Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I would never stand in the way of a colleague who has a trial. I hope it is an important trial that will improve general knowledge.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am defending the interests of a Labour-supporting newspaper.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Well, there we are: we know that the noble Lord adheres to the cab rank rule.

We have heard three very cogent speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Frost, Lord Carter and Lord Taylor, about the suffering point. If we look at the discussion we have had this afternoon, we now have a clear and stark difference between assisted suicide based on suffering and assisted suicide based on choice. I agree entirely with the noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Taylor: the public expect this Bill to be dealing with suffering. The public understand this Bill to be dealing with great suffering. They understand that the choice to have one’s life ended is based on great suffering, although it does not say so in the Bill. That must be clarified by the sponsor.

On the other side of the argument, we heard a very eloquent speech from my noble friend Lord Pannick, with whom I have a lot of sympathy. It is not generally known that, as he said, he has very personal experience of the issues arising from this Bill. However, the choice he is suggesting comes very close to being a choice for anyone who is seriously ill, not just someone who is seriously ill with an expectation of death within a certain limited period, whatever that happens to be. I fear that those of us who, like the noble and learned Lord the sponsor, are trying to reach the end of our process in the House of Lords on the basis that there will be a Bill, so it must be the best it can be, are not focusing on what choice really means.

We are talking about informed choice, accurate choice, if we can achieve it. I bear in mind very much what my noble friend Lady Finlay said. We are talking about a protective choice: the duty of the state to protect the citizen, even when they are making a choice. We do not, as citizens, have unlimited free choices in what we do; therefore, protection is important. It must be a morally sound choice, because that is part of our polity. We do things that are morally sound, and the Government protect us from those which may not be. It must be a choice founded on medical and scientific integrity: and there is the rub, going back to the points my noble friend Lady Finlay made about the uncertainty of the scientific and medical integrity of what is proposed.

For those reasons, I support the amendments that are focused on choice. I will mention three other amendments that I also support. The first is Amendment 76, which is not in my name but in that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, but he is not able to be here for the latter part of today’s proceedings and I agreed to mention it at his request.

Amendment 76 would do something very simple. In Clause 2(1)(b), it would add one word, “direct”, so that a person is terminally ill if, in the amended paragraph (b), their death as a direct

“consequence of that illness or disease can reasonably be expected within six months”.

It may not be the perfect word, but it is about facts and the consequences of those facts. I agree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that if there is to be a death of someone through the assistance of a third party, which is what the Bill is fundamentally about, then it cannot be just a consequence, or one of the many consequences, of the illness. It has to be the, or at least a, major consequence of the illness. That is the purpose of that amendment: there has to be a bond, as it were, between the illness or disease and the death which ensues.

The next amendment is Amendment 93. It suggests leaving out Clause 2(3) altogether as it lacks clarity as to when an assisted death would be permitted. The subsection says that

“treatment which only relieves the symptoms of an inevitably progressive illness or disease temporarily is not to be regarded as treatment which can reverse that illness”.

What if the relief that is provided for an inevitably progressive illness provides not only relief from the symptoms but extra time to the person who is suffering from the illness or disease? I argue that if it allows extra time, the individual concerned will be having a new experience: they will be seeing what can happen if their symptoms are relieved. They need to discuss with their medical advisers whether they can have that relief of their symptoms again and whether it will prolong their life if they do. The relief may cause a fundamental change of heart by the individual. Therefore, I do not believe that there should be any possibility of the six-month period being elongated in any way by that relief. Indeed, I believe that the period should start again if such relief is given so that the person concerned can have an informed choice.

The third amendment is Amendment 96, which suggests leaving out Clause 2(4), which says:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder (or both)”,


followed by an important further sentence that I will not read out because of time. This subsection fails to deal with the proportionality between the disease, which is the terminal illness, and the disability or mental disorder, or both, from which that person also suffers. It is a complex little conundrum, but a very important one. I believe that proportionality needs to be clarified so that the Bill can be the best possible Bill we can have.

We have much still to learn about the issues that have been under discussion. I invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to consider these carefully and present some draft amendments to us before we meet again in a week’s time.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Friday 23rd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, as a former, if somewhat historic, member of the General Medical Council, I can confirm that the GMC has no guidance relating to ending someone’s life because it is, at the present time, simply unlawful to end someone’s life.

I hope that I can try to simplify what is being discussed. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that there is a need to add something, though possibly not very much, to this Bill to ensure that consent, as consent, is included. We are talking about four stages. The application is not consent; it is just an application. Capacity is measured and is not an application. The discussion described in Clause 12 is a discussion, and I say to the noble Lord opposite that it is most definitely not the obtaining of consent. Then there is the issue of obtaining consent, which includes the effect of any drugs to be used, and that is what I think the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is seeking to add to this Bill.

Let me briefly give an example from my own experience. I had an extraordinarily formidable and occasionally difficult mother, and on one occasion she had a heart attack, not long before her death. She was taken into a very good cardiology unit in Blackpool, so I rushed up to Blackpool at high speed and found myself on the ward with my mother—whose eyesight and hearing were not good, but her brain was as good as any in your Lordships’ House—and a consultant. The consultant explained that he could do an operation which he had done once on a male patient aged 91, but he was prepared to try it on my mother. She was very enthusiastic to have any medical treatment that might prolong her life, which, after all, had by then lasted for only 98 and a half years.

Once we had had the discussion, the cardiologist proffered a consent form to me. My reply, which I will abbreviate, went something like, “Not likely; she is perfectly capable of consenting herself. But it must be explained to her so that she can hear it clearly. So, why don’t you sit down while I explain what you have said to me, and you correct me if anything is wrong?”

In due course, she signed the consent form and had the operation. Happily, the operation was entirely successful. Sadly, the effect of the operation gave her such a pounding heart that the rest of her bodily functions could not cope with it. She died a few weeks later. When she said to me during the period before her death, “Darling, I never thought it would end like this”, I thought to myself, thank God she signed the consent form, not me.

Consent has a conspicuous and real meaning. It requires full understanding from the patient. It can go horribly wrong, as it unfortunately did for my mother. I wish we had been able to celebrate her 100th birthday. But that element of consent, consent, consent—a bit like “education, education, education”—is not clearly set out in the Bill. It is not a major change to be made, and I would invite the noble and learned Lord to incorporate it.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group seek to establish a higher bar for reaching eligibility by requiring that informed consent be demonstrably shown. There are also amendments in the group tabled by my noble friend Lady Lawlor that seek to ensure that the patient has been made to understand the physiological effects of the drugs used. I will deal with each of these points, but fairly briefly, given the time.

Demonstrable consent is primarily a question of workability. It is the view of everybody, so far as I have heard, that a person must consent to receive assistance. The Bill allows assistance only if the person themselves takes the final step, which is in itself an important safeguard. But these amendments pose important questions for the Minister. What work have the Government done to date on establishing a process to ensure that all those receiving assistance under the provisions of the Bill will in fact have consented? What checks will there be on the service providing this assistance? How will Ministers and others respond to complaints or allegations of malpractice in relation to a person’s consent? All those questions touch on the key point: the practical day-to-day implementation of the Bill and ensuring that its provisions are complied with.

Most of the speeches in this group have dealt with the second issue—the amendment from my noble friend Lady Lawlor. It stands to reason that a person in receipt of assistance should be given all the information they need to ensure that they are making an informed choice. Certainly, that would seem to include the physiological effects of the drug they will take. When patients receive any drug or have any medical treatment, a doctor will explain the proper dosage and how it will affect them, and they will also advise on potential side effects. One would assume that the same level of explanation would be provided by doctors in this case, but I am interested to hear whether the Minister and/or the noble and learned Lord the promoter of the Bill will confirm that in due course.

My noble friend Lady Berridge threw me something of a curveball when she asked what the duty on a doctor is. That is a detailed question and, given the time, I will not give a very detailed answer, but it is notable that—this is an important point because it shows how things have changed over the years—if you go back, quite a long way, to the Hippocratic Corpus in the fourth to fifth centuries BCE, it advises physicians to reveal nothing to the patient of their present or, indeed, future condition,

“for many patients through this cause have taken a turn for the worse”.