European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I rather hope that the modest amendments in my name do not take the House two hours to deliberate over. They focus on a narrow set of issues relating to pending cases.

Amendment 62 would allow our domestic courts, subject to the terms of the withdrawal or transitional agreement, to refer cases to the CJEU after exit day if the course of action arose before exit day. Amendment 61 would require the Government to obtain from the CJEU and then publish a list of pending cases referred to domestic courts before exit day. Amendment 64 changes the definition of retained EU case law to include case law relating to pending cases referred to the CJEU before exit day.

These amendments were drawn from the Constitution Committee’s excellent report on the Bill and essentially aim to deal with two issues: first, pending cases in domestic courts that might have been referred to the CJEU and, secondly, pending cases already lodged with the CJEU before exit day. In the first instance I am really asking for the Government’s assurance that, in any withdrawal or transition agreement, they will seek to clarify whether domestic courts can continue to make reference to the CJEU in relation to cases that began before exit day. I can see that there has to be a cut-off point for references but it is the timing of that point which concerns me. What criteria will Ministers apply and how will these be written into the agreement in such a way as to guarantee, and not undermine, procedural fairness and access to justice?

It may seem that this is a small or insignificant matter but, given the wide range of issues that the court considers, I think not. After all, it looks at everything from trademarks to intellectual property rights, workplace rights and even the distribution of EU funds. Given that cases started before the Prime Minister triggered Article 50 are likely to be treated differently from those which followed it, it is surely important that principles of fairness and consistency enter into any agreement which the Government can sign.

The second type of pending cases, dealt with in Amendment 64, will be those that are already with the CJEU. In another place, the Solicitor-General argued that these cases would simply continue. That is fine as far as it goes but, as the Constitution Committee pointed out, the Government intend to provide for these pending cases to be covered in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. But what happens to those cases if there is no deal? Would it not make sense to have a saving provision in the Bill saying simply that any case that is with the CJEU is determined to be treated as contributing to pre-exit case law, and in turn forms part of retained EU case law?

The Constitution Committee’s proposal that the Government should produce a list of cases on exit day that would be treated in this way made very good sense. To my way of thinking, that is a logical way of handling quite a complex set of legal issues, which are obviously well beyond my sort of competence as a non-lawyer. However, I hope that the Minister can satisfy my curiosity and set out how the Government intend to proceed. I also hope that he can satisfy the Constitution Committee, which I thought had a rather neat solution to the problem. Pending cases are of great value and will be of great interest to colleagues. I am hopeful that the Government can satisfy my simple concerns and provide us with an explanation that works. I fear that we will otherwise end up with something of a case law muddle. I beg to move.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My noble friend is absolutely right that this is not a small or insignificant matter. It is an important one with rule-of-law implications. The starting point, as he explained, is his proposed Amendment 62 which, if agreed, would add a new paragraph (6C), the purpose of which would be to encourage the negotiation of an agreement that cases can continue to be referred to the CJEU by our own courts after exit day. That would relate to new cases where the cause of action arose prior to exit day. This is logical because the important point is about whether the full remedies currently available to litigants, potential litigants and, importantly, our courts remain until we leave, while the law of the EU remains in place.

Of course, being able to refer such cases depends on an agreement, the very agreement that my noble friend’s amendment would make it an objective to negotiate. We will not be able to refer cases to the court in Luxembourg after exit day, except by agreement with the EU in such an agreement. But he is also right that there is a risk—although we hope very much that it will not happen—that if we end up without a withdrawal agreement, there would need to be legislation enabling this to continue to take place. So the principle of the amendments seems entirely right, and he is right to say that this was dealt with by the Constitution Committee at paragraphs 150 and 153 of its excellent report.

Perhaps I may refer to what the committee said in paragraph 153, having made the point that my noble friend has identified:

“We recommend that, irrespective of any implementation bill, pending cases are dealt with in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. We further recommend that rulings on cases that have been referred to the CJEU before exit day are treated as pre-exit case law—such that they form part of ‘retained EU case law’—and that the Government publishes, on exit day, a list of all such cases”.


The middle part of that, on what the significance is of,

“rulings on cases that have been referred … before exit day”,

is dealt with in a later amendment. But, as he has said, the requirement that the Government should publish a list of all such cases is dealt with in these amendments. He is right to say that the Solicitor-General in another place referred to the importance of knowing, at least as I read his remarks, what those cases are.

It seems that there has to be a justification, although I can see none, for depriving litigants and our courts of the ability to refer cases to the CJEU. It is important that noble Lords are clear on the fact that that does not mean sending cases to the CJEU for it to decide; it is for that court to determine questions of interpretation, as the treaty currently provides, although the interpretation given may in fact then decide the case. Our own courts would then take the interpretation provided by the European court and apply it to the case before them.

I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness or the noble and learned Lord, depending on who will respond to the debate—forgive me, of course it is the noble Baroness the Minister—will say to my noble friend.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, this may have been a short debate but it concerns a significant issue, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for their contributions. I am aware that a key issue of interest in this Committee is how pending cases before the European courts will be resolved, and I hope that I can respond relatively briefly to these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam.

As was acknowledged in their contributions, the Government have been clear regarding their approach to cases which have been referred to the European courts before exit day and we have made good progress in achieving this outcome in our negotiations with the EU. As such, I applaud the similar concern expressed by the noble Lord that there should be legal certainty in this area. However, as I have said previously, and indeed as my ministerial colleagues have also said, the purpose of this Bill is to provide a functioning statute book on the day we leave the EU, irrespective of the result of the negotiations on any final agreement with the EU.

The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill through this House and the other place that it is not intended in any way to prejudge the negotiations or to predict an agreement between the UK and the EU on their future relationship. For that reason, I would submit that the Bill is not a suitable vehicle for such amendments to take effect. Future legislation will be needed to implement the withdrawal agreement, including the treatment of cases that are pending before the European Court of Justice. That legislation will need to be informed by the precise terms of the agreement. The Government have already committed to introducing a withdrawal agreement and an implementation Bill, but let me try to clarify a couple of the specific points raised.

I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who in effect asked about the status of a case that has been referred to the European court before exit, but does not proceed to a judgment until after then. The intention is that a case which starts and has been referred to that court before exit would proceed to a judgment, which our courts would be bound by. That is the intention but—let me make this clear—this is pending an agreement with the EU about these issues. In relation to the request of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for a list my understanding is that, at the moment, cases registered at the Court of Justice of the European Union are made available online, so after our withdrawal we will have certainty as to how many pending UK cases have been referred to the court.

I apologise to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord if I have not specifically addressed some of their concerns. The difficulty, as was made clear in December, is that there is a clear statement of intention made in good faith by the Government, surrounding heads of agreement that have been achieved between the United Kingdom and the EU. But we need to continue with our negotiations to fine tune that, and hopefully then reduce it all to the final agreement. But I cannot pre-empt what may be in the final agreement and I hope that, in these circumstances, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise for not having properly identified the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, as the Minister responding to this debate. I wonder whether she will allow me to just press one question. She has very helpfully identified the position in relation to pending cases that have started but for which rulings have not been given at the date of exit. These amendments include an additional category of cases, as I understand it, such as cases where the cause of action has arisen prior to exit: for example, where EU law is in place and there is an issue of EU law that a litigant wants to raise but they have not actually started the case at the moment we leave; or where the case has started but a reference has not been made at that stage, because the court does not make a reference until it comes to a particular point in the proceedings. In line with her helpful answer in relation to the category of cases that are pending in the CJEU at the date of exit, does she think the same principle ought to apply, subject to agreement, to cases where the cause of action has arisen before exit or the case has started but not got any further than that? Could she help on that point?

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his point, but I am afraid my response is going to be slightly less encouraging for him. The position of the Government is that we do not agree that new cases should be initiated post exit, even when these refer to pre-exit causes of action, because it would lead to an uncertain environment. It would be impossible to predict for how long the European Court of Justice would continue to issue judgments in respect of the UK. That, in the opinion of the Government, would strike at the underlying purpose of this Bill, which is to try to achieve a snapshot—to use that phrase again—as at the date of exit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, given the time, it may be relevant, appropriate or even helpful to try to wind up this particular debate, although not in such a way that undermines the very real importance of the amendment.

I want to underline two aspects. The first aspect is legal certainty, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is very important, for example, that in considering cases where retained EU law is in question, people and businesses are able to recognise that if there are decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union that are relevant, then it is likely—though not an obligation—that the courts will take them into account. They can order their affairs on that basis, and that is a critical part of legal certainty. It seems right, therefore, that this amendment, to which I have added my name, gives direction or guidance that where such decisions are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law they should be paid regard.

The second principle is the independence of our judiciary. It is right in this context to refer to the shocking instance of the attack on our judiciary that took place at the time of the Article 50 decision. It was shocking not just that our judiciary was referred to in such terms by a popular newspaper but that it was not immediately defended and the accusation rejected by the Government, including Ministers whose job it was to do so. In dealing with this particular amendment we have to be alive to the risk that if after exit day a judge chooses—because he or she believes it right or relevant to do so; whatever word you want to use—to make reference to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that judge is not then subjected to a barrage of criticism and the accusation, “How dare you take refuge in decisions of this hated institution, one which we have left, in making decisions on this law?” It is important that we should look at this carefully and make sure that judges are protected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

Does my noble and learned friend agree that, in all fairness, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, distinctly and clearly criticised those attacking the judiciary at the time that my noble and learned friend mentioned?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for that unexpected intervention from my own Front Bench, but I am happy to take the opportunity to say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was one of the few to say the right thing and uphold the independence of the judiciary at the time of that attack. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Beecham for making the point because it deserves to be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that encouraging response, and I am grateful to the noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate.

On a matter of detail, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about new subsection (2B) in Amendment 56, giving guidance to the judges to look to the relevance of an EU agreement. The noble Lord asked how that would work. I shall give him an example. If the judge is seeking to interpret a provision of retained EU law, relating to, say, medicinal products; if the Court of Justice after exit day pronounces on a regulation which has become part of retained EU law, and if the withdrawal agreement has said that there will be close regulatory alignment between the EU and the United Kingdom in that particular area, then the judge would be encouraged to pay close regard to what the Court of Justice had said about the meaning of the regulation. Our court would still be in control but it would pay particular regard—that is the whole point of new subsection (2B).

There is widespread agreement around the House that the wording of Clause 6(2) is unsatisfactory and that Parliament needs to give as much guidance as possible to judges in this context to protect them from being seen to be required to take policy decisions, which would undermine confidence in the rule of law. The Government and Parliament would be very unwise to reject, in particular, the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. It is much more difficult to identify precisely what should be put in place of Clause 6(2). I am encouraged by what the Minister said—that the Government are listening and considering this matter. I am sure that all noble Lords who have spoken would be happy to contribute to the discussions that will take place before Report. I hope that, on Report, the Government will bring forward amendments to Clause 6(2).

[Lord Goldsmith]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, as I suspect he is going to do, can I ask him to clarify one point? He talked a moment ago about the need to protect the judges. Would he agree that it is a question not of protecting the judges from attack, but of protecting the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law?

[Lord Pannick]

I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord. I think I said in opening this debate that it is not that the judges cannot withstand criticism of their judgments, it is rather that we are all concerned about confidence in the rule of law. As the noble and learned Lord said, if the judges are left to take policy decisions in a very sensitive context, where a decision will have to be made as to the weight—if any—to give to Court of Justice judgments handed down after Brexit, there is no doubt that they will be exposed. They will be the subject of criticism which will undermine the rule of law unless we do our job and give very clear guidance on what Parliament thinks should be the appropriate approach.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords—

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

We need to speak from these Benches as well.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made a powerful speech in favour of his amendment, backed by the powerful arguments of the Constitution Committee. It is apparent that this gives rise not to a difference on what the end objective should be: the need for clarity; the need for a clear status for EU law; and the recognition that retained EU law will need to retain its position of priority over pre-existing UK law because that is the status it has at the moment and because, as we have been reminded in debate after debate, the Government have promised that EU law will be passed across on exit day as it is at the moment. The routes proposed by the Constitution Committee and the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law—and in the interesting proposals put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—demonstrate that it is possible to reach those objectives by different routes.

However, the methods put forward by the Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, have the merit of simplicity and elegance. The status of the law is clear. We do not have to go through a process of trying to decide between now and next February what it is; we certainly do not have to go through a process of allowing a Minister to use powers under Clause 17 to assign a process, which would be, as the Constitution Committee says, an unacceptable approach.

It would have the additional advantage, or so it would seem to me at least, that retained EU law would then have some protection against amendability, save by the processes of this House and the other place considering the amendments which ought to be made rather than by a process of delegated legislation—I say “some” protection, because it would not be complete. Those seem reasons why the elegant solution proposed by the Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has much to commend it

I would like to read when it becomes available what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, to make sure that I fully understood all of it. I do not disagree with the intention behind it, but the proposal of the Constitution Committee may achieve it more readily and elegantly.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions and for the opportunity to respond to this debate. These provisions and amendments may be technical, but, in debating them, we must not lose sight of the real practical consequences that follow from how we deal with this issue. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, observed in passing, we are aiming at the same goal; it is a question of which route can most appropriately take us there. I shall come on in due course to look at some of the routes proposed.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I was referring to the different proposals by the Constitution Committee and the Bingham Centre, rather than to the Government’s proposals.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Then I reassure the noble and learned Lord that we are all intent on arriving in the same place; it is a question of how we arrive there. I shall deal with the routes that he touched on.

Perhaps I may correct one point: the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, referred to the work of Professor Craig and to some previous remarks that I had made about that. I commend to him what I said as recorded in Hansard. I referred to the publication of 26 February on the previous occasion; it did not come out after those remarks were made. I shall mention Professor Craig’s analysis in due course. The task of categorising such legislation would be challenging, but we would consider it as one route forward.

As we know, one of the core requirements of EU membership is the principle of supremacy of EU law. In the event of any conflict with domestic law, domestic law must give way. When we leave the EU, it would make no sense and would not be in keeping with our principles to leave that unchanged in our law; we all recognise that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right. If retained EU law were to be categorised as primary legislation, such challenges could not be brought. But the Minister resisted that suggestion in our earlier debate. I am concerned with the Bill as it is at the moment. What is the Government’s intention in this respect?

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, that short exchange has demonstrated how complicated this area is and how important the general principles of EU law are in it. It is, perhaps, late at night to be discussing this but it is extremely important because of both the principles and the way they operate. If one looks at it in this way, and takes the Government’s intention not to take away rights as a part of this process, one has to recognise that the architecture which provides rights at the moment is quite complicated. As a commentator has said, there is no single, simple answer to restoring the position in the light of what the Government propose to do.

Amendment 41, which stands in my name, follows the principle the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, initiated by saying that the general principles of EU law should continue to be capable of giving rise to rights which can be enforced by our courts. The point has already been made that there is a difference between these general rights existing as a way of interpreting other rights—as an interpretive technique—and giving rise to freestanding rights themselves. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 prevents any action being founded in contravention of one of the general principles or rendering any Executive act unlawful or disapplying any legislation, including secondary legislation, on the grounds that it offends these general principles.

The general principles of EU law have been critical to a number of legal decisions relating to people’s rights. One of those often cited is the case of John Walker, who brought a case for equal protection in pension rights for his same-sex partner, a claim upheld by the Supreme Court which recognised that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a key principle of EU law. As I apprehend it, without that the case would not have succeeded.

The principle of effectiveness of remedies has also been relied upon. When the Supreme Court struck down employment tribunal fees that disproportionately affected disadvantaged women and low-paid workers, the principle of effectiveness of remedies was relied upon. Cases concerning caps on compensation and equal pay cases have depended upon the general principle that we find in the EU principles. The amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to enable those general principles to continue to have that effect in our law. It is important that they do for a couple of other reasons. Take, for example, something that was raised in the other place. What if there is a principle of EU retained law which is deficient, defective, does not operate properly or is disproportionate? Without being able to rely upon the general principles of EU law, it may be that all the court could do if faced with that would be to say that either that principle or that particular Act or that particular piece of law, though deficient or defective, has to continue to operate because there is no principle by which it can be struck down, and that would be a loss.

The other reason goes back, I am afraid, to the debate that we had last week on the charter and the Government’s assertion that the charter is not necessary because all the rights are otherwise protected under our law. Of course, at the time the charter was drawn up we were still a member and, in many people’s minds at least, were expected to continue to remain a member of the European Union with all that that implied, including the continued application of general principles. But if one looks—

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

If the noble Lord will allow me to make this point, he can then, of course, intervene. If one looks, as we did briefly last week, at the reasons given by the Government in their right by right analysis for why certain rights would, according to them, continue to exist, we see—I take this from the JCHR’s analysis—that 16 out of 50 of the rights are based, in part at least, on the general principles of EU law. If the general principles of EU law have no more value than as an interpretive tool, that principle would disappear. That means that those rights that the JCHR saw could continue to exist and give rise to rights only because of the general EU rights.

[Lord Faulks]

When we were having the debate about the charter, I specifically asked the noble and learned Lord whether principles which were referred to in the charter were actionable or not, and he said that in his contention, they were not actionable. I am not simply trying to make some forensic point, but I seek clarity from him as to why in that context he said that the principles were not actionable—I can well understand his answer, because principles are rather difficult to identify as regards a clear breach, for example—but he now says that the Bill is wrong and that principles should somehow be actionable.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for the question, because it enables me to clarify that point. There are two sorts of principles. I was talking in answer to the noble Lord’s question last week about the principles which are contained in the charter itself. The charter says that it is a charter of rights and principles, and the principles there—it is not that easy to identify which are principles and which are not—are not actionable in themselves. They may become actionable, because as they are aspirational tools, they are then implemented into law and are actionable at that stage. The principles we are talking about here are different. These are the general principles of EU law, which are, for example, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of non-discrimination. These are different in that sense; they are general rather than specific principles, and they are actionable at the moment. That is why the Walker case I mentioned gives rise to a remedy, as did the other cases where the Supreme Court struck down tribunal fees as being disproportionately high for particular categories of workers.

That is why we believe it is important to keep this. It is one element of the architecture to retain rights. I remind noble Lords that the Prime Minister made it clear that the intention was that rights would continue the same the day after exit as the day before. To remove general principles in this way, and the ability to rely upon them, will fail to keep that promise. This amendment also—it has been referred to already—specifically proposes that the general principles of EU law should include those which are contained in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Those are environmental principles of huge importance: the precautionary principle, the principle of polluter pays and the principle for preventive action. Those principles and the others I referred to need to continue to operate to keep in place the rights that people enjoy at the moment.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their brevity.

Amendment 40ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to ensure that challenges to validity could continue on general principles of EU law grounds. I will address concerns raised on general principles in more detail later. First, Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave the EU. We recognise, however, that in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument. For example, a decision of an EU institution or body may be addressed directly to an individual or business. After exit, they would continue to be able to challenge such decisions—in so far as they apply in the EU—before the CJEU, and to have them annulled. Of course, the converted form of the decision would however remain in force within the UK as retained EU law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 would, after exit day, prevent a challenge to a provision of retained EU law by reference to common-law principles. I understand that the answer is no, it would not, and it is not intended to do so. I hope that that meets the position that he raised with me a moment ago.

Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not believe it would be right to hand them a new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU in this context. This amendment would effectively ask our courts to consider whether the EU acted incompatibly with the general principles when it made an EU instrument. Generally speaking, this is a function that we do not consider it appropriate to confer on domestic courts.

Therefore, although I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, the amendment would undermine the Government’s stated policy of a clear exclusion of both validity challenges and general principle challenges provided for within Schedule 1. However, we recognise that there might be some limited circumstances in which it would be sensible to maintain the ability to challenge retained EU law on validity grounds. The Bill therefore contains a power set out in paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1, to which the noble Baroness alluded, which would enable the Minister to make regulations providing for a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in specified circumstances.

Sub-paragraph (3) sets out that those regulations may provide that a challenge which would previously have proceeded against an EU institution may, after exit, proceed against a UK public authority, because of course there would be no EU institution against which it could be directed. I seek to reassure the noble Baroness that the word “may” is there as a precautionary term lest, in the context of trying to make such a regulatory power, it be perceived that there is no easily identifiable body against which the matter can be directed. However, the intent is that it should be possible to proceed against a public body in those circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I fully acknowledge that that is most certainly a circumstance that could arise. Of course, one might address that circumstance by Parliament legislating to reflect the outcome of that post-Brexit decision. However, I fully acknowledge that, depending on the way in which one constructs the departure on exit day, one might find that what one has retained as EU law ceases to be EU law almost immediately after one has left the EU. I believe that that has been acknowledged on a number of occasions. Indeed, it could lead to the development of two parallel jurisprudences—one for retained EU law and one for EU law. That is an inevitable outcome of our decision to leave the EU but to retain in our domestic law that which was EU law at the point of our departure. I fully acknowledge that, but it might also be a circumstance in which potentially one would seek to exercise the exceptional regulatory power that is referred to.

Reference was made to Amendments 41 and 42, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, which seek to retain indefinitely in domestic law rights of challenge based on the general principles of EU law. If agreed to, these amendments would empower domestic courts to quash administrative actions or secondary legislation or, indeed, even go as far as disapplying an Act of Parliament on the ground that it breaches one or more of the retained general principles of EU law—that could take place long after we have left the EU. That is why we have to have a point in time at which we have certainty as to the scope for such challenges, and that is reflected in the schedule.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, acknowledged, Amendment 41 would go even further. It seeks to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill. In that context, he alluded to Article 191 of the TFEU, which deals with environmental issues. I take issue with him as to whether the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle are both now accepted as general principles of EU law. I would suggest that there is considerable doubt as to whether the former, in particular, constitutes what is recognised in EU law as a general principle, so I have some difficulty with that amendment.

I come now to Amendment 63, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is, I apprehend, intended to retain this right of challenge but solely for the principle of proportionality, as she indicated, and specifically including where retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation. It would also appear to permit the possibility of a challenge on the basis of invalidity of EU law, as well as judicial review of such legislation. It is our position that the general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, non-retroactivity and fundamental rights, will be kept in our domestic law, but in order to assist in interpreting retained EU law and not to give rise to additional stand-alone rights. Whereas some general principles are now set out expressly in EU treaties, the general principles were those that were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They are essentially judge-made and determined as principles on the basis of case law. It is those principles that we are dealing with.

I come back for a moment to Amendment 41, which goes beyond just the issue of proportionality. It would undermine the approach that we are seeking to take if we were to pursue it. In particular the inclusion of Article 191 in the amendment risks going further than the existing principles that are, as I say, set out in EU law and consequently in UK law today.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Leaving aside Article 191—we can argue about that and there is a decision that appears to demonstrate the point: the case of Artegodan, where the court appeared to be willing to extrapolate from the precautionary principle a general principle of EU law—does the Minister accept that, so far as the other general principles of EU law are concerned, to exclude them from the ability to found a cause of action and not just be an interpretative tool would be a diminution of the rights that people currently have and would include a diminution of many of the rights that the Government are saying are already protected under English law?

[Baroness Ludford]

So that the Minister does not have to bob up and down, may I also ask him a question? He talked about our approach in this Bill. That leads me to reflect on how far the approach in this Bill fits, for instance, the Prime Minister’s speech on Friday, in which she envisaged not only strong commitments in the area of trading goods but binding commitments in competition law. The noble and learned Lord talked earlier about how there would be EU law and then retained EU law in this country, the interpretation of which could diverge. How will the Prime Minister’s commitment to binding commitments in some areas to stay fully aligned with EU law be reflected in this construction of the Bill? If we diverge, would we then have to have domestic legislation to bring us back on track with the EU?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

They will have rights but they may not have the same remedy, but that is quite distinct. We are talking about maintaining rights at the point when we leave.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that Mr Walker would not have the same rights? Those are rights purely based upon EU general principles and nothing else. Does he not accept that in that case, at least, the rights would not be there?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke on this subject at Second Reading in respect of the disputes that arose under the old regime which seem to me to deserve fair treatment. I am aware of instances, in particular relating to small businesses, where it could lead to a very unfair result and deprive genuine claimants of going to the EU courts. The noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, mentioned the note by James Segan, and it raises a question which perhaps my noble and learned friend can answer about whether as it currently stands with paragraph 27 of Schedule 8, which was mentioned, and Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978, there could be action under the Human Rights Act. It would be politically unacceptable, apart from anything else, to see claimants pursuing their claims if there were that interpretation.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I look forward to the answers that the Minister will give to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I have Amendment 44 which deals with the timing of the Francovich claim. I can be brief. My noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford set out very well what we are talking about. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, indicated the problems to which the Government’s approach gives rise. One can look at it this way: at the moment the Bill appears to say that if the Government were to commit an act that was unlawful—a breach of Union law, for example—before exit day, the Francovich claim could not be brought, except in circumstances where the claim had been brought before exit day. I do not see the justification for that. That amounts to whitewashing an unlawful act and, as has been said—and it seems to me to be absolutely right—it is quite inconsistent with the promise that has been made that we will have the same rights the day after exit day as the day before.

I look forward to the answers to those questions. Even if any change does not go as far as my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford, said, it must at least apply, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, put it, to accrued rights, so that any act which is committed before exit day which gives rise to a Francovich claim should continue to do so.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged. Reference has been made to the Francovich principle. I am not sure there is such a principle, although there is the issue of Francovich damages, which arises from the case that was referred to in 1991. In order to put that into context, since 1991, and in the 20 years following, there have been 22—possibly up to 25—claims for Francovich damages in the UK courts. This is not some wide-ranging citizen or business right for the recovery of damages. There have been very few actual Francovich damages claims. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, shaking his head, but I invite him to study the case law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I have no doubt about what the noble and learned Lord says. So why are they so worried about keeping it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am just about to come on to that. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his patience in that respect, and will endeavour to deal with matters as swiftly as I can, given the hour. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, very correctly, pointed out the criteria that apply in determining whether or not there is a claim for Francovich damages: first, that the relevant provision of European Union law was intended to confer rights; secondly, that there has been a serious failure to implement European Union law; and thirdly, that there is a direct causal link between that failure and the loss complained of. I would not go so far as to suggest that Francovich damages are in some sense more generous than those available otherwise under the common law in this country, particularly those available in the context of judicial review. I have to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that damages are potentially available in a claim for judicial review.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I wonder whether the noble Lord could exercise a small degree of patience while I just complete what I have to say on this topic. But we can take as long as it takes. As I was saying, in terms of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1, the right in domestic law to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich is removed as at exit date. There is of course a proviso in paragraph 27 of Schedule 8 in respect of claims for Francovich damages which have already been raised prior to exit date—the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made. The potential lacuna is this: there may be accrued rights as at exit date where no claim has been made. We recognise that and it was noted in the other place. We are open to addressing that issue in order to ensure that those accrued rights are not removed by the application of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1. That is something that we are prepared to look at, as I have indicated, because we are aware of the criticism that has been made about the potential removal of rights that have already accrued as at the exit date.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Do I take it from that that the Minister will be bringing forward an amendment to correct this?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has taken part in this interesting debate. I think that anybody listening in from outside will be impressed that we are working hard on a very serious matter at quarter to one in the morning.

[Lord Goldsmith]

And not drinking cocoa.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Yes, not drinking cocoa, indeed—absolutely right.

First of all, I must say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has misunderstood a number of things. One is that I think he has got it wrong on the issue of damages. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is representative in what he said of the great majority of legal opinion on this subject and of the experience that any of us have had—via our constituents or otherwise—in this area of the law.

The second thing is that I think the noble and learned Lord has misunderstood that the major part of the importance of the Francovich system or jurisprudence is that it is a potential deterrent to those who might be inclined to misgovern us. People know that they are subject to this particular sanction if they do, and that has enormous effect. The fact that the power is used 25 times is not negligible—28 times I think it is in this country and 300 and something times over the Union as a whole. That does not mean to say that it is without effect, or that its effect is limited to those occasions. It would be very naive to say that; its effect is created by the presence of that particular sanction and means of redress for those who have been wronged in this way.

I also do not think that the noble and learned Lord is right in saying that the whole matter of Francovich is not very important because it applies only when there are serious issues. The principle of—to put it in language that I think he will understand—de minimis non curat lex—applies to everything really, in the Roman law tradition anyway. So it is not at all surprising that it applies in this case.

I want to leave the Committee with complete clarity about this, and there are three separate issues here. One is what we do about people who have a claim, or think they have a claim, under the Francovich principle—and I continue to call it that—and it is overtaken by events because they have not litigated before Brexit or they are half way through or they have not expressed their claim or put it in at all. What happens about them? That is important, because it may only be three or four people, and we should always be concerned about justice for anybody. I do not in any way denigrate people who have taken up a lot of time to talk about their particular subject; it is a perfectly respectable concern to have. But my concern is not really with that—mine is to my mind much more significant. Going forward, do we have the Francovich principle or something like it in our own legal system, both to enshrine that principle that the state is subject to the law like everybody else, which as I say is so important, and to make sure that we have that instrument of good government, which has a real deterrent effect on the behaviour of central and local government, public corporations and, indeed, the private sector? That is very important to me.

I disagree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, when he says that the Francovich system does not make any sense when we have left the European Union, because there will not be such a thing as European law here. He is quite wrong about that; there will be retained law for decades, no doubt, until it is changed by statute—if it is changed by statute over that time. It is called retained law; it is exactly the same law. The difference may be that, whereas you could litigate under it before Brexit, after Brexit you will not be able to litigate under it at all, which seems completely unreasonable. That means the loss of remedies and rights that we currently have in respect of exactly the same laws, because they are exactly the same provisions with exactly the same wording having exactly the same effect, whether they are today on 5 March, or on 1 April next year after we have left. That is what the whole principle of retained law is, as I understand it—and I think that the noble and learned Lord knows that.

It is my concern in this amendment to make sure that, when the citizens of this country have current rights and protections, they should enjoy all those after Brexit. I thought that the Government were in favour of that principle. We heard earlier from another Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, that he believes that that is the case and favours that principle—and I think that that principle is enormously important.

Then there is the third issue, which I raised—and it is probably not the last time that I shall raise it in this House. The experience of Francovich is such that I believe that it should be carried forward into the whole corpus of law in this country, Scots law and English law. We continue to have these rights and these remedies. I believe their jurisprudence in this case to be a considerable advance of civilisation in the European Union over the last 25 years; there have been many such advances and, if we are going to carry forward the assets that we take over rather than throwing them away on Brexit, we should make sure that we carry forward this one. That is not a matter for this Bill; what is a matter for this Bill is the second point that I make, which is to make sure that in respect of retained law the rights that currently exist will be carried through and not abolished.

I hope that the Government will think about that between now and Report. I would certainly welcome the opportunity to discuss the matter with them before we decide how we can take this matter further. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Goldsmith]

13A: Clause 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations bringing into force subsection (1) may not be made until the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament proposals for arrangements for the continued application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to retained EU law under sections 2, 3 and 4.”

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we now come to the first group of amendments that deals with the exclusion from the Bill of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. A number of amendments relate to the exclusion of the charter and to its specific provisions, so this may be a convenient place to debate the general principle of what the Government are proposing and the issues to which that gives rise. I shall therefore speak also to Amendments 14, 20, 25 and 34. Amendments 46, 47, 333 and 347 are consequential and I apprehend that there will be no need to say anything more about them.

The starting point for these amendments is the Government’s decision to exclude the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from the carryover into domestic law of existing EU law that the Bill is otherwise designed to achieve. As noble Lords know, and as the Government have been at pains to point out, the purpose of the Bill is to maintain legal continuity, certainty and stability for businesses and individuals by incorporating EU law as it stands into UK law. As the Prime Minister said in her foreword to the White Paper, the purpose is to ensure that:

“The same rules and laws will apply on the day after exit as on the day before”.


The White Paper goes on to explain that it will then be for democratically elected representatives in the UK, in this Parliament and the devolved Administrations, to decide whether to change that law after full and proper scrutiny and debate. This decision to bring EU law into UK law at the moment of exit is an essential part of the plan to provide clarity and is necessary, it is said by the Government, to bolster confidence and planning as the Brexit process comes into effect. The noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal said at Second Reading that this is,

“about ensuring that people’s rights are maintained. It is vital to a smooth and orderly exit from the EU”.—[Official Report, 30/1/18; col. 1374.]

However, there is one glaring and deeply troubling exception to the proposal to bring EU law into domestic law so that it is the same the day after exit as it was the day before: the exclusion of the charter, in its entirety, from this exercise.

In another place, the Solicitor-General described the exercise as downloading EU law into domestic law, but what is not being downloaded is the charter. In another place, Sir Keir Starmer noted that although thousands of provisions of EU law are being converted into domestic law, and may have to be modified in some sense after that exercise, only one provision in the thousands on thousands of provisions of EU law is singled out for extinction, and that is the charter. That gives rise to a conundrum.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Is the noble and learned Lord going to come on to explaining why it was, when he was Attorney-General and working with Tony Blair, he worked so hard to try to get the charter excluded from the Lisbon treaty? Indeed, they thought they had achieved such an opt-out from the treaty until it was overruled subsequently by the European Court of Justice. Surely what we are doing now is trying to fulfil the objective that he himself had in mind.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I can see noble Lords opposite are all very well briefed. I predicted this at Second Reading. I will come on to that, but let me make some progress on the arguments which matter.

[Noble Lords]

Answer!

[Lord Goldsmith]

No, I will make some progress on the arguments which matter. As the Constitution Committee of this House said at paragraph 119 of its report, the conundrum is this:

“The primary purpose of this Bill is to maintain legal continuity and promote legal certainty by retaining existing EU law as part of our law, while conferring powers on ministers to amend the retained EU law. If, as the Government suggests, the Charter of Fundamental Rights adds nothing to the content of EU law which is being retained, we do not understand why an exception needs to be made for it. If, however, the Charter does add value, then legal continuity suggests that the Bill should not make substantive changes to the law which applies immediately after exit day”.


I want to examine the reasons that are put forward for not including the charter. The more I look at the arguments, the more convinced I become that the Government have got it wrong. I will not deny that there are issues as to the best way to bring the charter into effect in domestic law, and there are other amendments which will debate that, but Amendment 13A would require the Government to bring forward proposals for its continued application and the route by which the charter can be given effect.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Would the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee whether he is contemplating that the charter should be incorporated into domestic law as a statute, and as such be capable of amendment?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am suggesting that the charter is brought into domestic law in the same way as all the other provisions of EU law will be brought into domestic law by this Bill, if it is passed. That means that they will be subject to the powers in the clauses that will be passed for amendment through orders, if this House and the other place approve that way of doing it. They will also, of course, as always, be subject to amendment by primary legislation. I will come on to this, but it is interesting that special protection is given to the ECHR through the Human Rights Act to protect it as we go forward, but there is no protection provided at all for the rights which underlie the charter. That is one of the deficiencies that are not taken account of in the Government’s proposal.

[Baroness Deech]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that perhaps we are being tied in knots by his argument? The nub of the charter, and why it is different from the European Convention on Human Rights and our Human Rights Act, is that the charter says that judges can set aside, invalidate or nullify our Acts of Parliament. That is the nub of it and is why it does not sit with the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty. If you incorporate it in domestic law, you are in a real tangle, because if you try to repeal it, judges could set that aside. You end up in a vicious spiral.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the intervention. Of course it is not the charter which provides that, in certain circumstances, our courts have the ability to disapply domestic law; it is EU law and its ability to override Parliament. That is not what the charter has created; it is EU law that has created it. That is something which this Bill is intended to remove.

I want to get back on to the reasons why. The first reason put forward—this is the nub of the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson—is that the charter merely codifies existing rights and principles.

[Noble Lords]

Lamont!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise to both noble Lords. The proposition is that the charter does no more than codify existing rights and principles, so it is not necessary to bring it in. It has been said, for example, by the very distinguished and independent Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law that that proposition is demonstrably not correct. It sets that out in a detailed report that I commend to noble Lords. An opinion of Queen’s Counsel obtained by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission concludes that in fact this would lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the United Kingdom. Against those independent statements, it is no wonder that many NGOs and many members of civil society are deeply troubled about the exclusion of the charter. It is not just civil society that is concerned about that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, noted in the last debate, but industries such as the tech industry.

One can find examples of rights that are not protected in the report, which I also commend to noble Lords, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its right-by-right analysis it identifies which rights are already included in our law and which are not. For example, on the very first item in the charter—Article 1 on the protection of human dignity, which many people would regard as the most fundamental human right and the basis of all others—the Government’s right-by-right analysis gives two reasons for saying that that would be continued: first, an unincorporated treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which does not have enforceable effect in this country at all; and, secondly, as a general principle of EU law—but, as noble Lords will know, this Bill seeks to prevent general principles of EU law being given effect or creating any enforceable rights. That is an aspect that we will have to come back to later in the debates on the Bill.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord identifies the fact that certain rights are no longer protected adequately because the charter contains rights that are not there in the European convention or, presumably, otherwise provided for by law. Could he tell the House why the Human Rights Act was not expanded to take into account the protection of these laws? At no time from 1998 to the time when the Labour Government lost power was there any attempt to include these rights that he now says are a central part of our law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

They were, because the charter provided for them. The Human Rights Act incorporated one set of provisions only, the European Convention on Human Rights, which goes back to just after the Second World War and which provides the classic political and civil rights. The other rights that we find in the charter, which is a much longer document and refers to socioeconomic rights, were not included in the Human Rights Act because they were not included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The right-by-right analysis demonstrates which of these rights are not included. Given that the Government’s objective, as stated by the Prime Minister, is to ensure that the protections for people in this country are the same the day after exit as the day before, I respectfully suggest that it is not for me to identify why that is not right; it is for the Government to demonstrate why it is. When we have substantial independent bodies such as the Bingham Centre and independent opinions from QCs demonstrating that actually it is not the case that the protections remain the same, the Government need to explain. I shall come on to that further.

Obviously there are examples of rights in the charter that reflect precisely other rights that we have within our law. In particular, there are a number of rights in the charter that are explicitly based on the European Convention on Human Rights; they are the same. Indeed, during the negotiations I went to some pains to try to ensure that they were phrased in the same way so as to prevent lawyers from saying, “It’s written differently so it must mean something different”. However, those are not the only rights that are there. As I noted at Second Reading, the charter is based not just on the European Convention on Human Rights but on principles of EU law and on principles that are commonly accepted by the member states, and those are in a different position from the ECHR rights.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Just take one of the rights that is precisely mirrored in the convention. Is it suggested that henceforth, the wise complainant who faces primary legislation here which is incompatible with that right should therefore sue under both the charter and the convention because, lo and behold, under the convention, despite the constitutional arrangement whereby the court’s powers are limited to a declaration of incompatibility, he can disapply the primary legislation? Is that to be the consequence: that in a case where it matches, the convention trumps the constitutional settlement we arrived at, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred?

[Lord Goldsmith]

That will depend on the shape of the Bill when it is completed—in particular, what is said about the provisions which deal with primacy of EU law—but at the moment, as the noble and learned Lord will know well from the cases he sat on, people have been bringing cases by reference to both the charter and the convention. One reason for that is that the protection under the charter is more powerful. In future, if people want protection of human rights, they will want the more powerful protection, and if that remains available after the Bill is enacted, they will look to it.

[Baroness Deech]

So if that protection is more powerful, the entire British structure relating to human fertilisation and embryology, which is very liberal and go-ahead, could be wiped out by the application of Article 3. It is very fortunate that the bodies opposed to our progress in reproductive rights have not cottoned on to that. It talks about the prohibition of eugenics, whatever that is, and selection of persons. By interpretation, it would stop us doing mitochondrial research, selection of embryos to screen out disease and a whole host of other things. Another article ensures continuing freedom of movement. Surely we do not want that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Baroness raises two different points. Some of the rights in the charter plainly do not continue after exit because they are dependent on our membership of the EU. Those include freedom of movement, which is based, as the explanations of the charter plainly show, on the rights that currently exist. There are others, such as the right to vote in European elections, which will not apply.

Let me make this point now, because it is one of the objections raised to keeping the charter in. As with many other provisions of EU law, there will need to be changes—I think they are described as deficiencies in the Bill; defects. For example, other provisions of EU law refer to bodies to which we will no longer belong or to supervising agencies with which we will no longer be concerned because we will have left the European Union. That is what the provisions of the deficiency orders are intended to deal with. So, too, they can deal with matters under the charter which no longer have effect for that reason.

The noble Baroness’s first point was a different matter, which was to do with the ambit of Article 3. I am sure that she has it clearly in mind, but the explanations of Article 3 make it clear that:

“The reference to eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, relates to possible situations in which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts deemed to be international crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court”.


I do not doubt that the noble Baroness would be as opposed to those provisions as the rest of us would be. In relation to reproductive cloning, which may be what she had in mind, the explanations talk about being against reproductive cloning, but that is not the same as therapeutic cloning. We can have debates about that if need be.

Let me move on, if I may, because I have only started to deal with one aspect of the issue. In terms of the substantive protections that the charter provides but the ECHR does not, although it covers many of the same, reference has been made already to the case of Mr David Davis himself and Mr Tom Watson. I say this not because it is amusing to point the finger at Mr Davis, in his current position, having relied on the charter, as we know he did, but because it is illustrative of something significant. As a Back Bencher, he and Mr Watson brought a case against the provisions of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act—DRIPA. Mr Davis was concerned that they would impinge on the ability of MPs to have confidential communications from their constituents. In his argument, he and his lawyers relied on the charter, and they were successful in doing so. The court agreed that the charter was relevant.

Another example of new rights, developed rights or rights that have emerged through the dynamic approach of the charter is in the Google Spain case in which the right to be forgotten arose as a result of an examination of Articles 7 and 8 by the Court of Justice of the European Union. So, there are a number of examples where the substantive protections will be different. I have made it clear that there are many examples where the substantive protections are the same, but the purpose behind the Bill is to make sure that the protections for people are the same the day after leaving as the day before.

It is not just the substantive protections. There are different remedies, one of which has been referred to already—the ability to disapply legislation if that is where the Bill ends up at the end of the day. That is a more powerful remedy than the Human Rights Act. That was demonstrated in the Benkharbouche case when the State Immunity Act was disapplied so that foreign employees of an embassy could bring claims, which they would not otherwise be able to bring, so as to produce a more just situation.

The Government’s position on the substantive protections appears to have changed. I understood that the Government said that the protections would be the same, but now the formula that appears to be being used is that there will be no significant loss of substantive protection. That is not the same thing. No significant loss of substantive protection means that there is some loss of substantive protection, though someone takes the view that it is not significant. That is not the same as the principle the Prime Minister’s foreword set out.

Will the Minister respond to the following questions? First, will he confirm that the Government no longer contend that disapplying, excluding the charter, will lead to all the same existing substantive protections, or do they accept that some of them will not exist? If so, will he tell the Committee either now or subsequently what those are? Secondly, I referred to the phrase “no significant loss of substantive protections”. Does the Minister agree that that leaves aside the question of whether procedural or other protections will be excluded as a result of excluding the charter from this protection? I ask the Minister to identify what the differences are and whether he accepts that there will be a loss of protection, even though the Government wish to say that it is not significant, so that the Committee can judge. Also, he will need to say, please, why that meets the objective the Prime Minister set in her foreword to the White Paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I promise that I will not intervene again—I loathe intervening. But does the noble and learned Lord agree, although he proposes the domestication of the charter, it will still be necessary in future to decide what is within the ambit of what used to be EU law, because that is where the operation of the charter is presently confined—or does he suggest that now it opens up and encompasses all UK law, so that it is a wider application than it was originally? Are we going to have to go again through the impossible exercise, notoriously uncertain in application, of having to decide what is specifically and directly within the ambit of EU law in future as well?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I know that this is a point that troubles him, but he should bear in mind that what we have in Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the Bill are provisions to bring specific aspects of EU derived legislation and EU direct effect legislation into UK law. That is the Union law that will continue, and that is what is defined as retained EU law—and it is to that retained EU law that the charter will continue to have effect under the scheme that I advocate to your Lordships, not to anything else or more broadly UK law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

So the right to dignity would exist in the context of EU law, but not otherwise? Is that really how it is intended to work? Can the noble and learned Lord give an illustration of a case that will succeed under the right to human dignity in future—I mean, there has not ever been one in the past that has succeeded under that—when otherwise it would fail?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I find this very difficult to understand. If you look at the charter, you find reference to the Union in item after item. It begins with a series of rights, but as soon as you penetrate further you find that it is closely related to membership of the Union and things that are guaranteed by its law. If I understood the noble and learned Lord correctly, he wants the charter to be brought in and protected against that kind of amendment in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights. This charter will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU. I simply do not understand how the system is intended to work if it were brought into our law in the way the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord will recall that, whenever he opposed me with that argument from his position in the House of Lords or Supreme Court, I did my best to try to explain why there is an error in his thinking. With respect, I do the same here. If one takes, for example, one of the rights in the charter which does derive from Union law, is it to be said that although it is going to be transposed into our law as an EU retained law, it will no longer be subject to any of the protections that it has at the moment through being subject to the charter? It does not mean, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, suggested, that all UK law will be subject to this protection. It does mean that that law which is currently subject to that protection will continue to be so unless and until it is amended. That is the way that one gives effect to the intention that the law should be the same the day after Brexit as the day before.

I want to underline that we are talking about the extent of substantive protections; other protections and their extent; and the lack of enhancement of rights. These are all distinct points. I will also refer to the loss of the effect of charter principles. Noble Lords who have studied the charter will know that as well as rights there are principles. The principles are more aspirational, but they guide the legislator and that is a useful thing to have. Even leaving that aside, the other items I identified—the substantive protections, their nature and their enhancement or lack of it—are all things which mean we will not have the same protections after exit day as we have at the moment.

[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble and learned Lord telling the House that these principles are going to be actionable on their own?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Lord knows that that is not the position in relation to the principles: they are guidance and aspirational. I am not spending a lot of time on them, although some of the NGOs have. I will give one example. There was a case in which the EU’s proposed legislation in relation to plain packaging of tobacco products was challenged in the courts on the grounds that it contravened freedom of expression. One of the things that the court looking at that noted was that the charter provided for a high degree of public protection in terms of health. I hope that all noble Lords agree with that sentiment, whether or not they agree with the result of the case. That is an example of where the principles come into effect.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I apologise for interrupting the noble and learned Lord a second time. We have listened to what he has said with great care. He has spoken for 34 minutes. He said that he would answer the question I posed at the very beginning of his speech—namely, why he had altered his mind when previously he had tried to keep the charter out of the Lisbon treaty, when he then said that it ought to have no direct domestic effect. Why has he changed his mind?

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I was about to come to that and I am grateful to the noble Lord.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I said that I would come back to it, and that is what I intended to do. A number of things have happened since the charter was drafted, as I said on Second Reading. The courts have referred to provisions of the charter and have given them effect. The decision was made to give the charter legal effect, which was not the way we started the negotiation. That is what happened in the Lisbon treaty, but that was not the original intention. That is what we argued against at the time, precisely so as to avoid the situation in which the courts were in a position to give effect to rights that we had not expected them to give effect to. That is what changed. That is why we now have a situation, where, as I have said, in a number of cases the courts have said that the charter has an effect and provides enforceable rights to individuals.

I conclude. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered that the Government’s decision to exclude the charter, while effectively retaining nearly all other EU law, was taken without having undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the implications for the protection of rights. I cannot say whether that is right, but this amendment would require a focus to be given to that so that we can see what the correct analysis is and what the right way to proceed is. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 14A, 20A and 25A in this group, which stand in my name. I apologise for the absence of my noble friend Lord Bowness, who has put his name to a number of amendments but cannot be here because of weather conditions. He has asked me to apologise to your Lordships for his absence.

The purpose of the three amendments standing in my name is to ensure that the terms of the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, are capable of amendment by Parliament. This may be implied by the other amendments, but I think not. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord. While there is a capacity to remedy deficiencies by regulation, there is no capacity to enable Parliament to mount a careful scrutiny and amendment of the charter. Therefore, the purpose of my amendments is to make it explicit that the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment.

I do not want to say very much by way of a general justification for the need to incorporate the charter; I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord who has spoken has much greater expertise than I. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will probably speak. He, too, has much greater knowledge of this than I. I am but a journeyman lawyer and I have never had to wrestle with the charter’s significance in domestic terms. However, I noticed last week in the Times that Professor Bogdanor made a very powerful case for not scrapping the rights. The important thing that your Lordships need to keep in mind is that the charter provides a number of rights and remedies not found elsewhere in our domestic law. That point was made by the noble and learned Lord.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 14, the effect of which is to retain the charter as part of domestic law and to retain EU law under which claimants would be able to have domestic legislation struck down on the basis of incompatibility with the charter. Some noble Lords have expressed the view that they were baffled by the exclusion of the charter from this legislation, but I felt that the arguments were put very simply and cogently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, at Second Reading when he simply pointed out that the charter is only one part of our extensive framework of human rights, that there would be a risk of confusion because of conflict with the ECHR and that what this was doing was complicating the situation to no good purpose.

Furthermore, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has produced a memorandum showing how existing rights are being provided for in the legislation and in retained law. He has also gone further and said that if anyone can provide specific examples of rights that are not provided for, he will give the matter due consideration. Various people have suggested various things that may or may not be suitable for inclusion, but they will no doubt be considered by the Secretary of State and could be considered for primary legislation.

I asked the noble and learned Lord why he had changed his mind about the incorporation of the charter, which he and Prime Minister Blair strongly opposed in the Lisbon treaty. I do not want to go over that, as I think I made my point, but I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that he had very good reasons for excluding it, and that now is an opportunity—

[Lord Goldsmith]

In fact, this country accepted that the charter would become part of EU law in the Lisbon treaty—it is the opposite of what the noble Lord said.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Against the noble and learned Lord’s will. There was also an attempt to get an opt-out, which the European Court of Justice said was not valid. I see that the Minister is agreeing with me. I believe that is a correct account of what happened. It was struck down. The case in which it happened was, I think, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The potential answer is no, and the note says that my time is up. Nevertheless, and be that as it may, we will endeavour to address these issues as soon as we can. Clearly it will require us not only to consider the position we have adopted already in the document published in December last year but to take into consideration the concerns expressed by other lawyers and in this Committee in the course of the debate. We will look at those and we will want to address them at the next stage of the Bill; of that, I am confident.

At this stage I appreciate that there are some questions which I have not directly answered in the course of my response and it may be difficult to do so in the time remaining. Perhaps I may say that I endorse entirely the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood, with regard to the potential difficulties of simply drawing the charter over into domestic law. I am not going to elaborate on the consequences of doing that, but they can be summarised as confusion, uncertainty and difficulty, and ultimately could prove to be counterproductive. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have taken part in the debate. It has been wide-ranging, as we anticipated it would be. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. I shall obviously not spend long on what I say now, given the hour. As we approached midnight, I was looking around the corner to see whether a pumpkin would arrive with horses. I was not sure whether it would be for me or for the noble and learned Lord opposite.

Bach Commission: The Right to Justice

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, when my noble friend Lord Bach started this debate, he reminded us that access to justice needs to be effective for it to achieve what it is supposed to achieve. Although we all believe in it, as with the rule of law there is a real danger of not doing what is necessary to make it happen. I pay tribute to my noble friend, the other members of the commission and all who assisted him with this report. Here we have some practical solutions.

I want to identify and focus on the problems that real people experience as a result of the lack of access to justice. I do that by drawing attention not to what the effect of the cuts to legal aid has been on the legal profession but to the effect on the voluntary agencies that provide so much advice to people who desperately need it.

Let me give noble Lords one example. The House will recall, I hope, that one consequence of LASPO has been not just to cut the earnings of lawyers in private practice but to reduce the revenue available to law centres and legal advice centres. One such law centre is the Haringey Law Centre, with which my firm partners—I disclose that interest. Following LASPO, its staff numbers were reduced from 15 to five, yet it still supported almost 3,000 Haringey residents a year, of whom, not surprisingly, a large proportion are BME, unemployed or disabled. Further cuts in 2016 meant that Haringey was nearly forced to close. It stayed open only because several key staff members continued to work without pay. That is only one example. The Law Centres Network has reported that law centres suffered a 60% loss in legal aid revenue due to LASPO. That is producing a situation in which people cannot get the assistance that they desperately need, not in grand public law cases or private litigation, but in areas of everyday life—employment, benefits, housing—which matter enormously to the people in this country.

I declare an interest as the chairman of the Access to Justice Foundation, an organisation supported and set up by all elements of the legal profession to collect money and fund through grants law centres, legal advice centres and those agencies and people that provide legal services pro bono. But there is a desert of legal advice. The Law Society has identified that almost one-third of legal aid areas have just one, and in some cases not even one, law firm that provides housing advice.

The recommendation of my noble friend’s commission for a right to justice Act is to be commended, and I support him in that. However, it should not detract from the other practical recommendations that his report makes; those can be got on with straightaway. Like others in this House, I look forward to hearing the Minister and others indicate what is going to be done about this in practical terms.

Supported though it is by four former Lords Chief Justice—if that is the correct plural—this debate must not become an end-of-term, teatime debate. It needs to drive forward real reform. Last year, almost 1 million people were not helped by legal aid who would have been helped in 2013. That illustrates the extent of the demand. While it may be possible to make many important changes to our justice system to make it more effective, efficient or cheaper, none of that should delay the need for assistance for the people towards whom my noble friend’s report is directed. I commend the report and look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about what the Government intend to do to deal with it.