Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My noble friend speaks with great insight on these matters and I agree with him. Since October, there has been some hope of notice being given. The United States has shown that it acted in line with its obligations—it continued to abide by the treaty—and it has to be made absolutely clear that it is because of Russian actions that we have reached this point. However, there remains a window of opportunity. In line with the details of that treaty, there remains a six-month window, during which there is an opportunity for Russia to step up to the mark and fulfil its obligations. However, I agree with my noble friend, bearing in mind that the first occasion on which its non-compliance was brought to light was in 2014 and it took another three years before there was even a basic acknowledgement by the Russians that these weapons existed. The challenge remains real and the UK supports the United States’ actions.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, Europe has been the greatest beneficiary of this treaty since 1987. With the suspension of compliance by both the United States and Russia, Europe is now much less secure, and it will continue to be while that compliance is suspended. On the date in December when the United States gave Russia notice of its intention, there was a NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels. The statement from that meeting included the following paragraph:

“Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, we will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security”.


How does suspending compliance with a treaty of this nature fit with that commitment, and what steps will our Government take to live up to it? What are we going to do now to “further strengthen arms control” in the light of the deterioration that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, has so clearly described? We are heading for strategic problems with the new START because it is an Obama treaty and anything with Obama’s name on it is detested by the current President of the United States.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord raises an important point about NATO’s previous statement. I specifically draw his attention to NATO’s statement of 1 February 2019 on this very issue. It said:

“NATO continues to closely review the security implication of Russian intermediate-range missiles and will continue to take steps necessary to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture”.


The NATO alliance is important, and we and all NATO partners, including the United States, are committed to it. The noble Lord will know that in April this year the next meeting of NATO will be hosted by Secretary of State Pompeo of the United States. The implication is that non-compliance and compliance have to be a two-way process. However, if from 2014 there is a clearly identified situation in which one side does not abide by the rules and does not comply, it is a tall order to expect the other side to comply. As I said, there is an opportunity for Russia to step up to the mark, and I am sure we hope that it will. However, based on experience, it might be an opportunity that is not taken up.

Western Balkans

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 10th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw your Lordships’ attention to my entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests, particularly my chairmanship of the European Leadership Network. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, for securing this debate, for the Motion, and for her opening speech, which she delivered with passion and obvious knowledge. She has already generated sufficient questions for the Minister to spend his 20 minutes of summing up in responding to them; they are interesting, challenging questions. I am grateful to her for the information she has imparted to me. I do not make this speech suggesting in any way that I have any expertise about the western Balkans but I have a strong interest in this debate, as I will come to in a moment.

I associate myself entirely with the words of tribute to the late Lord Ashdown. He had a very close relationship with Tony Blair, who was the Prime Minister when I was first elected to Parliament. Although he was close to many of my colleagues in the Labour Party, I did not then have the benefit of having been in Parliament long enough to establish that relationship with him. I regret that I did not get to know him as well as I would have liked. Having read and heard many tributes to him recently, I have in my head—from my reading and from others’ appreciation of him—a man of outstanding energy, courage, loyalty, generosity and sense of duty. So I am happy to be associated with the noble Baroness’s words of tribute to him and I too hope that our policy in the longer term in relation to the western Balkans will be a monument to his contribution to the stability of that region. He deserves no less.

I spent this morning with the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, at the Royal College of Defence Studies, contributing to a course on strategy and strategy-making. It was a course for international military officers including, interestingly, an officer from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among other things, we were asked to explain how in that realm of strategy, from our experiences, conflicting conditions surrounding strategic decisions can survive domestic politics. That is a significant challenge, where there is competition domestically for resources against foreign policy, military deployment, the use of resource for nation-building, or whatever.

From my own knowledge of the consequences of a destabilised western Balkans—the matters which the noble Baroness identified, relating to guns, drugs, people trafficking and money laundering—it is incredibly easy to explain to the people of the United Kingdom why that should be a priority for us. This problem comes to our borders and our communities. It is manifestly there, not just in the shadowy parts of our communities in cities but also to some degree in the City of London and businesses in this country. It undermines our way of life, and for those selfish reasons rather than for others, we have a collective duty to engage and to ensure that the people of the western Balkans can be released from that tyranny, wherever it comes from.

I put my name down to speak in this debate because in the run-up to the London summit, on the 27 and 28 June last year, the European Leadership Network, which I chair, hosted a round-table discussion here in the House of Lords under the co-chairmanship of myself, a member of the European Leadership Network and the former Albanian Defence Minister, Fatmir Mediu. He was the Defence Minister of Albania at the same time as I was the Secretary of State for Defence here in the United Kingdom, and—entirely coincidentally—at that point Albania joined NATO. I am therefore, in his mind, associated with Albania’s membership of NATO, which is important and which he is very proud of. We have kept in close contact, and this round-table discussion was at his inspiration. I co-chaired it with him, and I can tell noble Lords that our visitors who attended that meeting, which brought together former and serving officials from most Balkan countries, ambassadors and representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, as well as UK parliamentarians, were all delighted to be here in the House of Lords. I observed that that environment caused them to engage with one another in a way that I suspect would have been more difficult for them in other environments. I attend quite a lot of multilateral, Euro-Atlantic meetings in the security environment. Such engagement between parliamentarians, when Members of our Parliament are involved, is motivating for a significant number of our visitors, and we should do much more of it. We should deploy this soft power much more extensively in driving our foreign policy agenda.

All the participants in that round table agreed that local customs and culture and shared values united the region far more than the issues that set their people and countries apart. Several speakers also voiced their hope that their history would not define the future of the western Balkans and the outlook for that region, which, they observed, had significantly improved over the past 12 months despite the manifest challenges that the noble Baroness set out clearly and knows well—probably better than most of us in this Room. During the discussion, the presenters also highlighted the two main goals for the region. I do not think it will surprise anyone that they were NATO and EU membership and full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. They argue that this will serve as a binding force not only between the countries of the western Balkans and the rest of Europe but between the states in the region, and it would help overcome the internal polarisation.

While the role and contribution of the EU were celebrated by participants, several people also voiced their concerns that the European Union may choose to treat the integration projects as a series of boxes to be ticked rather than a goal to be pursued. The main challenge they identified concerned the lack of leadership and capacity in Brussels for substantial change. They said that if partners could or would not offer better incentives for the political leaders in the region, constituents in the accession and pre-accession countries could come to populism and the offer of more radical solutions to their concerns. The increasing influence of Russia and Turkey was mentioned in some detail as a by-product of the lack of European strategic direction and energy in the day-to-day operations with the western Balkans. Everyone acknowledged the difficult environment in which the EU needs to address and square the concerns of its own citizens and those who aspire to be its citizens. However, it was also mentioned that,

“the Euro-Atlantic community must fill the vacuum”—

of political direction and vision—

“or others will”.

That is a direct quotation.

From this summit there came a number of action points. I shall share just those that relate to security, which is the focus of this debate. External players are clearly a significant concern for the region and its representatives. Speakers saw most external actors as merely pursuing their own national interests, to the detriment of those of the region. Religion, which is deeply woven into these societies, is being manipulated and the potential for extremism to spread is increasing. Regional countries must therefore increase their national resilience. Europe and partners across the Atlantic have a role to play in that, particularly with regard to sharing of lessons learned and best practice.

Returning foreign fighters are another threat. Sharing intelligence data, even at a regional level, can substantially improve current operations, but the region perhaps has something to teach the rest of Europe about de-radicalisation and reintegration of people back into communities. Thus it would be helpful to establish in the region an academy on preventing violent extremism. There are also positive and negative lessons to be drawn from the experience of UNPRODEF stabilisation.

Finally, NATO is seen to have a stabilising role to play. Some experts suggested that it should immediately offer membership to Macedonia—although that has moved on—a membership action plan to Bosnia-Herzegovina and participation in the Partnership for Peace for Kosovo. It should also consider the establishment of a regional Partnership for Peace forum where countries can share experiences and best practice.

Since then, of course, the summit has taken place. In anticipation of this debate I read the summary of the report of that summit and it is perfectly clear to me that the UK was unanimously considered to be an important actor in the set of ambitions that these countries have. They all wanted to see the United Kingdom championing this trajectory and were looking forward to the UK continuing to champion EU accession for the western Balkans six. I understand that the Government confirmed at the London summit that they would continue to do this even after Brexit. I was struck by some interesting words in the summary. Significantly, a risk is identified,

“that UK leverage in the region will be reduced if it is no longer involved in the EU accession process”.

The summit called on the Government,

“to explain its vision for an independent UK role in the Western Balkans, to clarify what it wants to achieve in the region and to explain how it plans to get there … to push for the Summit to adopt a robust set of commitments that can make a real difference in the Western Balkans”.

In short, it seems that we have not yet satisfied the question of how the United Kingdom intends to continue to play that role when it is no longer a member of the European Union. That is my most important question to the Minister.

In summary, I read with interest the speech delivered by Ambassador Kemp at the western Balkans Foreign Ministers’ meeting in November, which was published on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website. I congratulate the Government on following through with a set of significant commitments, particularly in engagement on security. These can be read on the website; I do not intend to read them out. But they seem to be a start, rather than something that would draw to conclusion the stability and security that are necessary for these countries. While I unequivocally commend the Government on the steps they have taken, there are still significant challenges and these, as I said earlier in my speech, will have a significant effect on the sustained security of our own citizens here in the United Kingdom. This is a collective ambition and I hope that more can be done.

Yemen

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Taking the noble Baroness’s final question, any support we provide, including support to the Saudis and Emiratis extended by the United Kingdom, is kept under review. Of course, she will also be aware that the litmus test remains that any action must be in line with international humanitarian law.

On the specific issue of whether my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary is aware—of course, he is central. As I have already said, he has been talking to his counterparts in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. I go back to the point raised in the Statement that the UN has already assessed that an attack on Hodeidah could displace up to 350,000 people and leave hundreds of thousands of Yemenis without basic requirements such as food and healthcare.

The noble Baroness will also be aware that the United Kingdom Government stand with the Yemeni people. We have been at the forefront of providing support. In April we also announced a further £170 million in support for essential healthcare and other requirements. I stress, as all noble Lords are aware, that Hodeidah is the gateway to providing much of the relief and humanitarian assistance that is required. It is the responsibility of both sides to ensure that that access continues. The Houthis, who currently control the port, are not without fault. They caused the crisis in the first instance by displacing the Government, and more recently have continued to exercise blockages of the port and have stopped certain shipments from taking place. Therefore, we implore all sides to ensure that a political settlement can prevail.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister not only for repeating the Answer to the Question but for the tone and the content of the Answer. Through him I also thank his right honourable friend Alistair Burt, the Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, for the “Dear Colleague” letter that we all received dated 8 June. It is very helpful and contains in the third-to-last paragraph some awful statistics about the scale of the humanitarian crisis in the Yemen, including the fact that more than 50% of the population of Yemen—17.8 million people —do not have reliable access to food and 8.4 million people face extreme food shortages. Is it not the case that the only traffic that passes through the port of Hodeidah at the moment is humanitarian aid—nothing else? Does the Minister agree that the use of starvation as a weapon of war is in breach of international humanitarian law? Would not an attack on this port be strong evidence of a breach of humanitarian law? If any UK-manufactured weapons and planes that we had sold to any member of the coalition were used in such an attack, how could we justify continuing to sell weapons to them?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank the noble Lord for his remarks, and I will of course convey to my right honourable friend the comments about his constructive letter. The noble Lord raised the dire humanitarian situation prevailing in Yemen. As I said in response to an earlier question, that is why we have been at the forefront of providing support. I share his concern, as do the UK Government, about the importance of keeping open Hodeidah port as a lifeline. Over the weekend, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary called once again for no action to be taken on Hodeidah port in order to keep open that vital channel. But let us put this in context. As I said earlier, the port is controlled by Houthi rebels, who at Hodeidah and elsewhere—including, for example, in Aden—have not missed an opportunity to intimidate UN ships. They have also used schools, hospitals and children as part of their activities in Yemen.

To answer the noble Lord’s specific question about weapons, I revert to what I said: we keep the situation under constant review and will ensure that we apply the litmus test that there are no serious violations of international humanitarian law. That point has been made to the Emiratis and the Saudis. As I am sure the noble Lord is aware, there was a judicial review of this situation. The judgment concluded that our risk-based assessments had,

“all the hallmarks of a rigorous and robust, multi-layered process of analysis carried out by numerous expert Government and military personnel, upon which the Secretary of State”—

this referred to the Secretary of State for International Trade—

“could properly rely”.

In other words, our measures were robust. However, the noble Lord raises important points about the use of such weapons. I assure him that, not just in this conflict but in conflicts elsewhere in the world, we keep the situation firmly under review.

Iran Nuclear Deal

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Wednesday 9th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I share the noble Lord’s concerns. I was quite specific on which elements of the deal have worked. I also said that the deal is not the perfect deal. There are limitations on it, some of which have been highlighted by the US in stating its reasons for withdrawing from it. That said, we still believe it to be an important part of ensuring that Iran does not progress down the route of acquiring nuclear weapons.

The noble Lord alluded to Iranian influence in the wider region. Again, we strongly condemn Iran and call on it to pull back. It has shown its hand in places such as Lebanon and Yemen, with support for the Houthis, and it continues to do so in Syria. This is not helping the situation in the wider region. It is destabilising. It is important that Iran recognises that its interventions in other parts of the region are viewed as far from helpful; they are extremely destabilising to the region and to peace generally. I assure all noble Lords that we continue to make this point very strongly to the Iranian authorities, its President and Foreign Minister on all occasions that we have these discussions. Iran has been destabilising in the region. That has to be recognised.

On our continued support, everyone would regret the fact that the Iranian people themselves need support. They have embarked on a difficult journey that is far from complete. It is important that we continue to show our support for them in the hope that we will see the kind of representation we all desire in Iran itself.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I commend the Government for standing four-square behind the JCPOA and I associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. But with all due respect, businesses that are conducting perfectly legal business with Iran need more than advice. The Foreign Secretary said today in the other place:

“We will do our utmost to protect UK commercial interests”.


On 24 April, in the context of a Private Notice Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, I asked a very specific question about this issue, asking what the Government intended to do in the light of developments at the Bill Foreign Ministers’ meeting to bolster and support our businesses, which were already concerned about the reimposition of US sanctions and secondary sanctions. I was not given an answer, but I was given an assurance that I would be written to. I await that letter; I am content about that. But surely the time has now come for us to tell businesses more than that they should take some legal advice and await further advice. We need to give them some specific indication of the extent to which the Government are willing to go to protect their interests from the devastating effect of these potential sanctions.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

On the noble Lord’s first point, I will ensure that there is a response, although that response no doubt will reflect the decision just taken. As I said earlier, the United States itself has issued specific guidelines in this respect, which we are currently evaluating. What I said about taking immediate legal advice was just that: immediate and initial advice. We will follow this up.

Of course we remain committed. We believe in strengthening trading ties with all countries across the world, but in this case we have continued to encourage commercial ties with Iran to try to build and progress that country to a more progressive future. We will look at this very carefully. Let me assure UK companies that are impacted that we are looking at the situation closely. The advice was issued only yesterday. We want to make sure we are evaluating it fully to ensure that we can subsequently give whatever advice and level of support we can after we have fully considered the implications. This is not just about telling businesses to get legal advice, but the first step must be—and I was in business for 20 years—to talk to your lawyers to make sure what you are doing and currently trading is in the context of international law and adherence to whatever sanctions regime might prevail.

My noble friend earlier raised an important point about the implications of the United States decision for international law. That also has to be evaluated, but let me assure all noble Lords that we are looking at this very carefully. It is a very sensitive issue, but the interests of British companies are going to be protected.

Syria: Humanitarian Situation

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I do not agree with my noble friend, for the practical reason that I have already highlighted—that the biggest influence on the Assad regime is that of the Russians. We have been working extensively with other European partners and other allies and directly with the Russians to ensure that we get the ceasefire that is required. It now needs Russia to be true to its word at the Security Council to ensure that we can sustain, retain and ultimately deliver the peace that is required to the conflict. As for the Assad regime itself, we believe that there needs to be a transition to a new Government who can protect the rights of all Syrians, and we will continue to work in Geneva in that respect.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, as previous interventions and the Statement itself have made clear, Russian influence is crucial in this situation. As we await the meeting between our Foreign Secretary and the Russian ambassador, in the meantime what contact are we having at any level with the Russians, or have we nothing to add to the pressure that must be being put on them by our European partners to get them to influence the Assad regime in the way we want? If we do not achieve that—and we cannot subcontract it to anyone else—there is no possibility that the ceasefire will hold.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

As I have said, the role of the Russians is essential—I agree with the noble Lord—to the ceasefire, which is not even holding, in that it has not started effectively. I am sure that many noble Lords heard as I did on the radio this morning the gentleman who was in the basement and who went out and first described the chilling atmosphere that was very quickly interrupted by bombing and then artillery fire. Clearly, the ceasefire has not happened.

On the noble Lord’s specific question, of course we are working at all levels with Russian officials. Indeed, we work very extensively with them in the UN Security Council, and it was as a result of us working together with our partners in tandem—not by contracting out but by working in unison—that we got the desired result of a unanimous resolution at the Security Council, supported by the Russians.

United States: Foreign Policy

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord McNally]

Oh, I do apologise.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, in an interview with the New York Times, the then presidential candidate Donald Trump—not spontaneously but prompted by his interviewer—said that his foreign policy boiled down to two words: America first. Later, he explained that this meant that his Administration would prevent other nations from taking advantage of the United States and at the start of his presidency he promised to radically reform America’s trade policy, to demand more of allies and to do less in the world. One year on and his promises, among other things, have resulted in calls to renegotiate NAFTA, to withdraw from the TPP, to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to leave the Paris climate accord.

This is all at a time when the liberal international order is under great pressure from revisionist states, there is turmoil in the Middle East, as well as North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the aftershocks of the global financial crisis. It is a time when, in addition to an erratic US President, Europe faces major foreign policy challenges: a revanchist Russian President; a western Balkans rejecting the settlement reached at the end of the Yugoslav wars; a Turkish President lashing out at Greece, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria; and a destroyed Iraq and Libya and a half-destroyed Syria, all exporting refugees, including jihadists, to destabilise already fearful European communities. It is a time when every European foreign ministry has had to divert resources to produce dossiers to feed the European Commission’s Brexit negotiating process and when Brexit is dominating the UK’s political and policy agenda, already putting huge strains on the country’s Civil Service. As a result, the UK’s foreign policy capacity and attention span is and will be constrained, and its priorities will be shaped by the Brexit agenda. I fear that any UK contribution to European foreign policy after Brexit is going to be even weaker and more limited than in recent years.

I am grateful for the opportunity of this debate, coming less than a week after President Trump gave us and other European allies a 120-day ultimatum to come up with a new deal addressing his Iran concerns or the US will pull out of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. His plan overtly involves bullying us and other allies into fundamentally changing the terms of a deal that we and the US know is working and which we have publicly stated we have no intention to amend. Further, we believe that keeping the JCPOA in place is the only way to make future negotiations on other Iranian activities possible at all and that a US withdrawal would undermine the transatlantic relationship and our alliances, which are mutually vital across a broad range of policies from trade to terrorism. The final words of the President’s statement showcase the challenge we face, and are worth reading and rereading:

“I hereby call on key European countries to join with the United States in fixing significant flaws in the deal … If other nations fail to act during this time, I will terminate our deal with Iran”.


And listen to this:

“Those who, for whatever reason, choose not to work with us will be siding with the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions, and against the people of Iran and the peaceful nations of the world”.


I recognise that last Thursday at a meeting in Brussels, the Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany and the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, the European signatories to the deal, insisted, having met Mr Zarif, that Iran was respecting the agreement and that it is essential for international security. At the same time, Sir Adam Thomson, director of the European Leadership Network, led a delegation of very senior non-governmental Europeans to Washington DC to engage the US Senate on the Iran nuclear deal. In his draft report, which I have seen and which will be published, he states that the delegation was,

“received and heard with courtesy and attention. They believe their weight, seriousness and arguments resonated privately with US interlocutors. Interlocutors on Capitol Hill asked the ELN to continue to feed in European arguments and material”.

Entirely coincidentally, at the invitation of the Centre for a New American Security, I, along with Ambassador Lose, the Danish ambassador to the US, spent part of last week in Salt Lake City, Utah, engaging in discussions and debates with residents of the city on various aspects of the transatlantic relationship. CNAS launched this initiative because of mounting evidence of a divergence between Washington and the rest of the US on issues of foreign policy and trade, and because survey data show that Americans and Europeans are losing sight of the value of the transatlantic relationship and what each side gains by committing itself to it.

To my astonishment, I found in Utah—a “red state” which could hardly be further from DC—an informed and interested range of audiences of all ages, receptive to the message of the value of transatlantic co-operation. There was no “America first” for these people. To me, the lesson of this snapshot, which is all I have time for in five minutes, is one of leadership and engagement. The US is correct to encourage Europe to take more responsibility for its security and destiny. My observations and experience of the last week confirm my prejudice that when we do, in solidarity, we are at our most effective. But I fear that we just do not do so enough.

Commonwealth

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, in this debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Luce, and congratulate him on securing this timely debate. I agree with him that for the Heads of Government convening in Colombo in November there is a significant history to be celebrated and a narrative that is redolent with optimistic potential, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, reminded us, as did my noble friend Lord Wills, there is also a narrative of challenge.

The latter is a familiar narrative for this part of the 21st century for organisations such as the Commonwealth. It is a narrative of challenge of reform and renewal, particularly a narrative of re-establishing trust among current Commonwealth countries and Governments in the credibility of the organisation, as well as rebuilding confidence in the delivery mechanisms of the secretariat, which involves dealing with institutional reform, developing leadership and showing a degree of resolve. The nature and scale of this challenge should not be underestimated despite the obvious achievement. For example, 70% of the Commonwealth secretariat’s budget is contributed by only three, possibly now only two, countries, and 30 out of 54 countries—or 53 as it is now—in the Commonwealth are in arrears in their contributions to it. There is a manifest north/south divide in the narratives of the Commonwealth. It was exemplified most recently by the differential narratives of the Canadian Government’s decision and the Gambian Government’s decision. This narrative is blocking relationships between countries. It is being exploited by others outside the Commonwealth, as the Library note makes clear in relation to China, and involves a significant deterioration in relationships. Polling shows that there is a lack of knowledge about the Commonwealth among the public of its member countries, and why would there not be when a majority of Governments do nothing to explain, promote or support the Commonwealth? None of this is new, and these challenges are not even comprehensive.

What is new is that part of the process of reform and renewal was to be the relaunch of the Commonwealth as a partnership of nations committed to upholding the Commonwealth values as set out in the new charter signed by Her Majesty in March. These values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance are all to be seen in a shared vision of bringing together better opportunities for people around the world. This is a challenging ambition in itself. Just how challenging has been exemplified by some of the references that have already been made to the varying views about the rights of citizens in the Commonwealth and by the evidence in pages 8 to 12 of the Library note, which make shocking reading, about the behaviour of some Governments in Commonwealth countries. The issues that frame this challenge for the Commonwealth are identified in the EPG’s report and recommendations. If we were to look for an agenda for the future of the Commonwealth, we could do worse than just to take that report and its recommendations as the agenda for the CHOGM.

How is that consistent with the question that has already been asked by convening this important relaunching of CHOGM in Sri Lanka at this time? How can we not be appalled by the idea of doing that, as the Canadian Government were? There is only one justification in being present there, and that is encapsulated in the Answer that the Prime Minister gave to a Question at Prime Minister’s Questions on 9 October. In response to a Question about attendance, he said:

“I think it is right for the British Prime Minister to go to the Commonwealth conference because we are big believers in the Commonwealth … but … we should not hold back from being very clear about those aspects of the human rights record in Sri Lanka that we are not happy with”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/10/13; col. 160.]

The Prime Minister has set a challenging ambition for our attendance at that conference, and I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, for whom I have enormous respect, to spell out in more detail exactly what our Government will do during the time that our senior representative, our Prime Minister, is there to live up to the challenge that he has set for himself.

UN Arms Trade Treaty

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

As the noble Lord is aware, the UK already has one of the most robust and effective export control systems in the world. I regularly see documentation on the countries for which I have responsibility. We have extensive criteria against which we assess any sales. We feel that this arms trade treaty sets an international benchmark, but we do not think that primary legislation will be required to enable us to implement it.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, of the 150 countries that adopted this treaty, a significant proportion do not have the capacity to implement it. What plans do our Government have to build that capacity in countries that are key to the implementation of the treaty as it is in our interests that they are able to do so?

[Baroness Warsi]

I can inform the noble Lord that resource has been set aside to make sure that we work with those countries which do not have the developed, sophisticated arms control systems that we have. The treaty will be effective only when 50 countries join; thereafter, it comes into force. We will, of course, use the network—as the noble Lord is aware, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has one of the most extensive networks—to make sure that we work with our partners to ensure that countries which need the support get the support.

Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I remind the House of my entry in the register of Lords’ interests. I am honoured to follow the cogent and well argued speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. Much what he said I agree with, but in a qualified way. I pay tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Hannay of Chiswick, for securing the debate and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on introducing it with such an interesting and comprehensive speech. I associate myself fully with the tributes to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. As I was listening to him, it reminded me of my time as the Secretary of State for Defence, when I was not nearly as happy sometimes to hear him speak in your Lordships’ House as I have been today.

As we await the State of the Union address it is relevant to remind ourselves that some progress has been made since President Obama’s speech in Prague in 2009. Arguably the new START treaty and the nuclear security summits are the high points of this progress. However, it is undoubtedly the case that the steam has gone out of this agenda, which we all espoused and cheered to the echo at the time of Prague, and we watch US/Russia relationships sour, for a number of reasons, with some worry.

Although global stockpiles of nuclear weapons are down dramatically since the end of the Cold War, today there are more nuclear-armed states and some of the weapons are in the hands of the most unstable regimes and regions in the world. Today Iran appears to be on track for a nuclear weapon, and it was announced yesterday that North Korea is planning a nuclear test. Pakistan is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal and its plutonium production and appears to be pursuing smaller warheads for missiles aimed at India. Despite Fukushima, plans for expanded civil use of nuclear power remain. Widespread dispersal of enrichment technologies will make it more, not less, difficult to secure and control nuclear materials in the future.

Some say the dangers of the current environment and their uncertainties strengthen the case for our continued reliance on nuclear weapons. In the short term, I agree with them. I was partly responsible for the decision to renew the UK nuclear deterrent in 2006 and I still do not support the unilateral abandonment of an independent UK deterrent. However, this is not 2006 and relevant factors have changed even since then, as has their significance. It is becoming clear that deterrence as a cornerstone of our defence strategy is decreasingly effective and increasingly risky. As nuclear technologies spread, it will be more difficult, not easier, to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. In 2006 I believed that our deterrent could play a role in deterring nuclear terrorism by threatening any state known to support it, but as the sources of material used for terrorism multiply, it will be more difficult to pinpoint the state responsible. If one cannot do that, one has no target for a credible threat of retaliation.

Cyber attacks are more commonplace today and they will grow both in number and in intensity. Attribution of the source is difficult, if not impossible. Where one cannot attribute an attack to a source, again one cannot deter with a threat of massive retaliation. That is not to say that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to all 21st century challenges, but it is to say that they offer less of an insurance policy against the challenges we will face in the future.

Further, I invite noble Lords to reflect on recent research into the climate change impacts of even a small nuclear exchange, let alone the effects of one between superpowers. Since 2006, new scientific research has revisited the nuclear winter theme. The research, employing more sophisticated climate models, stresses the devastating climate effects that would follow the use of nuclear weapons. A major use would be suicidal. It would so alter the climate and, as a consequence, our agriculture that the attacker’s population would starve to death, even without any nuclear retaliation. Even a smaller nuclear exchange, for example, between India and Pakistan, would produce global temperatures colder than any experienced in the last millennium, with massive impacts on agriculture affecting up to 1 billion people, particularly in China and the United States, causing economic damage and huge political instability around the world.

If we want to be secure against nuclear and other threats, we have to think more creatively than our current reliance on deterrence implies. We have to shift the emphasis away from the threat of massive retaliation to prevention of nuclear catastrophe and resilience in the face of any attacks. On the nuclear side, we must plan for the unthinkable, but prevention is our main route to safety. Fewer nuclear weapons and materials in the world must be better than more of both. Those who argue the opposite are dangerously overconfident about our ability to keep control of nuclear weapons and materials, particularly in the face of terrorists’ ambitions. Prevention means a number of things. First, we have to get and keep better control of the world’s nuclear weapons and materials. It is essential that the nuclear security summit in the Netherlands is ambitious. This is an issue for continued leadership attention. It is important that world leaders reaffirm their commitment to continue this process, and talk of the meeting in the Netherlands being the last of the series is foolish.

Secondly, we have to cap the problem by making progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty. The issue of such a treaty cannot be allowed to languish in the conference on disarmament any longer; it has been there for far too long. Thirdly, it is essential that President Obama and President Putin meet and pursue a follow-on deal to the new START treaty as soon as possible. The US needs to show flexibility on missile defence, agreeing to share more details because that is the key to unlocking the door to further nuclear reductions and a deal in which the US could agree to reduce the warheads it holds in reserve and Russia could agree to cuts and more transparency about its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Fourthly, we must never miss an opportunity to tell both the US and China that they have a solemn international responsibility to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Fifthly, we have to work harder to strengthen the grand bargain at the heart of the non-proliferation treaty or risk losing it. We are becoming dangerously complacent about it. All states have a responsibility here, but the nuclear weapons states bear a special responsibility. Successive Governments have reduced the number of warheads in the UK arsenal, but we need to do more. Formally, we are committed to the like-for-like renewal of Trident and the operational posture of continuous at-sea deterrence. The Government and all Members of this House need to reflect further on this position. Are we telling the countries of the rest of the world that we cannot feel secure without nuclear weapons on continuous at-sea deployment while at the same time telling the vast majority of them that they must forgo indefinitely any nuclear option for their own security? Is that really our policy? If so, do we expect the double standard that it implies and indeed contains, to stick in a world of rising powers?

The non-nuclear weapon states signatories to the NPT committed themselves to non-nuclear status only in the face of a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to pursue disarmament. Some of that disarmament must come through multilateral negotiation and agreement, but some of it can come through independent action, as in the case of several rounds of announced reductions in the size of the UK nuclear warhead stockpile, none of which we negotiated with anyone else. The time is now right, in my view, to change our posture and to step down from continuous at-sea deterrence. This would demonstrate that nuclear weapons are playing less and less of a role in our national security strategy, and along with the reductions in stockpile numbers we have made, it would strengthen our ability to argue internationally for the kinds of measures I have outlined in this speech.

There are those, I know, who will argue that we have already done enough, that it is time for others to act and that, in any case, such measures will have no impact on the actions of the Irans and North Koreas of this world. They may well be right. Certainly, some states must be confronted with firm international action and other states must also step up and take their responsibilities more seriously if we are to avoid the worst. If a disastrous nuclear incident does occur, it will not be all or even partially the fault of this country, but what consolation will there be in the blame game the morning after London has been devastated by a terrorist nuclear attack? What consolation will there be when we cannot secure incontrovertible evidence of the source of the attack and therefore cannot use the nuclear weapons we have on continuous deployment, even should we wish to? What will the value of our insurance policy be then? Where will the consolation be if even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan has the kind of climatic effect I described earlier? The choice is not between one risky and one risk-free future. There are no risk-free futures on offer.

The primary purpose of our policy must be to ensure that we never suffer the consequences of a nuclear attack. At this stage in our history, nuclear deterrence still has a residual role to play in achieving this objective, but the character of 21st-century threats means that its shelf life is eroding. To achieve our objective, we now need to shift the emphasis to the kinds of measures I have talked about—on to reducing the chances of any nuclear weapon ever being used anywhere. That means the relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons reductions, a relentless strengthening of nuclear security and non-proliferation regimes, and a decreased reliance on nuclear weapons for national security by all, including ourselves.

Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I do not want to be involved in this polarised binary approach, as my noble friend rightly calls it. We are negotiating very hard. She is quite right that there are very high prizes to be achieved if we can get the robust treaty we want. I think I shall leave it there, except to observe that even with the treaty and, indeed, much more so without a treaty, illicit arms continue to swirl around the world and feed Syria, the killing and the murder, and they will continue to do so unless, step by step, we can move from the treaty to tighter and tighter controls.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, those of us who follow these matters closely are hearing very strongly from New York that the sceptics are dominating the floor of this conference. We are constantly being impressed by the request that Britain speaks up more in this conference as a leader of those who wish to see a robust treaty. I shall repeat to the Minister the question posed to him by my noble friend Lord Triesman, about it not being too late for the UK Government to sign up to the statement signed by 74 countries setting out the humanitarian bottom line for a robust treaty. Are the Government prepared to consider doing that? It would send a very strong message to these negotiations.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Strong messages are going all the time. As I think the noble Lord knows, we have always said that we want to have a humanitarian dimension fully in this treaty. We have said that, but how we manage to secure our aims in this last vital stage is a matter of delicate negotiation, and I think I must leave it there, although I fully recognise the strong feelings on both sides of the House about this matter.