Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Monday 24th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I have always felt discomfort if not, indeed, some element of contempt for what is called the vehicular defence. Too often, it has been said in a case where there is every merit in a proposed amendment, “Ah, yes, but that is not the correct vehicle to use at this stage”. More often than not, in the years that I have spent in this House and in another place, I have felt that it was a path of craven retreat used by many Governments in many situations but in a wholly unworthy cause. Indeed, that is my reaction in the first instance when it is pleaded that this measure may not be the proper vehicle. However, I suggest that for once that argument may well be true—not only that it is not the appropriate vehicle but that it may not be the lawful vehicle.

I have total respect and regard for all the arguments that have been advanced in favour of changing the law in this area. The arguments advanced are noble, honourable and just and there is no way, it seems to me, that they can properly be countered. However, if one looks at the preamble to the Bill, it seems to me that there may be some dubiety. I put it no higher than that, certainly not in the presence of persons far better able than me to judge this matter. It could be argued that this issue does not fall within the Bill’s Long Title, which refers to,

“the review of civil partnership, and for connected purposes”.

It may well be argued that civil partnership deals with a sexual relationship. If that is so, the relationships that we have been talking about this afternoon go beyond that. They elongate civil partnership but are not of the essence of civil partnership.

Indeed, even if I am wrong, we should remember that what is asked for is inclusion in a review. There will be immense discretion as to what the conclusion should ultimately be. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this debate may be, and they are all one way, in my respectful submission one dilutes the possibilities by including the issue in a review where there may be dubiety as to whether that is the correct vehicle. Therefore, in the circumstances, I respectfully suggest that the amendment is aimed at the wrong Act. It is not the 2004 Act that causes injustice in this regard, but the 19th century Partnership Act, as amended. In other words, if the relationships that one speaks about could by statute be deemed to be a certain type of partnership with a certain type of fiscal consequence leading therefrom that would be just, equitable and proper, then the proposal would be aimed at a correct target. If that could be done quickly not by way of review but by direct legislation, I would, indeed, consider that we had done something very worth while in a very simple, understandable way without cluttering up the argument with all manner of other considerations that may be less than relevant in the two circumstances of the case.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee by repeating what I said nine years ago when we debated this issue, and the controversy between those who focused on sexual relations and those who focused on tax and inheritance tax.

I have two points to make. Clause 14 seems to me not to require any amendment because it states:

“The Secretary of State must arrange … for the operation and future of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 in England and Wales to be reviewed, and … for a report on the outcome of the review to be produced and published”.

The clause goes on to say that that,

“does not prevent the review from also dealing with other matters relating to civil partnership”.

One of the other matters relating to civil partnership that has been mentioned by my noble friend Lord Marks, in particular, was referred to by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in paragraph 95 of our report. We said:

“We are not convinced by the Government’s reasons not to extend civil partnerships to opposite sex couples, and we welcome the Government’s announcement that it will review this matter. In doing so, the Government should take into account the potential discrimination that may arise between cohabiting opposite sex couples and civil partners”.

I very much welcome the fact that the Government have made it clear that there will be a review of the operation of the Civil Partnership Act to look at that aspect of the existing discrimination. That point has already been made by several noble Lords and it is important to deal with it. I have always disagreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, as she knows, because I am strongly in favour of cohabitation rights for unmarried opposite-sex couples, and she is firmly opposed to that. That will clearly be a matter that the review will need to take into account to see whether the Government decide to give some protection to so-called common law marriages or not.

I continue to believe in that, as I did nine years ago. I am delighted by the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, because she has taught me aspects of social security and welfare that I was not aware of. For all the reasons given, I do not think that one should now fetter Clause 14 by requiring that the review should deal with matters that are truly beyond the scope of the Bill and ought not to be part of the review.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Monday 17th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

That is absolutely true. That is the assumption made in the Book of Common Prayer, which, as I understand it—I am a Welsh Presbyterian—says that there are three justifications for marriage. The first is the procreation of children, the second is the avoidance of the temptations of fornication and adultery, and the third is that there should be a lifelong relationship based on love, affection and respect. The first justification has been dealt with very properly by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. Many people who are young and capable of procreating children now get married on the understanding that there will be no children in their relationship. Does one say that their union is less than a union of marriage? On the third point, about the creation of a lifelong union based on love, affection, respect and mutual dedication, is there a fundamental difference between that and the institution of marriage, as we say now? Nothing that I have said can prove the matter one way or the other. However, I make the obvious point that marriage is not an immutable institution. It has become elongated and greatly changed over the years, and will be changed again. Is it not possible to accommodate within that change the term “marriage” for people of the same sex?

I make one last point with regard to union. The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, said that there was a union of Scotland, England and Wales. It was never a union in relation to Wales, as I am the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, will agree. The preface to the Act of Union says the country, dominion and principality of Wales is now and always has been annexed, incorporated and included. It was a rape—certainly not a union.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I was not at the Second Reading debate but I have read the 90 speeches since then. I am glad I was not there because I would have added even more to the length of the debates. I declare an interest: I am neither a believing Christian nor a believing Jew, and that no doubt colours the way in which I approach these matters. Many of those who have spoken already come from a strong religious tradition, which I fully respect, and which drives many of their views. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has said, the main purpose of the Bill is to enable same-sex couples to marry, either in a civil ceremony or, provided that the religious organisation concerned is in agreement, on religious premises with the marriage being solemnised through a religious ceremony.

I promise to speak only once in relation to Amendments 7, 8, 9, 34 and 46. All are based on the idea that there is something called “traditional marriage”, defined as the union of one man and one woman for life to the exclusion of all others. What they mean by “traditional marriage”—as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, indicated in referring to the Book of Common Prayer—is a form of marriage that is biblically ordained in the Judeo-Christian tradition, which is a theistic tradition, although it does not represent the thinking of many Christians or Jews or many of those of no religious belief who are not affronted by the notion of same-sex marriage. Under the Bill, Christian churches, Orthodox Jews, Sikhs and Muslims are well protected from the risk of liability. However, that does not satisfy the movers of these amendments, who seek to write into the statute book a lesser status for same-sex marriage than for opposite-sex marriage by calling it “civil union” or some other term.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, the motivations behind this amendment are, I have no doubt, noble, honourable and sensitive. I greatly respect, therefore, the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I respectfully tend to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that it may well be that there is a case for having what is almost a jury situation. In such a situation—again, bearing in mind that juries very seldom operate in civil cases—we would not normally have a jury in any event, but the real problem is, I think, a much deeper one.

Imagine a judge having to determine the fundamental issue of whether this matter is to be dealt with by way of a secret hearing. Does he look at the prose of the application by the Secretary of State or the affidavits? Does he look into the eyes of learned counsel to see whether there is a burning sincerity in the face of the counsel for the claimant or whether there are doubts genuinely registered in the face of the counsel for the defendant? Is the judge not placed in a situation that is virtually impossible?

To a large extent the question of a special advocate under Clause 5 and, I would say, to a limited extent the appointment of a special counsel under Clause 8, will deal with part of that. There will be a totally independent advocate, but an advocate, however brilliant, forensically skilled and eloquent, can be only as effective as the ammunition that he has at his disposal, which is the correctitude of certain facts that are relied on by a party. If that estimate, however genuine, is wrong, then the decision of the learned judge must be utterly fallacious. How do you deal with that situation? I harken back to debates that we had some years ago in relation to a criminal situation and PII. It seems to me that there is a very strong and unanswerable case for a special investigator operating under the special advocate. It does not seem from my reading of Clause 8 that there is any power for the special advocate to appoint such a person. However, the fairness of the situation will depend entirely on the assiduity with which some other person or body would be able to examine these sensitive facts. That person must be someone in whom the community has total confidence in terms of confidentiality and secrecy but also their competence to bring to the attention of the court that vital element of the correctitude or otherwise of those facts.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, in later amendments, we will be considering ways of making what at the moment is an unfair procedure fair, or less unfair. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the procedure as it stands is not fair and also that it does not become any more fair by adding assessors or advisors to help the judge who has to decide whether to grant a declaration under Clause 6(1).

My experience of assessors or others—whether in an employment tribunal or in a county court for example—in dealing with discrimination cases, which are difficult and often involve weighing proportionality issues, has been an unhappy one. Along with others who have spoken, I have huge admiration for, and confidence in, the ability of our senior judiciary and agree with the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile of Berriew, that our judges have displayed a very good ability to weigh competing interests in difficult cases.

It will be important to look later at ways of making the procedure fairer, but with all respect to county court judges, whether serving or retired, and to retired judges of the senior courts, I simply do not think that having more of them is going to make it easier. This is not a question of deciding facts, like a jury; it is a question of striking a balance between competing interests. That seems something that our senior judiciary are well able to do without being bolstered by any outside support.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Dubs, who has served with great distinction on the Joint Committee on Human Rights and of course has a long record of interest in matters of justice generally. However, I indicated to him during a conversation beforehand that I was not persuaded by his argument. I was persuaded, albeit temporarily, by the arguments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, but in the end I share the views of other noble Lords who have indicated that this is perhaps an overelaborate and unnecessary addition to the framework that would otherwise exist. One point that struck me is that it is a little invidious for a serving High Court judge to sit with current or retired county court judges. I do not mean any disrespect to county court judges, but am not sure—