NATO

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 29th May 2012 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the outcome of the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review and the implications of clarifying NATO’s deterrence posture for European security and the relationship with Russia.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I am pleased to have been granted the privilege of initiating this debate today. At the outset, I draw the attention of your Lordships' House to my entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests, particularly my association with a number of organisations involved in arms control and disarmament.

Our Prime Minister, David Cameron, has now attended two NATO summits: in Lisbon in November 2010 and in Chicago two weeks ago. After Lisbon, in his Statement to Parliament, he said:

“the test for NATO now is whether it can meet the challenges of the present and future. That means real change—not just signing communiqués about change but showing real political will to bring those changes about”.

Then he promised that the alliance would,

“shift its focus and resources still further from the old, Cold Wars of the past to the new unconventional threats of the future”.—[Official Report, 22/11/10; col. 979-80.]

With respect, I must say that that is the correct analysis and the proper test to be applied to NATO's transformation in the 21st century.

As part of the necessary “real change”, NATO spent the year before Lisbon rewriting the alliance’s main doctrine—the strategic concept—but it did not finish the job in time for Lisbon. The alliance managed to agree that,

“as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”.

The apparent clarity of that statement masked an inability of member states to agree on key issues about NATO’s nuclear deterrence. At the same time, NATO agreed to,

“develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence”.

However, that, too, hid significant differences about the role of ballistic missile defence in the alliance's future mix of capabilities.

The Lisbon summit solved this continuing disagreement by a procedural device and tasked the NATO council to continue to review,

“NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance”.

This process, the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review—DDPR—set out to consider the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence forces for NATO, and reported to the NATO summit in Chicago. Last week the Prime Minister reported the outcome of Chicago in a Statement to Parliament. Unfortunately, however, the Statement did not mention the DDPR.

For completeness, I asked the Library to research any parliamentary material or references relating to the DDPR. Yesterday it reported that, apart from an obscure reference in the Prime Minister's Statement following Lisbon, all it could find were Questions that I had put down and which were answered last week.

Today's debate, therefore, represents a unique opportunity to discuss whether the DDPR achieved the best possible outcome and whether the mixed capabilities mentioned in the outcome are indeed appropriate for the international security environment in the years ahead.

What were the realistic expectations of the DDPR? I and more than 40 other senior European political figures outlined in a statement issued prior to Chicago what we hoped the review and the Chicago summit might achieve. Together, we requested our leaders in Chicago to pave the way for a world without nuclear weapons and to live up to President Obama’s vision in Prague, which they all say they support. We stressed the opportunity to outline a clear NATO nuclear declaratory policy: that our nuclear weapons will be used for deterrence purposes only, aligning NATO’s policy with the declaratory policies of the UK and the US.

We would have welcomed the announcement of an immediate reduction of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with the prospect of an eventual consolidation of all those weapons within the next five years. All tactical weapons in Europe not only pose a risk to this continent’s safety and security, they lack any credibility to deter 21st century threats. They have no practical military value for the alliance any longer, and one cannot find anyone in uniform who says that they do. In addition, the review created the opportunity to provide greater transparency on the importance of NATO’s missile defence project and on the costs involved for European allies. One would have thought that in times of austerity, European leaders would grasp the opportunity with both hands.

On the issue of missile defence, the review was always going to have an impact on relations with Russia, whether NATO intended it or not. As missile defence is a dividing issue, more transparency would certainly have enhanced deteriorating relations between the United States, the alliance and Russia.

Finally, the review should have spelt out further co-operation with Russia, especially on increasing warning and decision times for political and military leaders so that no nation fears a short-warning nuclear or conventional attack. Unfortunately, the outcome has not lived up to my or my European colleagues’ expectation. In fact, it is a rather indecisive document. In the words of my United States colleague, Sam Nunn, a US senator for 24 years and former chairman of the powerful US Senate Armed Services Committee:

“The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) has made little progress in defining a clear strategy for changing the nuclear status quo and deserves, at best, a grade of ‘incomplete’”.

The DDPR avoided the challenge of resolving differences among the allies on the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO and instead opted for the maintenance of the status quo. Apart from acknowledging the,

“importance of the independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and”,

to some extent, France, the DDPR broke little new ground on NATO’s nuclear posture. As the allies could not agree on a unified policy on the basic purpose of nuclear weapons, NATO will continue to be governed by different nuclear doctrines, depending upon the state that owns the arsenals and without any input from non-nuclear NATO members.

More disappointingly, no tangible progress was made on the US non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. On the contrary, NATO will maintain and upgrade these weapons in Europe, and in doing so is likely to worsen the relationship with Russia. In contradiction, the DDPR states:

“The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture”.

At the same time, the US is planning to modernise its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The B61 Life Extension Program, which reportedly is a national decision by the United States, was inexplicably conducted independently of the question of implementation of nuclear sharing within NATO. It comes at a significant financial cost to many European allies in a time of financial austerity and in the absence of a demonstrated commitment by those allies to carry their share of the financial burden of existing commitments. It does not explain how this apparent contradiction is to be resolved. More worryingly, this move will prove to be a welcome excuse for Russia to continue investing in the upkeep of its own tactical nuclear arsenal, playing directly into the hands of hardliners in the Russian Federation who refuse to discuss reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons unless the US withdraws its own arsenal from Europe.

The DDPR has not delivered for disarmament. It is worth remembering that in Lisbon in 2010, NATO leaders committed themselves to the goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons. No longer can our leaders simply make this sort of statement and then ignore it when making their own nuclear policy. The alliance has a responsibility to be the change it wants to see in the world, not just to advocate for that change on the part of others. The only hope those who share our Prime Minister’s vision for NATO are left with is the promise of the DDPR to,

“consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia”.

Set against the test set by the Prime Minister for NATO, are the Government content with the outcome of the DDPR?

The DDPR was a major opportunity to make a comprehensive, coherent and balanced assessment of the mix of capabilities required in the years ahead and, importantly, it was an opportunity to spell out the potential contribution that arms control and disarmament can make to reducing nuclear risks in Europe. The issues covered by the DDPR and the decisions made will shape the alliance’s defence and deterrence posture for a decade or more. These decisions have major implications for Euro-Atlantic security and create the environment that will determine our relationship with Russia. If we do not get them right, we are at risk of sleepwalking back into the Cold War. I believe that NATO has missed this crucial opportunity for change, for overcoming Cold War thinking, for a new beginning as a security organisation of the 21st century, and for enhancing overall European security. Perhaps it is no surprise that, in his post-Chicago summit parliamentary Statement, the Prime Minister neglected to mention the DDPR again. For the sustainable security of the Euro-Atlantic area, let us hope that the opportunity we have grasped today is the first but not the only debate that this Parliament will have on NATO’s defence and security posture.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2015

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, it certainly does. As we move towards the next review conference, we would of course like to see clarified Israel’s position on nuclear, which is ambiguous, as the noble Lord knows, and for Israel to sign up to the NPT.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I remind the House of my entry in the register of interests, in particular my engagement in a number of multilateral nuclear disarmament organisations. The Minister will be aware that the worst aspect of the nuclear order in the modern world, now 20 years after the end of the cold war, is that there are thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert status. Indeed, in arsenals not only in the United States and Russia there are weapons ready for use within minutes, in some circumstances on warning of a possible attack and not just minutes after an attack is known. It seems highly improbable, given that President Obama took months to decide to send troops to Afghanistan, that he is comfortable with that position. What steps are our Government taking with our allies to reduce this dangerous situation in the world, because it is totally unnecessary?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right about the concerns. Obviously, we welcome the signs that Russia and the United States, which after all hold 95 per cent of these weapons—although other countries certainly have dangerous weapons as well—are moving towards some further resumption of the START negotiations. That would be very good. Over and above that, we continue to take the lead in the P5 process. Disarmament is one of the key three pillars of the NPT regime, along of course with non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and our full emphasis and efforts are applied to it. But obviously the big reductions in numbers must come through Russian and American action, which we greatly welcome and support.

Turkey

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 13th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, who brought significant personal experience of the island of Cyprus to enrich this debate. I have experience of the island of Cyprus only as the Secretary of State for Defence, but I know from my observations of the tragedy of that island the need for us to address the impasse there if for no other reason than that it ties down very valuable international military resources on the peace line that the international community could otherwise use.

I, too, commend the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for an assured and informed maiden speech. If he had not told us that he had spent a lifetime in communications, we might have worked that out for ourselves from the way in which he communicated with us. I look forward to his contributions in this House in other areas where I know he has genuine expertise and depth of knowledge.

I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, on securing this debate. I thought that her introduction was comprehensive—in fact, it was so comprehensive, as the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, said, that the rest of us are bit-part players merely reinforcing what she said. As I rise as the tail-end gunner on the Back Benches, I am in the happy position of knowing that everything has been said, although not yet everybody has said it, so I can cut to the chase.

I intend to make three points. One is a point of observation and information and two are points of inquiry, which I shall come to in a moment. Before turning to that, I should draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests, particularly an entry relating to a visit to Ankara in October 2010 when I took part in a roundtable discussion on NATO’s defence posture and Turkish security. That roundtable seminar and discussion was supported by the Arms Control Association, the British American Security Information Council, the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg and, very importantly, an organisation known as USAK, the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara. At this point, I should say that before I went there I was assisted greatly in preparing for that meeting by the embassy and the ambassador from Turkey to the United Kingdom, who facilitated my engagement with some genuine experts on these issues, for which I am very grateful. I promised to report back to the ambassador and if he is able to hear me here today—I know that he is here—I promise him that I will report back to him in detail. I intend to follow up that seminar with a further seminar on this issue in the not-too-distant future. I shall come back to that in a moment.

The first point that I wish to make arises from the potential in our relations, strategic or otherwise, with Turkey, with its changed and improved position in the world. It is a country of considerably greater assurance and of considerably greater importance in the geopolitical environment that it occupies. I know from my time as Secretary of State for Defence how important that has been to us as a country, not just in relation to Iraq and to our engagement in the Middle East, but specifically in relation to this issue: we have to thank the Turkish Government and their assured position in that part of the world for helping to release the 15 sailors who were taken by the Iranians in the northern Arabian Gulf when they were doing their job there protecting shipping. The Turkish Government quietly and assuredly made a significant contribution to securing their release and, as Secretary of State for Defence at that time—a very difficult time for me—I am very grateful to them. I know that our military are grateful to them, as the country should be. The point that I wish to make is that the potential of Turkey as a strategic partner for the United Kingdom has already been to our benefit and we should continue to exploit that relationship. I am glad to see that our Prime Minister approaches his relations with Turkey in a strategic way.

My second point arises directly from the reason why I was in Turkey in October last year. My visit was to discuss security issues and nuclear issues in particular. I found a country that has security concerns on a number of issues, including the behaviour of the PKK. It also feels, I think rightly, that it sometimes receives less than full support from fellow NATO allies in a difficult region. None the less, it is a country that is looking to take progressive positions on a number of issues that matter not only to it, but to our country, too.

Turkey does not want Iran to go nuclear and is seeking to play a constructive role in the international effort to prevent this. We should engage with Turkey on that. I am not necessarily supporting everything that it does, but we should engage with it and recognise the important contribution that it could make. Much more important, Turkey does not want to stand in the way of less NATO reliance on nuclear weapons. That is an ambition that Governments of all types in the United Kingdom share, as does the United States of America. Specifically, Turkey wants to play a role in the removal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The point that I wish to make to the Minister—and I ask him to engage with this—is that we will not succeed in achieving that ambition, which I know that the Government have, unless we translate the strategic relationship with Turkey into a strategic discussion about both the EU and NATO and address the issues that it has, so that we can move from a collective reliance on these weapons as the only manifestation of the cohesion of the NATO alliance. That is a consistent experience that I have had across Europe in talking to other countries with an interest in this area.

My final point—I am running out of time and have spoken longer than I intended to—relates to EU-NATO relations. These are key to our security, as Afghanistan has proved. Our ambitions in nation building rely on EU resources; we cannot deploy them into semi-secure environments unless we can improve EU-NATO relations. For two organisations that have such consistent membership with each other, the relationships between them are appalling and will be improved, as the alliance itself recognises, only if we address the issues that lie at the heart of that. That will happen only if we engage in proper strategic discussions with Turkey about the issues that cause the barrier in those relationships. I ask the Minister to address these issues in his response if he can, at least in general terms.

Human Rights

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 2nd December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for securing this debate. He promised us an interesting and engaging debate and it has been both of those thus far. On the subject of interesting, engaging and educative, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on her maiden speech and I look forward to her contributions in future. It is perfectly clear that a substantial part of our community now has a very eloquent advocate in the House. I am sure that she will talk knowledgably and interestingly on many other subjects.

I commend the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, on using his comparatively short time in a characteristically valuable way. I have had recent experience of the organisation that he speaks of and I share a lot of his observations in practice, particularly in relation to Sri Lanka. While I am addressing contributions, because I found them all valuable, I shall express a prejudice to the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, put before your Lordships’ House. From my experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I might find some opportunity in future to show where the international community has failed in doing just what the noble Lord described in conflict resolution.

I do not envy the Minister in responding to this debate, given its diversity and the interesting nature of the speeches that have been made so far. There are more to come and while I have no intention of adding to his challenges, I intend to draw him on the coalition Government’s policy and proposed actions on the continuing human rights challenges faced by the people of Sri Lanka in particular.

I do not think that this is a declaration of interest but I remind the House that I was the special envoy of the previous Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, to Sri Lanka. I was privileged to hold that job from early 2009, when more than 100,000 people were trapped at the height of the end of the conflict, until the general election. I suppose that I do not need also to remind the House that, as has been recorded, my appointment, although initially agreed to by the Government of Sri Lanka, shortly became an issue of division within their coalition Government, resulting in a lamentable lack of public co-operation with me in that role. Privately, however, I had numerous meetings with representatives of the Government and their emissaries. I do not consider the public posture that they adopted to me to be in any sense personal, because they have adopted that posture to a significant number of emissaries, including most recently the three-person panel of experts appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.

Despite the vanquishing of the LTTE and the apparent end to 30 years of the most atrocious violence and abuses by all sides to the conflict in that beautiful island of Sri Lanka, despite the renewed and increased electoral mandate that the Government of President Rajapaksa enjoys, which was gained on a manifesto of reconciliation and respect for minority rights, among many other arguments that he put forward, despite a personal commitment that he gave to the United Nations Secretary-General in May 2009 that he would take measures to address possible violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and, despite the repeated but often rebuffed efforts of the international community to support an agenda of reconciliation and respect, there are in Sri Lanka, as Alistair Burt, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, told the other place on 16 June:

“widespread and persistent allegations of”,

continuing,

“human rights abuses by both state and non-state actors”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/6/10; col. 166WH.]

My observation on the pervasive propaganda of the media in Sri Lanka is that there are, as the noble Lord, Lord Sacks, identified, the beginnings if not the developing evidence of a culture of hate there against the Tamil minority, which will lead inevitably to just the sort of consequences that we have seen all too often around the world.

Reports of the Government of Sri Lanka and their agents committing arbitrary and unlawful killings, including credible reports of the police and other security forces killing detained suspects, are all-pervasive. I remind the House that successive commissions of inquiry under the warrant of the President have all run into the sand and lack credibility. There have been disappearances, many of which can be brought to the door of paramilitary groups operating on behalf of government military forces. Civil society groups and former prisoners report several torture cases, involving beatings with bars or bats, electric shocks, suspending victims in contorted positions, asphyxiation and many other horrible acts. Yet because of restricted access for humanitarian organisations, the evidence of that sort of behaviour is very difficult to find.

I could go on but I am conscious of the time. The point I wish to make is that there has been no lack of engagement by the international community or by successive Governments, including this Government, in trying to deal with the issues on that island which is, I remind your Lordships, a holiday island for many of our fellow citizens. There have been many assurances and substantial rhetoric from the Government of Sri Lanka but very little evidence of any improvement. In the debate that I referred to in the other place the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, a Minister for whom I have the enormous respect, assured that House that this Government were convinced that the present Government of Sri Lanka intend to deal with those issues. That assertion, in my view, is denied by the facts that are known more broadly.

On a note which is slightly inconsistent with the rest of this debate, I say to the Minister that I regret the fact that during the visit of the President of that country over the past few days, the Secretary of State for Defence chose to meet him in a private capacity. I anticipated that the meeting would be used for propaganda purposes and, this morning, I see on the front page of the Government of Sri Lanka’s website them doing just that. I encourage Ministers to meet members of the Government of Sri Lanka but I would much prefer that it was done openly and reported in a very transparent fashion. I thank noble Lords for listening with respect to my observations.