British Military Equipment: Chinese Components

Lord Fox Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

The Government introduced a new critical minerals strategy—which is part of what the noble Baroness is asking about—that set an ambition for 2035 to reduce our reliance, and we are engaging with our partners on this. We also signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC. She asked me specifically about the approach of the MoD. The MoD is working hard to think about ways of stockpiling critical components and critical minerals for the UK defence sector and to improve recycling and the circular economy. I want to stress the recognition of the point that the noble Baroness makes and the need for a much wider approach, as identified in the strategic defence review and the national security strategy. We do not in any way underestimate the persistent challenges in this space, and we will do all in our power to use the powers we have to deal with them.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, a typical high-end, Chinese-made electric and semi-autonomous vehicle will have up to a dozen cameras, radars and laser sensors collecting images of everything around it. Cyber security is at best opaque, and a Norwegian researcher recently reported that 90% of the data that was collected by his car was sent back to China. What is the Government’s view on visitors with Chinese cars coming to MoD sites? You would not allow someone from the People’s Liberation Army to stand there with a video camera, and you would not allow a drone to fly over your site. But how do you monitor, police, and manage foreign Chinese cars coming on and off MoD facilities?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

The first thing I should say is that we focus on all vehicles coming to MoD sites, not just Chinese vehicles. All modern electric vehicles have surveillance components which we should be careful about, so I want to be completely clear with the noble Lord and the House that that is our approach. With regard to the question he asked, however, we are aware that individual defence organisations may have stricter requirements relating to electric vehicles on some sites, but, obviously, we do not provide specific details for security reasons, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand. We have made a lot of progress since the previous Administration instructed all government departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment. My right honourable friend the National Security Minister made it clear in November 2025 that all sensitive government sites originally identified with such equipment—that is CCTV equipment manufactured in China—have now finished their replacement work.