Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I want to make two points about whether these consultations should be face to face. First, I remind the Committee of the General Medical Council’s remote consultation diagram, which is in the GMC guidance. It is not absolutist about whether doctors should see patients remotely or face to face, but it sets out guidance. It starts:

“Remote consultations may be appropriate when… The patient’s clinical need or treatment request is straightforward”.


We are not talking about straightforward clinical needs or treatment requests here. The other side of the diagram says:

“Face to face consultations may be preferrable when… The patient has complex clinical needs or is requesting higher risk treatments”.


As I have said previously, and it is historic, I was a lay member of the General Medical Council for 10 years and I was involved in helping to draft GMC guidance as well as dealing with conduct and health cases. It is unimaginable to me that the General Medical Council would create guidance in which it accepted the proposal that, save from the most exceptional circumstances based on the clearest evidence, such consultations should be done remotely.

Secondly, the medical profession is not the only group of people who have to give important advice to their patients, clients or customers. Like a few other Members of your Lordships’ House here, I have often had to give advice to people in critical situations when they faced spending possibly the rest of their lives in custody. I recall one case when, in the middle of a longish murder trial, the client asked to see me to ask a very simple question, “How do you think it’s going, sir?” The answer had to be robust and realistic, and it was very difficult. It changed the whole course of the case, which came to a quick end shortly afterwards. The result was a minor advantage to the client: he did not spend the rest of his life in prison, just a substantial proportion of it, but that was very important to him.

I would say to your Lordships that it is quite difficult to see a doctor these days, unless you go to a private doctor. Even if you have seen a doctor, it is quite difficult to see the same one twice. There are remote hearings in the legal profession in certain circumstances, but for the sort of important decisions that I have been describing, it is unthinkable—to us, the professional lawyers who do these cases—that such consultations should not be face to face. That is a qualitative analysis based on two examples, but I hope your Lordships found it convincing.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can be truly short here and it is further to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Many of us are concerned about subtle pressure and coercion. It will not appear in all cases, but it will in some and these are legitimate concerns. If this is online, doctors are unlikely to know whether there is someone else present in the room or whether the door is open for someone to listen, nod and encourage the applicant—if I can call the person that—to make their request. If at least one of the panel is present in the room, they would be able to see and counter that. It is really important that there is at least one of those people, preferably the panel, in order to prevent that. That is an important safeguard and, if it is done online, such things could be missed. My recollection is that, in Canada, there have been instances where people, including coroners, have raised legitimate questions afterwards.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to act as junior counsel to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened carefully to some comments that the Minister made on Monday, which alluded to this clause, and I thought about them carefully, but they were brief and I, too, wish to test what is really intended by the Government. My feeling is that the Government have made an inadvertent mistake in Clause 31 which they can easily rectify.

This Bill is designed to protect citizens by imposing clear statutory duties. When clear statutory duties are imposed and there is a breach of those duties, it is very common for a citizen who is a victim of that breach to be able to bring a civil action. The purpose of the civil action is often to recover damages, though it may involve other declaratory judgments too.

I want to give a few examples, because I think we are going to have one substantive debate on this clause and then a decision will be reached. I am going to mention a number of instances in which breach of statutory duty gives rise to a civil action to obtain judgments of the kind I mentioned. First, driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition gives rise to a statutory duty which can result in a judgment for damages. In this Bill we are talking about something much bigger in scale than driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, but it may have exactly the same consequences.

There are other examples. If there are unsafe systems or means of work in any workspace, there can be an action for breach of statutory duty without it being necessary to prove negligence, nuisance or any other tort —civil wrong—that requires specific proof of certain aspects. Allowing a vehicle to be driven by an uninsured person allows a claim for breach of statutory duty. The failure to arrange compulsory insurance for employees allows such a claim. If a landlord fails to provide habitable standards, equally, there can be such a claim. If a company fails to disclose required financial information to investors, there can be such a claim for breach of statutory duty.

If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.

Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to differ with the noble Lord, but not because I do not want deserving people to recover compensation. My reading of the Bill as it stands is to the effect that, as drafted, Clause 31 achieves two things. First, it puts beyond doubt any question whether the breaches of requirements under the Bill can of themselves be a ground for a civil claim. It says plainly that such breaches will not in themselves be a ground. However, it is important to be aware that the fact that a breach of duty under the Bill or regulations has occurred will still be evidence that will be admissible in a civil claim which alleges negligence or other breach of common-law duty. The important point is that there may have been a breach that was without negligence.

If there has been a breach then it will be strong evidence that something has gone wrong that should be compensated for, but it may be capable of explanation and justification in the civil courts, which does not excuse criminal liability. Put simply, the Bill as drafted makes plain that a breach of statutory duty will not of itself alone give rise to an actionable breach of duty sounding in damages.

Secondly, as it stands, the Bill makes it clear that what is said in Clause 31(1) does not affect—that is, detract from—any right of action that exists in common law. In other words, a claim of negligence, in particular, or any other common-law right will remain; so this provision takes nothing away. Where, in a civil action, the claim establishes that as a matter of fact there has been a breach of such statutory duty, that will be evidence in the case and it is likely to be strong evidence. It will be a matter for the court to determine whether it is evidence of negligence or other evidence that might give rise to a justifiable claim for damages, and what weight to give it. I hope that is clear.

The amendment proffered to us would delete the whole of the existing clause, and would simply say:

“Nothing … affects any right of action”.


With respect, I suggest that that would be less clear and less helpful to the courts, because it will leave open a possible argument that breaches of statutory duty are themselves grounds for action, even where no want of care has been established. That would be getting closer, in effect, to strict liability for civil damages, however blameless the body or person concerned. That is why it is a step too far. It is unnecessary and potentially damaging, when we look at the vast range of bodies and people who will be affected.