modest so as to provide less of an incentive for those who would seek to make fraudulent claims. That, combined with the ban on medical officers, should fulfil what is, as the noble and learned Lord rightly says, essentially a policy decision.

In effect, the losers about whom we should be concerned are those genuine claimants, as opposed to the many who are not genuine, who I accept will get a lesser sum than they would otherwise have obtained. In the round, though, I suggest that this is a sensible policy decision. The House may have in mind that when these reforms were initially trailed by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne—and it came from the Treasury rather than the Ministry of Justice—the suggestion was that there would be no damages at all for whiplash injuries. This is a modification of that change, and of course there is the right of the judges to have an uplift in circumstances that we may be exploring later. Still, I suggest that it would be a mistake to pass these matters back to the judges. The Judicial College guidelines are in fact an extrapolation from individual cases decided by judges. They then, as it were, create a form of certainty, although they are variable according to individual cases.

I think the Government have made a case. They have to grasp the nettle, and they have done so in this case.

Prisoners: Foreign Nationals

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 12th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government how many prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for the protection of the public over the last three years have been foreign national prisoners eligible, pursuant to Section 119 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, for removal from the United Kingdom at the end of their tariff terms without a direction from the Parole Board for their release, and what proportion of such prisoners have in the fact been removed without such a direction.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, from May 2012, when the tariff- expired removal scheme was commenced, up to 31 March of this year, 261 prisoners serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection have been removed under that scheme—that is, without a direction from the Parole Board. A further five such prisoners have been eligible for removal but officials decided that they did not meet the criteria, while 16 have been approved for removal but are awaiting the settling of their removal directions.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for those figures but I am sure that he will readily understand the sense of injustice and frustration, not to say anger, felt by UK domestic IPP prisoners at this preferential treatment which is accorded to foreign national prisoners. It is preferential because, of course, the foreign national prisoners do not have to satisfy the Parole Board that they can safely be released. Would the Minister agree to see the Lord Chancellor and try to persuade him that this is yet another reason for the Lord Chancellor to exercise his powers, also given under Section 128 of LASPO, to modify the test which the Parole Board applies in the case of the domestic IPP prisoners so that, hopefully, some of them, too, may gain the earlier release that at the moment is given only to these foreign prisoners?

Civil Proceedings, Family Proceedings and Upper Tribunal Fees (Amendment) Order 2016

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, this is the second time that the Lord Chancellor has exercised his power under Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to prescribe enhanced fees—court fees, that is, that exceed the cost to the Courts and Tribunals Service of doing that for which the fee is charged. This power was first used last year in relation to the fees for bringing court proceedings to recover sums of money. On 4 March last year—a year ago—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, moved a regret Motion, on which I spoke. Frankly, much of what I said then applies with equal—indeed, even greater—force today. I pointed out that there has long been objection even to the basic principle of full cost recovery. The justice system exists for the benefit of society as a whole and really courts should no more be required to be self-financing than, say, the police service.

Of course, orders for enhanced fees go altogether further than mere cost recovery. In a real sense, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, explained, they amount to selling justice—on the face of it contrary to Magna Carta, although now of course regrettably sanctioned by Section 180 of that Christmas tree of an Act we passed two years ago, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. As I pointed out in last year’s debate, that Act stretches to 186 clauses and 11 schedules, occupying 232 pages of the Queen’s Printer’s copy. Small wonder that by Clause 180 we had grown a little lax or careless in our scrutiny of that Bill.

Today I want to focus briefly on the increased fees now to be exacted for a decree of divorce or nullity, an increase of about a third from £410 to £550. In the Government’s January 2015 response to part 2 of the consultation on the so-called reform of court fees, it was recorded at page 40 that the senior judiciary, who were, naturally enough, a statutory consultee in the process,

“noted that the current divorce fee was above cost”.

The recent 20th report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee confirmed this, noting at page 4 that the Ministry of Justice’s own estimate of the average cost of dealing with an uncontested divorce application is only £270—this new enhanced fee being therefore just over double that.

Of course, that earlier consultation related specifically to the then-proposed increase of the fee to £750—a proposal later abandoned. However, the objection remains essentially as to the original proposal, summarised in the case of the higher judiciary at paragraph 8.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum to this order. The objection was that,

“it will be a disincentive for divorce and in particular, women that are victims of domestic violence”.

Essentially, that echoed earlier objections that an increased divorce fee,

“could lead to parties being trapped in unhappy or violent marriages”,

and could prevent people from marrying or remarrying and being therefore,

“without the protection the law affords to married couples”.

At the conclusion of last year’s debate, noting that the Motion was one of only regret and not a fatal Motion, I expressed the hope that at least it would persuade the Government that enough is enough and really there must be no more use of this enhanced fee power. Alas, the Government have now chosen to go still further down this sorry road. This order is to be not merely regretted; it is to be deplored.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this debate has been short but not lacking in power nor indeed in criticism of the Government. It feels almost nostalgic to hear in this Session of Parliament criticisms of the Government generally in their handling of the economy and of the Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State. We are on familiar ground. It even included, from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the customary disavowal of anything being wrong with the economy at the time of the election in 2010.

Ministerial Code

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The Ministerial Code sets out clearly what the Prime Minister expects of his Ministers. If they depart from that code, it is evident that they have departed from it and there are modes of dealing with that. I take the noble Lord’s suggestion, but at the moment the situation seems to be satisfactorily dealt with.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Am I right in supposing that this amendment is really a prelude to the introduction of a British Bill of Rights in place of the existing Human Rights Act, and is intended principally to clarify the fact that our own domestic primary legislation trumps unincorporated treaty law?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble and learned Lord is quite right. He points to the difference between the dualist system, which we have, and the monist system whereby unless law is incorporated in an Act of Parliament, it does not become automatically a part of the law. The question of the amendments to the Bill of Rights, when or if it comes before Parliament, is somewhat separate but he accurately states the necessary constitutional principles.

Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 4th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

The Minister mentioned that Section 92(3) of the Courts Act 2003, which is the requirement that when making one of these orders, states that,

“the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied”.

I thought the Minister said that that had found its way into the actual Order. I have been looking at this and of course I am sure I shall be corrected, but an awful lot of provisions are referred to there but rather oddly not Section 92(3). One might have thought that it would be, because the second paragraph in the recital says that he has had regard to matters referred to in Section 180(3) of the 2014 Act. That is actually where one would have hoped and expected it to appear. I do not know that he makes any reference to having had regard to that provision, which the earlier statute required him to have regard to. As I said, I am open to correction, and apologetic in raising this point today.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. He is quite right: the recital refers to the fact that there is an exercise of the power conferred by Section 92(1) and (2) of the Courts Act and the consultation in accordance with Section 92(5) and (6). There is no explicit reference to Section 92(3). However, in purporting to exercise those powers, it would be said, although not specifically recited, that he was exercising them in accordance with the remainder of that section.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

Before the Minister answers that, the words that are completely surplus here are “acting heroically by”. Why can it not read, “was intervening in an emergency”? Can the Minister whet our appetite as to whether there is any scenario when you can intervene in an emergency and so on, within the meaning of this clause, without acting heroically? If not, for heaven’s sake get rid of it.

[Lord Faulks]

The answer is that the word is used in the clause to describe a particular circumstance which I think would convey to most people exactly what is intended by that clause. Yes, there may be some circumstances in which it is surplusage, and others when it is useful to describe what is said. I am afraid that the criticisms have now been made, and I have given answers to the questions. It is a matter for the House to decide whether they are satisfactory.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I wish to support the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and resist the Minister’s Motion on rather a broader basis than perhaps has been suggested so far. The problem, or one of the problems, with the Minister’s Motion is that it leaves intact the central thrust of Clauses 65 and 66, which were of course objected to and disagreed with by the Commons on the basis set out in Commons Reason 106A:

“Because it is appropriate to impose duties, rather than confer discretions, on the High Court”,

et cetera. My deep disagreement with that basis of rejection is that I do not believe it is appropriate in this jurisdiction to impose duties and to narrow or eliminate discretions on the part of the judiciary.

In Committee in July, I suggested that it is difficult to think of any area of law less suitable than this one for this sort of legislative interference. We are here concerned with the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the courts to hold the Government to account; to ensure that the rule of the law is observed when the Executive take action. Yet here is another example of the Government seeking to weaken those powers with the inevitable chilling effect, and in many cases making it practically impossible to bring a challenge. The fresh ministerial amendments still leave intact the provision that you cannot bring judicial review unless you give a whole series of particulars about how the process is to be funded.

In that same debate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—my respect and admiration for him is second to none, not least since he had the sagacity 22 years ago to promote me to the Court of Appeal—rightly pointed out that it was the judges themselves who had originally sought to underpin the rule of court under which judges had previously exercised their judicial review jurisdiction by giving it legislative form. Thus was enacted the section of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, spoke a little earlier: Section 31 of what used to be called the Supreme Court Act but, since the invention of a Supreme Court, is now called the Senior Courts Act. However, it must be recognised that Section 31 merely facilitated the exercise of the judges’ supervisory jurisdiction; in no way did it seek to constrain, limit or inhibit it. It imposed no duties on the judges and you will search it in vain to find such.

Now, though, in this clause, as in the one that we discussed a little earlier, the Government are intent on seeking to eliminate the judges’ powers and to impose duties upon them. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said about the earlier proposal: this is an amendment of constitutional importance. In truth, it is not a party political matter. It is a question of where the boundary should be drawn between the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary in this country, unlike its American counterpart, has always fully recognised the sovereignty of Parliament. We do not strike down primary legislation. Parliament, in turn, has not hitherto sought to whittle down the judges’ supervisory jurisdiction, and it is really inappropriate that they should now start to do so.

If the Government have their way on this or, on reconsideration later, on the previous or the next amendment, the constitutional balance will have shifted. The fact is that the Motions that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is advancing are ones that are truly worth fighting for.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this has been a very useful debate. The questions of the information available to judges are difficult. Most judges would say that the more information that they have, the better, to enable them to exercise any discretion in any context. When it comes to making orders for costs, which can be extremely serious in their consequences, it is important that they have information. By the same token, the Government take the view that it is only fair that people who seek the remedy of judicial review, who will inevitably cause costs to be incurred—often by a public authority, so indirectly by the taxpayer—should not be able to hide behind shell companies. That much, I think, is agreed. Where there is still some disagreement is over whether those who want to contribute to a fighting fund or a potential claim—however one likes to characterise it—should have to disclose that information.

The amendment is regarded by some noble Lords as being unsatisfactory because the Government do not specify a particular figure or percentage. Although, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quite rightly says, it is the Government’s amendment and he does not have to put anything forward, he said helpfully that it might be helpful if the figure was by reference to the overall costs of the judicial review. Our view, and I rely on the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is that these are pre-eminently matters for the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. It is of course not a committee of which the Lord Chancellor—the subject of much criticism today and throughout the Bill—is the chairman or has control, but it has considerable experience.

The important thing, I suggest, is to consider what is really at stake here. I respectfully suggest that actually the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, put his finger on exactly the dilemma here: whether we are talking about people who are making small contributions to a community project or about quite large sums of money where there is a pooling of resources to take forward a claim. I shall try to characterise what we are trying to get at by these rules. We suggest that there is a difference between an amount of money that by most people’s standards would establish a vested interest in the outcome of a case and someone who, in support of a cause, wishes to make a small contribution to a fighting fund. It is the latter that our clause seeks to exclude. That is the difference. We have adhered to that as an approach. We are not seeking to exclude people who are making substantial sums. I respectfully suggest that £10,000 to £15,000, as referred to by my noble friend Lord Marks, is a substantial sum of money.

The amount that individual lawyers charge is of course often much criticised, but I am asked to give some idea about the sort of costs that may be involved in judicial review. For cases that proceed to a full hearing, the Public Law Project estimated in 2007 that, for a straightforward case, costs to a claimant could be in the region of £10,000 to £12,000—adjusted for inflation, that is £11,000 to £22,000. In 2012, Guildhall Chambers published information estimating this at £5,000 to £10,000. In relation to defendants’ legal costs, the Treasury Solicitor’s Department estimates that in 2013, in cases that it was involved in, the defendants’ costs ranged from £8,000 to £25,000 for non-immigration and asylum cases, and from £1,000 to £15,000 for immigration and asylum cases. For an oral permission hearing, the Treasury Solicitor’s Department estimates an average cost to a defendant for preparing and attending the hearing at around £1,000 to £1,500.

It is important to bear in mind that Clause 66 requires the court to consider the funding information and whether to make costs orders. Of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, is quite right: the funding must be provided for them to go on to consider how to exercise their power over costs. Importantly, though, whether to make any costs order against a third party, provided that the prerequisite is there, will be entirely for the court to assess. The clause itself, provided that Clause 65 is satisfied, does not affect the judge’s discretion. We think it is right that the judge, in exercising his discretion, should have regard to what information would reasonably be expected to make a proper judgment about whether costs should be paid.

There was a reference to the possibility that privacy would effectively be invaded by having to provide costs. The information would be made available to the court but not publicly available, in line with existing practice when the courts deal with information that concerns personal finances or is otherwise confidential. It is right that there is transparency in the more generally used sense, and that the courts are aware of the nature and extent of funding provided to a claimant from those directly party to, but not potentially controlling, the litigation.

The judiciary itself responded to the consultation on judicial review. So that I cannot be accused of misrepresenting what it said, I shall quote from paragraph 179:

“The court is already empowered to make costs orders against non-parties … We support the proposal that it should be mandatory for a claimant to provide details of how a case is funded … to assist the court in assessing whether to make a cost orders against a non-party. We welcome the acknowledgment that the court should retain full discretion in relation to the making of these orders”.

That is a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown; he says that there should be no obligation on the part of those who are funding matters to provide information.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, as I understand Clause 65, it involves an insertion into Section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act. That will provide that no application for judicial review shall be made unless, as at present, the leave of the High Court has been obtained—that is fine. But then you insert these provisions—“unless the applicant has provided the court”. In other words, the court has no discretion left to grant leave to move unless this whole rigmarole is gone through and whatever it is ultimately decided has to be disclosed by way of the financial basis of the claim has been disclosed. That is the respect in which I suggest there is no longer going to be any discretion for the court to allow proceedings to go ahead.

[Lord Faulks]

That is entirely correct. The discretion would exist on whether to award costs. This is the discretion which is fettered, I entirely accept, to the extent that the Government think it is appropriate for it to be fettered because they consider that, because of what results from bringing a judicial review in terms of cost consequences, it is perfectly reasonable to provide within the realms of privacy the basis on which you are funding. That excludes those small contributors whom I have characterised, and whom I accept would be covered by the rules. Beyond that, however, we consider it to be an appropriate obligation. It is there to prevent what has been a potential evil. I will not go over the Richard III case again; the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is relieved. Undoubtedly there have been cases where shell companies have been used; the case is lost; there is nobody for anybody to recover costs from and again the taxpayer loses. This can happen. This is not a draconian matter: we have made a concession which, I suggest, is a reasonable one. The rule committee can be trusted to come up, with its experience in the matter, with an appropriate compromise reflecting the principles that I have endeavoured to outline on the Floor of the House.