Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will deal first with the central issue in this debate, which is the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The wording currently mentions:

“A terminally ill person in England or Wales who … has the capacity to make a decision”.


The noble Baroness proposes that “capacity” should be changed to “ability”. From what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, says, I understand that we should read that with Amendment 115, although there is another amendment that the noble Baroness proposes in relation to Clause 3. But I accept what the noble Lord says in relation to Amendment 2.

With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, she is suggesting that we remove “capacity” and replace it with “ability”. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put his finger on it when he said that “capacity” is well known to the law. You could not possibly have a Bill that did not refer to capacity because what it means, in the eyes of the law and of people in practice, is the ability to make the decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, if you do not have capacity, you cannot make the decision. That applies right across the doings of human beings, and the law recognises that. If, therefore, you replace “capacity”—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

On a point of clarification, I thought that the idea of adding both words was very helpful, but when the noble and learned Lord says that you cannot make the decision without capacity, it is not any decision but this particular decision in this Bill. Can he reflect on a point that was made very well by one of his noble friends on something that happened in my family as well? Somebody with dementia was said to have capacity for a particular decision, but I would not have wanted my mother to have been trusted as having the capacity to decide whether to ask for assisted death.

The Mental Capacity Act is fantastically important, but is it appropriate for this decision—not any old decision but this decision—which is a bit more challenging than some of the decisions that the Mental Capacity Act is used to decide on?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

That is very well put and is exactly the question. Is it appropriate to bring the Mental Capacity Act into this Bill? I understand that whether you have an assisted death is an incredibly important decision. You cannot remove the word “capacity”, so you have to reject the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.

Her Amendment 115 effectively draws on how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is currently drafted, except it adds two things. It removes the presumption of capacity and, separately, it requires the person making the decision to be aware of a variety of things that are connected with their illness. To summarise, the way the Mental Capacity Act operates at the moment is that if you are unable to understand information relevant to the decision, to retain that information, to use and weigh that information or to communicate your decision, you do not have capacity under the current Mental Capacity Act. The extent to which the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has referred to in her amendment would be relevant would have to be weighed in the context of the decision that has to be made.

I am more than happy to debate whether we need to make the changes to the Mental Capacity Act that she is suggesting. For my part, I do not think we do. One thing that is absolutely clear is that the amendment proposed, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, identified, is completely ridiculous. You cannot remove the question of capacity from this choice. Putting aside some detail hurdles, there are two hurdles that need to be overcome in how this Bill is constructed. You have to be capable of making the decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said, and—completely separately—you have to make that decision completely voluntarily. It has to be your own decision, not the product of pressure.

We have had—and I say this with warmth and respect—a rambling debate going over a whole range of issues, miles away from the question of whether one should remove the word “capacity” and put in the word “ability”. If this House wants to make the law completely confused in this area, either put in the word “ability” or put in “capacity and ability”. I echo the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when she says we have to approach this in a grown-up manner, and to remove the word “capacity” is not a sensible way to deal with this.

I also echo those who have said that the idea of running two systems at the same time—the Mental Capacity Act system and the separate system proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—is wrong and confusing. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for spotting what the right decision is. Of course, under the Mental Capacity Act some unimportant decisions are taken, but a decision such as whether to have the ventilation removed from you if you have motor neurone disease, that will almost certainly lead to your death, is without a shimmer of a shadow of doubt a life and death decision.

The Chief Medical Officer of England and Wales, in evidence to the Lords Select Committee, said:

“it is far better to use systems that people are used to and that are tested both in practice and, where necessary, in law”.

He went on to say:

“I have a concern that you could have a conversation in one bed in a hospital where someone is talking about, for example, an operation where they might well lose their life, because they are frail and there is the operative risk, done under the Mental Capacity Act, and, in the next-door bed, someone is trying to do the same process of having a difficult conversation about someone who might die, or could definitely die, as a result of that decision, but using a different legal framework. The risks that that could lead to confusion are not trivial”.


I also echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who sadly is not in her place, said. There are problems about practically every aspect of how various parts of the health service work, but she was part of a process that considered how the Mental Capacity Act worked. The broad conclusion was that it was a good, workable Act, and we should not stray from it in this particular case. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am very much obliged to everybody who has taken part in this incredibly important debate. It is terribly unfortunate that this debate is happening at this particular time—I am very glad to see the Minister nodding. This is incredibly unfortunate when we are talking about violence against women and girls, which is the big issue in relation to this Bill. This is no attack on the Whips, but they asked prior to the dinner break that we get on as quickly as possible. It is an incredibly unfortunate way for this House to look at legislation such as this.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his support for Amendment 284, which concerns street harassment. I take note of what he said in relation to Amendment 285 and the difference between the penalties. He was suggesting that there might be a way to amalgamate the two. That suggestion seems to be very well made, and I hope that when we come back with this on Report, we might try to follow it up. I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her support in relation to all of the amendments.

I take note of what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said in respect of the review on spiking. One is in a bit of a dilemma: there is already some degree of anxiety in relation to spiking. I think that what she was saying was, “Do not have an immediate review because that increases the anxiety,” but if you do nothing about it, the anxiety continues. My own judgment would be that one should have the review.

Separately, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked whether one should be worried if one is criminalising through harassment conduct including speech. I do not think that that criminalises free speech, because the sorts of speech that we would intend to criminalise under the harassment crime would be cajoling, offensive behaviour—not expressing an opinion but insulting people or demanding sex or other things of people in a wholly inappropriate way. I do not think that would give rise to the risk of an attack on free speech.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I suppose it is following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, about the broadness of that amendment. Since 2016, I have been subjected to a “fair amount of verbal”, as they say, walking around the Westminster village, from people who did not approve of my Brexit views. It was not pleasant: it was not sexual, but it was particularly obnoxious and offensive; but I do not know whether that should be against the law. I might have a moral view of it, but I would not want them all to be arrested. I am saying that, while verbal harassment is unpleasant, there is a question as to whether it should be made criminal. I just do not want everyone being locked up for things they say, even if what they say causes distress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I completely take the noble Baroness’s point. The law has been very, very aware of that. There is a difference between people saying to you on the street, “I very much disagree with your views on Brexit” and others saying, “Why are you such a stupid, awful” and then a series of expletives, and chasing you down the street, just abusing you. The law is capable of making distinction.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It was the latter rather than the former, I have to say.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Then there might be a point where that becomes harassment.

I found the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, to be terrible. He sounded like a Government Minister in relation to this, thinking of excuses why not to do something about harassment, not just against women—against other people as well—but particularly against women. I was very struck by the fact that the Minister at least acknowledged that there is a real problem in relation to this. Her speech accepted that something had to be done about it, which that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, did not.

There was a difference between the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which was broadly to accept the proposals that I am making in Amendment 284, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who raised two particular points in relation to street harassment. One was about the breadth of the offence, which is not limited to sexual matters. I do not think it should be limited to sexual matters. If somebody who is disabled is chased down the street by a group of people taunting them for being disabled, that should be harassment. The second point the noble Lord was worrying about was “ought to know”. The sort of conduct that we are seeking to criminalise here is where people behave in a way that is wholly unacceptable. If you say, “I did not know that it was criminal to wolf-whistle and chase somebody down the street,” the fact that you did not know that should not be any defence. Those were the only two points he made in relation to it.