Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I hesitate, my Lords, to speak again. I feel that so much of what has been said has been dancing on the head of a pin. I have to say that I have come to see new subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) in new Section 29A in Clause 1 not as dramatically different things but rather as a continuum. They cover a spectrum; indeed, there is an overlap in between them, in the middle. There is no question here of subsection (5), to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, objects so strenuously—the one about being treated, and so forth. It is always subject, be it noted, to new subsection (2) of new Section 29A. Any of these orders under new subsection (1)—in other words, whether it is an order under new subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b)—can be made subject to conditions. Those conditions clearly would control the extent to which there is to be any degree of retrospectivity or retroactivity, call it what one will.

I am a huge admirer and respecter of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I do not see this as being, so to speak, comparable to Parliament infinitely rarely passing legislation retroactively. We must always remember, must we not, that judicial review is, at the end of the day, a discretionary remedy; you do not actually have to make these orders anyway. I still see this, as the Minister would urge, as a tool in our toolbox, giving us the maximum flexibility and discretion to do what justice requires to all—which includes, of course, to those who are not in the courtroom, who do not have legal aid, and all the rest of it. With criminal convictions—taxation and things—one trusts and assumes that the court is going to behave correctly. In the Percy and Hall case, with the good lady trespasser and PC Hall who was being sued for damages for having arrested people who on the face of it were invading this territory, contrary to apparently valid by-laws, I pointed out in the judgment that, if and insofar as she had actually had criminal convictions, of course they would be set aside. But that is merely an aspect of judges behaving, as one hopes and believes they will, in a judicial manner.

So I respectfully continue to support this clause. I said at Second Reading that I was agnostic or entirely relaxed—I think that was the term used by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—as to whether it is “may” or “must” in new subsection (9), and I remain so. “Must” simply urges the judges to give attention to this new tool in their armoury or toolbox. But they do not have to, and they will not, unless by all the conditions that they wanted to impose, they have made it clear that what they are doing will not be contrary to justice.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is designed to take the sting out of the provisions in Clause 1, both as to the circumstances on which suspended or prospective-only quashing orders may be made and as to the way in which the discretion should be exercised. If passed, the amendments would each mitigate the damage which in my view is inflicted on the rule of law inherent in Clause 1. However, if all were passed, they would still by no means eliminate it. As has been pointed out, the worst part of Clause 1—in a sense, the elephant in the room of the first two groups—is the presumption, which we shall come to in the next group, which has been spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and which is, I suspect, opposed by the overwhelming majority of those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, spoke to it in the last group, and said that his support for the prospective quashing-order power was conditional on the removal of the presumption.

I suggest that there is also a flavour to Clause 1 that is inherently offensive. We are faced with a proposal that not only permits the suspension of a quashing order and the retrospective validation of unlawful acts—and we accept the power of suspension—but dictates to the court, by new subsections (8), (9) and (10), how the court should exercise its discretion. Once again, I have to say that I am impressed but dubious about the optimism expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that the Government are concerned only to give judges tools in their toolbox which they would not use, and that they can exercise their discretion in any way that they wish, because that is not actually how these new subsections work—and they are wrong in principle to dictate the way in which the discretion is exercised. The court when considering judicial review—

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Strongly though I support it and absurd though I too think it is to allow for some possibility of a jury trial with the jury sitting otherwise than in the actual courtroom, I had no intention of speaking tonight until I learned that my noble and learned friend Lord Judge could not. As I seem to be the last judge standing this evening and feel so strongly about this, it seems that I should say a word. But I urge all of your Lordships to recognise that if my noble and learned friend had been speaking, he would have said the little I propose to say so much more tellingly and convincingly that the House really ought to add enormous weight to it.

All I say is that the whole value of a jury, sacrosanct in our law of course, is that they are there and part of the atmosphere. They watch the whole thing unfolding, see the witnesses and sense the entire development of the arguments as they emerge. My noble friend Lord Carlile made a number of these points, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has just done. The whole aura of the process and the fact that the jury recognise in the courtroom that they are, for the first time, having to apply themselves to this critical question—is this man or woman guilty or not guilty?—is lost and dissipated if they are not there. I urge your Lordships not to provide for this suggested possibility, for who knows in what circumstances it would be? They can be only circumstances that do not justify having a separate jury.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on the amendments he moved or spoke to on proceedings involving children and health screening, and with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. We support those amendments, but I will speak to Amendment 97CA from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the use of live links in jury trials, to which I have put my name.

This amendment raises two important questions about the nature of juries and of jury trial. First, how important is it to the trial process that juries see and hear witnesses give their evidence live? Secondly, how important is it to the trial process that the relationship and balance between judge and jury is live rather than remote? On the first issue, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made the point that jury trials depend, more than anything else, upon the ability of jurors to weigh up the evidence of witnesses. They have to assess two things: veracity, or whether the witness is trying to tell the truth, and accuracy, or whether he or she has got it right.

As others, including the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile, have said, after nearly two years of the pandemic we have all become completely familiar with the process of remote discussion and meetings. None of us, I feel, would now argue that remoteness makes no difference. In this vital area of our national life, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, pointed out, we entrust decisions about the guilt or innocence of those charged with serious crimes to juries of 12 who listen to and weigh up the evidence of witnesses, and make decisions about truth or falsehood, reliability or inaccuracy, honesty or dishonesty, and intent, accident or misadventure. Those jurors will certainly consider objective evidence that has the same effect when seen or heard remotely as it has when seen or heard directly. But much of the evidence they will hear, and usually the most critical evidence in jury trial cases, has to be subjectively judged, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said. That is done by references to the witnesses’ demeanour, body language, response to cross-examination and emotional responses.

These are matters on which juries might initially and quite legitimately disagree. Their assessment—the different assessments of all 12 of them—will be the subject of detailed discussion during their deliberations and depend upon impressions. We would be undermining our jury system by depriving jurors of the opportunity, in the case that they decide, to share their experiences of the witnesses and the experiences that they have had live. I do not believe that undermining the jury trial in this way can possibly be justified.

On the second point about the presence of the judge, counsel and jury in the same place, the role of the judge and jury and the relationship between them is a delicate one. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the judge’s position is to ensure that trials are conducted in a responsible and serious way. I also think there is considerable importance in that relationship that the independence of juries is maintained. A stock sentence that judges quite properly use when summing up is when they tell the jury, “It is a matter for you, members of the jury,” and it is.

However, for juries to make the decisions they are charged with making, they must not feel to be, seem to be or, still less, actually be at a disadvantage compared to the judge who has seen and heard and assessed the witnesses live. When the judge recounts a particular piece of evidence in summing up, juries must not be cowed or persuaded into accepting what they may perceive to be the judge’s view of the evidence. They must be able to say to each other: “He or she may have said that, but I did not believe that witness—did you see how scared they looked?” That is what jury independence means. Jury independence is fundamental to our system and why it is so important. For that reason, I completely support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 13th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this regret Motion raises three important matters of principle: first, the accountability of government and the rule of law; secondly, access to justice for the public and cost protection in environmental cases; and, thirdly, compliance by the United Kingdom with its international obligations.

Environmental cases are frequently brought by individual citizens and concerned organisations to challenge the executive action of government, national or local, which threatens the environment in which we all live and on which we all depend. Where government acts unlawfully, judicial review exists to enable such claimants to hold government to account. These cases are often complex and expensive. As a party to the Aarhus convention, entered into in 1998 under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and ratified by the United Kingdom in 2005, enshrined in EU law, this country committed to guarantee in environmental cases to provide,

“adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.

In April 2013, finally and after much procrastination and an adverse decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in a case called Edwards, the Government introduced rules to implement the convention requirement that costs should not be prohibitively expensive. They did so by establishing an environmental costs protection regime, which, among other things, limited the costs payable by claimants to defendants in environmental judicial review cases. Your Lordships may remember that, in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, although this House successfully secured amendments limiting the damage, the Government legislated to impose a number of harsh costs provisions on judicial review, but in that Act costs protection arrangements for Aarhus convention cases escaped attack. However, this February Liz Truss, then Lord Chancellor, laid before Parliament the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017, to which this regret Motion is directed. I first tabled this Motion in March, but the sudden general election was called before it could be heard.

My first objection to the new rules is to the requirement that a claimant seeking costs protection must disclose,

“a schedule of the claimaint’s financial resources”.

That schedule must also disclose “any financial support” from others helping to fund the case. This requirement, I suggest, is invidious, offends against privacy and is likely—indeed, calculated—to deter potential claimants and their supporters. Supporters will be put off because they risk being ordered to pay costs. The European Commission, in a letter written in March, wrote that,

“a requirement for litigants to provide information of their own personal means is also likely to result in a chilling effect with many individuals not wanting to make their personal finances publicly known”.

That must be right.

The costs limits are £5,000 for individual claimants or £10,000 for businesses or organisations. My second objection to the changes is that the new rules provide that multiple claimants will each be liable for a costs order in those sums. Before these changes, the general practice was that the overall cap would apply even if there were several claimants, but that was not invariable. The convention Compliance Committee considered this change and has said that it could see no basis for this amendment, which, it said,

“removes an important possibility for members of the public to defray the costs of proceedings by sharing the cost burden with other concerned members of the public”.

It said that it,

“substantially increases the likelihood of extensive satellite litigation to determine the costs cap per claimant, further increasing uncertainty”.

However, the third and most important and powerful objection is that the new rules have driven a coach and horses through the whole principle of costs protection in environmental cases. That is because they provide that, at any stage of the case, the court may vary or remove altogether the limits on the maximum costs liability of any party in an Aarhus convention claim. It is true that the rule pays lip-service to compliance with the convention by limiting the power to cases where removing protection would not make the costs of the proceedings prohibitively expensive. The rules define when proceedings are to be considered prohibitively expensive, which they may be if they,

“exceed the financial resources of the claimant; or … are objectively unreasonable”—

applying tests that roughly reflect those set out in the Edwards case, but which are extremely difficult to fathom. Any financial support of the claim by others must also be taken into account. I suggest that the overall effect is that any claimant may feel at risk unless his or her entire capital would be consumed by an adverse costs order. The reality is that costs protection which can be removed half way through a case is no costs protection at all. These rules undermine government accountability, diminish the rule of law and reduce access to justice in environmental cases for all but the very wealthy.

When the changes were first proposed, they were put out to consultation. The response was overwhelmingly negative. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House produced a report that can only be described as scathing on the proposed changes. On the consultation, it said:

“The analysis in the EM”—


the Explanatory Memorandum—

“simply states that the consultation exercise received 289 responses. It does not explain, as it should, that for most of the questions the number supporting the Government’s proposal was less than ten: the vast majority of the responses received were against the proposed changes”.

The committee further noted the Government’s policy aim of,

“discouraging unmeritorious claims which cause unreasonable costs and delays to development projects”,

but the committee found no evidence to support the Government’s position. It also concluded that the Ministry of Justice had not addressed concerns and that,

“as a result of the increased uncertainty introduced by these changes, people with a genuine complaint will be discouraged from pursuing it in the courts”.

These rules inevitably deter legitimate challenges to government decisions. To take one example of their chilling effect, the Liverpool Green Party recently wished to challenge permission for a car park in an air quality management area granted by the council without its first undertaking an air quality assessment. The party was advised that it had a strong claim for judicial review, and it wrote a letter of claim. In its response, however, the council did not address the substance of the complaint but wrote that,

“it is noted that the court now has discretion … to vary the limits on maximum costs liability for Aarhus Claims and the Council will therefore require confirmation of the financial resources of your client in the event that it seeks a protective costs order”.

In the face of that letter, the party was unable to find an individual prepared to act as claimant, so the case was never brought.

I said at the outset that this Motion was about the rule of law. If the House passes this regret Motion, it will give the Lord Chancellor, who is widely held in high regard, an opportunity to show that he understands—better than his predecessor—the importance of government accountability, access to justice, the rule of law and of complying with our international obligations, in this case under the Aarhus convention. If he understands those things, he will withdraw these rules. I beg to move.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I do not usually find myself on the opposite side of the debate from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, but here I am. I make just two comparatively brief points—first, that the original 2013 rules to which he referred, which the 2017 rules that we are considering today have replaced, were drawn up before the CJEU gave the judgment in the Edwards case to which the noble Lord referred. That case was originally referred to the CJEU in 2011 by the Supreme Court, in which I was one of the five sitting, under the presidency of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead.

The original 2013 regime provided simply for fixed-cost caps for claimants and defendants. The noble Lord mentioned that the caps are £5,000 and £10,000 respectively, depending on whether it is one or more claimant. It costs £35,000 for defendants in certain environmental law challenges—judicial reviews—with no account being taken under those rules of the particular claimant’s financial position, whether they are a millionaire or a pauper, or of the strength of the challenge that they would bring.

The new rules were introduced after what seems to me an impeccable consultation process. It is true that, perhaps not unusually in this sort of situation, the great majority of those responding were unenthusiastic, to put it no higher, about certain aspects of the proposed changes, certain of which were changed following consultation. But the new rules take full account of the several factors set out by the CJEU in the Edwards case as being relevant to the proper approach to the Aarhus convention in this respect. It is true that the new approach is more complex and allows, as the old regime did not, for a variation of those default costs limits—variations, I should emphasise, in either direction, possibly in favour of a claimant, as access to justice might be thought to require, during and not merely at the outset of the legal challenge.

The measure, therefore, could be said to illustrate the age-old problem in the law of balancing the respective merits of certainty and flexibility—there of course being in all cases pros and cons of each. I, for my part, do not accept that meritorious claimants are likely to be deterred and, certainly, I do not regard these new rules as manifestly contrary to the rule of law, or being unlawful and the rest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I should perhaps make it clear that I deliberately refrained from referring to that case because it is sub judice, a judgment not having been given. So I have not referred to it and have not dealt with it. I take no issue with the noble and learned Lord so doing, because this is a case about delegated legislation but, nevertheless, I did not do so.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

In so far as the sub judice rule would apply to a debate of this character, I respectfully do not for a moment accept that I am breaching it. I am suggesting that it is highly relevant to the present Motion to Regret, a Motion which, as the noble Lord said, was initially tabled in March and, therefore, before those proceedings. In so far as, for example, it is now said that we are in flagrant breach of the rule of law and all the rest of it, those issues fall to be decided properly in the context of full argument in those proceedings and not to be well-nigh pre-empted by a Motion to Regret today. For my part, I would not support a Motion to Regret without the benefit of the High Court’s judgment on the legal issues arising.

Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 4th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, one problem with a Bill that stretches to 186 clauses and 11 schedules and occupies 232 pages of the Queen’s printer’s copy is that, at least by the time that Clause 180 is reached, this House’s scrutiny powers begin to wane. Thus it was that, last year, by passing Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, the Lord Chancellor was empowered to prescribe by statutory instrument, subject to affirmative resolution, court fees exceeding the cost of doing that for which the fee is charged—enhanced fees, as they are called. That Section 180 power must be reasonably, sensitively and fastidiously used. It is bad enough that the courts should be required to be self-financing at all. The justice system properly exists for the benefit of society and the economy as a whole. There has long been objection to the basic principle of full cost recovery.

To put that aside, the order for enhanced fees goes altogether further. In a real sense, it is selling justice—apparently contrary to Magna Carta, although now sanctioned by Section 180. Small wonder that it is characterised by some as a tax-like payment rather than a realistic charge for the use of the courts. Under Section 180(6), the enhanced fees,

“must be used to finance an efficient and effective system of courts and tribunals”.

That is small comfort to those who pay enhanced fees. Why, they will not unnaturally ask, should they be subsidising the family courts or whatever other proceedings are brought which do not attract the enhanced fee liability?

That is the first, fundamental, principled objection to the order. It is an objection not just in abstract constitutional terms, but because it must inevitably carry with it reputational consequences. Frankly, it sullies the overall image of British justice, no part of which should be open to criticism as a profit-making enterprise.

The second main objection is in two linked parts. First, to some extent at least, enhanced fees are bound to deter prospective claimants from litigating their claims. The second, necessarily linked, part of the objection is that, to the extent that claims are deterred, enhanced fees will fail in their central objective of raising money. The greater the number of claims deterred, the smaller the additional sum raised by the increases.

I add four footnotes to that objection. First, as explained in the Civil Justice Council’s response in December and the Lord Chief Justice’s letter written on behalf of all the heads of division, those dramatic increases, which, as we have heard, are in some instances over 600%, have to be paid up front and in full and are likely to impact disproportionately on SMEs and litigants in person. Of course, as the Minister observed in an answer at Question Time last week to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the heads of division were indeed consulted, but even after modifications were made they continued to voice “deep concerns” about the proposals.

Secondly, as explained in a detailed briefing paper from the Law Society, the Bar Council and various other professional bodies, clinical negligence and personal injury cases, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred, are likely to be adversely affected.

Thirdly, contrary to the Government’s bland statement that they are confident that the concerns expressed about the risk of damage to our legal services, and London’s reputation as the leading commercial dispute resolution centre, are misplaced—a bland assurance seen in their January 2015 response to the consultation and in Appendix 2 to the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee report—in fact 61% of the 158 people who responded on this issue to the BIICL research which was especially commissioned by the Ministry of Justice suggested that the proposed increase in fees could have a detrimental effect on the English litigation market, with 44 of those consulted considering this to be “highly likely”.

Wisely, following the consultation, the Government abandoned their initial proposal, which was to raise yet higher enhanced fees of up to £20,000 for the issue of the higher-value commercial claims in the Rolls Building, on the basis that this would be likely to kill or, at any rate, severely lame the golden goose that has paid the vast sums which this litigation has earned the nation—billions of pounds-worth, a lot of it foreign currency. It must surely follow from that abandonment that even £10,000 is likely at least to deter some foreign claimants from litigating their claims here or to drive people, if not actually to abandon their claims, at any rate to resort to arbitration or mediation, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also suggested.

With regard to my fourth footnote—I say this in fairness to the Government—unlike certain others, I do not see the employment tribunal fees experience as a directly helpful analogy. No doubt the introduction of those fees, whereas before there were none, has discouraged a number of meritorious claims but I suspect that it has discouraged at least as many unmeritorious claims—speculative claims, which used regularly to be brought and then bought off or settled because, frankly, that was a cheaper option for the defendant employers than successfully resisting them and then being left to bear their own costs, which were quite likely to be very substantially more.

A third and final reason for objecting to these increases is that they are not only intrinsically unfair when levied at this level but, in addition, produce curious and unfair anomalies. An obvious one is that all claims not specifically limited are now to attract the maximum full fee of £10,000. It is true that the Civil Justice Council said that it could see no logical justification for distinguishing between specified and unspecified money claims, and as far as it goes that is right. However, as the Lord Chief Justice’s letter points out, in personal injury cases, for example, it may well be quite impossible to value the claim when it is issued. Similarly, in many of the Rolls Building commercial cases, damages may be a subsidiary consideration. The principal relief being sought may well be an injunction or some other remedy—perhaps an account or something of that character.

My final point is that the Government are now proposing yet further enhanced fees, with a view to raising a further £55 million annually. They propose to do this—it is the subject of the January 2015 consultation document—by raising fees in possession cases and upon applications of one sort or another being made in ordinary civil proceedings. Again, there are compelling arguments against those, summarised in the Civil Justice Council’s response in February to the latest consultation round, but it is not necessary to go into them today.

Today’s Motion is of course one of regret rather than a fatal Motion. For whatever reason, Labour has apparently not been prepared to go that far. However, it will, I hope, help at least to persuade the Government that enough is enough and that really there must be no more use of this enhanced fee power. I suggest that the order is not merely to be regretted but to be deplored.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I regret that I find it difficult to understand what has made the Ministry of Justice persist with these changes in the face of the well reasoned and overwhelmingly hostile reaction to them. The ministry’s impact assessment was based upon express assumptions, described as “key”, that,

“fee changes will not affect court case volumes”;

that,

“there are no detrimental impacts on court case outcomes nor on access to justice from any increase in court fees”;

and that,

“there are … no impacts on the legal services used to pursue or defend claims”.

It was those assumptions to which the senior judiciary referred in their letter dated 19 December 2014, to which reference has already been made, which led the Lord Chief Justice to describe the proposals as,

“very sweeping and, in our view, unduly complacent”.

For judges not inclined to overstatement, that is trenchant criticism indeed. The letter was based upon the draft impact statement, which the senior judiciary had seen. Notwithstanding that criticism, the assumptions nevertheless found their way into the final impact statement when it was made on 16 January this year.

When the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked a Question of the Minister last Thursday, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay questioned why these measures had not been introduced with the consent of the heads of division. Cynics, and anyone who had read the letter of 19 December, could be forgiven for the view that the reason why such consent was not sought was that it clearly would have been withheld for the very reason that the assumptions made by the department were unsustainable.

It was not only the Law Society and the Bar Council that prepared a briefing on these proposals. Other professional bodies as disparate as the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, the Forum of Insurance Lawyers —who, of course, are usually on the other side—the Association of Business Recovery Professionals, and COMBAR, the Commercial Bar Association, joined them in referring to the evidence from individual law firms, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred, that:

“Over 200 individual examples provided by law firms show that the total value of cases brought by individuals would be likely to fall by around one-third (35 per cent) under higher court fees. For small and medium-sized companies it would halve (a 49 per cent decrease). This suggests that increased court fees could have a significant impact on access to justice for both individuals and businesses, as fewer could afford to pay the higher rates”—

a point eloquently made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support Amendment 157 for the reasons already given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. There are indeed currently real perils in Clause 71 in the way of the chilling effect that it must inevitably have. In Committee on 30 July, as reported at col. 1607, in relation to what was then Clause 65 and is now Clause 71, the Minister twice said that the senior judiciary welcomed this provision. I was troubled by that and looked at the response of the senior judiciary of last November. I hope that I have the right document and that I have isolated the right paragraphs; that is, paragraphs 34 and 38. I am sure that the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, They suggest that, in certain circumstances, there should be mandatory disclosure of financial circumstances. As I read that response—and I am unsurprised by this—the important point is that it refers only to when determining whether to make a protective costs order or when questioning,

“whether to make a costs order against a non-party”.

Those are not routine events, and they would not require, as the clause as it stands does, a disclosure of financial resources on all applications. If I am wrong about that the Minister will correct me, but if I am right, with respect, that wholly deprives him of the support on which he rested in Committee: the senior judiciary’s response.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I simply do not accept that it is right that a requirement for financial disclosure should be imposed before the permission stage in a judicial review application. The time for considering such information is when the order for costs is considered, and not before. At the costs stage—the stage with which Clause 72 is concerned—it is clear which side has won, and the judge knows who is and who is not vulnerable to a costs order. Only at that stage is the issue of financial support relevant, and at that stage the present position is that the judge already has the power to make a costs order against a non-party who has financially supported an unmeritorious application. There is no utility in expanding or developing that power further. But if there is to be legislation, I urge the House to accept that it should be left to the discretion of the judge as to what order for costs he makes. There may be some sense, however, in legislating for the court at that stage to have the power to require financial information in order to help the judge form a conclusion. That is the limited purpose of my amendments to Clause 72. With your Lordships’ consent, I shall detain the House no further.

Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Thursday 17th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I rather hope it was not mine, but it might have been. At any rate, it has been moved now.

The proviso of republication in a different manner as the application of the rule in my view provides sufficient protection. That was the unanimous and strongly held view of the Joint Committee, and it is one which I urge the Government to reconsider. I would add one caveat which is that, while I support the principle of this amendment, I can see the need for its qualification to ensure that this situation is addressed. It is possible to envisage a first publication by an insolvent publisher and then a second publication by a publisher who is worth suing. It would be perfectly reasonable for a claimant to take the view that he did not propose to sue the first publisher, but that he did wish to sue a publisher at a later date when the original limitation period might have expired because that publisher was worth suing and was likely to be good for the costs and the damages. It does not seem to me to be beyond the wit of draftsmen to cater for that position and to allow suing a second publisher in those circumstances. Subject to that caveat I support the amendment.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I was not proposing to speak to this amendment at all but it seems to me that there is an enormous distinction to be made between person A and person B as to which publication one is being denied by the Limitation Act the opportunity of proceeding in respect of. It is, with respect, not only whether the second publisher may be financially worth suing as opposed to the first publisher which must be catered to in this provision, but surely also the standing and reputation of the publisher. One can very well imagine a situation in which one simply would not be bothered to be defamed by person A because that person’s standing and reputation was itself so low and yet a republication by somebody of real repute and standing would trigger one’s intent to sue. So if this Amendment 44A is to be accepted, that sort of thing should be catered to, whether under the provisions of subsection 4, with a specific provision about material difference lying on occasion in the character and position, financially and otherwise, of the publisher, or in some other way, I leave to others to consider.

As to the other amendments, I agree with the view that Amendments 45, 46 and 47 are a simpler and more elegant fashion of expressing those provisions. As to Amendment 47B and the proposed insertion of new Section 5A, I am neutral as to how desirable it is to spell out these considerations which shall not be regarded as materially different. I would respectfully suggest that the expression should be not,

“shall not be deemed to be”—

it is not a question of deeming—but

“shall not be regarded as”,

but that is a very minor point indeed.