All 3 Debates between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Mon 21st Feb 2022
Judicial Review and Courts Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage & Committee stage
Mon 22nd Nov 2021
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill
Lords Chamber

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage part one
Mon 15th Nov 2021
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill
Lords Chamber

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage: Part 1

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
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These are important amendments. They address the botched way that, if these powers are to come in, the exercise of discretion is to be applied. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby is saying that you would use what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, describes as the tools in the toolbox only if it is “in the interests of justice to do so”. That is the starting point. That sounds to me a lot more sensible a starting point than the very strange wording in new subsection (9), which is, if the court is to make a quashing order in accordance with new Section 29A(1),

“the court must exercise the powers in that subsection accordingly unless it sees good reason not to do so”,

and the condition is that

“as a matter of substance”

an order under new subsection (1) would

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”.

Obviously, there is a difference between adequate redress on the one hand and what is the best order in the interests of justice overall on the other. Can the noble Lord tell us why this strange wording has been adopted if all that is intended is the broadest possible discretion in relation to using these two new tools in the toolbox?

My noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s amendments also relate to new Section 29A(8). The Minister said, in reference to prosecutions and taxation, that you would never make a new subsection (1) order, whether a delayed quashing order or prospective only one, and that is clear, he says, from new subsection (8). He relied in particular on new subsection (8)(c), which refers to

“the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”.

If I have been prosecuted under a regulation that was unlawful, I would expect my prosecution to be upheld. But then, new subsection (8)(d), refers to

“the interests or expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act”.

Therefore, if, for example, it is made unlawful to do a particular thing and I have had my dog put down as a result or I have bought lots of expensive equipment to comply with the criminal law as I thought it was, my interests or expectations under new subsection (8)(d) would be “Let the law stand”. So new subsection (8)(c) points in one direction and new subsection (8)(d) in another. If it is the Government’s intention that all prosecutions brought under unlawful regulations or laws will never be prospective only, and if it is their intention that taxation raised under unlawful regulations will never be prospective only, in my respectful opinion—I may be wrong, in which case let me corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—new subsection (8) does not get him anywhere near that. Indeed, it leaves the judge to decide and the judge has to decide on the basis of new subsection (9).

I therefore strongly agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. A bit more work needs to go into this to get to a point where there is clarity about what the Government intend, if their intention is that these are only two tools in the toolbox, with complete discretion over how to use them. If that is what they want, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s amendments are giving them quite a good opportunity of getting there.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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I hesitate, my Lords, to speak again. I feel that so much of what has been said has been dancing on the head of a pin. I have to say that I have come to see new subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) in new Section 29A in Clause 1 not as dramatically different things but rather as a continuum. They cover a spectrum; indeed, there is an overlap in between them, in the middle. There is no question here of subsection (5), to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, objects so strenuously—the one about being treated, and so forth. It is always subject, be it noted, to new subsection (2) of new Section 29A. Any of these orders under new subsection (1)—in other words, whether it is an order under new subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b)—can be made subject to conditions. Those conditions clearly would control the extent to which there is to be any degree of retrospectivity or retroactivity, call it what one will.

I am a huge admirer and respecter of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I do not see this as being, so to speak, comparable to Parliament infinitely rarely passing legislation retroactively. We must always remember, must we not, that judicial review is, at the end of the day, a discretionary remedy; you do not actually have to make these orders anyway. I still see this, as the Minister would urge, as a tool in our toolbox, giving us the maximum flexibility and discretion to do what justice requires to all—which includes, of course, to those who are not in the courtroom, who do not have legal aid, and all the rest of it. With criminal convictions—taxation and things—one trusts and assumes that the court is going to behave correctly. In the Percy and Hall case, with the good lady trespasser and PC Hall who was being sued for damages for having arrested people who on the face of it were invading this territory, contrary to apparently valid by-laws, I pointed out in the judgment that, if and insofar as she had actually had criminal convictions, of course they would be set aside. But that is merely an aspect of judges behaving, as one hopes and believes they will, in a judicial manner.

So I respectfully continue to support this clause. I said at Second Reading that I was agnostic or entirely relaxed—I think that was the term used by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—as to whether it is “may” or “must” in new subsection (9), and I remain so. “Must” simply urges the judges to give attention to this new tool in their armoury or toolbox. But they do not have to, and they will not, unless by all the conditions that they wanted to impose, they have made it clear that what they are doing will not be contrary to justice.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
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What I am saying in putting forward this provision is that you want to send a clear signal that a certain sort of evidence is not admissible. In order to make it easier for people to come forward, you need to have much clearer lines than we have had previously. There has been a whole variety of evidence that English law has said is not admissible, even though many people would think it was probative, because it is the safest way overall to deal with trials—it is the safest way to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between complainant and defendant.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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Surely the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord must be at cross purposes. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put it on the basis that the witness is saying, “I wouldn’t do this, not only with this man but I wouldn’t do it with anybody, ever”, and the evidence is that she has. Is that perjury simply to go unresponded to in any shape or form?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
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I am afraid I did understand what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. It is exactly as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has put it. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is right in the way that he analysed this amendment: it would exclude that evidence. I understand that that is the consequence, and I am saying it is a good thing.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
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I commend the speech of my noble friend Lord Blunkett. I agree with every single word of it. I am as culpable as he is in relation to this. I was a junior Minister in the Home Office at the time, and the Lord Chancellor did not foresee the consequences of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, who I am glad to see in his place, described as

“the greatest single stain on our criminal justice system.”

Our purpose on these Benches is to participate in a coalition of people with a view to persuading the Government to make sensible changes to the regime to get rid of this injustice that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and my noble friend Lord Blunkett, have referred to. The amendments before the Committee today provide a number of sensible options, but we put them forward, or support them as part of that coalition, with a view to reaching agreement with the Government to do something about them.

I may try the patience of the Committee too much, but I will speak to the amendment to which my name is put, and then I will speak again indicating the Labour Party’s position on the whole range of amendments. The amendments I speak to at the moment, therefore, are Amendments 208A and 208C, which deal with the position in relation to those IPP prisoners who have been released, and what the Government should be doing about them. I add my thanks to those of my noble friend Lord Blunkett to the Prison Reform Trust, which has provided an incredibly valuable briefing to the whole House. I also thank the Howard League for Penal Reform, which has done the same; Frances Crook, who has, over a very long period, provided real guidance to policymakers on these issues; and UNGRIPP, a group of friends and prisoners who have suffered as a result of this regime.

I turn now to the probing Amendments 208A and 208C, which are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Blunkett. He gave the figures. The basic proposition is that to reduce reoffending, energy and resources need to be devoted to ensuring that IPP prisoners who secure their release are able to live successful lives thereafter, avoiding recall to prison. That is what is best for society and for them. Without this, the current incidence of recall will soon, as my noble friend said, lead to a situation in which the number of people serving the IPP sentence may start to grow rather than decrease. From 30 September 2015 to 30 June 2021, the number of never-released IPP prisoners fell by 61%, from 4,431 to 1,722.

However, at the latest date for which I have figures, which is June 2021, there were 1,332 people back in prison having previously been released—more than double the number of five years ago. Recalled IPP prisoners who were re-released during 2020 have spent an average of 20 further months in prison before re-release. The hopelessness and despair that engenders is incredibly effectively described in the Prison Reform Trust’s report No Life, No Freedom, No Future. Its findings are based on data provided from Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service on recalls and re-releases and on interviews with 31 recalled IPP prisoners. A briefing from the Prison Reform Trust said:

“The report found that IPP prisoners’ life chances and mental health were both fundamentally damaged by the uniquely unjust sentence they are serving. Arrangements for their support in the community after release did not match the depth of the challenge they faced in rebuilding their lives outside prison. Risk management plans drawn up before release all too often turned out to be unrealistic or inadequately supported after release, leading to recall sometimes within a few weeks of leaving prison, and for some people on multiple occasions. The process of recall also generated strong perceptions of unfairness.


At its worst, the report found that the system … recalled people to indefinite custody”


for what appeared comparatively trivial matters,

“defined needs (e.g. mental health) as risk factors … ignored the impact of the unfairness of the sentence on wellbeing and behaviour … could not provide the necessary support; and … provided no purpose to time back in custody or a plan for re-release.”

Not all IPP recalled prisoners endured that, but it was common enough to say that the system needed looking at overall. As I indicated, many IPP interviewees suggested that the recall decisions were taken too lightly. At most, 23 of the 31 participants had not been convicted of a subsequent offence when they were recalled.

What to do about it? To prevent the current situation continuing—and I am dealing only with people being recalled—there are basically eight things to do. First, the process for licence review should be automated, and the qualifying period reduced from 10 years to five. That is in line with Amendment 208D. Secondly, the test for recall should be changed. It should be that there is imminent risk of the person committing an offence causing serious harm, and that that risk cannot be managed in the community. For other things, such as not staying at the address named in the conditions, other measures should be thought about—for example, adjusted reporting requirements, use of electronic tags and curfews. Thirdly, where a person has been charged with a further offence, the normal criminal justice processes should apply, with a court considering whether remand in custody is appropriate for the new alleged offence. Fourthly, if a person is convicted of a further offence, the court should decide what happens to that person, not an official. Fifthly, if a person is convicted of a further offence and the court decides to recall them under the provisions of their IPP sentence, the Parole Board should be required to consider release alongside any considerations of discretionary release that attach to the new sentence—for example, an extended determinate sentence. Sixthly, IPP prisoners who have been recalled, not having received a new custodial sentence and not being re-released on the papers by the Parole Board, should have the right to an oral hearing if they so wish. Seventhly, if the Parole Board panel upholds the decision to recall, it must set a fixed date for a further review. Eighthly, all recalled prisoners should be entitled to annual reviews of their continued detention at an oral Parole Board hearing with free legal representation.

We, on this side of the Committee, are very much aware that proper measures need to be in place to provide public protection, but that has to be balanced against a system where once people on IPP are released, they are not recalled except when something significant has happened and there is proper and serious support. I commend these amendments to the Committee.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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My Lords, first, I commend, as others have, all those who have, in recent times, been building the road on which we are set today—none more so than the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. For many years, I have urged, with no success thus far but with great hopes today, the reform of what remains of the IPP sentencing regime. It is in no way hyperbole to describe it, as I already have, as the greatest single stain on the justice system. Indeed, it is a deeper, growing stain because of the situation with the recalls.