I will speak briefly in support of the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, in this group. On resettlement, what we have in the treaty may be described as less than useless. I say that because, to a certain extent, it confers a right that is already there, but it underlines it in such a way and denies others that right. The treaty explicitly says that there is a right for Mauritius to resettle people.
If we have handed over sovereignty to Mauritius, people implicitly have a right to resettle on the other islands anyway but, actually, it very much underlines that Mauritius is completely in control; it is completely in the driving seat. There is a lack of reference to the Chagossians: yes, Mauritius may choose to allow some Chagossians back, but it may choose also to deny them. There is no specific right for the Chagossians.
If, as has been mentioned across the Chamber, we are to try to rectify some of the many ills that we have done to the Chagossian people over the years, having at least some level of right of return is the bare minimum that we should be looking for here. The concern is that, from the point of view of Mauritius, the implication will be that, if it is to allow back some Chagossians, they will be the hand-picked Chagossians who have played ball with the Mauritian Government. If you are a good boy or a good girl, yes, you may be allowed back. If, however, you have been part of the awkward squad, you may have a much lesser chance of being resettled on the Chagos Islands than, for example, Chinese contractors. That is the problem.
These amendments would at least take a step towards trying to ameliorate and rectify that situation. If we cannot give the Chagossians an opportunity or a right, which is completely missing in the treaty and missing in the Bill, we are not giving them anything.
My Lords, I just want to add my voice to those of my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord Weir. If the Chagos Islands had remained inhabited, this issue of sovereignty would not have arisen. They would have been in the same category as Gibraltar, the Falklands or any other territory with a permanent population that had expressed its right to self-determination.
Now, you could argue that that would solve our problem in terms of the base. Equally, you could argue that it is the obvious way of making restitution; it is the way of giving back what was taken. But if you flip that around and look at it from the point of view of Mauritius, is that not precisely why you would not want to have a Chagossian population—or an exclusively Chagossian population—in a doughnut in the outer atolls around Diego Garcia?
The last thing you would want is to risk a Chagossian secessionist movement, where the people who had returned to their ancestral homes had made it very clear that they felt no loyalty to the state of Mauritius and that—in most cases, with a few exceptions, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, said—they did not want to be part of it. Therefore, you would have every incentive to settle the place with your own citizens, or with others, so that they were at least a majority.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, for his remarks. Picking up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—I have a subsequent amendment on the supplementary list, so we may get to it at some point but it is not on today’s list—does the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, agree with me that what makes this lack of provision for resettlement of the Chagossians worse is that we actually have a blueprint, albeit not necessarily perfect, of how this can be achieved, through the KPMG report in 2015? It is not as though we are doing this against a vacuum. We are not only ignoring the right of Chagossians to return but completely ignoring the pathway through which this can happen.