Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

That, I think, is a very narrow and technical point. It may well be that, if Amendment 1 had referred not to the probation service but to the probation system, it would have been unexceptionable, and a very short, simple manuscript amendment would probably bring that result about.

As for the present amendment, I wholeheartedly support it, and it is all the more relevant now, on account of the earlier amendment being passed and incorporated in the Bill.

I was somewhat surprised by the Minister’s attitude to the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. If anyone has served the public interest with great, dispassionate and conscientious commitment in so many fields, it is he. It is entirely wrong that he should be listed with the “bad lad” wreckers such as me, who may sometimes be accused of having a somewhat subjective neutrality on the Cross Benches.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to Punch and “Dropping the Pilot”, but I am thinking of another well known Punch cartoon, about the curate’s egg. The Bill is good in parts, but is thoroughly rotten in others. It is good and splendid in what it seeks to achieve, which is somehow or other to rid society of, or at least to ameliorate, the curse of reoffending. I have already cited, in an intervention on the noble Lord, Lord McNally, the National Audit Office’s figures, which he accepts. In 2010, the parameters were from £9.5 billion to £13 billion. The noble Lord now says that they are from £9.5 billion to £14 billion. That is apparently the point, in relation not only to the earlier amendment but to this one, too. He says that if there is a reduction of 5%, 10% or 20%, we will obviously achieve a massive public saving.

However, why must we assume that we shall make that saving? The probation service, which is now about 100 years old, is one of the most distinguished public services that this country has ever had. These changes are the greatest ever conceived for that service, and have the capacity to wreck it and emasculate it completely. If we get them wrong and they are failures, and if that, not unnaturally, results in more reoffending, we could be talking in terms not of saving millions but of the possible loss of millions, or even more. Why should we automatically assume that there will be a saving? The Minister may say, “I am assuming that because I believe the transfer of 70% of the probation service to private enterprise will succeed”. Why is anybody entitled automatically to come to that conclusion?

I have spent a great deal of my life in the courts, as a solicitor, a barrister, a recorder and a circuit judge, and I believe that the probation service is a Rolls-Royce service. Indeed, the evidence supports that. Of 35 units —I think it is 35—four were classed as “excellent” and all the others as “acceptable” and “good”. There could be no better bill of health, so there is no justification for the changes on that basis. This is a sortie into the dark—a voyage into uncharted waters. It may be successful; I will not argue that transferring those responsibilities to private entities carries an absolute guarantee of failure. What I am saying is that there is a huge danger, and there are huge question marks over exactly what could happen.

One problem that I foresee involves the probation service’s present quasi-judicial functions, in reporting to the court that there has been a breach. A decision has to be made on how to balance a number of factors against another set of factors—a decision that sets the machinery in the courts in motion. How can lay men, however well tutored in the short term, ever achieve that sort of expertise? How can there be confidence in the exercise of that quasi-judicial function?

Here we have the most massive upheaval that the probation service has ever seen in its 100 years’ existence. We are running massive risks, and everything must be done by this House to try to reduce those risks and to see to it that the laudable motivation behind the Bill, of reducing reconviction rates and all that emanates from that, is given the best chance possible. That is my plea. If I am to be labelled by the Minister as a wrecker on that account, I plead guilty and do so with pride.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister will know that I have been concerned about a payments-by-results service, not least because of the threat, as I see it, to innovative, interesting, small-scale provision which is delivered so effectively by a number of organisations that are very often—because this is the way with the voluntary sector—working on something of a knife edge. I have had reassurances, which I have very much welcomed, about the financial arrangements being such as to support small organisations which—I do not want to be pejorative towards them—may feel that they are lurching from month to month not being entirely certain that their income is sufficiently stable. They are also at a disadvantage compared with bigger organisations when it comes to a bidding war. There are a lot of sectors where some sort of beauty parade is undertaken. Sometimes, the money gets spent on the beauty rather than the content, and that is what wins the contract. I say again that I have heard reassurances about support for small organisations for part of the bidding process.

I want to take this opportunity to ask my noble friend for reassurance about something that struck me only earlier today. It is entirely likely that large outsourcing companies—we know the various names—will bid for some of the contracts. We also know that the proposed changes to criminal legal aid are likely to mean that the same large organisations may, through different parts of their workforce, bid to undertake solicitors’ services under the new legal aid contracts. What occurred to me was the danger of a conflict of interest, whereby two parts of the same organisation are representing an offender and providing rehabilitative supervisory services. I am using this occasion to ask my noble friend for an assurance about the solidity of the Chinese walls that will be required to be put in place, and the monitoring of them, if these two parts of the Government’s proposals go ahead more or less at the same time and more or less hand in hand.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with what has been said by all speakers on this matter. For any new criminal offence to be created, or for any existing criminal offence to be extended, there is a heavy onus on the Government of the day to show that that is reasonably necessary. It is against that template that Clause 145 fails completely. There is a great deal of misunderstanding about the matter, which may very well have been deliberately fomented by the right-wing press. It is said to people, “What would you do if you were on holiday and came back to find that there were 20 people living in your house and having every intention of living there for ever?”. Of course, you would say it would be absurd for such a situation not to be visited by a criminal sanction—but it is already visited by a criminal sanction.

The civil law has catered for this situation—whether it be developed property or not—for a long time, since the early 1970s. Those of us who belong to the noble calling of the law will realise that Order 24 and Order 113 apply and provide a procedure that is swift, effective and cheap, provided it is competently carried out. There is no problem whatever so far as the civil law is concerned.

In 1977, with the Criminal Law Act that the noble Baroness has referred to, it was realised that there were situations where owner-occupiers were in fact trespassed upon in their own homes, normally when they were away for a day or two or where people were expecting to move into property but found that they could no longer occupy it. Section 7 of that Act said very clearly that it did not apply to non-residential property. A clear distinction was drawn and deliberately considered in detail by Parliament. That seems to have been a boundary of common sense, fairness and justice.

Why is that boundary being transgressed now? What is the case in favour of changing that boundary? It is my submission that there is no case whatever for doing it. The civil law amply provides for civil sanctions. If those are not obeyed, then of course the courts can always act on the basis of contempt of court. The punishments are severe, as we know. The criminal law deals with those cases when it is right, proper and inevitable that there should be a strict criminal sanction. It does not apply to non-residential property because it was never thought necessary that it should do so. The Government of course have issued a consultation paper on this matter, to which a substantial number of people responded—96 per cent of whom said there is no need to change the law at all. This is not a case of softness towards people who defy the law but a case of looking in a mature, fair, just and proper way at a problem. The conclusion of so many people in an excellent position to judge is that there is no need whatever to do anything. A letter in the press signed by 163 distinguished petitioners, jurists and academics, supported that view. The Criminal Bar Association, the Law Society and the Metropolitan Police supported that view. In relation to the consultation, the Metropolitan Police said:

“The Metropolitan Police, responding on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers, considered that the law was broadly in the right place and that the existing array of offences allowed them to tackle the worst cases of squatting (e.g. where squatters cause the rightful homeowner to be displaced) … They warned that new offences could have an impact on policing in terms of community relations, local policing objectives and cost”.

On the question of cost—and I have no doubt that other noble Lords will deal in some detail with this matter—it is abundantly clear that the Government’s own estimate of a cost of some £25 million to the public purse over a period of five years is woefully inadequate and entirely unrealistic. They have not taken into account the fact that tens of thousands of persons squatting do not apply for housing allowance. These cases, if people are ejected from their squats, will find their way into the courts. There will be massive expenses adherent to that situation. Again, there is little doubt that the figure of £25 million— I would not seek to try to set a specific figure—can probably be multiplied by 10 or 20, leading to a massive non-saving in a Bill that is dedicated to saving expense to the public purse.

I ask the House to consider one further matter. This is retrospective legislation. Clause 145(1) applies to a situation when a person, the defendant, has trespassed in the premises, knowing that he is trespassing. He may have entered 10 years before, when there was no such thing as a criminal sanction in relation to that type of trespass. That is retrospective legislation and that is what Parliament abhors and resorts to only in the most drastic of circumstances. It is the very thing that is condemned, as the House knows, by Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

All in all, this is a wholly unnecessary piece of legislation. It is utterly merciless, utterly unfeeling and utterly costly, and it is likely to be a heavy and unnecessary burden on the time and energies of the police. The next best thing to rejecting it would be to accept the amendments, which I support wholeheartedly.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on her persistence in dealing with this matter and provoking some very powerful speeches from your Lordships, as well as making her own.

The issue is homelessness and housing supply. Whatever is being done now by the current Government, the stark fact is that at this moment the housing needed is just not there and cannot be created in an instant. Ordinary, decent, desperate people, whose motive is not envy, or to deprive others, or to make a political statement, are simply seeking a roof. Many of them would be regarded as vulnerable, in any normal sense of the word. Like my noble friend, I am interested in and concerned about the interface between these provisions and local authorities’ housing responsibilities —in particular, whether a conviction is needed for someone who has been squatting to be unintentionally homeless. How does all that fit together, and what guidance will be given to local authorities on this?

Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 20th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I take issue with my noble friend Lord Taylor only to the extent that we should start with not just the “how” but the “why”. It does not matter what you call something, provided you do not then use your term as an excuse for sloppy thinking. That is a danger. It would be easy during our debates on the Bill to say that such-and-such is local or localist, without analysing what that means and what it should mean in each context.

The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, referred to Pepper v Hart. I must say that it worries me when people who have not been closely involved with our proceedings say, “Parliament clearly must have thought such-and-such”, and one wonders whether Parliament has thought at all about a particular issue.

Representative democracy is so valuable for lots of reasons, but I have written down four: balance, priorities, nuance, and wide objectives. When the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, spoke about community groups being self-selecting, I thought that she was going to say that they were self-serving—just occasionally, they are and I, too, recognise the examples she gave. The issue of bail hostels precluded my party from taking control of our local authority in 1978. My noble friend Lady Tonge was elected in a by-election shortly afterwards, having failed to be elected at that earlier point. However, the issue was of concern in a community that one should have thought was most sympathetic to the problem that the establishment of the bail hostel was addressing. The centre has a role, but its role is not to protect local people against their own local authority.

The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, asked what the clause would achieve. It sets criteria against which the detail of the Bill can be tested. Something that is superficially local or localist is not sufficient.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with the sentiment behind the proposed new clause. Ever since I was a schoolboy, I have been arguing for devolution in one way or another, and I have not changed. In the past few months, in regard to the boundaries Bill, the police Bill and the Public Bodies Bill, a great deal of the House’s time has been taken up by me arguing devolution points, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, will remember. My sympathies are all with the new clause, but a constitutional issue of immense magnitude is raised by it.

Pepper v Hart, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, caused a massive upheaval in the whole concept of interpretation by a court of what was contained in an Act of Parliament. Up until then, the same rule had abided for utterings in an Act of Parliament as for the interpretation of a will. It was the golden rule of interpretation. That was very simple. It was that the strict grammatical meaning of the words should determine the matter unless there was some obvious or latent ambiguity. In other words, it was in any event restricted to solving the problem that arose from an ambiguity. It was not of general content. When Pepper v Hart came along, it did not change that rule; all it did was change the machinery by which one tried to deal with that conflict.

The new clause, whose intentions are admirable, seems to be an attempt to go well beyond that. It is not confined to situations of latent or patent ambiguity but deals with a whole host of general situations. I will be corrected if I am wrong, but it seems to be an attempt to act as if we had a written constitution at the limits of the Bill, and those limits are very wide indeed. But we do not have a written constitution. Therefore, we could have endless argument as to whether there is a patent or latent ambiguity. To speak for a moment of my former occupation, I have no doubt that clever lawyers would seek to persuade courts that there were ambiguities and conflicts where there were none. Here we have a presupposition that one can pretend in legislation that there is a written constitution, as set out in the new clause, when in fact we do not have such.

The new clause is titled “Purpose of this Act”, but the purpose of an Act is set out in its preamble, which is not part of the Act itself. It is very much like the memorandum of a limited company: it sets out the metes and bounds of what can be contained in the legislation. With the best will in the world, the new clause, laudable though it is, would, if carried, create a massive constitutional problem to which there is no real answer.