Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Bill [HL]

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Condon (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment put forward by the noble and gallant Lords, not only for the reasons that they have articulated but very briefly to mention my experience in my former service, the police. I was able to initiate and help champion flexible working in the police service. We used terms such as career breaks, career development breaks and role sharing. We very carefully avoided any notion of part-time, simply because in my old service in the military and maybe in some other uniformed public services, job description generics carry weight beyond just normal civilian meaning. While it may be feared that the noble and gallant Lords and I are being oversensitive, notions of part-time can be seen to dilute notions of operational prowess, commitment, sense of duty and so on. If there is even the risk that, informally, notions of part-time will dilute how colleagues in the military view people taking advantage of flexible working, the term “part-time” should be avoided. If there is some room here for change, I hope the Minister will listen very carefully to the arguments put forward by the noble and gallant Lords. If there is a necessity to test the opinion of the House, I think this is so important that I will support the noble and gallant Lords.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I also rise to support the speeches made by the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig of Radley, Lord Boyce and Lord Walker. I will not repeat their arguments. It is quite clear from conversations that one has had that the general thrust of the Bill is well supported. The point at issue here is the use of the term “part-time”, and I underline my opposition to its use. I add one further argument for the noble Earl to reflect on. One of the Army’s six core values is selfless commitment. That selfless commitment is not divisible; it cannot be on a part-time basis.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of the three noble and gallant Lords. I very firmly share the view of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, about whether there is really a necessity for this Bill, but it will happen. Having been in government, I know that these things get on tram rails and go along. But words are important and “part-time” is not a very good term to use; there is no doubt that it will be damaging. On that specific point, I disagree with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. It can have a lot of impact and be very damaging. That is not the intention of the Bill, and such a minor change of wording has a huge impact. If the House divides, I will certainly be voting for the amendment. I spoke to the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, who was appalled by the use of the term “part-time” and wanted me to raise that if I spoke. He believes that being in the services is a vocation and was horrified that such a term should be used.

Before I sit down, I congratulate the noble Earl the Minister because, 235 years ago today, his ancestor relieved Gibraltar.

Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Bill [HL]

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for yesterday’s very helpful briefing session on the Bill and for the background material that has been made available. This has all helped to work out what this short Bill is all about and what it is not about. It is clear that the underlying purpose is to improve operational capability through the retention in service of some personnel, whose personal circumstances would otherwise have led them to retire from the Armed Forces prematurely. It is presumably with this overall aim in mind that we are led to understand that the service chiefs support the Bill.

However, I believe that the flexible working provisions which the Bill would enable must be used sparingly, and be seen to be the exception and not the rule. There are dangers to unit cohesion—and therefore to morale and overall effectiveness—if the attitude develops that individuals can pick and choose what they will, or will not, do in terms of participating in exercises, deployments and operations. So there is a balance to be struck between increased flexibility and overall capability.

It is also my understanding that this flexibility will create something of a two-way street, with regulars opting for a period of reserve service, and reservists opting for a period of regular or full-time service. On the face of things, this would seem eminently sensible but I believe there is a potential danger here. In the case of the Army, the largest employer of service manpower, it can be said that the closer integration of the 80,000 regular soldiers with the 30,000 trained reservists produces an Army of 110,000. If we add to that some 30,000 regular reservists with a call-up liability then the Army is apparently some 140,000 strong. With the current disinclination to commit large numbers of boots on the ground—and no current operational imperative to do so—the case can quickly be made that an Army of 140,000 is simply too large and too expensive. The most expensive element of this large Army is the regular component and, in a period of continuing pressure on the defence budget, programmers could well be considering options to reduce the size of this. However, this move towards greater flexibility and the blurring of the distinction between regular, reserve and regular reserve service must be treated very carefully, because the core of the operational capability of the Army is its full-time regular component. At fewer than 80,000 that regular component is already too small, and any attempt to further reduce that number, supposedly mitigated by more flexible use of the reserve or regular reserve, is nothing short of a dangerous illusion.

Given that this Bill is about maximising the operational capability of our service personnel, there is one more matter that I feel bound to put before your Lordships, and I have already indicated to the Minister that I would do so. This relates to service personnel suffering from mental illness, and I stress that this point relates to serving personnel, not veterans. Serving soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines suffering from mental illness are under the care of the Defence Medical Services and, more specifically, the department of community mental health. A hundred years ago, we did not understand mental health—they called it shell shock—but today we understand anxiety, depression and PTSD and encourage people to come forward for treatment. However, when one of those serving individuals experiences a severe mental health event out of hours—potentially, a suicide event—the advice is to contact the local medical centre, if there is one, go to the local NHS A&E department, or otherwise ring the Combat Stress helpline. I am not alone in believing that this is completely unacceptable. The department of community mental health should be able to provide a 24/7 service to its patients. It is often at night and at weekends that people are at their most vulnerable.

I have raised this issue before and I am told that to provide this service would require the employment of some 40 additional mental health-trained staff, and that this would cost about £2million per annum. I am also told that in 2016, fewer than 50 serving personnel needed out-of-hours help. Fewer than 50 probably means 45, so I ask the question: is £2million really too much to help 45 serving Armed Forces personnel at a moment of crisis in their lives? In 1917, they shot soldiers who ran away with shell shock. In 2017, there are still too many cases of soldiers with PTSD who kill themselves. I do not believe that £2 million is too much for the Ministry of Defence to spend to discharge its duty of care to its serving personnel with mental health illness, let alone meeting its responsibilities under the Armed Forces covenant. Some of those serving personnel have asked the question: if the MoD can spend £6 billion on two aircraft carriers, surely there is £2 million that can be spent on us?

I apologise if I have digressed away from the Bill, but if its purpose is to maximise operational capability through more flexible arrangements for certain individuals, let us not forget other individuals whose circumstances need a more flexible approach, and that flexibility does not include ringing up a charity’s helpline.

Type 31 Frigate

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 3rd April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as we do not have a Type 31 and do not know yet what tonnage it will be, I cannot answer my noble friend’s question. However, I do not anticipate any problems with docking in Gibraltar.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, does this Question not get to the heart of the fact that our defence budget is woefully underfunded at present? We would not be discussing the number of frigates and destroyers if that were not the case. At the time of Brexit, and in the wider context of NATO, is there not a case for this country showing leadership in taking responsibility for security in Europe by increasing our defence spending, perhaps by rebalancing between the 2% of GDP spent on defence and the 0.7% spent on international development?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. That was indeed a point that came out loud and clear from the recent defence debate we had in your Lordships’ House. However, the UK is leading the way in NATO. Our defence budget is considerably more than 2% at the moment, which is the NATO target. There are, however, other European members of NATO whose defence spending does not even reach 1%. Therefore, I agree that there is a lot of ground to make up with our allies. However, in our case I remind the House that we have a budget over the next 10 years of £178 billion to invest in equipment and support, which is no mean sum.

Armed Services: Claims

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I add my thanks to that of other noble Lords to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, for proposing this important debate and to the other Cross-Bench Peers who voted that we should discuss these matters today.

However, we should not be having to spend valuable parliamentary time on this subject in the first place. The fact that we are having this discussion today is not as a result of a plethora of cases of abuse and wrongdoing by British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan but as a result of an abject failure by Her Majesty’s Government to back members of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces in their carrying out of difficult and dangerous duties on behalf of the people of this country.

Rather than hundreds of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines facing indictment for a range of alleged offences, it is the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice that should be facing popular indictment for an abject failure to stand up to the threats from the International Criminal Court to take over the investigation of British service personnel. The lack of faith in the good conduct of the vast majority of British service personnel is lamentable—little short of shameful. The only exonerating mitigation available is that the Prime Minister had the moral courage to cross Whitehall and meet with the service chiefs on this issue. However, it should never have come to this. As my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood’s Motion states, it should not do so in the future.

At the heart of the issue is the willingness of government Ministers and officials to believe the fallacious allegations of Iraqis and Afghans, themselves manipulated by unscrupulous and commercially driven lawyers, rather than to have confidence in the Armed Forces’ chain of command and the tried and tested processes of investigation and judicial disposal.

Like other Members of your Lordships’ House who have spent time on operations around the world, I am fully aware that there are incidents of abuse and wrongdoing by members of the Armed Forces when deployed. Such incidents are, of course, deeply regrettable and where credible allegations are made, investigations follow and, if appropriate, due process of law is applied. One such example is the action taken in the genuinely outrageous Baha Mousa case, which resulted in a court martial and a conviction. But this stands in shameful contrast to the treatment of Sergeant Rachel Webster of the Royal Military Police. She was arrested in the early hours of the morning in her home by members of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, an experience she described as,

“tantamount to being kidnapped by the state”.

The fact that Rachel Webster, who served for 24 years in the Army, was subsequently paid a four-figure compensation sum illustrates the degree to which this whole matter has got out of hand.

In conclusion, I want to ask the Minister a number of questions. How many cases of abuse and wrongdoing have been alleged to the Iraq and Afghanistan historic allegations teams? How many of those cases have led to formal criminal justice proceedings? How many convictions have there been? It is my understanding that the answers to my own questions are: thousands in Iraq and hundreds in Afghanistan, with no more than a handful of cases going to court at most, and there have been no significant convictions to date. Furthermore, will the Minister tell the House what the financial cost of these inquiries has been to date?

Finally, does the Minister agree with me that the financial cost is nothing whatever when compared to the loss of morale and operational effectiveness by members of the Armed Forces and loss of confidence in the Government, in whose name, on behalf of the people of this country, they have been operating? We must never put our soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines in this position again.

NATO Warsaw Summit

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there is no question of NATO ground troops being sent to Ukraine. On the other hand, the NATO Council was very clear that there is a role for NATO alliance members to support Ukraine in training in particular, and that is a major commitment of ours. Clearly, we would not wish to do anything that would serve to escalate the tensions that exist in Ukraine. We are encouraging both Ukraine and Russia to support the Minsk process and adhere to the commitments given at Minsk. Nothing that would escalate the violence that we have seen in eastern Ukraine should be contemplated.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, may I take the Minister back to the issue of withdrawal from Germany, raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig? The principle of forward deployment for practical and demonstrative purposes has been well illustrated by what is going to happen in Estonia and other areas of the Baltic. However, although I have been supportive for many years of withdrawing the Army from Germany, is there not a case for looking again at leaving one of our armoured infantry brigades in the well-found garrison of Paderborn and Sennelager, and saving ourselves the capital expenditure of building a third armoured infantry garrison around Salisbury Plain? This would also demonstrate, in the post-Brexit environment we find ourselves in, that we are willing to remain physically present in Germany with about 2,500 of our troops. I think it is worth looking at again, and I urge the Minister to take that thought back to the Ministry of Defence and think about it again.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I will gladly do that. In fact, I can tell him that these matters are under continual review, as he would expect. There is undoubtedly a value to the idea of British troops remaining in Germany to a certain level, able to train alongside our German partners. However, I am not in a position at the moment to give him definite news on that front. What I can say, though, is that the bulk of UK forces will be withdrawn as planned. We believe that that is the right thing to do at this juncture, but we do not rule out keeping a contingent in Germany for the kinds of purposes that the noble Lord suggests.

Army: Helicopter Pilots

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

Let me first make it clear that the overpayment referred to in the Question has not affected Royal Navy air crew, nor indeed RAF pilots. I can give the noble Lord the reassurance that he seeks, because the action now being taken is in the wake of mistakes made in the past. The system is now working correctly.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I served as Colonel Commandant of the Army Air Corps from 2004 to 2009, and many of the pilots involved came under my control and command. Will the Minister accept that, although remedial measures are being taken, stories such as the one that has given rise to the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, are enormously damaging to morale? Will the Minister commit to publicly refuting these stories and getting a much better message out there? In the context of the regular Army having been reduced from 102,000 to 82,000 in the lifetime of the coalition and Conservative Governments, and now having fallen to a strength of around 79,000, such damaging stories are extraordinarily destructive of morale and do not help the safety and security of our country.

[Earl Howe]

I can only agree with my noble friend—these stories are damaging. At the same time, the Army is very aware of the need to retain and, indeed, recruit skilled personnel of this level. It has been careful to adopt a case-by-case approach when overpayments have occurred, taking account of people’s individual circumstances when they are brought to its attention; certainly, that includes hardship where necessary. What we are now hearing in general from Army pilots is that they like what they see in the package available to them, in terms not only of pay but how their skills are being used. Many are signing up now for five years.

Armed Forces: Future Force 2020

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Thursday 25th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it makes absolute sense to look to our reserves to house some of the deep specialties that the Armed Forces are looking for. It makes sense because the reserves can deliver capabilities that can be safely held at lower readiness, which provides access to skills that are best developed and maintained in the civil sector or are not practical or too costly to retain in full-time military service. A good example of that is cyber, although there are others, such as language intelligence analysts. We are seeing the success of that policy. Indeed, on recruiting reservists more generally, we are on track to achieve our targets.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, now that the recent period of high operational deployment has concluded—at least perhaps temporarily—will the Minister reassure the House that, within Future Force 2020, progress is being made towards recruiting sufficient regular and perhaps reserve medical specialists in order that the Defence Medical Services can meet their obligations in the future, and in particular that we are recruiting sufficient mental health specialists so that our serving soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have 24/7 mental health cover?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there are a number of pinch points in the armed services, but, broadly speaking, they are in areas where there are skills shortages in the wider economy. Medical expertise is one of those skills, but there are also areas specific to military organisations, such as logistics and intelligence. We are taking a multifaceted approach to tackling those shortages—for example, financial retention incentives, extensions and continuance of service, targeted recruitment incentives and a direct entry scheme—but there is no single bullet. I am aware that medical services represent a challenge, but one that I think we are slowly winning.

Syria and Iraq: Airspace

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Thursday 22nd October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this idea has obvious immediate appeal. But when one drills down into the practicalities one soon realises that there are serious obstacles to creating so-called safe havens or buffer zones in any part of Syria. Those zones would need to be policed and reinforced. If they were not, we would see a repeat of what we had in Bosnia with the Srebrenica massacre, and the sheer effort of putting men on the ground to ensure that those safe areas really were safe would be enormous.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with what the noble Lord, Lord Reid, just said about shooting the wolf closest to the sledge, and I have heard that the memorandum is beginning to increase co-operation between air forces operating in the Iraq-Syria airspace. Can the noble Earl say when this House and the other House will be consulted on the extension of Royal Air Force operations of an offensive nature over Syrian airspace so that we can slay that wolf that is nearest to the sledge as soon as possible?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made very clear that ISIL needs to be destroyed in Syria as well as Iraq. He was clear when he said that that there is a strong case for us to do more in Syria. But, as he also said, it would be better if there were a consensus supporting such action in the House of Commons. His views on that have not changed, but what has changed is the growing evidence that ISIL poses an increasing threat to us here in this country. I cannot give the noble Lord a date on which such a vote might take place, but before that we would clearly need to be sure that that political consensus was there.

The Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I very much welcome the debate this afternoon, which is very timely in the context of the work being done on the current SDSR. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, outlined at the start, we are all conscious of the current security situation in which we are operating. Quite rightly, the noble Earl pointed out the wide range of operations and activities that UK Armed Forces are superbly carrying out at present.

I also welcome the commitment made before the Summer Recess to 2% of GDP being spent on defence because that is a considerable help to defence planners as they do their work within the SDSR. I made a side note to myself as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, was speaking. I do not want to step into the word-eating competition between himself and the Minister, but I would observe that in 1997 when the then new Labour Government began their strategic defence review, I was the director of the defence programme staff, which in simple terms meant that I had some staff responsibility for the allocation of funds. It was actually an extraordinarily good SDR with a good series of policy outcomes which were widely recognised at the time. The sadness about that otherwise excellent SDR was its underfunding almost from the start. Over the next 13 years as I progressed from being a brigadier as the director of the defence programme staff until I retired as Chief of the General Staff in 2009, I watched the cumulative effect of the underfunding of the defence programme. I do not know whether the figure was £10 billion short in the defence equipment programme, or whether it was £35 billion or £38 billion short, but a shortage of funds in that programme undoubtedly accumulated as a result of the underfunding of the otherwise excellent SDR of 1997 through to the culmination of the then Government and the election in 2010 and the SDSR of that year. I shall watch with interest to see what the OBR says about the size of that underspend, but I am in no doubt from my own observation of 13 years in and out of the Ministry of Defence that underspend in equipment there undoubtedly was.

A useful and constructive point to make today is that the commitment to 2% of GDP being spent on defence undoubtedly gives the planners, in the context of this SDSR, a confirmed budget and a firm baseline from which to operate and to counter the wide-ranging challenges we know we are experiencing both at home and abroad. We must make sure that we have the right set of capabilities to deal with them.

Without rehearsing the many positives of the UK Armed Forces, I would like to raise a number of points in areas where I think we could and should do better. One of the principal lessons we learnt from our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we handicapped ourselves at the outset with our poor level of understanding of the culture, history and background of those countries. The current initiative for greater emphasis being placed on defence engagement is hugely to be welcomed: to use some of our existing resources more robustly when exercising in those parts of the world we think we want to understand better and where there is a possibility that we might find ourselves operating in the future. This seems to be an extremely effective and worthwhile use of military capability. The question I would be grateful if the noble Earl would consider answering either today or at another time is whether defence engagement will formally become a military task. It seems eminently sensible to me—it is not expensive and it would authorise the use of much of our existing capability.

A subset of defence engagement is our ability to communicate with the people in the countries in which we are operating. I am talking about language skills and the need for us to use interpreters. I am mindful of the current criticism of the present Government’s policy on Afghan interpreters and whether we are looking after them adequately. I am grateful to the Minister for his recent letter explaining what the Government’s policy is. I regret that I have not yet written to the noble Earl to thank him, but this is advance notice of my thanks. However, I would point out that there is a perception that our policy is ungenerous and mean in some regards. Whether that is true, I am not entirely sure; I discussed it with the Minister for the Armed Forces last week. If it is not mean and ungenerous, there is a perception that that is the case. In my view, I think that it would be sensible of Her Majesty’s Government to mount a proactive campaign pointing out that we are looking after our interpreters properly rather than to allow the alternative narrative to gain credence. If it is thought that when the UK needs language assistants and interpreters in faraway places where we do not have native skills ourselves, then in the global world in which we live, people in other countries will be very wary of taking on employment with us if they think that when we have departed, we will have no further interest in their welfare or well-being. There is a problem. It must be addressed. If it is only a problem of perception, it still has to be addressed.

Also in this further subject of defence engagement on the softer side of defence, I would be interested to hear whether the Minister believes that sufficient effort is being made in terms of co-operation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DfID and the Ministry of Defence in working together to prevent conflict through better integration of our defence, diplomatic and development capabilities. We have talked about this a lot in recent years. I am not convinced that I have sufficient evidence that we are putting substance into the words and there is a lot to be achieved in preventing conflict by better integration of our capabilities in those three areas.

This debate is essentially about capabilities to meet the current security threats that we face. One of those threats is from a resurgent Russia under its current President Vladimir Putin. I have raised before that although back in 2010 and prior to that I was one of those who very much favoured the complete withdrawal of the Army from Germany—in 2010 it seemed to be the right thing and I welcomed that within the context of the SDSR—I believe that we would send a useful and quite significant message if we were to leave an element, perhaps a brigade-sized element, of our Army in Germany. In this regard, is the Minister confident that we will have the funds to complete the withdrawal from Germany in the timeframe predicated in the 2010 SDSR? If, as I suspect, we do not have those funds, it is a consideration that we could turn a necessity into a virtue by deciding to leave an armoured brigade in Paderborn and Sennelagar. That would show solidarity with our NATO allies on the continent of Europe and contribute to sending a message that the UK does indeed take seriously its defence responsibilities in mainland Europe. That would not be an expensive thing to do, but it may be a necessity and I would strongly urge Her Majesty’s Government to consider turning that necessity into a virtue.

Another point that I remain concerned about that I have raised in your Lordships’ House before is the issue of protected mobility. Whether we remain with an element still in Germany or not, our battlefield manoeuvre capability remains compromised by the effective cancellation in 2007 of the Army’s medium-weight vehicle replacement programme. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, recalled a conversation with me at about that time when he asked me about my priority for the FRES programme, which is the unfortunate acronym for that particular programme. My priority was and is the Scout vehicle, mostly because the vehicle that it was due to replace, the CVRT vehicle, was designed in the 1970s and very light. The concept of its design was to be small enough to go between two rubber trees in Malaya. Clearly, that concept was outdated by the time we got to Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, I said that my priority was that we should have the Scout vehicle. But it was only my priority in a whole range of vehicles that we required at medium weight. The only survivor of that medium-weight vehicle replacement programme is the Scout vehicle, now called Ajax.

Now that we have withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Army is reconfiguring to Army 2020 around several brigades but three armoured infantry brigades, there are battalions within those armoured infantry brigades that do not have the vehicles that were originally intended in the 2001-02 endorsed medium-weight vehicle replacement programme. Those battalions are now equipped with what we salvaged from Afghanistan under the UOR programme—the Mastiffs and the Ridgebacks. Those vehicles have no place on a modern-manoeuvre battlefield. I cannot see where we will fight a modern-manoeuvre battle, but a lot of us cannot see much about the future and at some point we will be required to put one or more armoured infantry brigades into the field, probably in a division, and those battalions and combat support, and combat service support units, do not have suitable battlefield mobility. That remains a major failing.

It comes back to this issue of: was there a deficit in the defence budget building up towards 2009-10? Yes, there was. The competition in the Defence Board in 2007 was between two major programmes, of which there was money only for one. One was the carrier strike programme and the other was the Army’s medium-weight replacement vehicle programme. A debate was had, a decision was taken and the carrier strike programme was funded. It would be churlish of me to be anything other than welcoming of the two new large aircraft carriers, in which we can all take pride in the future. However, I am in no doubt that the casualty of that success was the Army’s medium-weight vehicle replacement programme, which leaves our Army hobbled in the future. I have a question for the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I do not think there is much difference between us on this issue. I am prepared to agree with the noble Lord; I am sure it is still correct that we could have, and probably should have, spent even more money implementing the 1998 White Paper, which, as he said, was an excellent White Paper. That, however, is not what is referred to when the black hole myth is mentioned. The black hole myth implies not that we did not contract for enough military equipment—you can always usefully buy more military equipment and, of course, there are other things we could and would have liked to have done if we had had the money to do it—but that we could not pay for the equipment that we had contracted for. The programmes the noble Lord is talking about—the rest of the FRES programme, apart from Scout and so forth—was not something we ever contracted for or pretended that we had contracted for. There is a real distinction here and I do not think there is any difference between my perception of that period of our history and that of the noble Lord.

[Lord Dannatt]

I am very grateful for that information. I do not want to extend this debate unduly other than to observe that at the time when the Army endorsed the requirement for what became the FRES programme in 2001-02, the money for that programme was available because we had cancelled two other programmes, TRACER and MRAV, and the production money sat in the budget for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. We could have paid for it if the money had not been reallocated by the Defence Board to the otherwise very welcome carrier strike programme. However, I do not want to go any further down that track other than to observe, without being unduly lengthy, that I attended the Welcome to Norfolk party for the Queen’s Dragoon Guards last week—a reconnaissance regiment which previously had been equipped with CVRT and might have been expected to be equipped with something like Scout, but discovered that they have four-wheeled unarmed Jackals and their combat boots in which to conduct their reconnaissance. They have less capability than they have had over the last 30 or 40 years and this, I am afraid, illuminates the fact that, if we had more money, we would have done more things that we needed to do. We did not have that money: therefore, we have gaps in our capability.

I am conscious that I have taken far too much time, for which I apologise. However, I have a wider concern about our national defence industrial capability. It is something that we are right to worry about. We are told that European collaborative ventures, while superficially attractive, are the way forward, but experience has shown that many of them are costly and slow. We often do not get what we want when we want it and in a manner that we want. The alternative is that our national industrial capability is protected and preserved. That, of course, is good for jobs and apprenticeships in this country, and is good for giving youngsters coming out of education hope for decent employment in the future. However, I accept that bolstering, if you like, the national industrial capability is more expensive. Perhaps less expensive is not to go down the multilateral European route but to adopt some bilateral options. Some very good examples exist of bilateral arrangements between the French and the United Kingdom at the present time and, indeed, of course, with our well-known partner, the United States.

There is a current debate about Apache attack helicopter replacement: should we buy Boeing off the shelf or Westland, as we did last time? It does not have to be an either/or debate: we could buy the aircraft from Boeing and Westland could undertake to do the maintenance and upgrade. However, I worry that if we go too much further down the European collaborative track we will not get what we want when we want it and it will cost an awful lot more.

Finally, I am suspicious—maybe overly so—that those who are keen proponents of European defence industrial integration see it as a stepping stone to European armed forces integration, ultimately providing a unified set of European armed forces, which is an essential element for those who wish to see full European political integration. I may be overworrying here, and there is a wider issue at stake, but I would not want to see defence used as a Trojan horse in a wider political argument.

Counter-ISIL Coalition Strategy

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I do agree and I am grateful to my noble friend for his comments. He is quite right: ISIL does not respect international boundaries. My Secretary of State has said publicly that he thinks it is logically incoherent that the United Kingdom is unable to engage in offensive operations over the border into Syria, whereas it is able to do so in Iraq. Nevertheless, we have been absolutely clear that we will return to Parliament for a separate decision if we propose to take military action against ISIL in Syria. Having said that, as the Prime Minister has made clear, if there were a critical British national interest at stake, or a need to act to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, we would act immediately in those circumstances and explain to Parliament afterwards.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I have no particular brief to offer an explanation of what my noble and gallant friend Lord Richards said recently. However, if we take seriously the fact that ISIL must be defeated, the broad strategy of the coalition must be pursued with all vigour. I am sure that the noble Earl agrees with that. We need to do that to make sure that we do not, in extremis, ultimately have to put British soldiers and British units on the ground. Therefore, we must do everything short of doing that. Does the noble Earl agree that, although it is tremendous that there is now a coalition of 60 nations fighting ISIL, those myriad 60 countries can lead to confusion among those we are trying to help? A country such as the United Kingdom has great expertise in providing training teams, equipment and know-how to those fighting on the ground. Therefore, will the noble Earl bring to bear all the influence he can within the Ministry of Defence to ensure that we deploy our maximum efforts to send British training teams, so that our expertise is maximised and the confusion which a number of the recipient countries are experiencing is reduced?

[Earl Howe]

I agree with the thrust of the noble Lord’s points and questions. He is absolutely right that, to the extent that we are able to do so, we should use our strongest endeavours to contribute to the anti-ISIL effort. We will contribute around 85 military personnel to US-led training of the moderate Syrian opposition, training thousands of screened members of the opposition over the next three years in, for example, the use of small arms, infantry tactics and medical skills. More than 6,000 Syrians have volunteered for the train-and-equip programme and are in various stages of registration, pre-screening and vetting. It is imperative that we attract, recruit and retain the right candidates. We screen potential recruits thoroughly.

Our focus will initially be on helping the new Syrian forces defend communities against ISIL and eventually lead offences against its brutal attacks. Training will take place in Turkey and other countries in the region. I have already referred to the training we are undertaking in Iraq, which, as I have said, is welcomed by the Iraqi Government and is proving effective.