Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Hain Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the amendments he has tabled. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. One has to think that the continued inclusion we have just heard described was inadvertent and that the Minister will make sure that it is cleaned up immediately in the Commons—otherwise we will have to address the issue when the Bill returns to this House so that it is consistent throughout.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to thank your Lordships’ House for allowing me to speak at length on three occasions to spell out the corruption and money laundering involving some British companies. I am told by those involved that, when the leadership change took place in South Africa just before Christmas, these interventions had some effect on the margin, and I am grateful for that. I thank in particular the Minister. When last Monday I spoke on Report, I think that I may have strayed outside order, narrowly—or not, as the case may be. I am grateful to him and to those involved for their tolerance. I have thanked him personally but I wanted to put it on the record.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Hain Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 15th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I too am very glad that the Minister listened to the debates in Committee and engaged, with his team, so effectively with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others. I was slightly amused that, in his letter to us, the Minister described his amendments as technical in nature. I thought that was a phrase he might have avoided, given the trouble he ran into on it before. That aside, I welcome the amendments.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to these amendments, on which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, made some persuasive and consensual points about how we uphold our international obligations. I will focus on sanctions in the related context affecting UK-based companies. I would be very grateful for some leeway from your Lordships in this so that we can make progress on the whole Bill, especially on Wednesday, when time will be short.

It should be a matter of shame that companies headquartered here in the UK have so far evaded sanctions for aiding and abetting money laundering, corruption and state capture in South Africa, including Bell Pottinger, KPMG, McKinsey, SAP and banks such as HSBC, Standard Chartered and Baroda, in total betrayal of Nelson Mandela’s legacy. I have just referred Hogan Lovells, the international law firm headquartered here in London, to the Solicitors Regulation Authority—the SRA—for enabling a corrupt money launderer to be returned to his post as second-in-command of the critically important South African Revenue Service, SARS. I have asked the SRA to withdraw Hogan Lovells’ authorisation as a recognised body and to examine what other disciplinary action can be taken against its leading partners, including withdrawing their permission to practise as solicitors.

Hogan Lovells spared two of the most notorious perpetrators of state capture in South Africa, Tom Moyane, head of SARS, and his deputy, Jonas Makwakwa, from accountability for their complicity in and cover up of serious financial crimes. In so doing, Hogan Lovells are complicit in undermining South Africa’s once revered tax-collection agency and thereby effectively underpinning President Jacob Zuma and his business associates, the Gupta brothers and others, in perverting South Africa’s democracy, damaging its economy and robbing its taxpayers. When Hogan Lovells was engaged by the corrupt Moyane in September 2016, it was well known that he and Makwakwa were synonymous with President Jacob Zuma’s capture of the state. Hogan Lovells could therefore not plead ignorance as they walked right into that web of corruption and cronyism for a fat fee.

To help protect himself from 783 counts of corruption, fraud, racketeering and money-laundering levelled against him when he came to power in 2009, President Zuma systematically dismembered and manipulated the once highly functional South African Revenue Service and the National Prosecuting Authority. Zuma’s key man in this process was his long-time comrade, Tom Moyane, whom he appointed as head of SARS, as commissioner, in 2014 and who, from day one, loyally set about obliterating all its investigative capacity, with the assistance of his deputy, Jonas Makwakwa. These two turned the institution, which under the leadership of the highly respected Pravin Gordhan had consistently overdelivered on revenue collection, into one now facing a 51 billion rand, or £3 billion, revenue shortfall.

Makwakwa’s unethical behaviour was quickly exposed in May 2016 when South Africa’s financial crime regulator, the Financial Intelligence Centre, ordered SARS to establish whether several “suspicious and unusual cash deposits and payments” into the accounts of Makwakwa and his lover, a low-level SARS employee, Kelly-Ann Elskie, were “the proceeds of crime and/or money laundering”. About 1.7 million rand—about £100,000, a lot in South African purchasing power—had been paid into their bank accounts over a six-year period. The FIC noted that the amounts flowing out of Makwakwa’s account,

“are of concern as they originate from unknown sources and undetermined legal purpose”.

However, when the FIC reported these suspicious transactions to Moyane, he tried to ignore the request by keeping it a secret. At the same time, the FIC reported the suspicious transactions to the police, known as the Hawks, to investigate the alleged criminality associated with the transactional flows and they opened a case.

Four months later, in September 2016, news of the FIC’s report to Moyane was exposed by investigative journalists and he begrudgingly suspended Makwakwa and later Elskie. This is when Hogan Lovells entered the picture. Moyane appointed the law firm to conduct “an independent investigation” into the Financial Intelligence Centre’s allegations to ensure “transparency, independence and integrity”, and then to recommend and independently facilitate necessary action, including disciplinary action. Hogan Lovells was therefore appointed to investigate the allegations contained in the FIC report and to conduct disciplinary proceedings against Makwakwa on behalf of SARS. To that effect, Hogan Lovells drafted the terms of reference for the engagement, a seven-page roadmap signed and adopted by SARS. However, Hogan Lovells failed to investigate the very reason the firm was appointed; the allegations contained in the FIC report. Hogan Lovells deviated so materially from its own terms of reference, allowing itself to be blindly led by Moyane, who redefined the terms of reference as and when it suited him, that a respected investigative journalist described the outcome as being,

“so tailored that it borders on the realm of being cooked”.

What an indictment of a leading international firm, Hogan Lovells, and its role.

The allegations against Makwakwa involved layers of possible transgressions; these being, first, tax law breaches, linked to whether he declared the transactions; secondly, criminal breaches, linked to whether the suspicious transactions were predicated on corruption or money laundering; and thirdly, whether internal SARS policy breaches had occurred. Moyane also mandated PricewaterhouseCoopers to analyse Makwakwa’s tax compliance, with regards to the “suspicious and unusual” money flows through his accounts. The Hawks were simultaneously investigating the criminality. Hogan Lovells’s mandate was, according to its terms of reference, to institute an independent investigation, partly using the findings of these other processes, to assess the veracity of the FIC allegations against labour and administrative law, and institute a disciplinary process.

But then two things happened. First, SARS declined to provide Hogan Lovells with the PricewaterhouseCoopers investigative report into Makwakwa, citing taxpayer confidentiality—an inaccurate interpretation of the law, which Hogan Lovells accepted without question. Secondly, Hogan Lovells never made contact with the Hawks to assess the status of their investigation—information which would logically be crucial to its assessment of Makwakwa’s fitness as a senior SARS employee. Equally puzzling is that around that time, South Africa’s Parliament got interested in Moyane’s puppet mastery of Hogan Lovells, prompting a parliamentary question about the nature of the engagement between the two organisations.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sheehan (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 75A, which is also in my name. I agree with all that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said. The Bill allows such sweeping powers to future Ministers that we on this side of the House seek to put in place safeguards which will enable Parliament greater scrutiny over the regulations made under Clause 16—namely, that they are made by the affirmative procedure.

Clause 16 is the enforcement clause which includes not only the creation of criminal offences punishable by up to 10 years in prison but makes provision for matters in relation to those offences, including defences and evidentiary matters. The Constitution Select Committee has recommended that Clause 16 should not remain part of the Bill, stating its opinion that such regulation-making powers are constitutionally unacceptable. Indeed, we heard arguments to that effect from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lady Bowles on the first day of Committee. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that this clause should not disfigure our statute book, as he said. Therefore, this amendment is purely an attempt to create a safety net should Clause 16 remain part of the Bill.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I added my name to this group of amendments and I support my noble friend Lord Collins in pressing for greater safeguards and extra parliamentary scrutiny, not least because, as I detailed last week in Committee, the banks and London have an appalling record on money laundering—it gives me no great pleasure to say that. We pride ourselves on having one of the best centres of finance in the world, and it is a tremendous source of employment, which is important. However, there is a record of money laundering that simply requires extra parliamentary scrutiny, which is why this group of amendments is so important. That gives me the opportunity briefly, as noble Lords will be relieved to know, to comment on today’s news that HSBC has been relinquished of the penalties that could have applied in the United States of America for similar allegations. That is good news for a British bank that has a global footprint, and for its many employees here in Britain.

I will make two points on this. I caution all our banks which face allegations of money laundering—the Minister may care to comment on this point. Usually, their initial response is to deny it. Then, for example, HSBC, discovered several accounts held by the Gupta brothers, who are South African associates of President Zuma’s family, and it has closed them down, which is welcome. However, we have had a steady stream of allegations against mainly British companies: Bell Pottinger and KPMG, and then McKinsey, which is an American-based company with a presence here. Their initial stance is to deny, then admit, and then apologise. I caution them that with this disease of money laundering it is better not to deny in the first instance.

My second point is to thank the Financial Conduct Authority for the way it has engaged on this issue. I can report to the House that at least one whistleblower who has been supplying me with information from South Africa has engaged directly with the FCA—it has been a positive experience. I say to the financial institutions involved that I named in your Lordships’ House, including HSBC, Standard Chartered and the Bank of Baroda, that if I find that there is any witch-hunting of those responsible, or of the brave, courageous people in the South African governmental system who have also been supplying me with information, I will name the institutions involved and identify the individuals as having suffered that persecution. I say this before your Lordships because it is important that as we take the Bill through we arm it with the instruments necessary to stop this kind of practice.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I will not say anything that would diminish what we just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and I do not believe in repetition. However, if I have to repeat it at the next stage of this process, I shall be as vehement as I was before. I support this amendment.

Yemen: Humanitarian and Political Situation

Lord Hain Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My noble friend makes a number of important points. I can assure him on one of the central points that he makes, when he gets to the heart or crux of the challenge and the issue on the ground in Yemen—the protracted dispute and regional rivalries being played out in Yemen. In recent history, the current crisis was exacerbated when the then legitimate Government, who had support, was removed by the rebel Houthis, supported again by other regional players in the area. It is important to recognise, as he says, that, as we have made clear to all parties, including the Saudis, protracted conflict through use of military actions and the restrictions that are being applied will not result in the long-term solution required on the ground, which can be achieved only by all parties coming together. That is what we are emphasising not just through the political solution that we seek through the United Nations but through the work that we are doing with key regional players, including the Emiratis—yes, the Saudis as well—but also the Omanis, in ensuring that through the Quint and the Quad we bring all relevant parties forward towards that political solution.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Government accept that their one-sided approach to this whole crisis is prolonging it? The Minister made criticisms of Iran, and rightly so, but he made no criticisms at all of the Saudis, although their strategy is acting as a recruiting sergeant for militant rebels and encouraging Iranian influence in the region. Surely, there should be an even-handed attitude between Iran and Saudi Arabia to get both to accept their responsibilities for this conflict, or we will see a disaster on the kind of scale that we have seen in Syria—and I say that as a former UK Middle East Minister.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Of course, the noble Lord speaks with experience in this regard. I assure him that, as I have said already from this Dispatch Box, not just today but previously as well, regional conflicts are being played out not just in Yemen but in other parts of the Middle East, which tragically go back to a core conflict that exists in the schism, tragically, in the Islamic faith. However, that should not detract from the fact that the United Kingdom, as I assure him and all noble Lords, makes the strongest representations to the Saudis. I assure him that we have tried to ensure that the Saudis and all regional partners bring to an end this conflict, which has gone on for far too long.

Zimbabwe

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend, who speaks very aptly. We have always been concerned about the situation in Zimbabwe and its impact on the surrounding regions. I alluded to this in the Statement but, irrespective of which party has led the Government and notwithstanding the situation on the ground in Zimbabwe, we have stood firm and side by side with the people of Zimbabwe. We have seen from recent economic conditions on the ground and in the situation under Robert Mugabe’s leadership that the people have suffered dreadfully. However, at the same time, the British Government, irrespective of political colour, have stood resolute in supporting Zimbabwe’s citizens. We continue to provide £80 million per annum in bilateral support, in crucial areas such as education and health, and it is important that that support has continued irrespective of who has led Zimbabwe.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, in welcoming the Minister’s Statement, can I gently correct him? South Africa is the jewel of Africa—not Zimbabwe. More seriously, could he investigate why the fearlessly investigative online newspaper the Daily Maverick had its chief reporter in Zimbabwe, Richard Poplak, detained and then put on a plane out of Harare? Is there now an even greater attack on press freedom in Zimbabwe? Could he investigate that, because it is a worrying development? Given the instability, we need journalists in there to tell us the truth.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

On the second point, I shall write to the noble Lord as appropriate. On his first point, there are many jewels in Africa, and that is probably where I shall let the matter rest.

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I agree with the sentiments of the noble Lord, who knows the region well. I think I speak for everyone in your Lordships’ House and beyond when I say that we wish to see a resolution not just of the conflict in Yemen, where innocent civilians in particular are suffering, but of any conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is worrying not just to the region but to the whole world. This conflict is tribally based and has not just arisen since the regime took over in Iran in 1979; it is a deep-rooted, embedded conflict which goes back to the division in Islam between the Sunni and Shia communities. I assure the House that Her Majesty’s Government are using all means available to us to make bilateral representations. We remain very supportive of the nuclear deal with Iran. We are using all good offices to ensure, first and foremost, that the suffering of those in Yemen can be brought to a halt. Ensuring free access for United Nations and other agencies will be a first step in providing humanitarian relief to civilians in Yemen.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Evans of Bowes Park) (Con)]

My Lords, we will hear from the Labour Benches and then from the Liberal Democrat Benches.

[Lord Hain]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that we have to adopt a much more even-handed stance between Tehran and Riyadh in order to resolve the toxic instability afflicting the entire Gulf/Middle East region? We are seen to be allies of Saudi Arabia—I do not dispute the need for that—and to take the side of Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Muslim faith against Iran and the Shia Muslim faith. We need to be equal-handed between the two in order to end the proxy wars in Yemen, Lebanon, increasingly, Syria and Iraq.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I assure the noble Lord that we support the work that Saudi Arabia has done in the region. The stance we have taken on recent events regarding the Iranian nuclear deal shows the importance the UK attaches to bringing stability to the wider region. As for the two branches of Islam, let us not forget that there are 73 branches of Islam and Her Majesty’s Government are neutral in our interpretation of all of them.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Hain Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a real privilege to follow the noble Baroness. I have been in the House for less than two years, but she has always struck me as a real star. I have marvelled at the way in which she has managed to make the Government’s case on Europe vaguely plausible, which shows expertise and charm. I have also noticed that the noble Baroness has always spoken and answered questions from the Front Bench, including from myself, with great courtesy, even giving the impression in her answers that she has listened to the questions. Her colleagues may well want to bear that in mind. I note that the casualty rate in the post that she has just left seems to be quite high. I wish her all the best in the future, and I am sure that the whole House does as well.

The noble Baroness made the case for sanctions against South Sudan and elsewhere compellingly. I do not refer to her specifically, but I remember the way in which this House opposed sanctions against the apartheid regime. If she had been in the Conservative Government at the time, perhaps that might have changed.

There have been no criminal prosecutions for money laundering of financial institutions, and very few of other “enablers” such as lawyers and accountants. There have been regulatory fines, but it is not clear that these are enough to deter banks and other financial players from making their anti-money laundering compliance regimes a tick-box exercise rather than a meaningful one. This Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill enables the Government to introduce regulations that would create new civil penalties and criminal offences for money laundering, but the threshold for the latter is low—a maximum three-month sentence for a criminal conviction.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned, using such powers to enable the Government to introduce criminal offences by regulation is against parliamentary convention. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, also referred to this matter with his expertise. Surely it would be better for the Government to accept or introduce an amendment to the Bill to introduce a “failure to prevent” money laundering offence, like that in the Bribery Act and as there now is for tax evasion, which would ensure that such an offence was introduced by primary legislation.

As I said, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, made moving points about South Sudan and elsewhere from her experience. However, my main focus today is whether the Bill will deal effectively with the massive money laundering organised from the very top of the Government in South Africa, the presidency itself—the subject of my Oral Question on 19 October in your Lordships’ House and my letter to the Chancellor of 25 September. I beg some indulgence in speaking at greater length than the noble Baroness on this to spell it out. It is serious.

Corruption within and money laundering from a monopoly capital elite around the President’s family in South Africa and their close associates the Gupta brothers—which is painful for me to witness, having been active along with my brave parents in the anti-apartheid struggle—show that winning the war against financial crime will require co-ordination, influence, action and accountability between multi-jurisdictional law enforcement agencies. Money laundering is a key enabler of organised crime, allowing criminals to transmit multi-billion pound illicit funds into the legitimate economy, undermining its integrity and public trust. However, confronting it is difficult, partly due to the fragmented information-sharing arrangements across borders and between banks and law enforcement agencies. It is all very well to develop better protection for our own country, as this Bill purports to do, but, without simultaneously enhancing cross-border co-operation, we will not win the war against financial crime.

On regular visits to South Africa—most recently last month—I have been stunned by the systemic transnational financial crime network facilitated by an Indian-South African family, the Guptas, and the presidential family, the Zumas. If there had been more proactive and genuine co-operation between the multi-jurisdictional law enforcement agencies, and within and between the banks, which have been moving money for the Gupta/Zuma laundering network, the devastation wrought on South Africa could have been significantly reduced, and perhaps the financial institutions involved would have been able to better mitigate their exposure.

I had delivered by hand last night to the Chancellor printouts of transactions and named the British bank concerned, and I asked that he again refer these to the Serious Fraud Office, the National Crime Agency and the Financial Conduct Authority for investigation. This information shows illegal transfers of funds from South Africa made by the Gupta family over the last few years from their South African accounts to accounts held in Dubai and Hong Kong. The last columns of each sheet, now in the Treasury, show the relevant banks involved, and the records show all account numbers used. Many of the transactions are legitimate, but many certainly are not.

The latter illicit transactions were flagged internally in the bank concerned as suspicious, but I am reliably informed that it was told by the UK headquarters to ignore it. That is an iniquitous breach of legal banking practice in the UK, which I trust Ministers would never countenance, and it is also an incitement to money laundering, which has self-evidently occurred in this case, sanctioned by a British bank, as part of the flagrant robbery from South African taxpayers of many millions of pounds and many billions of their local currency, the rand.

Each originating transaction would start with one bank account and then be split into a number of accounts a couple of times to disguise the origin. Undoubtedly, hard questions will need to be asked of the facilitating banks, because they have aided and abetted the Gupta money laundering activities. Can the Chancellor please ensure that such evident money laundering and illegality is not tolerated and that the bank is investigated for possible criminal complicity in this matter? Urgent action is needed to close down this network of corruption.

Then let us consider an example of the devastation caused to South Africa by cross-border money laundering. The Free State, one of nine provinces in the country, is marked by miles of flat, rolling grassland and crop fields, and it is the country’s granary, responsible for 70% of total maize production. Britain played a defining part in the history of this province, as it marked one of the most contested spaces during the late 19th century/early 20th century South African wars involving the British imperialists, the Afrikaner nationalists and the Basotho people.

Today, the Free State is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa. Nearly one in two of the people is unemployed and nearly two-thirds live below what is called the “upper bound poverty line”. More than half of the people in that province survive on one meal a day, tens of thousands of children go to school hungry, if they are fortunate enough to be in school, and over half of the province’s children drop out of school before obtaining their matric—roughly equivalent to our A-levels—primarily because their daily focus is on survival.

Therefore, when in February 2013 the Free State Government announced that they would spend £18 million —approximately 340 million South African rand —to build, in a small Free State town called Vrede, a dairy farm which would be part-owned by 80 impoverished beneficiaries, the local community felt a sense of hope. Indeed, this kind of public/private partnership is a commendable and deeply necessary model of economic empowerment to redress the profound racial inequalities generated by the apartheid state, which continue to reverberate throughout South Africa.

What the people of Vrede did not know was that this project, and therefore their village, would become the scene of a transnational money laundering crime committed by collaborators from within the Free State Government on the one side and the now notorious Guptas on the other. In essence, this criminal network used these 80 people and their families as pawns in a swirl of international money laundering, which involved some British and other financial institutions.

The laundering operation went like this. Step 1: in May 2013, three months after the Free State Government announced the dairy farm project, a company called Estina—ostensibly the vehicle for the 80 beneficiaries but which was actually linked to the Guptas—was handed a farm to begin building the dairy. Estina’s sole director was an IT salesman with no farming experience. The project was not put out to public tender. Step 2: the Government almost immediately transferred about £6 million to Estina. Step 3: instead of investing this in the farm, Estina transferred most of the money to a Gupta company in the United Arab Emirates called Gateway Ltd. Gateway is registered in Ras al-Khaimah, RAK, which is one of seven emirates making up the UAE and a highly secretive offshore company jurisdiction. At the time, Gateway held its account with the British bank Standard Chartered, which the bank has subsequently closed.

Step 4: once the funds were in Dubai, the Guptas engaged in a classic laundering cycle, transforming illicit money into ostensibly legitimate assets. In arguably the most eye-watering example, they transferred over £2 million of the Estina dairy money in two separate tranches through two shell companies, ultimately consolidating it in their Standard Chartered account for another of their UAE-based companies, called Accurate Investments. The bank has since closed this account too. Step 5: they then transmitted this money into an entity called Linkway Trading, banked with the State Bank of India, back into South Africa.

Step 6: once in Linkway, the Guptas used these funds to pay for a lavish four-day family wedding where, among other extravagances, over £1,000 was spent on chocolate truffles, £120,000 on scarves for guests and £20,000 on fireworks. At about the same time that the Guptas were celebrating at the wedding, veterinarians in the town of Vrede were called to the dairy farm because of the reeking stench of dead animals. According to their report, they found at least 30 cows that had been buried in a ditch having died from,

“an unknown condition that could be caused by malnutrition”.

I have detailed the Vrede dairy example because many of us do not appreciate the destitution caused by money laundering. It almost always requires the complicity, whether witting or unwitting, of financial institutions. In this case, some of those are headquartered in Britain, such as Standard Chartered. I am grateful that the bank is now being investigated, along with HSBC and the Bank of Baroda, by the Serious Fraud Office, the Financial Conduct Authority and the National Crime Agency following my Question in your Lordships’ House on 19 October and my request to the Chancellor.

The success of these criminal networks relies also on the action or inaction and co-operation or non-co-operation of the relevant law enforcement authorities. Always, it is the poorest who bear the brunt. In my letter to the Chancellor on 25 September requesting that he investigate UK bank exposure to the Gupta/Zuma network, I listed the 27 entities and individuals who were, among others, involved in the Vrede dairy farm tragedy. It is by no means the only example of the devastation wrought on South Africa by the Zuma/Gupta network.

The Vrede dairy criminal catastrophe proves that the laundering was effected through a transnational triangulation between South Africa, the UAE and British and other global banks. Therefore, the success of our law enforcement authorities in protecting our country from the proceeds of ill-gotten gains entering our financial system, as this Bill seeks to do, and by association protecting more vulnerable developing nations from falling victim to extractive criminal networks, depends on genuine and proactive co-operation and collaboration between the relevant law enforcement agencies in the concerned jurisdictions. Frankly, this Bill falls well short of what is required to do that.

Familiarising myself with the Vrede dairy farm tragedy—and taking some time in this House to explain it—what struck me time and again is why an internationally respected bank such as Standard Chartered would open bank accounts for shell entities registered in a free trade zone such as Ras al-Khaimah, whose primary attraction is as a highly secretive offshore jurisdiction. What was it doing this for? Shell companies, by virtue of their ownership anonymity, such as those used by the Guptas in the Vrede dairy tragedy, are generally classic vehicles for money laundering and other illicit financial activity. According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, shell companies,

“typically have no physical presence other than a mailing address, employ no one, and produce little to no independent economic value”.

The Financial Action Task Force, established in July 1989 at the G7 Paris summit, has consistently warned that free zones could be used for illicit trade and money flows that fall below the radar of regulatory authorities. We know that free zones have become an increasingly popular mechanism for the UAE and other countries looking to lure international investment and boost foreign trade. However, the question for us is whether we are ensuring that our financial institutions are facilitating, inadvertently or not, misuse by those interests attempting to move their illicit funds from one part of the world to another in order to facilitate money laundering, mafia crime, terrorist activity and financing, as the Minister said, and robbery from taxpayers, as in the South African case.

There are disturbing questions around both the complicity, witting or unwitting, of UK global financial institutions in the Gupta/Zuma transnational criminal network, and these institutions’ wilful blindness to the reality that the laundering process most often necessitates financial systems with lax regulation and controls. Unless we urgently find ways to leverage our respective capabilities to co-ordinate and influence action between the law enforcement and banking sectors—domestically here in the UK and globally—we cannot win this battle.

I have received new information, which is still being corroborated, that the Gupta/Zuma network may be using the global metal recycling sector—some of the company names I have received have a UK presence—to launder the proceeds of their corruption. Indeed, this preliminary information suggests that, as South African banks, including British headquartered ones there, have shut down Gupta accounts in response to the financial crime risk they pose, so the family has simply shifted its laundering machine into the metal recycling sector, using intermediaries within these companies in South Africa, the Middle East, possibly the UK and Hong Kong to move their funds for them.

My question, therefore, to British-based financial institutions and to the Government is: are their compliance departments applying the necessary forensic eye to this secondary-layer threat—as primary accounts are shutdown, so the illicit funds must find alternative channels—and are law enforcement agencies and their regulators applying their minds, sharing information and, in so far as they can, acting on it?

My latest information, supplied as before by South African whistleblowers deep inside the system and disgusted by the corruption at the heart of the state, suggests metal recycling is the latest conduit. However, there may be other sectors these criminal networks are penetrating and I ask the Minister to investigate this.

Unless we use the opportunity before us to crack down meaningfully on these criminals, they will always be one step ahead. Over the past few months, several multinational companies have either fallen or been massively contaminated as a result of their complicity in the Gupta scandal, including Bell Pottinger, McKinsey, KPMG and SAP. The US Justice Department and the US Securities and Exchange Commission are now investigating German multinational SAP after it apologised the other week—“wholeheartedly and unreservedly”—to the people of South Africa for paying over £6 million in kick-backs to Gupta companies as part of their network of corruption headed by President Zuma and his family.

I believe that it is a matter of time before financial institutions in South Africa, in the Middle East, in Hong Kong, here in the UK and in the US will be forced to answer hard questions about their own complicity, and they must. I am today sending a copy of this speech, together with my letter of 25 September to the Chancellor, to the US Ambassador to London formally asking the US regulatory authorities to intervene, as the FBI has already begun to do. I am also asking the Government—I would be grateful if the Minister could respond on this point—to press the financial authorities in Hong Kong and Dubai to cut all links with the Guptas and Zumas. My Labour MEP colleague Neena Gill is raising the matter in the European Parliament, and Commissioner Pierre Moscovici has agreed to her request to investigate European banks which may be involved. In parallel, I wrote to the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, on 25 September asking him to act, but have not yet had a reply.

It is not only financial institutions and Governments which need to ensure that they are above reproach. A number of other global firms, whether legal, auditing, forensic or advisory in nature, have provided professional services to some of these complicit individuals, companies and institutions. These include UK-based firms such as Grant Thornton and Hogan Lovells, which have conducted forensic investigations at the South African Revenue Service under the brief of its Gupta-aligned head, Tom Moyane. Norton Rose Fulbright and Morrison & Foerster have assisted in the internal investigation at McKinsey into that company’s links to the Guptas. There are other examples. I am not suggesting that these firms are necessarily complicit in the corruption, because in most cases they have been employed by the complicit companies—for example, Norton Rose and Morrison & Foerster by McKinsey—to try to surface the corruption.

In conclusion, I am suggesting that it is absolutely critical that all professional firms cut their contacts entirely with any individuals or entities associated with the Gupta and Zuma families or their associates. At the very least, whatever pressure they may come under from their clients and whatever the cost is to their commission or fees, they must conduct themselves according to the highest professional standards, which most if not all have palpably failed to do so far, as we saw with KPMG, McKinsey and SAP. To its credit, the law firm Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr recently upheld the highest professional values by boldly exposing corruption and dishonesty by senior executives at the country’s power utility, Eskom.

As I stand here today, the 80 individuals who were supposed to benefit from the Vrede dairy farm are destitute. The complicity of our financial institutions in this, as well as the responsibility of law enforcers and regulators in all the concerned jurisdictions, should make UK Government Ministers and UK parliamentarians hang their heads in shame. Just as they were complicit in sustaining apartheid, so today they are complicit in sustaining the corrupt power elite in South Africa which is now betraying the legacy of Nelson Mandela and the anti-apartheid struggle.

Syria: President al-Assad

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 1st February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I said that President Assad has shown that he cannot be trusted. He has led to the deaths of something like 400,000 of his own people, has put tens of thousands in detention— I have met some of those who have experienced torture at the hands of people there—and has failed to provide a secure future for his country without the air power of countries such as Iran and Russia. That is somebody whom we do not see as being capable of providing a political solution and providing peace. However, what we are doing, and continue to do, through the UN Geneva process is to provide the opportunity for the Syrians to decide this matter. Whatever our view is, it is for the Syrians to decide.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, is not the very problem with our foreign policy that, to use our own phrase, we have tried to dictate what should happen, not having learned the lessons from Northern Ireland that you do not impose preconditions when trying to resolve a conflict? To demand at the beginning with a bit of bombast and bluster that Assad must go—he was never going to—then say that he should stay for only six months, and now say that he cannot stand for re-election, is a failed strategy which is contributing to a disastrous catastrophe. Why do the Government not change course and recognise that he has to be negotiated with and a transition agreed?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, the noble Lord has interpreted what has been said in a way that is not accurate. Throughout this process we have always stressed that it is for the Syrians to decide this matter. We have also said that Assad cannot be trusted. That has been proven by his past relationship with us. The peace process is one in which the opposition groups need to come together in security to discuss the future. The Syrian Government have, of course, been part of that process. That is the objective of the UN procedure. That is why the Geneva process, which we hope and expect will be reconvened by Staffan de Mistura later this month, provides an opportunity for the future. As I said, it is not for us to dictate. We have said that we do not think Assad can lead the country to a peaceful future. The Syrians need to have a chance to decide that for themselves. That is what we are trying to provide.

Yemen: Breaches of International Humanitarian Law

Lord Hain Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I can confirm that the Foreign Secretary has raised these matters. I will check whether the current Prime Minister has done so; I know that the previous Prime Minister did. However, I will check on that and get back to my noble friend, who raises the point which must affect us all: that one-fifth of the world’s total population who are in need of humanitarian aid live in Yemen. It is 21 million people or 80% of that population. The UK is the fourth-largest donor and we have more than doubled our commitment to Yemen over the last financial year, but what really needs to be done is to find the peace.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, surely the Minister will accept that at the heart of this deepening and horrific conflict, with its humanitarian disasters, is the proxy war being fought between Saudi Arabia and Iran in that arena. Is it not our duty to use our historic alliance with the Saudis, in particular, and our new-found relations through the nuclear treaty with Tehran to make sure that they seek a rapprochement instead of fighting each other at tremendous cost to local people in Yemen?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

The noble Lord makes a very acute observation. I would call upon Iran to make best efforts to avoid doing anything to protract the conflict in Yemen. It is important that in both circumstances Saudi Arabia and Iran are in a position where they make sure that peace can happen. For any country anywhere to carry out a proxy war is something we should deplore.

Outcome of the European Union Referendum

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to explore the question raised in this House by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, on the case for a referendum on the precise terms of Brexit. The referendum on 23 June was unusual, even unique, for 1 million reasons. It was clear what leave supporters were voting against, but nobody knew what sort of alternative future they were voting for. None of their leaders explained this. Boris Johnson, for example, began by insisting that remaining in the single market was essential, then moved to supporting a Canadian-type trade deal. When the deficiencies of that option were exposed, he stayed silent until the Monday after the referendum when he published an article readvocating UK participation in the single market, only for an aide the next day hastily to withdraw that explaining he was too “tired” when he wrote it. So confused were leave leaders that Michael Gove actually suggested we model ourselves on Albania. Is that really the best this great intellectual of the leave campaign could do?

If we end up maintaining a trading relationship within the single market, voters are entitled to know the consequences, such as any, or no, limits on freedom of movement. They should also know the cost consequences. For example, on the Norway model, the net cost to the UK of full access to the single market was estimated by the Library last year at £7.5 billion per annum, compared with a net cost of £10 billion per annum for full UK membership of the European Union. Yes, it is less, but it is still considerable and leaves very little surplus for filling the multibillion pound gaps in subsidies to farmers and areas such as Wales and Cornwall in receipt of European funds which Brexit campaigners airily promised to maintain.

Immediately after the vote, Brexit leaders also began shamelessly reneging on what direct experience from weeks on doorsteps told me was the overwhelming reason for people voting to leave; namely, to reduce immigration—not just to “control”, but to “reduce”. That was a betrayal if there ever was one, as was the brazen denial by the leave leaders after the vote that the “£350 million for the NHS” poster on their very own Brexit campaign bus actually meant that. I know for a fact that people on doorsteps believed that. People are entitled to know and to have their say on all this when the outcome of the negotiations is clear.

Let us consider other referenda sanctioned by Parliament. In 1997 in Wales and Scotland, referenda on a Welsh Assembly and a Scottish Parliament respectively were crystal clear. From the White Papers published beforehand, people knew exactly what they were voting for. The same was true of a referendum on a north-east England regional government in 2004, and in the more recent alternative vote referendum of 2011. But, last month, nobody on the leave side had a clue what they were voting for. That is why there is a strong case for having a second referendum, not to rerun the first one—for the result of that was clear, even if narrowly so—but for the British people explicitly to decide whether they approve of the terms of exit. This is emphatically not some ruse to overturn the result on 23 June, but instead to seek the verdict of the people on the future of the UK, on our trading relationship, if any, with the European Union, and on the implications for our prosperity and migration. This is fundamental to democratic principles.

Perhaps a straw in the wind, or perhaps not, came yesterday with an ITV Wales Welsh Political Barometer poll conducted by Cardiff University. It showed an almost exact reversal from a 53% to 47% leave vote in Wales to a 53% to 47% remain vote. Professor Roger Scully commented:

“When we look at the details of the results … There appears to be a small cohort of voters who voted to Leave, but who may now be experiencing what some in the media have termed ‘Bregret’”.

If, as we might all agree, the Brexit vote was a salutary one of no confidence in the whole political class, will that not be made even worse, perhaps creating a dangerous mood of betrayal, without a referendum for voters to decide whether they support the final Brexit deal?

I turn to some troubling questions over Northern Ireland. John Major and Tony Blair in their joint appearance in Belfast last month were trenchant about the dangers to Irish stability and the peace process if we left the EU, and as architects of the peace process, they should know. The settlement I helped negotiate in 2007 reinforced the Good Friday cross-border institutions which are important to both republicans and nationalists in supporting that process. What exactly will now happen to these, especially since Brexit means that the two parts of the island of Ireland will be on opposite sides of an EU border for the very first time in history? Remember that the UK and the Republic joined together in 1973.

Leave advocates ask why the common travel area, which has existed since the early 1920s, would be threatened when it even survived the Troubles. However, there were tough security checks and border controls between north and south during the Troubles, which under the peace process have been dismantled. The border today is invisible, with substantial cross movement and increasing business, cultural and economic links, which are all to the good. This is especially important to republicans and nationalists, and vital for businesses of all colours.

If we left the EU, that same 310-mile border would be the only land border between the UK and the EU. Surely it is unthinkable in today’s world of jihadi terrorism, mass migration and desperate refugees that it would not have to be made secure. Indeed, after the leave campaign’s pledges for even more stringent border controls, how could they with any credibility allow the current open crossing to survive as a back door into the UK? Surely it is hard to envisage how the common travel area between the Republic and the UK could remain.

I have one other point. EU funding and investment have underpinned the peace process. Over £2 billion will have gone to Northern Ireland in the six years to 2020. Are the Government guaranteeing to replace it? Perhaps the uncertainty over Northern Ireland could also be a case for a referendum on the negotiated final deal of the UK’s exit from the European Union.