Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
Debate between Lord Deben and Lord Avebury(11 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Deben
My Lords, I put my name to this amendment because it seems a very fundamental and simple question. Is it right that a person who is a subject of Her Majesty in this country shall not be able to claim against discrimination when they would be able to in India or Nepal, or indeed in Bangladesh? Is it right that when we have clear evidence that caste has become a feature in this country, they have no defence against it?
I have had very informative and helpful discussions with the Minister responsible in another place and the usual extremely well thought-out discussions with the noble Baroness. It is with considerable sadness that I have to say to her that I am not convinced by the Government’s argument. First of all, it has only just become the Government’s argument. In opposition, the Conservative Party said that this was necessary because it was the only way in which more than 400,000 of Her Majesty’s subjects could properly be protected. If it were possible for the Government to explain to the House that in taking office there were circumstances of which they were unaware that changed their mind, then I would be happier.
However, that is not the argument that has been put forward. What has been suggested is that we need to have yet another investigation. As the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, rightly says, the investigation by the previous Government was not by some small, unimportant body without respect, but by exactly the people to whom one might turn to find that answer, and their answer was unequivocal. It seems difficult to suggest there should be yet another investigation unless there is a clear statement of what has changed since that one, what was missed out by that one or what the Government felt should further be looked at which had not been looked at. Yet that is not anywhere in the Government’s response.
I believe we have to look at this extremely carefully for a reason which will be perhaps more understood on these Benches than anywhere else. If there is one thing that really annoys people about immigration, it is when people bring to this country attitudes that are wholly contrary to the traditions of Britain. That is why people have reacted so firmly against the attempt, for example, to introduce Sharia law into this nation. Most people in Britain feel that we have a society that should be welcoming, but it should be welcoming on the terms of the tolerance that has been so much part of our history.
There are, after all, fewer Jews in this country than there are Dalits. They are wholly protected under the laws. There are fewer Sikhs in this country than there are Dalits, but they are wholly protected under the laws. Most people would say that there is no place for discrimination by caste in Britain. If there is no place for that discrimination, how can it be that all the other discriminations for which we think there are no place are covered by the law but this one alone is not?
I have to say to my noble friend that I find the arguments used deeply distressing because they go like this: first of all, that we do not know quite enough about it so let us have a further investigation. Frankly, having had the investigations up to now, if it turns out that there are no cases, what harm will have been done? We will have protected people and they will feel protected. If it turns out the investigation that took place under the previous Government was unnecessary and its findings were not true, then we have done no harm. However, if we leave it for another year—and I am told, with some authority, that we will have to wait only a year for a further investigation—we will have another year in which people have no recourse, and at the end of that we may still have no recourse, because there will not necessarily be a legislative opportunity for us to bring this home to the Government.
The second reason that I find so difficult to hear is that we will not deal with it that way anyway, but will deal with it through education, with or without the investigation. Here I do not want to follow the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, except to say: what do people say in this education? A Dalit in a class says “Okay, I shouldn’t be discriminated against, but what happens if I am?”. The fact that there is now education on this means that the answer will be, “Tough luck, because there is nothing you can do about it, as we have specifically refused to ensure that there is an opportunity for you to take your case”. That is a recipe for lack of integration, poorer community relations, and a worse situation than would have arisen had we had no education or had not raised the matter in the first place.
The third reason that comes up is one that I find more distressing than any other. Every Minister who speaks about it—and we have two Ministers of particular quality here—assures me that they are totally committed to the eradication of discrimination, which includes the eradication of discrimination on the grounds of caste, but that theirs is a better way to do it. I believe that a decision has been made somewhere else that is not on this ground at all, and is not worthy. It is no good listening to those who, in their own circumstances, have a view of caste that is different from that of the majority of us in this House.
In Britain no one should suffer discrimination on the grounds of anything that they cannot help. They cannot help their sexual orientation and their colour; they very often cannot help their religion, or they have chosen that religion; and they cannot help their gender. What on earth is different when they cannot help their caste? You can change the name from “untouchable” to Dalit, but you cannot change the fact that some people are treated in an appalling way, simply because of the person they were born.
I have absolutely no doubt that it would be utterly wrong for us to say to the world that we had the opportunity to protect people from this disgraceful discrimination but decided not to do it because we had to have another investigation. I invite all noble Lords to look back on the history of the fight against discrimination. What happened at every point? Those who did not want to change suggested that we looked again and examined it once more. They said, “Let education deal with it; it’ll all come right in the end”. It was only when we changed the law, however, and made it wrong not only morally but legally as well, that we actually had a change in attitudes and gave the protection which was needed.
I want to finish by saying something very tough: if anybody in this House has any history of discrimination—whether it is the small amount that Catholics have today, which is still real, or the great amount that people have because they are of colour or Jewish or in any other minority group—let them make sure that they do not fail the Dalits, because they have a greater responsibility than those who are lucky enough not to have suffered discrimination as a subject of Her Majesty.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, I have seldom listened to a more powerful speech in this House. I agree with every single word that was said by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, except for one very minor point which has to be mentioned. The Government are not proposing to undertake any further investigation, but simply to review the investigations that have already taken place. Therefore, what they are proposing to do is of even less consequence than he credited them with.
We already know, from the study undertaken by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research—which was mentioned by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, in introducing this amendment—that caste discrimination actually occurs in the United Kingdom. That study confirmed that discrimination and harassment of the type that would be dealt with under the Act exists in the UK, as was reiterated only the other day in a letter from one of its authors, Hilary Metcalf, to my noble friend Lord McNally.
The Government now recognise the existence of caste discrimination. As the Minister for Equalities said, in words very similar to those used by my noble friend Lord Deben just now,
“We obviously do not think that anyone should suffer prejudice or discrimination, whether it is because of caste or any other characteristic. Such behaviour is wrong and should not be condoned, whether or not it is prohibited by legislation”.
However, no Minister has explained properly, in the extended correspondence that we had with the Government over the past three years, why caste should be treated differently from age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex or sexual orientation—the protected characteristics that are already covered by the Equality Act.
The Minister Helen Grant MP wrote to us on 5 February, saying:
“We need to be satisfied that it is the most appropriate and targeted way of tackling a specific problem before legislating”.
I respectfully suggest that Parliament wisely decided that legislation was indeed the right way to tackle discrimination across the board after many years of trying to apply remedies to particular kinds of discrimination such as for race—with the Race Relations Board—or gender, by compliance with the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Nobody ever said that before including race and gender in the Equality Act, we needed to be satisfied that it was the most appropriate and targeted way of dealing with the problems that still remained. Legislation was seen as the top storey of the edifice of ways of tackling discrimination of all kinds. The onus is on the Government to prove that, in the unique instance of caste, we should return to non-legal remedies which proved insufficient in respect of the nine existing protected characteristics and are no substitute for the right to take complaints of discrimination to court.
The original reason given by the Government for failing to enact Section 9(5)(a) was that there was no consensus on the need for legislation even among the communities that were potentially most affected by it. We naturally interpreted that as meaning the Dalit communities whose members are the victims of this discrimination. However, it emerged in a letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, to the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, of May 2012, that the reference was to the wider Hindu and Sikh communities. In that sense, there is never a consensus for legal measures against particular kinds of discrimination. The policy of ending apartheid in South Africa was vociferously opposed by certain groups within the white population. At one time, plenty of men’s organisations were opposed to women’s equality, including, I may say, Parliament itself, and there are still institutions opposed to LGBT rights. Fortunately, the absence of consensus was not used as an argument for blocking legislation for the rights of racial minorities, women or gay people.
However, I realised quite recently that some Hindus and Sikhs believe that what we are seeking to do labels their communities as a whole as persecuting Dalits. I assure them that nobody has any such idea, any more than the Equality Act labels native British as being intrinsically racist, or men as being intrinsically misogynist. There are already cases where litigants such as the Begraj have done their best to use the existing law to make a claim on caste discrimination grounds in the courts. However, there has been no suggestion that a handful of cases point to a general pattern of conduct among people belonging to certain religions.
Education Bill
Debate between Lord Deben and Lord Avebury(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Deben
I listened with very considerable care to how the amendments were introduced by the noble Baronesses. In both cases, the suggestion was that the kind of schools where teachers’ religious beliefs were taken into account, apart from the chaplain or the like, would be schools of which they disapproved because they felt that it was better for children to be educated in circumstances in which there was a wide range of teachers with a wide range of views. I am merely saying that I want a society in which parents can choose and do not have that dictated to them by those who think it would be better for them to have a particular kind of circumstance. I am pleading for that on the basis of discrimination. I do not wish to discriminate against the poor. I am pleading for it also on the basis of liberalism.
In a free society, people should have the choice to the widest possible degree. It is illiberal to say that a person’s belief that a faith-based school is in some way—I think that the word was used, but I will not use it myself; I shall just say “restrictive”, as it makes people unable to share in the rich variety of life. That is an unacceptable position in the sort of society that we have. Young people have a difficult enough time in any case in maintaining standards and values. They have a difficult enough time in any case upholding the faith in a society which is dedicated to its destruction, and parents and religious organisations, either Catholic or Anglican, wanting to make sure that they have the best possible opportunity, should be encouraged. These amendments make it more difficult and I therefore believe that they should not be supported.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, I have seldom heard a more hysterical and inaccurate speech than the one that we have just listened to from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, which is clearly based on a total misunderstanding of the amendments and of the motives of the people who tabled them. I do not think he can have heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, said in her intervention—that Amendment 85 and the other two amendments have nothing whatever to do with the choices that parents make of the schools that their children will attend. I hope that he will think carefully about the remarks that he has made and, perhaps, hesitate on future occasions to leap in with the wild assertions that he made today.
Lord Avebury
I had no objection to the noble Lord intervening, if that is what he was doing.
Lord Deben
I merely say to my noble friend that the point that I was making is that parents may wish to choose a school in which the restrictions on the choice of teachers expected under these amendments are not ones that they would wish. It is perfectly reasonable for them to choose those schools.
Lord Avebury
No one is suggesting that there should be any restriction on the right of parents to choose whatever school they think is best for their children. The noble Lord’s remarks are based on a total misunderstanding of the amendment and what the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, said. But perhaps I may move on to the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, who I thought said that these amendments were fine but unnecessary. I am hoping that he is in support of the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, because surely there may be teachers who are not entirely opposed to the faith basis of a school who belong to other religions or none but have a particular aptitude for mathematics, say, or geography, and are therefore suitable for those subjects in the school, although it has a religious ethos. He said, rightly, that the schools would want to choose persons who were best capable of teaching the non-religious subjects and that they would not wish to discriminate in making choices when appointing those persons.
I am afraid that we have made no more progress on the issues covered by the noble Baroness on religious discrimination than we did on collective worship since Committee, although, with the noble Baroness, I was grateful to the Minister for writing to us and entering into a detailed discussion with us in the interval between Committee and Report. The Minister will remember that he was handed a dossier of legal opinions, which the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, mentioned, including one commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission that challenged the compatibility of the Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998 with the European Union employment directive. The focus of these opinions was Section 60(5). Looking back at the passage of this subsection through this House in 1998, I see that the original wording of the equivalent part of the Bill, then Clause 58(4), was entirely benign and unobjectionable. It provided that in a voluntary aided school of a religious character, no teacher of subjects other than religion would receive any less remuneration or be deprived of, or disqualified for, any promotion or other advantage by reason of his religious opinions or of his attending religious worship.
The amendments to that clause, to which we are now objecting, turned the original words on their head by saying that preference may be given, in connection with the appointment, remuneration or promotion of teachers at a voluntary aided school which has a religious character, to persons whose religious opinions are in accordance with the tenets of the religion or religious denomination of the school. Those amendments were drafted following a delegation to the Home Secretary led by the then right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Ripon and Leeds, who acknowledged in the House that the amendments had been,
“prepared in consultation with the Churches”.—[Official Report, 4/6/98; col. 576.]
He understandably expressed his delight that the churches were “completely satisfied” with the amendments then inserted. No other amendments were made by any other noble Lord.
Those proposals were made by the Church of England and accepted by the Government at the same time as the employment directive was being drafted in Europe to combat precisely that sort of unfair discrimination. They are the basis of the formal complaint lodged by the National Secular Society earlier this year to the European Commission, which I understand is still under consideration. If Section 60(5) is left alone, they may yet be the subject of litigation by teachers who consider that they have been treated less favourably than others in terms of their appointment, remuneration or promotion to posts involving the teaching of history, English or mathematics, for example, because they do not subscribe to the particular religion or denomination which gives the school its religious character. I suppose that the same would apply not only to Christian but also to Muslim schools, where a teacher might be discriminated against in the same way because he belongs to the wrong brand of Islam.
The then Government compounded the offence of undermining the directive by insisting, at the 11th hour, as a condition of their acceptance of the directive, that previous legislation, including in particular the School Standards and Framework Act, should be regarded as being in effect exempt from the new directive. The Government were so desperate for unanimous agreement, as was required, that they were able to force the Council of Ministers to accept their demands.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, has, on the grounds of pragmatism, gone only a modest way today to reverse these discriminatory 1998 amendments. I therefore appeal to the Government to recognise that these privileges granted to religious bodies create, as do all privileges, victims—those who would otherwise not have been disadvantaged. The innocent and undeserving victims of Section 60(5), which the noble Baroness seeks to replace in her Amendment 86, are teachers—there may be thousands of them—who are not of the faith of the publicly funded school or academy where they teach or apply to teach subjects other than religious education.