Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Fuller and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 262 concerns an issue of considerable importance, not merely for those involved directly in industrial relations but for the health of our broader economy, the stability of our public services and the legitimacy of this legislation. The amendment would require the Government to commission and publish, within 12 months of Royal Assent, an independent assessment of the impact of this Act on the number of working days lost to strike action, specifically comparing the 12 months following its enactment with the 12 months preceding it. That report would then have to be laid before Parliament. This amendment is modest in scope. It does not seek to obstruct the Bill or alter its provisions. It merely seeks transparency, accountability and, above all, vital evidence-based analysis in due course.

There is a striking—if I may use that word without inflaming the debate—absence of hard data or persuasive analysis in support of the central justification for these changes, namely that repealing certain elements of the Trade Union Act 2016 will result in better industrial relations. Indeed, the Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that there could be a benefit

“if Trade Union reforms lead to better industrial relations”.

I emphasise “if”. Hope is not a good substitute for policy. Nor should legislation of this consequence be built on assumptions rather than analysis. I will therefore structure my remarks around three core questions which the Government have failed to answer convincingly and which this amendment would help to address.

If we are to repeal elements of the 2016 Act, we must first understand what standard the Government are using to declare that Act a failure, or at the very least to assert that it is no longer fit for purpose. The Trade Union Act 2016 introduced significant changes: minimum turnout thresholds for strike ballots; requirements for information on ballot papers; limits on picketing; and restrictions on facility time in the public sector. It was controversial, certainly, but it was also justified by the Government of the time as necessary to ensure that industrial action had a strong democratic legitimacy, and that the wider public were protected from excessive disruption.

Now we are told that these measures must be rolled back, but we have at no stage been told what objective, or even subjective, measure of success or failure is being applied. Are we to believe that the 2016 Act failed because it did not eliminate all industrial action, because it was unpopular with some stakeholders or because it placed an administrative burden on unions—or, more worryingly, is it being repealed simply as a matter of political preference? To look at some figures, according to the Office for National Statistics, the number of working days lost to strike action was at a historic low throughout the period following the 2016 Act until a sharp rise in 2022-23, partly driven by inflation, the consequential erosion of real-terms pay and broader discontent in the traditional public sector.

Are we being told the legislation was ineffective because strikes still happened in 2022? If so, that ignores the very different macroeconomic context we now face. Or is the claim simply that industrial relations will somehow improve if these legal constraints are lifted? In any of those cases we must ask: compared with what? Compared with the pre-2016 environment? Compared with our European neighbours? Or compared with a model of workplace consensus that may not exist in reality? Without a baseline for comparison, the Government’s argument is essentially unfalsifiable and unjustifiable.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Government believe that these changes will lead to more equitable bargaining, greater union engagement and ultimately improved relations between employers and workers. Even if that were true, we must still ask at what cost. If these reforms lead to a rise in industrial action, that will have implications not only for the affected sectors but for the public at large. Trains will be cancelled, schools will be closed, hospital appointments will be postponed, bin collections will be missed and courts will be adjourned. These are not abstract costs, so it is extraordinary to repeal a major piece of industrial relations legislation without offering any quantification of the risks of increased disruption and without explaining how those risks will be mitigated.

The impact assessment leans heavily on the idea that increased union involvement could lead to improved communication and better outcomes, and perhaps it could. But the fact remains that the cost of getting this wrong will be borne not by policymakers but by the public. That is why this amendment is so crucial. It simply asks the Government to return to Parliament within a year and tell us whether this has worked. Has industrial action decreased or increased? Are we seeing the promised harmony or the feared escalation? If it is the latter, we as legislators have a responsibility to know that and to act accordingly.

Perhaps the most fundamental question of all is: what actual, empirical, verifiable evidence do the Government have to support their central claim? We have not been given a retrospective analysis of the Trade Union Act 2016 and its impact. We have not been provided with consultation data that robustly supports repeal. We have not seen sector-by-sector breakdowns of how these measures will improve the industrial landscape. We have not even seen clear articulation of the problem the Bill is trying to solve. Indeed, the rationale appears to be more ideological than evidential. It seems to be based on the belief that loosening legal constraints will somehow foster good will and reduce conflict. All the academic research and literature on industrial relations remind us that legal frameworks matter, that institutions shape behaviour, and that rules, when clear, consistent and fairly applied, help prevent conflict and not exacerbate it.

If the Government are so confident in their position, why not test it? Why not commit to measuring its effect? Why not, a year on, lay before this House and the other place an honest assessment of whether their theory of change has delivered the desired result? If the evidence proves them right, they will be vindicated. If not, Parliament should be empowered to revisit the legislation. There is, after all, considerable flexibility inherent in legislation so riddled with Henry VIII powers. I look forward to the Minister’s reply and I beg to move.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 262 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and others, because I want to talk about a simple economic truth. One of the provisions in the Bill will reduce the thresholds at which industrial action may be called or authorised. The truth is that when you reduce the threshold, the likelihood of industrial action does not grow linearly; it grows exponentially. The amendment is needed because the Bill, sadly, will provide the world with a real-life experiment that will inform political and economic science of that simple truth.

It could be worse than that. My experience comes from local government and my relationship with the National Joint Council. Local government employs 1.8 million local government workers. There are three principal unions: Unite, UNISON and GMB. Within the cohort of local government workers, I have negotiated with the craft workers, the Salisbury workers and the coroners. There is a red book, a green book and a blue book; there is even a gold book covering senior fire officers and police officers. There are 136 different activities that local authorities do and, of course, there are 350 principal councils. I have engaged with all this complexity over about 10 years sitting on the National Joint Council, the device through which the employers engage with the unions. I have sat alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, on that body for many years, and now we both find ourselves in here.

As part of the gang of four, the top four local government councillors engaged in these important negotiations, I have learned a lot of things. There is less beer, there are fewer sandwiches and there are palatial premises built by one of the unions in Euston. It has not been easy work, but we have had a series of national agreements engaging on a respectful basis. It has been valuable work. The important point is that there have been powerful incentives to avoid industrial action. The bar has not been impossible, but it has been a high bar against which strike action must be called. It has sort of worked, because there has been an equilibrium between the employer and the employees across 1.8 million unionised workers —just under a third of them all—in this country.

That equilibrium has meant that when there is a strike, it is serious. When people down tools, it is in the news. The Birmingham bin strike is a case in point: there is a strike, and it is serious. My anxiety about so many of the provisions in the Bill is that it is going to dissolve the powerful incentives to avoid industrial action and instead, arithmetically and structurally, put in the provisions where it is encouraged. The Bill sets the wrong balance, because we are not talking about simple organisations with single unions and small workforces in local government. We are talking about a very complex landscape. If you reduce the thresholds, people are more likely to strike because a minority, as little as 10%, of workers could call a strike. When 10% hold the 90% over a barrel, that is clearly not in the interests of the public; it is not in the interests of the workers; and I do not believe that in the long term it is in the interests of the unions.

Amendment 262 calls for a robust assessment of the effect of the Bill on days lost to industrial action. Not only is that the right thing to do but we would do a service, because it would demonstrate once and for all that simple efficiency of labour relations: if you reduce the threshold to call industrial action, the number of days lost to strikes will go up geometrically. I regret that we are going to do a service to political and economic science, but if that is the way it is, Amendment 262 is the way to achieve it.