European Union Referendum Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Marlesford

Monday 2nd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

There could be economic advantages in doing that; equally, there are other advantages in having tax competition. I am rather in favour of the latter, as tax competition produces downward pressure on the level of taxes. A free-for-all in retail deposit insurance produces upward pressure on the guarantee and therefore on the liability of the member states extending it. The two things are diametrically opposed. I know that there are arguments in favour of unifying corporation tax rates but they do not persuade me. I do not imagine that they persuade the noble Lord either.

I come to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, who always speaks with great thought and wisdom on these matters, although I do not usually agree with him on European issues. He said something very depressing: he did not think that anybody—or very few people—would bother to read any reports produced on this matter and that people would take their decisions otherwise, perhaps by looking at the press. I have no illusions about this. I am very depressed and worried about this campaign, which could turn extremely unpleasant. I anticipate that a number of the large-selling newspapers, particularly the Sun and the Daily Mail—and the Daily Express, which does not sell very many—will adopt a very demagogic and emotive campaign, which will be rather subtle and indirect. It will use dog-whistle techniques but will really be all about foreigners, refugees and barbarians at the gate. I fear that people will be influenced by that sort of thing but I hope that it will not be a dominant number, or certainly not a majority.

We have a sophisticated democracy and an educated public, so we should not be too depressed or cynical about our fellow citizens. There must be literally millions of people in this country who will face the decision they will be asked to make in this referendum very conscious of its importance for the future of their country, their families and their communities. They will desperately want to have some clear advice and information from somewhere. If they go on to the internet they will have 5 million references and be completely paralysed, as we all are when we look up a matter which is the subject of substantial and wide-ranging controversy on the internet. It is utterly reasonable that they have a small, defined number of authoritative sources, some of which must be identified with the two campaigns but some of which should be identified with the Government.

We seem to be missing two essential points here. One is that the Government and Parliament are the servants of the public, not the other way round. It is our responsibility, and the Government’s responsibility, to provide such a source of material and information. Whether or not the elector chooses to bother with it at all would of course be his or her decision. The elector is sovereign but under no circumstances should we not fulfil our duty, which is to provide the opportunity for this important element in the decision that individual electors will need to take.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

Does it not follow from what the noble Lord is saying that one way of reducing undue influence would be for both sides of the campaign to agree on a simple exhortation: make up your own mind?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I come now to my second point, which relates to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. A citizen of this country is entitled to think that the politicians who he or she pays for will do an honest job in a case like this, by not merely providing an opportunity for a referendum to take place but providing what we can by way of elements to enable that individual elector to take a decision.

I want to re-emphasise the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. Any Government who are half competent—or even a quarter competent—will, in circumstances like this, produce their own study of the cases for joining or leaving, along with the costs of leaving or not leaving and so forth. Any Government who were 10% competent would be going through those exercises and, as he said, given that those studies will have been undertaken, they must not be kept under lock and key in Whitehall. The public in a democracy have a right to know to what conclusions the Government have come in their own studies. They have a right to have disclosed to them material information of that kind, which may be available in Whitehall or elsewhere in the interstices of government. On those two counts, it is absolutely essential that we do what we can to ensure that such reports are identified, undertaken and, above all, made available to the British public.

Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (EUC Report)

Debate between Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Marlesford

Wednesday 2nd July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am sorry, I take a different view. It seems very contradictory to me. Either you should not have fiscal integration or you should. It is very important that politicians are coherent about these things and I do not think that the Eurosceptics are coherent, not least on the matter of democracy in the EU.

Incidentally, my noble friend Lord Desai made the excellent suggestion that we should have an election for the President of the European Union. I have always been in favour of that, and I quite agree that the EU lacks democratic accountability. You hear all the time from Eurosceptics that the EU lacks democratic accountability, but the moment you suggest any measure at all, whatever it might be—changes at parliamentary level, say, or the direct election of the President—that would supply much greater accountability, they are always against it. Again, there is a blatant contradiction running through their views on the subject. I have to say that if you pursue politics on a contradictory basis like that, you do not do great credit either to your reputation for intellectual clarity or to the good faith of your arguments.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

Surely the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is wrong. The point that my noble friend Lord Lamont is making is that the eurozone requires integration. We did not join it because we were not prepared to take part in that integration. The European countries joined because they were prepared to integrate but then they did not actually do it. That is what all the problems were about.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I repeat that you cannot at the same time complain about something when it is absent and then complain when it is present; that does not make any sense to me at all. Equally, I do not think that I have heard any response to my points about democratic accountability. If there is a desire for more democratic accountability in the EU, which there is, and if it should be addressed, which in my view it should be, then you cannot turn down every possible proposal that is made in order to achieve that, which is what the Eurosceptics tend to do.

I think that our report makes three conclusions. The first is that the general direction of genuine monetary and economic union is probably right. We support it and think that it is a sensible thing for the eurozone to be engaged in. We feel that it should go further and be completed. We think that it is troubling that one or two elements of the agenda have not been implemented and will not be in the immediate future, notably the retail bank deposit insurance system that we have just referred to and which has been referred to several times today; we are broadly in favour of that and think that it is a very good scheme.

The second general conclusion is that this process is not without risks and costs for our country. That point is made very clearly in paragraphs 185 and 186 of our report, to which I draw the Committee’s attention. It is also made in another document, the British Bankers’ Association report, which we have obviously all been sent. I have been sent a copy, and it has already been referred to and quoted from. I shall quote from it in case some people here have not received it:

“EU, government and industry studies have shown that deepening the Single European Market offers a growth potential that is achievable without further increasing public debt … However, the understandable moves towards stronger Eurozone governance may make it more difficult for the UK financial sector to play a full role. For example, development of Eurozone caucusing, outside the EU-28 format, on matters that impact directly the Single Financial Market could, even unwittingly, damage its integrity”.

The document goes on to raise other risks, not just caucusing but the risk of the eurozone having a permanent president, the risk of the new configuration of the European Parliament being less likely to defend British interests—largely because the Conservative Party withdrew from the EPP, so that is entirely its fault—and other risks.

The fact is that the British public have been bamboozled, and this report goes some way towards redressing that and illuminating them, which is very necessary. They had been persuaded to believe that somehow we can have a half-in and half-out approach, with one foot on one side of the fence and one on the other in our relations with the EU at no cost, or that we can gain all the benefits from the EU without actually subscribing to all its programmes and disciplines. The sheer fact is that you can never do that in life, and you cannot do it in this case. Personally, I would prefer any measure of relationship with and access to the European single market and the EU than none. I am the sort of person who would always prefer half a loaf or even a quarter to no bread at all. However, I am very conscious that we are losing some portion of the loaf by the course that we are adopting. That comes out very clearly in the conclusions to the report, and we have fulfilled a useful function in writing it.

European Banking Union: EUC Report

Debate between Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Marlesford

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, it has happened more times than I can recall since I have been in this House, nearly two and a half years, that I have had the pleasure of following the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, or he has had the task of following me. Although I rarely agree with him about very much, it is a great pleasure to debate with him. However, I did agree with two things that he said this afternoon. First, I share his view that the ECB, in practice, is likely to have a dominating and increasing intellectual influence on the EBA. Secondly, I very much agree with his characterisation of the way the European Union makes progress as two steps forward, one step back. Although he probably would not agree, I think that is a very sensible, sound and prudent way of advancing in difficult territory, and I am very content that that has been and continues to be the process. Had he put the order the other way around, I would have very much disagreed with him, but his judgment and mine are very much the same in that way.

I want to add my own word of tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, and to everyone on the committee for having brought forward a very interesting and timely report. I want to address just two of the issues on which the committee focused in drawing up that report, and then to say a few words about the position of the British Government. First, I recognise that the testimony that the committee received was rather conflicting. A very important and fundamental issue is whether it is right to have the monetary authority—in this case, the European Central Bank—as the supervisory authority for the banking system. It seems to me that it is right. There is often said to be a conflict of interest between financial stability and monetary policy. I see it not so much as a conflict of interest but of objectives. It is not the sort of conflict that can be eased or solved by separation of responsibilities. On the contrary, it is the sort of conflict that can be made a great deal worse by the excessive separation of responsibilities, because if there is a problem and in difficult times the supervisory authority feels it necessary in the interests of financial stability to provide more liquidity to the market, for example, or to support a particular bank by replacing deposits that may be fleeing elsewhere, or otherwise, that decision would immediately have monetary consequences and could be implemented anyway only by the central bank.

The central bank needs to be brought in—inevitably, it must be brought in—and the earlier the better. What is more, the central bank is in a very good position because of its open market operations, because it can see to what extent banks are varying their levels of deposit with itself, and because it knows about any drawings through the back door by banks in its area of responsibility. It is in a very good position to see whether liquidity problems are emerging for institutions in their area. Therefore it seems to me extremely important that the supervisory authority and the central bank should work together anyway. The idea of having two different directorates within one institution—the ECB—responsible for stability and for monetary policy seems to me a very good solution. I personally have the greatest confidence that, if there is a difficult decision to be made—as there will be, inevitably—it should be Mario Draghi, a person in whom I have the greatest confidence, who has the responsibility of making that decision.

The other issue that I want to address, which was dealt with in the committee’s report at some length, is whether it is desirable or acceptable for the banking industry come in in stages. Only the first stage so far has been agreed. Of course, it cannot be certain that there can be any agreement with the second or third stages, the first stage being the supervision regime and the second and third stages being retail deposit insurance and resolution procedure and mechanism. Clearly, it is not ideal; it is not the way one would wish these things to be, but I think it is a reasonably acceptable situation on a temporary basis, and a good deal better than nothing. I am glad that we have the process going.

I have to say that I think the Germans are not being rational. Maybe the Germans, and the Dutch, are resisting a European Union-wide resolution and retail deposit insurance system simply because if there were a problem and a run on the banks in one member state because in that particular context depositors no longer had confidence in the credibility of the retail deposit insurance system, and if that confidence depended entirely on the credibility of the national Government, unsupported elsewhere in the EU, there would inevitably be a systemic crisis. Similarly, if it was necessary for a particular member state to recapitalise the banks, and that task was out of proportion to the financial resources of that particular member state, that would engender immediately a sovereign debt crisis for that country.

What is more, such a crisis would never be limited to one member state. There would be knock-on and systemic effects for the whole of the European Union. If Greece went down, we know that there would be effects elsewhere, or if Portugal went down again there would no doubt be strong effects in Spain. The consequences of that would be that German and Dutch banks—to take the examples of the two countries that are resisting the logic of the banking union, which I think they are—would find that they are making great write-offs of their assets that were exposed to these particular markets and deposits with those banks, and so on. They could be supported only by their own banks, which would have to be recapitalised by their own national Governments.

The cost of such a bailout would be enormous and vastly greater than any credible drawing in respect of one, two or three particular institutions on a retail deposit insurance scheme. I think that the Germans are being quite illogical about this. They are not looking at the matter in the long term or in the round. No doubt intellectually they might agree with me, but they find themselves under political constraints. I hope that with the various events that are in the pipeline in the coming months they will find that it is politically possible to do what I think is the rational thing to do.

I now want to say something about the position of the British Government in all this, which seems to be perfectly ludicrous, if I may say so. I understand that they see the banking union as a good thing for others but not for us. That immediately is a slightly suspect argument, and one wonders why it is the case. I looked at the committee report to see what the British Government’s analysis of the national interest was, and why it was not in our interests to join the banking union if it made sense for other people. There is no such explanation in the whole document. I shall read what passes for an explanation to the House. Paragraph 129 states:

“The Government have repeatedly stated that the UK will not participate in the banking union proposals, on the grounds that the measures logically flow from monetary union and are designed to secure the success of the single currency”.

That is a quite unconvincing argument. If someone buys a car, a pharmaceutical product or a piece or electronic gadgetry, he is not worried about who the product was originally designed for; he is worried about whether it is suitable for him, and whether it will work for him. That is the argument that needs to be addressed, but it has not been addressed by the Government at all.

[Lord Marlesford]

Surely what the noble Lord has just been saying is precisely the reason why the British Government do not want to join the banking union. They are saying that there must be mutualisation through the European Central Bank and the banking union of the debt of banks in the euro area. Is he really suggesting that it would be sensible for the British Government to share in that liability, and that if, as he described graphically, there were to be a run on one of the banks in Greece, we, too, should have our share in picking up the pieces?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Indeed, I am suggesting exactly that to the noble Lord and to the House. It would be very much in our interests to do so, for the reason that I thought I had explained. Perhaps the noble Lord did not follow my argument, which was that if there were a run on the banks in a member state, left to itself it could engender a systemic crisis that would be far more costly to us, because British banks would write off a very large portion of their assets as a result of collapses elsewhere. In order to restore those banks to financial viability, we would need to recapitalise and support them in ways that would be much more expensive than the likely cost of any contribution to the system. I do not want to detain the House for too long, but I believe that we should have interventions such as this, so I will give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Marlesford]

In that case, why did the American banks not recapitalise the British banks that went bust?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

It is obviously necessary, if we are going to get involved in any kind of obligation of this kind, to make sure that we come under the same supervisory authority and that everybody works according to the same rules. That is palpably not the case with us and the United States.

The position of the British Government is clearly that they are not interested in making a dispassionate and functional analysis of the national interest in this area. If they were interested in doing so, it would have been quoted in the report and we would all know about it. They have simply decided that on party political grounds, because of the need to conciliate the Eurosceptics in the Tory party—we know that this is the way the country’s foreign policy is now being run; it is being bear-led by the Eurosceptics—it is impossible to do the rational and sensible thing, so they have simply excluded a priori any possibility of our joining the banking union, even as a participant that is not a member of the euro. A large number of countries will join on that basis—almost certainly a good deal more than the four that have already announced they will. I expect that every east European country other than the Czech Republic to come into that category. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, very convincingly argued, that would cause great problems for us. It is absurd for the British Government to say that one of the major difficulties here is the voting system, because the problem would be resolved if we were part of the system, and at least one of a minority of nine or 10.

If we do not join the banking union, there are only three logical possibilities. I do not think that any Member of the House will want to argue with my logic, which is very basic and elementary. The first is that we have a supervisory system that in practice simply tracks that of the ECB; we will do exactly what the ECB does in its area of responsibility, for example in matters of licensing, authorisation, intervention and guidance to banks. That would mean that we were de facto part of the system, with the important difference that we would not be part of the decision-making mechanism and would not have the kind of influence within the system that otherwise we would have had.

The second possibility is that we adopt a supervisory system that is somehow stricter and more severe than that adopted on the continent by, for example, the Republic of Ireland under the ECB. That would mean that banks here would find that they were at a competitive disadvantage doing their business out of London as opposed to doing it out of Paris, Frankfurt or somewhere else. That would not be a very intelligent thing to do.

The third possibility is that we adopt a regime of supervision that is lighter and more complacent than that adopted by the ECB. In the short term, that might attract institutions that do not like the stricter regime on the continent, but in a crisis we would be much more exposed because we would have a lesser degree of credibility. It would be considered that our institutions and banks were less safe and sound than those across the Channel, or indeed across the Irish Sea. That, too, would be a bad day’s work for the country. We would face a situation in which either we would have no advantage at all, but the disadvantage of not having the influence that we ought to have and that is commensurate with the importance of the City, or we would be otherwise disadvantaged either in competitive terms or in our ability to withstand crises. That would be a profoundly bad day’s work for the country—and it is exactly the day’s work that this Government have done. I deprecate it very strongly indeed.

Euro Area Crisis: EUC Report

Debate between Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Marlesford

Monday 21st May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, both the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and my noble friend Lord Maclennan have warned us against advising or criticising other countries in these matters. It always seems to me that one advantage of the privacy of your Lordships’ Chamber is that we can freely give advice to the Government without much danger of it leaking out.

As the only other member of Sub-Committee A speaking today, I congratulate my chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, on his lucid exposition of our findings. I also tell your Lordships that in the ever-changing kaleidoscope of events in the euro area that we faced during our inquiry, his skill as a chess master enabled him to guide us through and sometimes even interpret the irrational, usually contradictory and often ill conceived moves of the euro area.

I am neither a Eurosceptic nor a Europhile. If I presume to symbolise anything at all, I would try always to use a pragmatic approach and describe myself if anything as a Euro-challenger.

Never has it been clearer that the first commandment for a leader is to identify and then face reality. That applies in politics, economics and business; it applies especially to bankers and, above all, to central bankers. Do not let us forget that one of the main architects of our misery is that shrunken giant Alan Greenspan, with his failure as chairman of the Fed to face—and still less to act on—the reality that he had, in fact, identified in the three years that led up to the summer of 2007, when it became clear that everything would unravel.

The former name for economics was political economy, which underlines the crucial links between economics and politics. Even when the economic realities are revealed, political forces often conspire to frustrate the hope of solutions. I intend to devote my own brief comments to the situation in Greece and suggest a possible way forward for that country.

I should perhaps declare a rather remote interest in that my great-grandmother was Greek and her uncle was Capodistrias, who after he had represented the Russian tsar at the Congress of Vienna was, in 1827, persuaded to be president of Greece—and for his efforts was assassinated in 1831 within five years of taking office. It was ever thus.

It is perhaps relevant to remember that the British Foreign Office argued strongly against the liberation of Greece from the Turk on the grounds that it would undermine the Ottoman empire and thus destabilise the Balkans. The words of the noble Lord, Lord Monks, “I told you so”, may be echoed by diplomats of today. Of course, it was Lord Byron and his friends who ensured that the advice of the Foreign Office was not taken on that occasion.

Noble Lords will remember that it was Plato himself who argued against Athenian democracy of the fourth century BC on the grounds that demagogues could use it to prevent sound decisions. His analogy was a ship controlled by ignorant and quarrelsome sailors who refused to believe that there was any such skill as navigation and would write off a mere helmsman as a useless stargazer. His solution was, of course, the philosopher ruler. Whether either Mr Papademos or Mr Venizelos is up to such a role is not perhaps for me to judge. However, at paragraph 133 of our report we draw attention to the outburst of anger on the part of Greek politicians at the suggestion that there should be a budget overseer for that country. It seems to me that the danger now is that the second round of elections may again result in a preference for the rather destructive demagogues in the extreme right Golden Dawn and the hard-left factions forming the Syriza. There are rather frightening echoes in these economics and politics of how Hitler came to power 80 years ago.

It seems to me most unlikely that Greece can, or should be, bailed out yet again. I think, therefore, that it must leave the euro area, but I certainly hope that it remains inside the EU. Then what? There are two choices. The first is assumed, and that is the re-creation of the drachma as a new Greek currency. I believe that this would be a disaster for Greece. It would be a currency that no one would wish to lend or to borrow. The markets would ensure that it would be rapidly devalued and the Greek central bank would have to resort to the printing press.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I agree with the noble Lord’s analysis entirely up to now. However, does he agree with me that if the drachma collapsed, as it certainly would, everybody would want to borrow in it and have their liabilities in drachmas and their assets in euros, and that that would be part of the problem?

[Lord Marlesford]

My goodness, the noble Lord is certainly a speculator.

If Germany is prepared to pay not the cost of bailing out Greece but the cost of redeeming the Greek euro debt which already exists, we have to think of something better than going into a Mickey Mouse currency such as the drachma. The solution would be for Greece to leave the euro area but to continue to use the euro. There are plenty of examples from past economic crises, such as Latin America using the dollar and Yugoslavia using the deutschmark after Tito died. The whole point is that using the euro with a new central bank for Greece would impose a discipline on the central bank and on Greece. Like anyone else, it would be possible for it to use only the currency that it could afford. It would not have any relation or connection with the European Central Bank. It would be paddling its own canoe but it might well have to have some help from the IMF. However, it might well produce a remarkable resurgence. Indeed, a noble Lord talked about the possibility of financing certain projects with eurobonds. This might be very possible if people could see sound opportunities in Greece and they knew that the currency being used was a proper international currency. I think that that would be a real help.