Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we now turn, in my submission, to probably one of the most important groups of amendments on the Bill, which I am sure will promote some discussion and likely much disagreement. That is perhaps something to be welcomed.

The stated aim of the Human Rights Act, when it was introduced, was to bring rights home. It incorporates 16 rights derived from the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law and was itself enacted to satisfy the obligations placed on the British Government by Article 1 of the ECHR. This was all to satisfy a noble purpose: to make sure that human rights in the United Kingdom were protected and upheld. But we have seen the corruption of this noble purpose no more keenly than when we see how it has been applied to matters of immigration and deportation.

To give an example, noble Lords will no doubt be familiar with the horrific abuses inflicted on girls by the Rochdale grooming gangs. Two of the Rochdale grooming gang ringleaders, Adil Khan and Qari Abdul Rauf, fought deportation by claiming their right to a family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is also Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. Rauf even gave up his Pakistani citizenship just to make sure that we could not deport him. He lost his appeals, yet he is still here: still in Rochdale, still living among the people whose lives he destroyed.

It is clear that, under the straitjacket imposed on us by the Human Rights Act, our country has lost control of the asylum system. Hundreds of thousands of people have come here claiming to be refugees—far more than politicians before us ever imagined—almost all passing through neighbouring countries which are perfectly safe. Tens of thousands of them will receive taxpayer-funded legal aid, which is spent on lawyers competing to devise ever more ingenious legal arguments to keep them in the country.

Let me give your Lordships some more examples. One woman, who was refused leave to remain, deliberately joined a terrorist organisation to manufacture a claim that she risked imprisonment back home. A convicted paedophile evaded deportation by claiming he was gay and that his life would be at risk in his home country. And let us not forget the Albanian criminal who claimed in February that he could not be deported because of his son’s sensitivity around food, the sole example given in court being his aversion to foreign chicken nuggets. The immigration tribunal ruled that his deportation would breach his Article 8 rights, as it would apparently have an “unduly harsh” impact on his son.

Every day we see these kinds of cases reported, and tens of thousands of illegal immigrants, mainly adult men, take the risk of crossing the channel in small boats because they know that we cannot remove even criminals and terrorists. Indeed, we pay their legal fees to help them stay. We have seen this unjust situation unfold further with the Government’s returns deal with France. The week before Parliament broke for recess saw the first two flights leave with no migrants on board. Those who were due to be deported on those flights had their deportation orders halted by the High Court due to concerns about human trafficking and torture. The new Home Secretary herself admonished those trying to use the Human Rights Act and the ECHR to prevent their deportation as

“making a mockery of our laws”.

How can this situation be a reflection of the laudable aims that heralded the incorporation of the ECHR into our statute book in 1998? The simple answer is that it is not. The dream has become a nightmare, and the time has come for us to do something about it. That is why I and my noble friends on these Benches have tabled this amendment.

There is a point I wish to clarify here. After the excellent, thorough report of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, the Conservative Party has committed itself to repealing the Human Rights Act and leaving the ECHR. While it is no longer the policy of the Official Opposition simply to disapply the Human Rights Act for immigration cases, this Bill does not present us with the opportunity to repeal the HRA. To do so would require a Bill of its own. This amendment is therefore the avenue through which we are able at this stage to facilitate discussion on the impact of our continued membership of the ECHR.

I know that some noble Lords in your Lordships’ House today will disagree with me. As I have already said, the debate is welcome, but I ask those who disagree whether our situation now, this minute, is one that the Human Rights Act is working to improve. Has the Human Rights Act protected the victims, their families and communities in Rochdale? Has it protected our people from the paedophiles who continue to languish in the United Kingdom because we cannot deport them? Does it help or hinder people smugglers who use it to reassure the people they are transporting that they will not be removed? The answer is clear: the Human Rights Act in this context does not uphold human rights. It aids and abets abusers in their abuse. Trauma is continued and renewed because of the Act. The rights of our people come second to the rights of child abusers and terrorists, who hide behind the Act to remain on our shores, to remain a threat to our people and to remain a source of terror and pain for the people they have already harmed. We are prevented from deporting those who show flagrant disrespect for the laws passed by our sovereign Parliament, but even more fundamentally it prevents us enacting the wishes of the British people. This is an untenable situation that we must swiftly seek to remedy.

I further welcome the amendments to Amendment 189 tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth; they perform an important function in strengthening its purpose. While that amendment would disapply the Human Rights Act from immigration legislation, my noble friend’s additions would ensure that the mechanisms contained in Sections 4 and 10 of the Human Rights Act are also expressly excluded. In practice, this means that the courts would not be able to issue declarations of incompatibility in relation to immigration law; nor would Ministers be able to use remedial orders to alter such legislation on human rights grounds. That would close off any backdoor reintroduction of Human Rights Act challenges into this field, and it would provide the clarity and certainty that are essential if this policy is to be delivered effectively. I therefore strongly support these amendments as a logical and necessary reinforcement of the central principle of Amendment 189.

As has been said in the other place, now is the time for radical decisions. This is an amendment the Government should welcome if we are to stand up for the rights and well-being of the British people. I beg to move.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as foreshadowed by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, I have two amendments in this group that seek to amend the Front Bench disapplication provision for the Human Rights Act. Of course, disapplication feels rather “yesterday”; the Overton window on the question of human rights law is now clearly swinging in favour of repeal of the Human Rights Act, following the excellent report produced by my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and the announcement of the party’s new policy. Be that as it may, for the purposes of this Bill, the correct approach, which I suggest the Minister should grasp with both hands, is to disapply the effect of the convention and the operation of the Act in the sphere of immigration decisions.

Disapplying the Human Rights Act from this area is not unprecedented. As the Minister will recall, this provision was incorporated, in a slightly different form, in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, and it was clearly a matter that passed both Houses of Parliament. It is both a precedented and a necessary step.

I turn briefly to the context for my amendment. The amendment itself would add two further provisions to the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Davies: that is, to include in the operation Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, which is the court power to make a declaration of incompatibility, and Section 10, which is a power to remedy any incompatibility by means of a statutory instrument. As Policy Exchange observed in its paper on the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act in December 2023, that disapplication provision did not mention Sections 4 and 10 and was the worse for it, because the experience has been that, where a court can make a declaration of incompatibility, those matters are taken almost automatically by the Government as warranting some sort of remedial step.

No Government so far have ignored a declaration of incompatibility, to my knowledge. For example, in the recent case where the Northern Irish High Court found an incompatibility in the legacy Act, the decision of the Government was to bring forward a remedial order to have the effect of suspending the operation of the provisions of that Act without waiting for primary legislation, itself a controversial move. To avoid that situation recurring, I have tabled these amendments to exclude from any potential challenge to immigration-related decisions a decision by a court to make a declaration of incompatibility, or a decision by a Government to attempt to remedy it by making a remedial order under Section 10 of the Human Rights Act.

It is clearly time that we took back control of the United Kingdom’s borders. This Government, and particularly this Home Office, know the difficulties that trying to operate within the constraints of the Human Rights Act has generated as it has evolved. I encourage the Minister to accept a provision similar to this so that he can implement the policies of his Government.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, in an earlier day of Committee, the Committee heard an exchange between my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower and the Minister. It was pointed out that political gatherings of more than 200 people quite frequently happen in Members of Parliament’s constituencies. Quite often there is a local issue, or indeed a national issue, that encourages public engagement. One of the features of this Bill is that it is striking that there has been no discussion about the impact of the measures in the Bill on the right to protest. That is an ancient right under common law but it is now found also, in part, in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention, as scheduled to the Human Rights Act.

One of the Bill documents produced by the Home Office—quite rightly—when this Bill was produced was the human rights memorandum prepared for the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. That document does not appear to engage with the question of whether this Bill will infringe or curtail any person’s Article 10 or 11 rights to protest. It is noticeable, given that omission from the human rights memorandum, that the Minister and his equivalent in the Commons certified on the front of the Bill that, in their view, it was compliant with the convention. I am afraid that I beg to differ with that analysis—at least to the extent of the amendment proposed on the Marshalled List today.

We will look at what the amendment does in a second. By way of background, it is important to point out that on 6 February this year, the Court of Appeal, presided over by the Lady Chief Justice, produced a judgment in the case of Sarti, Hall and Plummer against the Crown: 2025 EWCA Crim 61. The Court of Appeal considered, as part of the Just Stop Oil protests, appeals brought by individuals who had been protesting by closing Earl’s Court Road. The Court of Appeal, reversing or revising earlier decisions of the courts, determined that it was not necessary for a criminal court hearing a charge of this type to go through the elaborate proportionality tests required in the earlier Shvidler case, and therefore it was for the court to implement Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023.

Noble Lords will be asking, “Why is all this relevant?” It is relevant for this reason: Section 11 in Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 imposes an obligation to notify the police in advance of the date, time and proposed route of any public procession or protest which is intended

“to demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons”,

or to

“publicise a cause or campaign”.

That obligation to notify the police is not addressed in any way in the provisions of Clause 3 of our Bill, which defines “qualifying events”, and it is not inconceivable to see that there may well be a situation where a public protest falls within the definition of Clause 3.

The Bill is silent about who may be considered the responsible person and who may be liable to regulation by the SIA. In fact, the whole thing is simply inapposite. But it is not inconceivable that, unless an amendment of the type that I propose in the Marshalled List is inserted, there is a risk—albeit, as I am sure the Minister will tell me, it is a small risk—that these measures might be used to curtail protest, or have the unintentional consequence of curtailing the democratic right to protest.

For those reasons, I draw the attention of the Committee to the provisions of my amendment. Clearly, the first proposed new subsection simply ensures, as a matter of construction, that nothing in the Bill should be viewed as curtailing those Article 10 and 11 rights. Similarly, it makes clear, in proposed new subsections (2) and (3):

“The provisions of this Act shall not apply to protests or demonstrations, provided that such protests or demonstrations do not directly incite violence, threaten public safety”,


et cetera. The third provision is:

“This Act shall not be used to impede, restrict, or unlawfully interfere with the right of individuals to express dissent”


or to protest. So, in that way, this measure will simply ensure that the Bill could not be misread by any future Government, or indeed by anyone. I can see no reason why His Majesty’s Government would not accept this amendment or something similar. I look forward to hearing some good news from the Minister. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 37B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. The amendment seeks to insert a new clause after Clause 31 to safeguard the right to protest, as protected under Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998. The amendment makes it clear that nothing in the Bill should be construed as infringing on the right to protest, provided that such protests are conducted peacefully and lawfully, do not incite violence and do not threaten public safety or disrupt essential services. Furthermore, it proposes that any action taken under the Bill that impacts the ability to protest or assemble should be subject to review to ensure that fundamental freedoms are not unduly restricted.

The right to protest is a cornerstone of any democratic society and one of the primary means through which individuals and groups can express their views, voice grievances and influence public discourse. Throughout history, peaceful protests have played a transformative role in shaping our society, strengthening democratic governance and securing fundamental rights and freedoms. From the suffragette movement, which fought for women’s right to vote, to more recent demonstrations calling for climate action and social justice, the ability to gather, express dissent and campaign for change has been essential to our democratic values. Indeed, the richness and resilience of British democracy have often been reinforced by the willingness of citizens to stand up and speak out when they see injustice or seek reform.

However, the context in which we now consider this amendment is one of heightened security concerns. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill rightly seeks to enhance public safety by imposing new security obligations on certain premises to protect against the ever-evolving threat of terrorism. As noble Lords will agree, this is a pressing and legitimate concern, and our duty to protect citizens from harm is paramount.

Yet, as we pursue this noble objective, we must be vigilant in ensuring that necessary security measures do not inadvertently erode the civil liberties that define us as a free and democratic society. The fight against terrorism must never become an excuse to undermine the very freedoms we seek to protect. Ensuring compatibility with human rights principles is not merely a legal obligation—it is a moral imperative.

This amendment provides much-needed clarity. It recognises that, although security is of the utmost importance, it must be balanced with the protection of democratic rights. The conditions it outlines are both reasonable and proportionate. They would ensure that protests remain peaceful, lawful and respectful of public order while preventing unnecessary or heavy-handed restrictions that could stifle legitimate dissent. The provision for review is particularly important. It would ensure accountability and create a safeguard against potential overreach by authorities. This is essential in preserving public trust, especially in the sensitive area of counterterrorism measures. If people perceive that security measures are being used to suppress dissent rather than to protect them, we risk undermining the very co-operation and solidarity needed to combat threats effectively.

Critics may argue that the amendment is unnecessary because existing legal frameworks already protect the right to protest. However, clarity within the legislation is crucial to avoid legal ambiguities or unintended consequences. By explicitly affirming the compatibility of this Bill with the right to protest, we would send a strong message that we value security and civil liberties equally and make it clear that security and freedom are not mutually exclusive but must coexist in a healthy democracy.

In practical terms, this amendment would also support public co-operation with counterterrorism efforts. When people see that their rights are respected and protected, they are more likely to trust and engage with security measures. Public trust is a critical component of effective counterterrorism strategies. A society that respects the right to peaceful assembly is one where people are more inclined to work with, rather than against, the authorities.

To be clear, this amendment would not weaken the Bill’s security provisions, or shield unlawful, violent or disruptive activities. Rather, it reinforces the principle that peaceful and lawful protest should not be treated as a threat to public safety or security. It provides assurance that this important legislation will not inadvertently target the exercise of democratic freedoms.

Moreover, we must consider the international dimension. The United Kingdom has long been regarded as a bastion of democracy and human rights. By enshrining protections for the right to protest in this Bill, we would reaffirm our commitment to those values on the global stage and demonstrate that it is possible to confront terrorism without compromising the fundamental freedoms that are the hallmark of a democratic society.

This amendment would strengthen the Bill by ensuring that it aligns with the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights. It would send a clear and important message that we can protect our citizens from terrorism without sacrificing the freedoms that define our society. Security measures that respect civil liberties are not only more just but more effective in fostering a cohesive and resilient society. I therefore urge the Government and noble Lords to support it. Let us demonstrate that we are committed to both safeguarding our citizens and upholding the principles that make this nation great. By doing so, we can ensure that our response to terrorism remains not only strong but principled, just and democratic.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35 seeks to extend the grace period for the payment of a penalty notice from 28 days to 42 days. The intention behind this change is to ensure that individuals and businesses who receive a penalty notice are not unduly penalised by an unreasonably short payment window, allowing them more time to address the fine in a manner that is fair and manageable.

In many circumstances, particularly for small businesses and those already facing financial pressure, a 28-day period may not provide sufficient time to arrange payment, especially if the penalty notice is unexpected or substantial. Extending the grace period to 42 days would offer a more reasonable timeframe for individuals and businesses to manage their obligations without rushing into payment or incurring additional costs. A longer grace period would also account for the reality that certain individuals or businesses may face logistical challenges in arranging payment within a short window. This might include delays in receiving the penalty notice, awaiting advice or support on how to address the fine, or having to co-ordinate the payment within the wider operational needs of their business. Extending the period to 42 days would provide the flexibility needed to handle these situations responsibly.

The principle behind penalty notices is not to punish excessively but to deter non-compliance while giving those who have committed an infringement a chance to rectify their actions in a reasonable manner. By extending the payment period, we can help avoid situations where individuals or businesses are unable to pay within the initial 28-day period and, as a result, face additional penalties or other consequences that exacerbate their situation unnecessarily. This amendment would therefore ensure that the penalty system remains proportionate and that the focus remains on encouraging compliance rather than imposing punitive measures that may create further hardship.

Extending the grace period would also encourage greater compliance with the penalty system as a whole. When individuals and businesses are given adequate time to pay, they are more likely to do so in full, reducing the administrative burden on chasing unpaid fines. Furthermore, it would prevent the risk of penalties escalating due to an inability to pay on time, which could of course undermine the effectiveness of the penalty system.

It is also worth noting that longer grace periods are common practice in other areas of regulation and penalty enforcement. For example, when it comes to tax payments, local government fines and other civil penalties, 42 days is frequently viewed as an appropriate balance between giving adequate time to pay and maintaining the deterrent effect of the fine. The amendment would align the penalty notice grace period with that established precedent, ensuring consistency across regulatory frameworks.

Extending the grace period for the payment of a penalty notice from 28 to 42 days would strike a fair and reasonable balance between ensuring compliance with public protection requirements and avoiding undue financial hardship. The amendment would provide individuals and businesses with the time they need to manage their responsibilities without excessive penal- isation, fostering a system that is both effective and compassionate. I urge the Government to accept the amendment and support a more balanced and equitable approach to penalty notices.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 35A, 35B, 36ZA and 37ZA. When the Bill was considered in draft by the Home Affairs Select Committee, which reported in July 2023 under the then chairmanship of Dame Diana Johnson, she said of the Bill—which at that point had a threshold of 100 for the basic tier—with the endorsement of the committee, having heard evidence about the impact of these measures on volunteering:

“However, we are concerned that the capacity figure of 100 for standard tier premises, which will capture some small and micro-sized businesses, and community-run and voluntary groups, could be disproportionate and burdensome. This category is particularly troubling because it would include many smaller venues that may not have sufficient resources to cover costs of what is proposed. It would also cover village halls, places of worship and similar amenities that provide vital community support, often on low budgets. If such places are forced to close down, this represents a win for terrorism, rather than an effective means of combatting it”.


That is at paragraph 39 of the report, and I could not have put it better myself.

The committee made that cogent point and it was responded to; in my Second Reading speech, I praised the decision taken by the Home Office under the present Government to increase the threshold for the standard tier from 100 to 200. But I remain concerned that the effect of the measures in the Bill will be to greatly harm village halls and community centres up and down our country. In particular, the effect of the measures in the Bill will reduce the appetite for members of the public to step forward and volunteer in senior roles in village halls and community centres. In an era when public involvement in these sorts of institutions is waning, it is important that the Government do not make it harder and harder to be a volunteer or a trustee of these institutions. One of the unintended effects of the Bill might be that village halls are no longer the beacons of stability and assistance within the communities that they encourage. The amendments that I propose are directed to removing the worst of the disincentives for people to volunteer and to become trustees.

The way it works in my amendments—if the Committee were to look at the supplementary Marshalled List—is that Amendment 35A seeks to remove the risk that a volunteer or an unpaid trustee would be held personally liable for financial penalties imposed under Clause 17, provided that they were acting at all times in good faith and within the scope of their duties. I do not ask for a general exemption, whereby they can act in bad faith and still expect to be exempted.

Amendment 35B would exclude a voluntary unpaid officeholder or unpaid trustee from the daily penalties, which are described in the Bill as being up to £500 a day. I suggest that that is a powerful disincentive to volunteers due to the risk to their personal liability.

Amendment 36ZA would exempt from criminal liability those volunteers, unpaid officeholders and unpaid trustees, provided again that they have acted without wilful misconduct or gross negligence. I hope the Committee will agree that it is a significant disincentive to volunteering to think that you face, on a cursory reading of the Bill, the risk of up to two years in prison for failing to adhere to the strictures in the Bill.

I appreciate that, as the Minister will tell me, this will be used only in very rare cases and is a maxima. I am sure all of that is right. However, the fact that it is in statute will be a disincentive. People will say that they are happy to volunteer but will not be the responsible person because they do not want to take the risk of having to go to prison. This amendment addresses that concern.

Finally, Amendment 37ZA simply clarifies what I think is probably already clear in the Bill: that there is no right of action generated by the Bill against a voluntary unpaid officeholder or unpaid trustee in the event that a dreadful incident occurs at their venue and that they might be personally liable. Again, that would be a significant disincentive to volunteering.

I hope it is clear why I seek these amendments to the Bill. I very much hope the Government will look carefully at creating the kind of exemptions sought by these amendments.