(5 days, 20 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I am very concerned by my noble friend Lord Harper’s amendment to extend the Bill’s definition of terminal illness to include simply the one word, “injuries”. I agree entirely with my noble friend Lord Sandhurst and with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, may propose to ensure that those who have suffered an industrial injury are not deprived of their rightful compensation. I support entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, said on that, but I disagreed with his general thesis that the Bill should be extended to include all other injuries, because that could take us in a rather dangerous direction.
We all know that some injuries are awfully catastrophic, relentlessly painful and leave no prospect of meaningful recovery. For those individuals, the desire for control over the timing and manner of their death is understandable and deeply felt. If the law permits assisted death for terminal illness, it is in some ways emotionally coherent to ask why a grievous and irreversible injury that will inevitably lead to death should be treated differently. I think the amendment from my noble friend and the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is born of a humane impulse: to extend compassion to a group whose suffering can be as severe as that of the terminally ill. However, compassion must be married to clarity and caution when Parliament contemplates measures that permit an irreversible outcome. Extending the definition to “injuries” raises serious legal, clinical and ethical problems. I will set out the principal flaws and risks that I see flowing from the proposed change.
First, the term “injury” is legally and clinically vague. What counts as an “injury”? Does the word encompass acute trauma, chronic sequelae, surgical complications, other serious harm, or the long-term consequences of an earlier wound? Without precise limits, the category could sweep far beyond the narrow cohort the amendment’s proponents intend. Vagueness at this threshold invites inconsistent application and litigation.
Secondly, I suggest that the proposed threshold—that the injury be “reasonably expected to result in death”—is problematic. Prognosis after severe injury is often uncertain, as it is with terminal illnesses, and can change with treatment, rehabilitation and time. Modern trauma care, reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation can alter trajectories in ways that are difficult to predict at the bedside. Using “reasonably expected to result in death” without a clear evidential standard hands clinicians wide discretion and risks premature decisions made on the basis of an evolving clinical picture.
Thirdly, there is a real danger of premature decisions in acute settings. Many catastrophic injuries occur in emergency contexts where prognosis is evolving and where immediate stabilisation, surgery or intensive rehabilitation may change outcomes. Allowing assisted death on the basis of an early prognosis risks decisions taken before full treatment options have been explored and before the patient has had the opportunity to adapt to new circumstances or to benefit from specialist rehabilitation.
I will not talk about civil law and compensation, because that has already been expertly covered by my noble friends and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. My noble friend also mentioned the coronial and investigatory consequences which arise, so I will not elaborate on those.
There is a “slippery slope” argument here. Once “injuries” are included—just that one, simple word—pressure may grow to widen eligibility further to chronic disability, psychiatric consequences or non-combat trauma. Experience from other jurisdictions shows how initial expansions can lead to broader reinterpretation over time. Parliament must be wary of opening a door that cannot easily be closed.
The clinical complexity of catastrophic injury demands multidisciplinary expertise. This is not one GP giving an opinion here. Assessing such cases properly would require trauma surgeons, rehabilitation specialists, pain teams, psychiatrists and a whole range of different medical specialities. The Bill’s processes must ensure that such expertise is mandatory before any irreversible step is taken, otherwise we risk decisions being made without the full range of clinical knowledge that these cases demand.
In conclusion, if Parliament is to consider injuries within scope, it must do so with surgical precision, so to speak. It needs narrow definitions, higher evidential standards, mandatory specialist review, and explicit protections for families and compensation rights; only then can we balance mercy with the safeguards that such irreversible decisions demand. I urge the House to reflect carefully on the human impulse behind this amendment and on the legal and clinical realities that make adding it to the Bill as currently drafted—with just one word, “injuries”, as my noble friend proposes—deeply problematic.
My Lords, I return us to Amendment 829, to which I put my name and which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I added my name because I share experience with the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Sandhurst. We have all seen cases in which a potentially huge claim arises under the Fatal Accidents Act which will provide a family with a payment for their dependency on the deceased for many years to come, so these are very substantial claims.
Probably all three of us have done cases for both claimants and trade unions on the one side, and for insurance companies on the other. Insurance companies are very business-like and accurate, but they are not social services organisations. One question they ask their counsel—particularly their leading counsel, their KC—in such cases is, “Are we liable to pay? Is there a point we can make, saying that it does not arise because the death was caused by some other means?” There have been many cases in which novus actus interveniens, which the noble Lord, Lord Harper, referred to earlier, has been cited as a reason for not paying.
Well, there we are: we know that the noble Lord adheres to the cab rank rule.
We have heard three very cogent speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Frost, Lord Carter and Lord Taylor, about the suffering point. If we look at the discussion we have had this afternoon, we now have a clear and stark difference between assisted suicide based on suffering and assisted suicide based on choice. I agree entirely with the noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Taylor: the public expect this Bill to be dealing with suffering. The public understand this Bill to be dealing with great suffering. They understand that the choice to have one’s life ended is based on great suffering, although it does not say so in the Bill. That must be clarified by the sponsor.
On the other side of the argument, we heard a very eloquent speech from my noble friend Lord Pannick, with whom I have a lot of sympathy. It is not generally known that, as he said, he has very personal experience of the issues arising from this Bill. However, the choice he is suggesting comes very close to being a choice for anyone who is seriously ill, not just someone who is seriously ill with an expectation of death within a certain limited period, whatever that happens to be. I fear that those of us who, like the noble and learned Lord the sponsor, are trying to reach the end of our process in the House of Lords on the basis that there will be a Bill, so it must be the best it can be, are not focusing on what choice really means.
We are talking about informed choice, accurate choice, if we can achieve it. I bear in mind very much what my noble friend Lady Finlay said. We are talking about a protective choice: the duty of the state to protect the citizen, even when they are making a choice. We do not, as citizens, have unlimited free choices in what we do; therefore, protection is important. It must be a morally sound choice, because that is part of our polity. We do things that are morally sound, and the Government protect us from those which may not be. It must be a choice founded on medical and scientific integrity: and there is the rub, going back to the points my noble friend Lady Finlay made about the uncertainty of the scientific and medical integrity of what is proposed.
For those reasons, I support the amendments that are focused on choice. I will mention three other amendments that I also support. The first is Amendment 76, which is not in my name but in that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, but he is not able to be here for the latter part of today’s proceedings and I agreed to mention it at his request.
Amendment 76 would do something very simple. In Clause 2(1)(b), it would add one word, “direct”, so that a person is terminally ill if, in the amended paragraph (b), their death as a direct
“consequence of that illness or disease can reasonably be expected within six months”.
It may not be the perfect word, but it is about facts and the consequences of those facts. I agree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that if there is to be a death of someone through the assistance of a third party, which is what the Bill is fundamentally about, then it cannot be just a consequence, or one of the many consequences, of the illness. It has to be the, or at least a, major consequence of the illness. That is the purpose of that amendment: there has to be a bond, as it were, between the illness or disease and the death which ensues.
The next amendment is Amendment 93. It suggests leaving out Clause 2(3) altogether as it lacks clarity as to when an assisted death would be permitted. The subsection says that
“treatment which only relieves the symptoms of an inevitably progressive illness or disease temporarily is not to be regarded as treatment which can reverse that illness”.
What if the relief that is provided for an inevitably progressive illness provides not only relief from the symptoms but extra time to the person who is suffering from the illness or disease? I argue that if it allows extra time, the individual concerned will be having a new experience: they will be seeing what can happen if their symptoms are relieved. They need to discuss with their medical advisers whether they can have that relief of their symptoms again and whether it will prolong their life if they do. The relief may cause a fundamental change of heart by the individual. Therefore, I do not believe that there should be any possibility of the six-month period being elongated in any way by that relief. Indeed, I believe that the period should start again if such relief is given so that the person concerned can have an informed choice.
The third amendment is Amendment 96, which suggests leaving out Clause 2(4), which says:
“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder (or both)”,
followed by an important further sentence that I will not read out because of time. This subsection fails to deal with the proportionality between the disease, which is the terminal illness, and the disability or mental disorder, or both, from which that person also suffers. It is a complex little conundrum, but a very important one. I believe that proportionality needs to be clarified so that the Bill can be the best possible Bill we can have.
We have much still to learn about the issues that have been under discussion. I invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to consider these carefully and present some draft amendments to us before we meet again in a week’s time.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I seek a cast-iron assurance from the Government Whip that those of us whose speeches will be delayed till next Friday are recorded by the Government and will be allowed to speak. That is all I want to say at this stage. We want an assurance that we will be allowed to speak next Friday if we delay our speeches from today.
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in supporting my noble friend Lady Deech’s amendment, I of course recognise the very considerable and determined efforts of my noble friend Lord Verdirame, who sought to persuade the Government to accept the amendment made by your Lordships’ House when the Bill was before us previously.
I have some questions for the Minister, but before I ask them, I want to thank him for his very heartfelt and obviously extremely genuine and clear statement of what he sees as the purpose of the learning centre. I totally accept what he said as being his view. My questions relate to the use of the word “inappropriate”. I take it that the use of that word reveals that the words that my noble friend Lady Deech seeks to insert in the Bill—or, indeed, the words originally inserted by your Lordships’ House—are not in any way out of scope of the Bill. It is a matter of choice, of taste even; it is not a matter of law or legislative practice.
Secondly, I invite the Minister to answer the question: does what he has said in any way bind a future Government or even bind the trustees? I suspect that it might be possible to bind the trustees, but not a future Government, but only by expensive litigation, which would be extremely distasteful on this subject, if in the future they chose to change the approach of which the Minister has spoken.
Of course the Bill is about changing planning arrangements for Victoria Tower Gardens—that is necessarily part of it—but it is slightly absurd to suggest that the Bill is just about property, given the basic purpose of having a memorial learning centre in the gardens. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that there is a memorial and a learning centre, which has the one aim that people will go there—in my view, it is too small and in the wrong place, but I cannot debate that now—to learn about the Holocaust, the Shoah, what happened to Jews in the Second World War, what built up to that Holocaust and to learn the lesson. That is the only purpose of spending many millions on this project.
What is wrong with stating in the Bill the purpose of the project? Those of us who have a personal, a family, background which makes us very close to this proposal, as I have, do not want to see that limited desire for the purpose to be stated in the Bill to be rejected by the use of a vague adjective like “inappropriate”.
I have huge misgivings about why this is being put in Victoria Tower Gardens, what is being put there and whether it will be secure. I absolutely reject the notion that one should be concerned about the current Middle East situation in deciding the words that should be put in the Bill. That, in my view, is unprincipled and should not be allowed to endure.
I earnestly say to the Minister, who is much admired in this House—and I share in that admiration—that he should listen very carefully to this debate before pitching into something that is unacceptable to a very large number of people who have close contact and concerns about this proposal.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I commend the very wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and support the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, in this important amendment.
I should say first that I respect 150% the honesty and integrity of the Minister; I trust him 100%, but I do not entirely trust the Government to deliver on this. I thank not just the two Labour Peers who were on the Committee but all those Peers from all sides—the other Labour Members, Cross-Benchers, Lib Dems and Conservatives—who raised many concerns about all aspects of this memorial.
The one thing we were united on was that it had to commemorate the Holocaust—the Shoah—and antisemitism. What concerned us during the Committee was that on many occasions when we pushed the question, “Will this be purely about the Shoah?”, we did not get a categorical answer that it would be. We had many reports from other organisations suggesting that it could include Rwanda, Pol Pot, Darfur and others. Those were horrible genocides, I know that, and we have seen some horrible genocides around the world since the end of the Second World War, but they are not the Shoah, and the memorial should be purely about that.
The noble Lord was right: it would be perfectly in scope of the Bill to insert the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. To reject that on the grounds that it would be inappropriate is rather flimsy. When I was chair of the Delegated Powers Committee and we saw the Government taking extraordinary powers to pass regulations, the Government always said, “Ah yes, but we don’t intend to use them”. The intention is irrelevant; it is what is in statute law that counts. Putting this into statute law would guarantee that it was enforced.
The Minister said, if I remember correctly, “Oh, people could challenge any requirement in a statute”. If people can challenge, with difficulty and judicial review, words in a primary Act of Parliament, then how much easier would it be to challenge a letter from the Government to the administrators or the trustees? That seems ripe for judicial review, whereas a statutory requirement would not be.
That is all I wanted to say. As I say, I entirely trust the Minister and his noble intentions, but I do not trust the Government to be able to deliver on this, either through negligence or a deliberate act on their part. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, is absolutely right in seeking to put this in the Bill.
(11 months ago)
Grand Committee
Lord Blencathra (Con)
We will deal with this issue more extensively in the third group of amendments, but perhaps it would help to quote from page 11 of the National Audit Office report, which sets out all the organisations in charge of trying to run this project. It says that the Treasury is:
“Responsible for allocating funding for the programme. Treasury approval is required at different stages as per the Integrated Assurance and Approval Plan … As a condition of the funding, the Department must seek further Treasury approval if the programme is forecast to use more than half of the approved contingency”.
Another box also says that the Cabinet Office must give approval as well.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The noble Lord mentioned the shoebox. Is he aware that, if I remember correctly, the Holocaust Commission wanted a campus of between 5,000 square meters and 10,000 square metres, but in an Answer from my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook on 12 April to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, the department said that the Adjaye bunker would be just 3,258 square metres? The Answer went on to reveal that 48% of it will be completely unusable, made out of risers, ducts and unusable space, leaving a mere 1,722 square metres for the learning centre. That is about four or five times the size of this Room—some campus, is it not?
I absolutely agree and I will try to finish within the 10 minutes, and I believe that there is going to be a vote in a moment anyway. I believe that if the Minister were to listen to the witnesses available in your Lordships’ House, we would have a different conclusion. I promise the Minister, not because I know it but because I know it in my bones, that if we were allowed to build a Holocaust learning centre elsewhere, with the subvention that is already promised by the Government, we would have no difficulty in raising the money for an establishment that would rival the great POLIN museum that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, mentioned.
I finish by saying that if the noble Baroness will allow me to say so, and she knows that I love her dearly, I thought she was a little unkind to some members of the Committee. I do not believe that anybody is ill motivated about this in any way. I believe that, unfortunately, they are just wrong and should recognise it.