Queen’s Speech

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, it is now just over 18 months since the Government announced the outcome of their strategic defence review. Much criticism was and still is heaped upon it, suggesting that the outcome was driven by the financial difficulties that the country was facing and was less than a fair appraisal of the Government’s strategic perceptions. The vision—no more than that—of a new defence capability to be achieved around 2020 was projected, but without certainty, until after the next SDSR in 2015, that the additional forward funding required to match these aspirations is going to be provided. Last Monday's defence budget Statement said that the proposals for planning round 12, which will take the programme as far as 2021 were,

“reflecting the planning assumption agreed with the Treasury of a 1% per annum real increase in the equipment and support budget from 2015”.—[Official Report, 14/5/12; col. 141.]

Note, please, that that is not the same as an increase in the overall defence budget. Will that 1% have to be found from elsewhere in the defence programme? Perhaps the Minister can elucidate on that point.

Given the great unease and uncertainty about the economic situation, I wonder whether even a modest increase in the equipment spend of 1% will be achievable come the day. Meanwhile, today our Armed Forces are involved in considerably more expeditionary activity than they were to expect or to plan for, and at the same time all three services are embarked on redundancies and redeployments of major proportions.

An essential part of any defence programme must strive to ensure that commitments and capabilities are matched. If they are not, sooner or later the overstretched equipment has to be replaced or refurbished far more quickly than planned for and at additional budget cost. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell the House more about the next stages in the coalition’s defence thinking, not just about the gradually more imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan. Do they, for example, accept that for what are termed wars of choice there has to be a protracted period of disengagement or an absolute minimum of new operational commitments? That is particularly so for the Army, which seems likely to have to rely on the safe recovery of much of its equipment that is now deployed in Afghanistan, although if press reports at the weekend are to be believed, £2 billion worth of this army kit is to be left behind and handed over to the Afghan Army.

For the rest, if the problems over logistics access through Pakistan persist, and with no credible alternative route to shipment home by sea, the long and tortuous overland route north and west from Afghanistan will be even more of a challenge. Perhaps the Minister will be able to reassure the House that the Government have contingency funds earmarked to replace army equipment handed over to the Afghans or that does not make it successfully back to this country from Afghanistan.

One of the most unsatisfactory decisions announced at the time of the strategic and security defence review was the scrapping of the maritime patrol aircraft Nimrod mark 4. I set out my reasons when your Lordships debated the review back in November 2010 and I do not intend to dwell on them again in detail. But since that debate, I was concerned to learn that the public line being taken by the then Defence Secretary, Dr Fox, had been inaccurate and misleading. What really took so many by surprise was the decision not only not to proceed with Nimrod, but to cut all the airframes up immediately for scrap.

That caused a great deal of disquiet. Attempts were made by the Government to explain away this crass decision. For example, in a BBC TV broadcast on 27 January last year, Dr Fox said that the Nimrod had not passed its flight tests. The story was being put about that the Nimrod was 10 years late, was unsafe, that there were doubts that some of the technical difficulties could be resolved and even that the aircraft had not flown. If those were the points being briefed privately by the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister during discussions of that defence review, then he was being seriously misled about the true state of the programme. While I accept that rightly or wrongly the financial pressures faced by the Government forced the decision not to bring the Nimrod into service, it does nothing for the credit of those taking these decisions to attempt to mask it with such misleading statements.

The true state of the programme, admittedly after years of difficulty, was, by autumn 2010, well advanced. Five airframes had been flying, the first getting airborne in August 2004. The second, which first flew in December 2004, was used extensively for missions system testing and had completed more than 230 flights. Three further aircraft with mission systems had been flying by 2010. Apart from the first airframe that did not have a mission system fitted, four aircraft could have been ready for operational use by last year or this one. The first aircraft was in fact delivered to and accepted by the RAF in March 2010.

None of that suggests that the aircraft was unsafe or that any teething technical problems could not have been dealt in the normal way when a new type enters service. Apart from its primary role in maritime operations, the earlier variants of Nimrod demonstrated the versatility, variety and flexibility of such air platforms fitted with state-of-the-art electronic aids and weapons. Nimrods proved their worth hundreds of miles inland over Afghanistan as much as they did providing security cover for our deterrent force submarines or co-ordinating search and rescue missions far out over the Atlantic. In last Monday’s Statement there was no mention of a plan to meet this particular role. I hope that the Minister will reassure the House that the roles abandoned when Nimrod was scrapped have not been forgotten.

Are there plans for a new maritime patrol aircraft with the range, endurance and sophisticated mission systems associated with its predecessor roles well to the fore in the future equipment programme? The cost of providing new platforms and mission systems for this role will probably far exceed that of putting the nine Nimrods into storage until the funds to bring them into service could have been found—a penny-wise, pound-foolish decision if ever there was one. Indeed, there seems to have been a waste of resources on this programme and on the “will we, won’t we, will we, yes we will have” the F35 STOVL-variant and the £100 million additional nugatory cost of preparing for the now redundant cats and traps system on the carrier.

The current reliance for critical maritime surveillance tasks on a mix of Merlin helicopters, surface ships and a Hercules aircraft can do little to match the reach and variety of roles of a maritime specialist aircraft. The sooner their more modest capabilities are replaced and enhanced, the better for our national security. I hope that the Minister can reassure the House.

Libya

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for the way in which he introduced this very important debate. I know that the whole House will be with me in wishing our Armed Forces, which have been tasked by the Government to participate in the implementation of UN Resolution 1973, well. We should all admire the way in which each succeeding generation of service men and women contribute with great credit to the Government of the day’s determination to be seen to be punching above their weight in the world scene.

Understandably, the 6,000 mile round trips to attack targets in Libya by two-seater Tornado aircraft operating out of RAF Marham in Norfolk were highlighted. These were epic flights, but this should not overshadow admiration for the numerous and extremely rapid deployments to forward operating airfields of a variety of aircraft types and their ground supporting crews with all that they need by way of munitions, spares and supplies. Equally commendable were the movement and attacks from Royal Navy ships and submarines in the relevant areas of the Mediterranean.

Such short-notice movements of operational units and their essential support and their rapid involvement in very precise kinetic attacks rely on detailed fore-planning. Personnel must also have regular opportunities to train to ensure that all will go smoothly and seamlessly when the Government require. Too often, training exercises have been curtailed or even cancelled in the search for in-year economies. This is a risky choice for any Government aspiring to a robust foreign policy and intent on mounting or sustaining expeditionary operations, particularly at short notice, with the minimum of embarrassing mistakes or PR disasters.

The initial operations from RAF Marham underline the much valued, but poorly understood, characteristics of air operations and the responsiveness and flexibility of air power. However, it is not solely aircraft and weapon performances that contribute to the fighting attributes of air power; it is also the resourcefulness, ingenuity and imagination of the crews and commanders who turn the theories of air power into practicalities, such as we have seen in recent days.

How often our Armed Forces are committed to operations in wars of choice must ultimately be balanced against their numbers, their equipment and the other resources necessary to fulfil the objectives or mission that they have been given. Following our long involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan and the reductions that have been implemented, or are shortly to be implemented, in the wake of last year’s strategic defence and security review, our forces have reached levels of commitment that have to be reduced—witness the firm determination of Her Majesty’s Government to withdraw from combat operations in Afghanistan by 2015. A few tight years were forecast before a real-terms increase in defence budgets from 2015 would fund the defence aspirations of the 2020s, but then the unexpected happened, yet again. How rapidly the international security situation changed in the first few days and weeks of 2011. Fortuitously for the Government, current operations in Libya call mainly for effort from the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy as the United Kingdom’s contribution, forces less committed than in Afghanistan.

I turn now to the great unknown about this Libyan engagement. As the Government have admitted, the fulfilment of UN Resolution 1973 is not easily measured unless there is a major and beneficial change in the present shares of authority over the different regions of Libya. Rightly, the additional costs are to be funded from the reserve, but that too should not be seen as open-ended. While there were compelling reasons to get quickly into the rescue and evacuation of British nationals, particularly from Libya, at the start of the uprisings in the new year, of its nature that was going to be of only short duration, and they were operations of necessity.

The Prime Minister has said that it was not reasonable to argue that, because we could not help everywhere, we should not attempt to help to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Libya, but what we might characterise as humanitarian might be seen very differently through Arab and Islamic eyes. The switch from destroying Libyan air defences to the continuing night-after-night interdiction of Libyan armour and weapons storage, attempting to impose a no-drive zone and loose talk of arming the rebels, smacks of mission creep. We are on a high wire, without any safety net and in the hands of opinion-formers who could quickly turn these developments to our disadvantage. Are we not very close to being accused of involvement and taking sides in a Libyan civil war? Once again, we will face the accusation that oil-starved colonialists are up to their knavish tricks.

We have certainly ensured that in Gaddafi we now have an enemy for life. If he survives in power, our national interests will again be under renewed threat from him. Hopefully, however, sooner rather than later there has to be an exit and an end to our involvement. The experiences of recent history are not necessarily always relevant, but as a general rule no-fly zones or no-drive zones are rather like maritime mounted blockades: none, on its own, is likely to achieve any clear-cut political result. Consequently, once started they can become a long and protracted task.

Much more in the non-military field by politics and diplomacy has to be done and will surely be needed to bring about an internationally acceptable outcome in Libya. I therefore welcome the large international meeting of Foreign Ministers held in London earlier this week and the recent news of the defection of the Libyan Foreign Minister. This may well be a result of the efforts of the FCO and other government agencies that we cannot yet know about. We had rather a poor start when the Libyan crisis erupted, with delays in evacuating our citizens and the apparently crass attempt to infiltrate Special Forces into the country near Benghazi. Since then, there seems to have been a steadier hand on the tiller and I look forward to a satisfactory and hopefully early release from this new operation, which is adding to the overcommitment of our Armed Forces at this present time. Perhaps we should take a lesson from President Obama’s approach and realise that we cannot take on more and more military operations. Others must be persuaded to take the strain.

Queen's Speech

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, there was disappointingly little in the gracious Speech about the Government's future commitment to Afghanistan. Some indication of timescales would be helpful to inform Parliament and the public about government thinking. Perhaps in his response the Minister will be more helpful—not only on this but on the timescale for completion of the Strategic Defence and Security Review on which so much of the long-term future for the Armed Forces will hang.

When I was Chief of the Air Staff 25 years ago, the RAF had almost 90 stations, including some 28 main flying bases. Uniformed personnel totalled around 100,000 men and women. Today there are just 30 stations, of which only 14 are operational flying bases. Manpower, too, has fallen dramatically, and is now less than 40,000. In 1985, the RAF had 1,450 airframes of all types. Today's figure is just 700. In particular, there has been a large net reduction in operational fast-jet aircraft since 1985. A total of almost 550 has been reduced to less than 300, even allowing for the still-to-be-introduced latest Typhoon. On the maritime side, nothing is left of the 29 Nimrod mark 2s held in 1985.

The reductions in defence budgets over the past 25 years—from more than 5 per cent of GDP to a little over 2 per cent—account in part for this large-scale retrenchment: but within this overall reduction, the cost of some of the critical support activities of the Royal Air Force has increased relative to that of fast-jet, front-line numbers. Additional, more capable support helicopters—Chinooks and Merlins—have replaced the old Wessexes and some of the Puma fleet. Air transport, while still burdened with old and unreliable VC10 and Tristar airframes, has benefited from the increased capabilities of the large but costly C17s. Much improved surveillance capabilities, including airborne early-warning Sentries, have taken on a far greater global role than was possible with six very aged AEW Shackletons. In short, in the past 25 years, RAF effort increasingly has switched to the in-support role, at the expense of the more traditional fighter and offensive air power capability. A question for the future is whether this balance in the Royal Air Force is right: should it be moved even further to in-support roles or has it gone too far?

Those who advocate that there should be no further investment in Typhoon, for example, are taking the view that there is no call or need for adequate preparation to fight for and maintain control of the air. In the relatively benign airspace over Afghanistan and elsewhere on our recent expeditionary operations, the threat to our ground and seaborne forces of attack from the air has been negligible; but I and others who were in the services in the 1980s had a salutary reminder of the importance of effective control of the air. That salutary reminder was our experience in the Falklands.

While our air defences operated with great valour and determination, they were sorely tested by far-from-outstandingly equipped Argentinean air forces. Even though the Argentineans were operating from mainland bases at the extremities of their range, they bombed and sank four front-line warships and the “Atlantic Conveyor”, which went down with war-fighting stores, and all but one of the Chinook helicopters sent with the task force. Other ships were badly damaged and put out of action—the noble Lord, Lord West, can bear personal witness to that. At Fitzroy, the Welsh Guards were bombed while about to disembark, suffering a large number of casualties and 51 killed. Naval and Army units suffered because we lacked effective control of the airspace over our forces.

With our experience in the Falklands and the ever-present Argentinean aspirations to acquire them, the key to our ability to protect them is the safety and security of the airfield at Mount Pleasant. If that were to be seized by an Argentinean coup de main, we would no longer possess the capability to return in force by sea. Indeed with the capture of Mount Pleasant, the Argentineans would deny us any reinforcement of our available forces in the Falklands, and their aircraft would have a large forward-operating base from which to repel us. The Typhoons at Mount Pleasant, and a demonstrable ability to reinforce very rapidly by air from the United Kingdom, are the key deterrents to such an outcome. Nor should we overlook the requirements of today and into the future to police the skies around the United Kingdom. RAF Tornados and Typhoons have been scrambled regularly this year and last to investigate Russian long-range bombers operating close to our national airspace; and 9/11-style terrorist attacks from the air cannot be ruled out, either.

So what contribution do air forces make to strategic defence and security, including to expeditionary engagements? While boots on the ground have had a vital part to play in most of our recent overseas involvements, the cost in blood and treasure of prolonged major deployments and their support, particularly by much reduced front-line forces, places a considerable and worrisome strain on those involved. These levels of operation cannot be sustained indefinitely at our present, let alone a reduced, level of resources and capability. If this Administration aspire to a global presence, alternatives for the future need to be considered.

The contribution of air power—for some 17 years over Iraq between the two Gulf Wars—is an example of what can be done successfully and without being seduced into, or bogged down in, lasting and expensive operations on land. As we face the unpredictability and uncertainty of future threats, the inherent agility and adaptability of air platforms and their supporting systems should be treasured and encouraged.

Combat ISTAR is becoming one of the core competencies, providing assured intelligence and situational awareness not only to on-board offensive systems but to all types of operation by other joint forces. Indeed, the advantages can be spread to other non-military authorities and agencies caught up in an operation. Combat ISTAR is a fine contemporary example of how the inherent flexibility of air systems are re-rolled to engage in new defence tasks, giving greatly ongoing and added value to the original investment in these equipments.

In our more straitened circumstances, the case for reducing, rather than increasing, the number of ground forces, while maintaining an ability to contribute more widely and strategically by air and space, and by maritime, means to an allied expeditionary capability, should be weighed in the balance in the Strategic Defence Review. I look forward to learning that this Administration are taking such a structured and broad look at what options there are for our future strategic stance.