Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Viscount Hailsham

Report stage
Monday 29th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I declare an interest: I sit as a legal assessor for regulatory bodies, and I am very nearly 77—and therefore significantly older than the age of 72 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. There are many other legal assessors of my sort of age sitting on regulatory authorities. I know full well that we are talking about judges, not legal assessors, but the principle is very much the same. If you were to say to legal assessors, “You cannot serve beyond 72”, you would lose an awful lot of quality which is now available to those regulatory authorities. I believe that the same is also true of the courts. I think judges should be able to sit until 75.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I join those who have indicated that they fully support Part 3 of the Bill and would raise the retiring age for judges—or rather return it to where it was 27 or 28 years ago—to 75, which it was for nine years of my own time on the Bench. I should declare that I too am well beyond the age when such as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, might be having a discreet word with me.

I point out that this provision is fully supported by—as I understand it from Second Reading—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who originally lowered the age to 70. He recognises that, all these years on, frankly, 75 year-olds now are a good deal younger than the 70 year-olds of those days past.

I suggest that the most important consideration is really that of judicial recruitment, which is still proving extremely difficult. The imperative surely is to get the most able people on to the Bench, whether they be men or women, whether they be gay, trans or straight, and whether they be young or old. The fact is that most cases are decided by a single judge. It is no good having the most wonderful judge trying the case in the next court if your judge is perhaps rather an indifferent one. So it is too with courts of three, five, seven or whatever.

Of course diversity is a highly desirable objective; obviously, public confidence in the justice system overall is enhanced if more people see themselves represented among the judiciary. In a three-judge, five-judge or seven-judge court, the wider the diversity of judges—including, of course, more women—the likelier the court is to bring to bear a wider experience and judgment on the questions. But I suggest that the argument in favour of 72 rather than 75 being supportive of diversity is, frankly, somewhat speculative; certainly, it is not sufficiently clear, I suggest, to justify sacrificing the goal of individual excellence on the altar of supposed greater diversity. Getting the best candidates to apply and appointing them on merit has to be the cardinal rule.

As to that, raising the MRA to 75 is, to my mind, assuredly going to assist in the recruitment of the ablest candidates, and I suggest that is so equally of women candidates as of male ones. First, it becomes more attractive because it is viable to take the job rather later in one’s career than at present. It gives candidates, male and female, longer to pursue whatever their initial career has been—it may have been in academe or in a range of areas on the borders of the law. It certainly gives practitioners a longer working life in which they can earn more than we all recognise they are going to be earning on the Bench.

Secondly, it gives candidates the option—it is not compulsory; they do not have to serve until 75—of being employed, useful and busy, as most of us would wish to be, for longer and later in their lives. Most of us do not actually want to be forced into compulsory retirement at 70—or, for that matter, at 72.

Thirdly, not only does a retirement age of 75 provide a yet better incentive than 72 for encouraging the best applicants to apply but it serves the public good. It retains supposedly skilled and experienced judges for that much longer. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggests, it is surely not to be supposed that judges suffer a significant and noticeable failing in their abilities between the ages of 72 and 75 sufficient to draw the line at 72. It must therefore be in all our interests to keep these judges working, if they wish to, for that much longer.

Finally, I add as a footnote that it will save the taxpayer the need to pay these reluctantly retired judges a judicial pension for those three years for doing nothing.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Viscount Hailsham

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham]

That is true but there are many aspects of the law where it is not true. I look nervously at my noble friend Lord Faulks, but I think privileged communications to journalists are not covered by the definition of confidential and privileged information in the ordinary and criminal courts. I would therefore be very chary about extending the privilege to journalists qua journalists. There is also a serious point: who is a journalist? When does a career become spent and when is it still operational? There are quite a few problems along that line. I will bring my remarks to a conclusion so that the noble Baroness can respond to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson, Lord Carlile and many others.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Just before the Minister responds, can I add a word, I hope not too tiresomely, on Amendment 5? If you suggest that it would be a good idea to deproscribe a particular organisation, can you do so only on the basis that it is better to deal with it in the open, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and indeed, by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, so as to discourage recruitment, or can you say that it is because you regard the organisation’s aims as essentially innocuous or perhaps even beneficial overall? If the latter, surely that would risk destroying much of the effect of Clause 1 as a whole. You would simply couple your remarks with a suggestion for deproscription. If the former, surely the amendment, if it is to be incorporated in this legislation, had better build in the need to make it plain that at the same time as promoting deproscription, you continue to condemn the aims of the organisation.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Viscount Hailsham

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will confine myself to Amendments 39 to 42. I have a great deal of sympathy for the thinking that lies behind these amendments. To my mind, this is one of the most important parts of this part of the Bill, because judicial oversight seems to me to be absolutely essential if there is to be public confidence in the working of the Act, should this Bill be enacted.

My own feeling is that the provisions do not go far enough. It is a long time since I have had to study or discuss judicial review and I am cautious about doing so in the presence of many lawyers more distinguished than me, but my recollection, broadly speaking, is that the judicial commissioner will examine whether the powers have been exercised intra vires and not unreasonably. I am bound to say that I want to go beyond that. I should like to see some review of the merits—more particularly, addressing whether the issue of the warrant is properly supported by the material advanced in support of its issue and whether it is truly within the scope of the statutory criteria. I do not think this is provided for by the Bill as presently drafted. I am not saying that the amendments put forward solve the problem, but they are heading in the right direction. I would welcome any movement from my own Front Bench which may address this point.

I want to make one other small point about judicial review. I have already owned up that my recollection of judicial review is pretty faint, but I know that it develops a lot. There is not always a unanimity of view as to what the principles are because they develop and you get divided judgments, even from the Supreme Court. The principles of judicial review change as time goes on. It makes it very difficult to know whether the statutory requirement, as provided in this Bill, is satisfied.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I confess to taking a rather different view of this. This is a question of judicial oversight; it is not in principle judicial initial decision-making. I am perhaps a little out of date, although I have been at pains to keep up to date with developments, and as the noble Baroness and the noble Viscount have already recognised, there have been significant developments. This is not just about process; it is not what used to be called Wednesbury review, or perversity or irrationality. Nowadays it has developed into an appropriately flexible standard of oversight. Even without the explicit requirements to look at the necessity, the proportionality and the requirements of the human right to privacy, as there are here, there is in the modern concept of judicial review an ample opportunity.

In recent cases—I am looking at the Judicial Review publication of March of this year, so it is fairly up to date—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, in one of these recent cases such as Kennedy, Pham, and so forth, said that it was,

“improbable that the nature, strictness or outcome of such a review would differ according to whether it was conducted under domestic principles or”,

the EU law principle of proportionality. Therefore, even without the explicit requirement to look at proportionality, as there is in respect of all these oversight obligations, there is here an appropriate degree of flexibility.

You want an element of flexibility—you want the judge plainly to be able to take account of the nature of the underlying decision he is reviewing and of the extent to which there has been an invasion of privacy, against which this judicial oversight is designed to protect the citizen. This matter has been thrashed out; if you read the two days of debate in the other place, you see that there was some appropriate degree of give. However, I respectfully suggest that the oversight as now provided for is, if not more than adequate, certainly adequate.