Right to Roam

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Wednesday 21st February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Douglas-Miller (Con)]

It seems like a similar issue to bikes on pavements—bikes on paths in the countryside. This is a really difficult area, and one I come across a lot in my private life, with people accessing the countryside in inappropriate ways. Paths are narrow, and it is often quite dangerous when someone on a mountain bike, or a group of people on mountain bikes, is coming down that path. It is intimidating, and it is very challenging to find a safe place and a safe way to make those two meet. I sympathise with my noble friend.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, traditionally, people in Scotland have been allowed freely to access the outdoors. I am 71 years of age, and all my life I have known that I was free to walk anywhere, as long as I did not do any damage. This was codified in the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, which set out the conditions that you must observe if you do so. Can we not just adopt the same here and let people enjoy this? it does not cause any problems.

[Lord Douglas-Miller (Con)]

As a resident in Scotland, I would not necessarily agree with everything that the noble Lord has said. It is a devolved issue, and Scotland is entitled to make its own decisions on this.

Biosecurity and Infectious Diseases

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is both a delight and an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rees, and to join other noble Members in congratulating and thanking the noble Lord, Lord Trees, for securing this debate and for his excellent opening speech. We are fortunate in this House to have the benefit of their respective world-class scientific expertise, communication skills and deep commitment to the cause of increasing our biosecurity.

As is now clear, climate change is a driver of multiple other risks, from emerging zoonoses and disease transmission to compromised food security and an increase in drug-resistant infections. The Covid-19 pandemic is a lesson on the degree to which the entire world is vulnerable to a pandemic or another, as yet unanticipated, major public health event. It is sobering that by near-universal consensus, this vulnerability is set only to increase. The IPCC’s Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report could scarcely be more unequivocal on this specific question. It predicts that, in the near term, we will face

“multiple risks to ecosystems and humans”,

including a greater incidence of

“food-borne, water-borne, and vector-borne diseases”.

These are not merely warnings of a possible dystopian future, but something that already is crystallising into observable reality. We are seeing spikes in malaria transmission in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the first ever locally acquired cases of malaria in Florida and Texas, and, as has already been mentioned, outbreaks of dengue fever in Paris. In 2022, there were more cases of dengue fever in Europe than in the entire preceding decade. Forecasts suggest that, owing to a rise in global temperatures, malaria transmission seasons could be up to five months longer by 2070. Malaria rates in Mozambique are at their highest since the current reporting phase began in 2017. Over 70% of anti-malaria drugs in Africa are imported; what are we doing, or encouraging the international community to do, to stimulate local manufacture of drugs to ensure that weaknesses in the international supply chain do not result in preventable deaths in Africa?

What are the Government doing in either conducting or commissioning predictive modelling of the expected impacts of climate change on current and future disease transmission? If we are to equip ourselves adequately to deal with this crisis, a reactive approach will be insufficient. I welcome the new US-UK Strategic Dialogue on Biological Security and would be grateful for an explanation how, in granular terms, such co-operation will enhance our ability to anticipate future biosecurity threats.

On globalisation, I turn now to recent representations to the Government by port health officials in Dover. Since September 2022, when checks were first introduced, 57 tonnes of illegal, non-compliant pork imports have been seized in Dover alone. The Dover port health manager describes the scale of these illegal imports as “unprecedented” and suggests that for every tonne seized, multiple tonnes are going undetected. These illegal pork imports significantly increase the risk of African swine fever entering the UK, something that would have a devastating impact on agriculture and, in turn, offer a further incentive to those who wish illegally to import meat.

Given that the cost of living crisis has led to an increase in the illegal food trade, can the Minister elucidate the reasons for the proposed shift in customs checks from Bastion Point to Sevington, 22 miles from the Port of Dover itself? Defra’s rationale thus far seems to focus on cost but, given that concerns have been raised by industry sources at Defra forums, I suggest that it may be worth thinking again. The Dover Port Health Authority suggests that this change could easily lead to unexamined goods travelling 22 miles across the UK, with all of the attendant risks of possible infection, diminishing UK biosecurity. It claims it has not received appropriate assurances from Defra as to how existing standards could be maintained and that the Sevington facility, unlike Bastion Point, will not be operational 24 hours a day. Given the degree of concern expressed by the health authority and the UK food industry, does the Minister not agree that further work is needed before this change responsibly can be put into effect?

To return to the broader themes of this debate in the little time remaining, I join other noble Lords in welcoming the Government’s 2023 biosecurity strategy. Its ambitions, if realised, would make a genuine and substantive contribution to enhancing our biosecurity. I agree with the Centre for Long-Term Resilience that sustained resourcing will be critical in making its implementation a success. While the £1.5 billion being spent annually is welcome, have the Government considered a longer-term, multi-year funding settlement that would enable implementation to proceed securely and at pace?

I remind the Minister that the Government’s first biological security strategy was published in July 2018, just as Parliament was rising for the Summer Recess. To my knowledge, it was never debated in Parliament and while it warned of the need to co-ordinate government actions better and for a “truly comprehensive approach” to meet risks, including pandemics, it manifestly failed so to do, to such an extent that the parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, in its December 2020 report, found that Covid-19 exposed “profound shortcomings” in Britain’s approach to biosecurity.

As this debate makes clear, we face a variety of long-term biosecurity threats, and our response to these risks must be considered, proactive and durable to ensure that we keep this country safe.

Zoonoses Research Centre

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

We are supporting something called the Quadripartite MoU for One Health, which includes the OIE, the WHO, the FAO and UNEP—apologies again for the acronyms. That is part of what we are doing to participate in measures to address the surveillance issues, so that we know about diseases sooner and can react to them, and it is part of the response which we in the UK, as has been already pointed out, are particularly skilled at providing. There are a number of other international bodies of which we are a part.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, three-quarters of emerging human infections are zoonoses, and Covid-19 is only the latest example of this. It is therefore surprising that in our biological security strategy there are only fleeting mentions of zoonoses—one in a footnote and one in the glossary, and nothing else. Maybe this is one of the reasons why the strategy is being refreshed. However, unfortunately the call for evidence for the refresh makes only a very generic reference to them. We will need to correct that if we are going to claim to be world-leading on this. Our own national biological security strategy should give this dimension the attention it deserves.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

The noble Lord is very knowledgeable on the wider context of threats, which the integrated review picks up. I point to the leadership that was given in the G7 when Britain had the chairmanship, and subsequently in other fora, to make sure that we are part of a global effort on this and that we are leading where we can add expertise.

Water Companies: Duties and Accountability

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

We are asking water companies to make all kinds of provision that will address the points the noble Lord has raised. Storm waters have flooded into our rivers for hundreds of years. The difference today is that there are areas of high population dealing with infrastructure that is seeking to catch up. That is what we are investing in. Through the very strict targets we have introduced in the Environment Act, through measures that our regulators are imposing on water companies, and through the delivery of record fines for water companies when they get this wrong, we hope to see—indeed, we insist that there will be—a dramatic reduction in storm overflows.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

Throughout the many years that these very companies have been discharging raw sewage into our rivers, their customers have, in contractual terms, been paying them to treat that sewage and release it safely. Surely, what they have been doing is not only a breach of contract, but fraud. They knew full well what they were doing but were charging people otherwise. Surely, accountability requires compensation for people who paid them to treat and dispose of this sewage properly, and an investigation into whether the directors and executives, who knew what they were doing, were behaving fraudulently.

Environmental Land Management Schemes

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 24th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I think he will be reassured that, in moving from area payments to a more nuanced system of supporting environmental activities, farmers will be encouraged to farm their best land as best they can and look at those corners of fields and other parts of their farm that are less productive and are economic only because of the basic payment scheme. I hope he will see that kind of, if you like, market-led push by the Government as moving in the right direction. As far as a register is concerned, that will have to happen as part of further schemes, which will require local authorities, or local government at some level, to be involved in their rollout.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I join in the words of welcome to the Minister. Some 30% of farmland in England is let to tenant farmers. Published survey evidence reveals a lack of confidence and willingness among them to participate in the SFI pilot. Their association spokesperson said that

“tenant farmers are concerned that DEFRA does not fully understand or appreciate the diversity of land management models that exist within British agriculture”

and that

“the pilot may not be able to fully test out the implications of the scheme for the tenanted sector.”

How do the Government plan to ensure that this is not the case?

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

We have had about 2,000 requests to enter the sustainable farming initiative pilot; we will probably go with around 1,000 of those, starting from October this year. We intend to have a wide geographical base as well as a wide group of different farm sizes; this will certainly include tenant farms, and we are working with the Tenant Farmers Association to achieve that.

EU: Xylella Fastidiosa

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, this is a priority. We have intensified our surveillance, inspection and testing regime for high-risk plants. We feel very strongly about this. The Secretary of State has written to Commissioner Kyriakides, and the Chief Plant Health Officer has written to the director of DG SANTE, because we think that this is a mistake and that the EU should be very concerned about the spread of Xylella fastidiosa into other parts of the EU. We are determined to exclude it from this country; that is a priority.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

Since we joined the EEC, most plant pests, animal diseases and invasive species discovered in the UK had established themselves first in mainland Europe. Consistently working with our European neighbours, we have been able to benefit from early warning of imminent threats and from guidance on the best management tools. Changing trade patterns under Brexit may result in the UK changing from an overall recipient to a donor of emerging biological threats of concern in Europe. How, and how well, are we prepared for that scenario?

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, we have increased investment in surveillance and inspection precisely for that reason. The United Kingdom has more protected zones for plant pests and diseases than any EU country. We are determined to enhance our environment, and clearly our future arrangements for sanitary and phytosanitary measures post the end of the transition period will be important as we increase biosecurity.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests, in particular my involvement with the BioRISC initiative at St Catharine’s College, Cambridge. I am delighted to follow the noble Earl, Lord Shrewsbury. I pay particular attention to his remarks and I thank him for raising the continued use of lead ammunition in this debate. As he indicated, he and I, with others, have been discussing this issue over some months. I have discussed this with the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner of Kimble, and I know that he has an interest in this issue.

From my perspective, this is a simple issue. Lead is a poison. We ban it in many areas of our lives, but still use it in game shooting. The use of lead ammunition is partly banned and ought to be banned completely. There is compelling evidence that lead shot pollution damages extensively the environment in which it is used, poisoning wildlife that graze on it accidentally and poisoning meat served as food, posing dangers to the vulnerable, particularly our children.

The 2019 Great British Game Week, which begins on 25 November, aims to promote the Game to Eat campaign and I expect it will have a high profile in Parliament’s catering outlets. We have been reassured that no lead shot meat will be served in the House of Lords catering outlets, but we need to ensure that none is served in any of the catering outlets in the Palace of Westminster. Of course, we then need to address the question that if we are not prepared to eat lead shot meat because we know it is potentially poisonous, why do we allow other people, particularly children, to eat it? Following up on the noble Earl’s remarks, it is our intention to invite ammunition manufacturers to come to your Lordships’ House to brief us on the alternatives. It is my intention to invite the Minister to join us at that meeting. This could be done relatively simply.

In my remaining time, I want to concentrate on one point only: measures to stop invasive species coming into the UK through existing and potential new trading routes. This may seem rather a narrow point, but it is a significant issue. Invasive non-native species cost the UK an estimated £1.7 billion per year. Ash dieback alone is predicted to cost the UK £15 billion over the next 100 years, with about half of the cost—£7.5 billion—occurring in the coming decade.

Invasive species are the focus of an inquiry of the Environmental Audit Select Committee of the other place. The committee convened an evidence session at St Catharine’s College in Cambridge at which it took evidence from a wide range of experts. On another occasion, on 9 July, the Minister himself gave evidence to the Select Committee. The evidence-taking having concluded, the committee’s report is expected to be published soon. I think it will make some very stringent recommendations.

The adequacy of measures to stop invasive species entering via trading routes was raised with the Minister when he gave evidence to that committee. Caroline Lucas raised the specific question that I want to concentrate on: the degree to which the Government are prepared for the inevitable change in this threat that will occur as a result of their ambition to expand and open up new trading routes post Brexit.

This summer, an expert workshop held at Cambridge University identified changing trading patterns as one of the key risks to biosecurity in the UK. Under Brexit, we might reasonably expect novel pests and diseases to arrive through new trading patterns. For example, as a result, the UK might shift from being an overall recipient to an overall donor of tree pests and diseases into Europe.

Historically, the UK has received most invasive species after they have already established and spread through mainland Europe. Consequently, we have benefited greatly from engaging with our European partners to anticipate and to understand the likely risks posed by them, and from tried-and-tested management techniques developed first on the continent with the species before it gets here. That is about to change dramatically.

When questioned, the Minister revealed a commendable level of knowledge of this issue. He agreed with Caroline Lucas that an inspectorate dedicated to invasive species at the UK border ought to be considered and expressed sympathy with that consideration. Further, he said that it was something his department would be looking at in the spending review because,

“it is vital that we raise the bar on the considerations of invasive species”.

On 15 May, during a Brexit debate on plant and animal biosecurity, I asked what assessment the Government have made of our capacity to discharge this responsibility in a post-Brexit world, where we would have considerably more trade directly with countries such as China, the USA and the 53 diverse members of the Commonwealth. The informative answer I received at the conclusion of that debate was that we,

“will leave this well established and effective system and replicate it, as best we can, on our own”.—[Official Report, 15/5/19; cols. 1628.]

It appears from his evidence to the Select Committee that the Minister is in a position to give a better and more detailed answer on this issue. In addition to updating the House on his department’s deliberations in the context of the spending review, I should be obliged if he would respond to the following two additional questions. How well prepared is the UK for understanding and prioritising risks to biosecurity under changing trade patterns? How will the UK continue to engage with European partners in sharing information about emerging biological risks? These are essential and necessary questions.

US-imposed Trade Tariffs

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 7th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, my understanding is that tariffs will be levied on the Airbus nations and the EU. The data shows me that 38% of French trade is directly targeted, compared to 10% of ours. These tariffs will affect the EU as well. My noble friend is right—to repeat it and put it on the record—that Scotch whisky is the UK’s largest agrifood export, at £4.7 billion in 2018. It is the largest contributor to the UK’s balance of trade in goods and, thinking of Scotland, it provides 7,000 rural jobs and 11,000 in total. It is very important to Scotland.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his answer but I cannot help but contrast it with the answer given by the Leader of the House, Jacob Rees-Mogg, on Thursday when asked a similar question about 25% tariffs on Scotch whisky. He saw the opportunity to attack the EU for what he calls its illegal acts and he stated that the Scotch whisky industry would be better off post-Brexit—if we can believe that, given the amount we sell to Europe.

In his answer, the noble Lord substantially reflects the press release the Government put out when the WTO ruling was made. I am reassured that he has repeated the Government’s view that they are not acting illegally, and that no European nation is; that is very important. If we can get the WTO to establish that, that is good. There is no question of illegality, despite what Jacob Rees-Mogg said, but now there is a question about support for engineering jobs in Airbus. He was disparaging about them. Some 124,000 people in the United Kingdom are employed or supported by Airbus. Will the Minister join me and the Unite union and write to every one of those 124,000 to say that the Government still support that industry?

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, the Government are clear that the United Kingdom is compliant with WTO rulings in the Airbus dispute. That is where we pitch our line. We think we are compliant so it is not right that the US Administration should impose tariffs when we are clear that we are acting lawfully. I use this opportunity to encourage our friends in the United States to see that this is a time when we should be seeking free trade and encouraging these industries, wherever they are, whether they are small rural ones or large industrial ones.

Brexit: Plant and Animal Biosecurity

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Earl. I think that the Minister will be pleased that I have only two questions to add to the impressive list that has already been put before him.

As I intend to restrict my remarks to two issues and mainly to the part of the report that deals with UK-EU biosecurity collaboration, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests, particularly the reference to my relationship with St Catharine’s College, Cambridge. That relates to the setting-up of BioRISC, a research initiative to provide cutting-edge, evidence-based information about existing and emerging biological security threats and interventions—I can sense those who know me wondering why I am involved in that given my background, but it is proving a significant education to me.

I add to the congratulations and appreciation expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and his committee on this wide-ranging and very good report. As the noble Lord reminded us, biosecurity is an important issue. The Government agree with that. So serious a matter is it that, in July last year, they published a UK Biological Security Strategy. Governments do not publish national strategies unless the nature of the threat merits it. We can infer from the publication of this document that the National Security Council, the main forum for discussion of national security, found agreement that biological security is a priority for our collective security.

The very existence of the strategy leads me to the preamble to my first point. It is astonishing that, in late 2018, when I last looked, a search of Hansard revealed no reference to it—no ministerial Statement, not even when it was launched; no debate; no Written or Oral Question; apparently no committee interest; and no parliamentary accountability or scrutiny whatever. Not only Ministers but Members of both Houses have been largely silent on the strategy. A conversation at least, and in this House, is long overdue. I ask the Minister whether, in government time, we can have a debate on the national biological security strategy.

As on all other issues of national security, the Government rightly say that this strategy cannot be delivered by government on its own. Clearly, there is a role for many parts of society, for industry and for academia. Unfortunately, from my reading of the strategy, it contains lots of statements about what people are doing beyond the Government in relation to biological research, but there is no plan as to how this partnership and its activities will be taken forward. Perhaps in a more detailed debate we could tease out from the Government how they will administer and bring into action their strategic approach to biosecurity. At St Catharine’s, we intend to take advantage of the first anniversary of the strategy and have a conference of experts in order to identify 100 questions that need to be answered to implement it. Thereafter, we intend that these questions will form a coherent programme of academic research and study, perhaps for years to come, to deliver the strategy.

I have no criticism of this important report’s recommendations. On the contrary, I welcome its publication; it does this House and the country a great service. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said the following on its publication—I feel rather awkward having to read his words, when he read virtually none in his wide-ranging speech—which sums up effectively the point that I want to make:

“The existing”—


that is, European Union—

“arrangements are far from perfect but significant gaps will be created when the UK leaves them. We rely on the EU for everything from auditing plant nurseries and farms to funding our research laboratories. The UK Government has a huge amount of work to do to replace this system in time for Brexit, and failure to do so could have an economic and environmental impact that would be felt for decades to come."

Those words describe the scale of the challenge that we face at Brexit probably better than I could myself.

I regret that I cannot be so positive about the Government’s response. In it, they rely on various forms of the “we will work to build on existing capabilities”-type statements. For example, the responses to recommendations 10 and 13 are redolent of this approach. This language betrays a lack of recognition that we will be building not on the existing state of capabilities following Brexit but on a reduced set of capabilities, since the EU-based components will be necessarily diminished in various ways and substantial work will be needed to bring those diminished capabilities back up to existing levels to sustain them, never mind to build on them. If anybody has any doubt as to why that is the case, I recommend to them—I shall not read it—Michel Barnier’s speech to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in June 2018. In it, he spelled out the legal obligations that we among others imposed on the European Union that mean that we will have a necessarily diminished relationship with the European Union. It is impossible for us to sustain anything like the relationship that we currently have with those countries and their institutions.

My second point relates to the topical issue of the threat of invasive species. On cue, we read today of the Costa Rican frog that turned up, apparently healthy, in a shipment of bananas in a Lidl supermarket in Nottinghamshire. It has been all over the papers. The frog has even been given a name by those who discovered it.

Understanding the donor regions, vectors and introduction pathways of invasive species, plant pests and animal diseases is central to the effective prioritisation and management of future biological threats to the UK. Trade patterns have been demonstrated to be central to explaining the introduction of high-profile biological threats into this country, including foot and mouth, ash dieback and many invasive animals and plants.

Post-Brexit, the Government’s policy is that our trading patterns will change considerably. This is likely to have a profound effect on the origin and type of organisms that are introduced into the UK. This is an important point: before we joined the EEC in 1973, the vast majority of invasive species discovered in the UK had first established populations in mainland Europe. In the 40-odd years that we have been in the EU, that has reversed. It comes to us now predominantly from Europe, but that means that we get prior notice and sometimes guidance from them on the most effective management tools.

Changed trade patterns under Brexit are likely to result in the UK changing from being a recipient to being a donor of emerging biological threats to Europe. If the Government build the trading patterns that they anticipate, with countries such as China, the US and the 53 diverse members of the Commonwealth, we will have an enormous responsibility to develop tools for horizon-scanning, early detection, containment and possible eradication, as we will be the recipient and the introducer of many such threats. My question to the Minister is relatively simple: what planning do we have for that significant change, given our new trade policy?