The Future of EU Enlargement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I speak as a habitual complainer about the dilatoriness of the scheduling of debates on the reports of this House’s Select Committee on the European Union, and indeed of other committees. However, it is only fair on this occasion to congratulate the usual channels on having arranged this debate promptly and in a particularly timely fashion, coming as it does when the EU is taking stock of its further enlargement policy.

The timeliness of the debate is wider than such rather ephemeral considerations. A combination of the distraction of the eurozone crisis, and a certain air of enlargement fatigue, has caused this issue to drift towards the margins of the policy debate about the future of the European Union, both in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe. Yet, as is shown by this report, the quality of which owes much to the skilful chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, the further enlargement of the EU is of significant importance to the future security and prosperity of the union, and to its prospects of playing a stabilising role in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. We would be deluding ourselves if we thought that the process of definitively putting behind us the mayhem which engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s could be achieved without setting all the countries in that region on a sustainable path towards membership. We should equally be deluding ourselves if we thought that we could turn our backs on Turkey, the most vibrant economy in Europe and a rising regional influence, without serious negative consequences for ourselves. We should also be deluding ourselves if we believed that cold-shouldering the European aspirations of countries which emerged from the former Soviet Union to a shaky independence would not further Russia’s ambitions to create for itself a sphere of influence around its borders. Quite a lot is therefore at stake in the way the EU handles its further enlargement, and it cannot be said to be doing so very skilfully or very purposefully at the moment.

In addition to these general geopolitical considerations in favour of further enlargement, I want to focus on three specific issues: first, the need to avoid importing into the EU existing territorial disputes, either between future member states or between them and their neighbours; secondly, the need to guard against backsliding by new member states on their commitment to the Copenhagen criteria for membership after they have joined the club; and, thirdly, Turkey, where recent developments have been troubling for its friends even though they should not, I would contend, have shaken their fundamental support for Turkish accession.

With the benefit of hindsight, most people now recognise that the EU’s handling of the accession of Cyprus with the division of the island unresolved was, to use a diplomatic phrase, suboptimal. The report that we are debating said as much, and it has since been roundly denounced for it by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots—a symmetry of denunciation which in my own lengthy and fairly painful experience of trying to resolve the Cyprus problem normally means that you have got it about right. It is not hard to identify similar disputes in relation to the existing candidates and aspirants: Cyprus, again, in the context of Turkish accession; Serbia and Kosovo; Macedonia and Greece; Moldova and Transnistria; and a whole rash in the republics beyond the Caucasus. That does not make them any easier to resolve. In the case of Cyprus’s accession, one can see that the EU would in theory have done better to make settlement of the dispute a condition of accession. However, to have done that at a time when the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, the late Rauf Denktas, and the then Government of Turkey were making any attempts at compromise completely nugatory would have been to hand them a veto which they would not have hesitated to use. There are parallels with some of the future members. Each case will need to be treated on its own merits and the EU needs to address each in a timely and proactive fashion as it is doing, admirably in my view, in the case of Serbia and Kosovo. There is no magic solution, no template, for every case. What one can say is that some unilateral attempts at exercising pressure, such as Greece’s continuing blockage on even opening negotiations with Macedonia, are both counterproductive and deplorable. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, on that point.

There is also the problem of backsliding on the Copenhagen criteria and other values and responsibilities of membership. There is experience of that in the cases of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. It has become painfully evident that the EU is better placed to handle such problems before a country has joined the Union than it is afterwards, although some instruments are available even after accession, if extremely hard to apply. Again, as in the case of international disputes, there are no obvious, easy and universally applicable solutions, but it seems desirable to ensure that, before a country accedes, the basic values which justify its membership are firmly entrenched in that country’s laws and constitution, and that the machinery to uphold those values is in good working order. I rather doubt whether new dispositions for handling post-accession transgressions will prove either negotiable or operable.

Recent events in Turkey cannot have left any of Turkey’s friends untroubled. Even before the demonstrations in Istanbul, the repression of critical press comment had cast a dark shadow over the remarkable progress made in recent years. The peaceful demonstrations were, from the outset, met with the disproportionate use of force, and the Turkish Prime Minister’s rhetoric has been extremely divisive. That said, it is equally important to say what this is not; it is not a series of events in any way analogous to the uprisings in the Arab world against undemocratic dictators. Turkey is a working democracy, and it is for Turks, using their democratic institutions, to work out their solutions to the problems and protests that have emerged, while above all respecting the rights of citizens to peaceful protest and to express their views through a free press.

What role should outsiders play? They should certainly not, I would argue, block or suspend the already pretty stagnant process of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. One thing comes clearly through the pages of the report that we are debating: the EU’s ability to influence candidate countries varies in proportion to the progress being made in the technical aspects of the accession negotiations. If that process moves along, long though it may be—and the process with Turkey has a long way to go—and if it is on a clear and sustainable path, the EU can exercise real conditionality and can hope to have real influence; if not, it cannot.

As a steady supporter of Turkish accession, I hope that the Government will maintain that case, while making it clear that Turkey’s eventual accession will require unquestioning and credible adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. In that context, the agreement reached in the Foreign Affairs Council yesterday to delay the opening of the next chapter of Turkey’s accession negotiations until the autumn, while perhaps better than some of the alternatives, merits no more than one cheer.

As we in this country debate our future in the European Union—and I welcome the Prime Minister’s recent statement that our future lies in the European Union—it is surely essential that we develop a positive reform agenda for the EU as a whole. Within that agenda, I would argue, the further enlargement of the EU should have a prominent place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kilclooney]

My Lords, I first congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, and the members of his European Union Committee on this excellent report, which clearly outlines the opportunities and challenges as nations apply to join the European Union as new members. As the noble Lord said, it is timely that this report be debated in this House: not simply because Croatia is likely to be confirmed as a new member this week, but also because there are ongoing issues of major importance at this time. For example, there is the European Union and United States trade agreement; CAP reform, which I hope may be confirmed this week, especially for Scotland and Northern Ireland, where agriculture is important; and the ongoing major issue of banking union within the EU.

I well remember that when I was a member of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, we regularly met the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. One occasion always stuck in my head. The Prime Minister said: “You should encourage greater enlargement of the European Union, because the more countries that join, the more likely it is to collapse”. That was the understanding of what enlargement would mean in practice. There could be some truth in it. Croatia is now about to become a member and yesterday it was agreed to commence Serbia’s accession negotiations and an association agreement with Kosovo as well. Of course, all this is subject to the approval of the European Council, but enlargement is ongoing.

One of the conditions is that new members in the European Union should also accept the euro as their currency. The Chancellor in his Statement on the economy today said that the eurozone is in crisis. That phrase has been used by several contributors to this debate this evening. It is the case in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Greek Cyprus and the Republic of Ireland; you have only to look at the Financial Times today to see the leaked tapes about the banking situation in the Anglo-Irish Bank to realise that there are ongoing problems in the eurozone. There are increasing fears about Italy as well over the next six months. As recently as last week, a senior French Minister said that the worst in France is yet to come. So the question arises: should accession of new members to the European Union require compulsory membership of the eurozone? Why not provide them with the same opportunity as the United Kingdom to be a member of the European Union but not a member of the eurozone?

Turkey was mentioned in the report. I well remember the European Council meeting in Luxembourg. Perhaps Members of our House have forgotten the events of that lengthy session, which went on and on until one minute before midnight, when it came out with a compromise—the deadline was midnight. The compromise was that Croatia and Turkey could apply to join at the same time. That was then agreed by the European Council.

I come from the island of Ireland, and I recognise sectarianism when I see it. As a Member of the European Parliament, I recognised that France and Germany would not agree to 80 million Muslims coming into the European Union. I remain convinced that that is the underlying problem as Turkey tries to become a member of the European Union. As has been mentioned, Turkey has its problems. Democracy in any country is not simply rule by the majority, it also requires the consent of the minority, and that does not seem to apply in Turkey today. We have the decision yesterday to start further accession talks on Turkey, which has aroused opposition from Germany, France, Austria and Greek Cyprus. It seems difficult to foresee Turkey being able to join the European Union, and I say that as one who has been a friend of Turkey for 40 years. It may well be that Germany is right and that a special arrangement with Turkey is now the way forward.

There has also been reference to Cyprus. I am delighted to see that the committee has stated in its report that it was wrong to allow Greek Cyprus to join on its own. The decision to allow EU membership before a settlement was foolishness in the extreme, and many of us said so at the time. However, the application was supported by Her Majesty’s Government on the recommendation of its advisers on Cyprus. They should now all hang their heads in shame, and many of them are now publicly doing so. Only last week, I heard one who was involved in the discussions saying so.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to intervene to say that I am not hanging my head in shame. I explained the situation in my speech, which perhaps the noble Lord did not hear properly. I did not say, and the report does not say, that Cyprus should not have been admitted. It states that the European Union was not sufficiently zealous at ensuring that a solution was reached before.

[Lord Kilclooney]

I have to say that I heard the noble Lord’s speech and listened to it very carefully. I have to say that his opinion at the time of the accession of Cyprus was wrong and that some of those who agreed with him at the time now say that it was wrong and are apologising. I hope that, some day, he will do the same.

On Cyprus, reference has been made to Turkey’s role, but Turkey encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to vote for the Annan settlement—oh yes—and the Turkish Cypriots voted for the settlement in Cyprus. It was the Greek Cypriots who voted against the United Nations Annan plan for a settlement, so it is wrong to finger Turkey, as is suggested in the report; it was others who created the problem.

In foreign affairs and security, the EU has only France and the United Kingdom really to rely on, because they are members of the United Nations Security Council. The others will talk a lot but do very little. As enlargement proceeds, questions should also arise as to whether the EU should cease to have a role in foreign affairs and security.

In conclusion, clearly the European Union needs to revise existing treaties as it considers a revised relationship with the United Kingdom itself.

EU: UK Membership

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 13th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the European Union is a continuous process of negotiation. We are pursuing a multilateral reform agenda and, indeed, in the past few months a number of things on that agenda have been achieved. We were committed to containing the growth of the European Union budget and the multiannual financial framework agreement has achieved that. We have been committed, as indeed were the previous Labour Government, to extensive reform of the common fisheries policy; that has now been more or less achieved. We were committed to an EU patent court; that is now here. There is a range of further items that we wish to pursue and we will do so with like-minded member Governments, many of whom share our concerns, through the processes of multilateral negotiation.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that one of the best ways of ensuring that great concerns are not caused by British European policy would be to accept the sage advice of the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place? In its report published earlier this week it said that the way to proceed is through a broad, positive reform agenda for the EU as a whole and not by devising new cut-outs for the UK. In the effort that the Government are making to talk at all levels with the German Government, which I strongly welcome, please do not forget—and I hope that the Minister will say that he has not forgotten—about the need to talk to France, too, because unanimity is needed to get many of these changes.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we have certainly not forgotten about France or the other 25 members of the European Union. Bilateral discussions and multilateral negotiations are a constant process. We welcome the report from the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and I recommend it to Members of this House.

EUC Report: EU External Action Service

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 3rd June 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, trying to judge the performance of the European External Action Service less than three years after it was first set up, a period during which a massive amount of time and effort necessarily went into the administrative complexities of that teething process, given the impossibility of doing more in advance planning while the Lisbon treaty was going through its rather agonising ratification process, is not an exact science, nor can it lead to any very definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, we owe a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and his colleagues for this last in a number of really excellent reports that the committee has brought forward in the years that he has chaired it. It is a genuinely valuable account of a work still very much in progress.

The report is timely, as the noble Lord recalled, as a first review of the EEAS is now under way in Brussels and because—this is a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jopling—in 2014 the process of appointing a new Commission, including a new president, a new high representative for common foreign and security policy and a new president of the European Council, creates an opportunity, if it is taken, to address some of the problems that have arisen in the early years of the EAS’s existence.

If I may be tempted by the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, to a bit of anecdotage, I reminisce, and I find it astonishing, how that wizard of modern diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, managed to fix the whole debate, practically for ever it sometimes seems to me, with his remark about which telephone number he had to ring. That was an extraordinary piece of chutzpah, if that is an adequate word for it, since, even when Henry Kissinger himself managed for the only time in American history—and it will probably remain the only time—to combine the offices of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, you still needed more than one telephone number to find out what American foreign policy was: probably more than 20 or 30. It is a pity that he somehow fixed the debate, and we should not allow ourselves to be mesmerised by that objective of producing someone at the end of a single telephone number. I doubt whether it is achievable, and it certainly will not be achieved in the short term.

To add to the Kissinger stories, I add his unhappy initiative that he called the “Year of Europe”, which caused a good deal of fracas in Brussels at the time when he launched it. When he asked the man who I worked for at the time, Christopher Soames, former Leader of this House, why everyone was so upset, Christopher said to him: “Well Henry, how would you have liked it if I had made a speech saying that next year is the year of the United States?”. That brought the conversation to a short and rapid conclusion, and the year of Europe came to a conclusion rather soon after that.

I will address three main issues. First, there is the question which the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, with whom I agreed 100% on this, spoke about: the overload on the person holding the job of vice-president and high representative. This really cannot be in doubt and it is likely to get worse as the EAS and common foreign and security policy become more a part of the international scene. It is not only that the high representative cannot be in two places at once, particularly when those places are often separated by thousands of miles, but that the number and complexity of the policy issues needing to be handled exceed the capacity of one person to do so. Because the crucial work of co-ordination in Brussels at a political level cannot be effectively achieved by someone who is often absent from that city, the present situation is absurd. Even Foreign Ministers of small member states often have political deputies to share the load. However, the Commission, where there are now 28 commissioners from 1 July onwards, which far exceeds the number of meaningful separate tasks to be performed, cannot seem to contemplate a system of a deputy or deputies for its vice-president.

Alternative ways of addressing the overload problem, such as turning back to the rotating presidency to plug a gap, would seem to me a cure that is worse than the disease, risking recreating the confusion and dispersal of effort that the high representative was established to remedy. It should surely be a high priority for the 2014 process of EU appointments and the allocation of responsibilities to address this problem.

Secondly, there is the problem of policy coherence. The European Union of 2013 has a wide range of policies and policy instruments that impact on the world outside its borders, such as enlargement, neighbourhood policy, development aid, trade, environment, transport and immigration, to name only the most obvious ones. However, is it achieving the sort of coherence in the operation of those policies that will maximise their impact and maximise, too, the European Union’s influence in an increasingly interdependent and multipolar world? The honest answer is that it is not. One need look no further than the way in which both Russia and China are able to divide and rule among the member states when there is no meaningful overall policy approach towards those two countries, or at the contradictions between the Union’s agricultural policy and its development policy, or those built into the handling of Turkey’s and Macedonia’s applications for membership. The best diplomatic service in the world cannot itself compensate for, or gloss over, such a lack of policy coherence. If the EAS is to be more effective, that lacuna in policy coherence needs to be filled.

Thirdly, there is the issue of turf fighting, both within and between the various institutions in Brussels, between the Commission, the EAS, the Council, the Parliament, and the member states. If there was a gold medal for turf fighting, Europe would surely have won it quite a lot of times. One of the principle objectives with the establishment of the EAS was to reduce that turf fighting. Has it succeeded in doing so? I rather doubt it. Those who work within the Brussels machinery tell me that while there have been some improvements in the operations, such as the operation of the Political and Security Committee and the Situation Centre, there are plenty of other examples of time and resource-wasting infighting. There are some member states—the UK, I fear, prominent among them—whose lip service of support for the EAS is in sharp contrast to the resources they devote to the task of policing the lonely frontiers of competence creep, biting the ankles of the EAS whenever any transgression, however minor, is perceived.

There are plenty of other areas that need to be addressed before the EEAS can confidently demonstrate a degree of professional excellence equal to that of the best among its member states, which have, after all, been in the business for an awful lot longer. Better language skills, as my noble friend Lady Coussins said, greater effectiveness at public diplomacy, the avoidance of cronyism in the making of senior appointments and better co-ordination between the work of special representatives and the EEAS heads of mission on the spot all need to be addressed in the period ahead. Above all, the EU and the EEAS need to spend more time and effort influencing the policymaking of the rest of the world and less time arguing among themselves about the precise formulation of EU positions, whose shelf life is inevitably limited. This is work not just for three years but for as many decades. Meanwhile, I would be grateful if the Minister replying to this debate could give the Government’s views on the three priority issues I have identified—deputisation, policy coherence and turf fighting—and say what steps the Government intend to take to make the most of the opportunities of 2013 and 2014 and the general post appointments next year to address those problems.

EU: Subsidiarity Scrutiny

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the noble Lord uses his characteristically robust and colourful language. There is always a tension between the time that national Parliaments wish to take for scrutiny and the pressures that national Governments, including our own, may wish to give to taking decisions. There are those in national Parliaments who regard the eight-week limit for taking a scrutiny decision as unfortunate, but I am informed by those who know the Brussels situation better than I do that the earlier national Parliaments submit reasoned opinions in the process of negotiation, the greater effect they have.

Reasoned opinions in the form of reports issued by the European Committee of this House are widely respected throughout the European Union in other national Parliaments and elsewhere. I recall with delight a Member of the European Parliament being appointed to head a committee in the European Parliament. He was asked by his clerk to start by reading three documents, two of which were reports from the House of Lords EU Committee.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, would the Minister not agree that in the short period of time that the yellow-card system has existed, the main lesson to draw is that we have to get better at enlisting other national Parliaments when we use the yellow card because that is the shortfall? Will he confirm that on the one occasion when it was used, the Commission withdrew its proposal—the Monti II proposal? Will he also confirm that the right to take action in the Court is one for this House, not the Government under the Lisbon treaty?

Georgia

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 11th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dykes]

My Lords—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Order.

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)]

My Lords, there is plenty of time for both noble Lords. I think that we can hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and then my noble friend.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dykes.

I should admit that I was in Georgia by chance the week before the parliamentary elections, and, perhaps to offset some of the comments this afternoon, I should say that the massive demonstrations that took place then after the revelation of terrible human rights abuses in Georgian prisons were impeccable. There was no violence on the part of protesters and there was no force used by the police. What we need to do, surely—

[Noble Lords]

Question!

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I said that what we need to do, surely, is support those people in Georgia who showed that degree of maturity in advance of the elections.

[Noble Lords]

Question!

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I have asked a question.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Lord for those comments. The previous Government were not perfect. There is a very large prison population in Georgia and prison conditions were clearly awful. The current Government are not perfect either; media freedom is still very limited, but we have to do what we can to encourage a process of transition to full democracy, which is still under way.

European Union Committee Report

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I believe that this may be the first occasion on which the House has debated the work of its EU Select Committee over the previous three years. Whether it is or not, it is surely a debate worth having. I welcome the participation in it of our two distinguished and effective chairs during the period in question—the noble Lords, Lord Boswell and Lord Roper, who have both preceded me.

It is a debate worth having because it has been alleged frequently in the House by at least one of its Members that the work of the committee is worthless and because it is also suggested that the resources devoted to the work of the committee are excessive. I believe that neither of these criticisms is well founded, but it is right that a member of the committee, such as me, should be ready to defend that view in debate and not simply to assert it. I was a little disappointed to see that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, made only a cameo appearance some moments ago— 10 seconds, I think. He may have gone off to get a string of garlic to hang round his neck before facing such dangerous people around the Table. If he has not, I wish that he would come and substantiate some of his claims in the sort of debate that we are having.

I will focus first on the work of the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, Health and Education, which I have the honour to chair, and to whose members both past and present—I note that at least two of them are here—I pay tribute for their hard work and effective contributions. During the period in question, the sub-committee produced two major, thematic reports: on the European Union’s internal security strategy and on the European Union’s drug strategy. A third on the general approach to mobility and migration will be published within the next month. Since it has not yet been adopted, I will make no further reference to it in this debate.

In each of those thematic reports we have addressed European Union policies that are still being formulated and shaped, and we have thus aimed to contribute to that process, not merely to commenting after the event. I believe that we have had some success. In our work on the internal security strategy, we focused mainly on counterterrorism, civil protection and cybersecurity. Our overall conclusion can be summed up in a single, very brief phrase: Britain’s internal security neither begins nor ends at the water’s edge. We strongly recommended that a cybercrime centre be established within the existing Europol agency and not as a separate free-standing agency, and it seems likely that the Commission will accept that advice when it brings forward proposals for the development of Europol early next year. During this and other work we have done, we have formed a high opinion of the work of Europol and of its use and value to this country. That view will certainly be relevant when we take up the Protocol 36 opt-out decision in the next few weeks.

On the drugs strategy, as in so many areas with which our sub-committee deals—internal security and migration are others—we found ourselves in a policy area where there are mixed competences and where the principle of subsidiarity is alive and well and is actually being applied. We did not think in any of those cases that the boundary between the European Union as such and national competences should be shifted; rather, we thought that the European Union’s input should be better focused and less broad-brush. We called for a wide and inclusive public debate on drugs. I wish I could say that that call has been heeded, but it has not. The paucity and poverty of public debate on drugs is truly shameful.

In addition to those thematic reports, the Lisbon treaty has heaped on to our plate a whole range of new responsibilities reflecting the fact that now, for the first time in the EU’s history, national Parliaments have been given a clear role in the EU’s legislative processes. Thus, we not only intervened in a yellow card subsidiarity procedure in respect of the draft seasonal workers directive but we produced opt-in reports on the passenger name recognition directive and on the proceeds of crime directive. On the first of those, our recommendation to opt in was accepted by the Government; the second has not yet been so, but I very much hope that it will be at the adoption stage. In one area—the data protection directive—I fear that the Government failed to implement their commitment under the Ashton-Lidington undertakings to provide time for a debate before the opt-in period expired. That was lamentable. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, accepted that that had been an error and the Government’s decision to opt in was in any case what the committee had recommended. Least said, soonest mended.

In conclusion, I shall turn to two matters that fall outside the purview of my sub-committee. First, there is the EU’s multiannual financial framework, which has been referred to by other speakers, on which the main committee has spent much time and effort. The European Council’s failure at the end of last week to reach agreement was regrettable but not surprising—nor was it unprecedented. The gaps between the different groups in the Council were too wide to bridge at one attempt. That was exactly what happened, too, in December 1987, but it did not prevent a satisfactory agreement being reached in February 1988. The problem is that these budgetary negotiations really are zero-sum games: one country’s gain is another’s loss and the overall common interest tends to get overlooked as the competition for resources becomes more acute.

Our committee supported the Government’s aims to achieve a real-terms freeze over the next seven years. We did not consider that a cut was either desirable or achievable. The fact that the Prime Minister was able to work together with a group of like-minded member states was admirable and greatly increases the chances of an ultimate outcome with which the UK can live, even if it may contain some difficult compromises. Failure to reach agreement in the new year, particularly if the UK were alone to be responsible for that, would not, I believe, be in this country’s interests given that in the absence of an agreed MFF the European Union would have to fall back on an annual budgetary system that could well produce higher figures and an even less desirable distribution between policies.

The second matter, to which several other noble Lords have referred, is the decision that the House took earlier this year to cut the resources allocated to EU scrutiny and to abolish one of the Select Committee’s sub-committees. To have taken that decision shortly after the Lisbon treaty had considerably increased the overall work of European scrutiny and just when national Parliaments had gained a foothold in the EU’s legislative process was, I would say if I was being polite, counterintuitive. I would call it aberrant. I trust that when these matters next come up for review—for example, at the beginning of the next Session—that lamentable decision will be reversed. Unless the Minister, in replying to the debate, is tempted to retreat into procedural obfuscation and to argue that this is a matter for the House and not for the Government, I urge him at least to make it clear that the Government want to see the work of the EU Select Committee properly resourced and up to the challenges that it faces in the years ahead.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I stand corrected. I am not sure whether the justice and home affairs inquiry has yet taken evidence from the Irish Government, who have a clear stake in the question of the opt-out or the opt-in. It may be that the Irish Government—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Just to enlighten the noble Lord, as he has effectively asked a question, the call for evidence does address the Irish dimension. It will, of course, be a matter for the Irish Government to decide whether or not to offer evidence. I do not think that we should go around telling other Governments what they should do. It has been made clear to them that evidence would be extremely welcome.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Lord very much for that. I happen to know that there are those within the Irish Government who are enthusiastic about coming to give evidence, and I look forward to them accepting the invitation that has been made.

The wider issue we all face is the gap between globalisation—internationalisation—and publics who regret the extent to which power is slipping away from local control. Last summer I read an excellent book by Dani Rodrik, the Turkish economist who is now at Harvard, on the limits of globalisation in which he talks about the underlying contradiction between popular desire for stability, local control and understanding what has happened, and the driving forces of a global economy—the global social elite, immigration, et cetera—that appear to be taking power away from the local level and sweeping away autonomy, identity, sovereignty and democratic accountability. That is the tension that we all face. In the United States the American Tea Party takes it out on international law, international organisations and the federal Government. In Britain, by and large, our often disturbed and discontented public take it out on the European Union. Part of what we have to do is address that contradiction to see how far we can persuade our public that some of the regulation that now appears to them to be imposed from the European Union is unavoidable, desirable and necessary, and to persuade the European Union in return that it should not attempt to regulate everything in sight or expand its competences too far.

China: Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 22nd November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, the subject of this debate might seem at first sight to be a little esoteric, but I suggest that it is not. It is, in fact, at the heart of any meaningful effort to make progress towards the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, which was set out in President Obama’s Prague speech. However, the issue is equally at the heart of achieving that other objective, which is supported by a wider body of opinion than the first, of a world with far fewer nuclear weapons than exist now, and with such weapons stood down from the state of high alert that currently persists and playing a less prominent role in the defence and security strategies of the states that possess them. Add to those considerations the facts that President Obama has recently been elected to a new term of office, that the Democrats have a larger majority in the Senate than they had before that election and, at the same time, that a sweeping shift in the leadership of China is taking place—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, told us some interesting things about that—you have all the conditions for a highly topical debate.

The tireless efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, as the convenor of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation, and of the European Leadership Network, which met last week in London, are so noteworthy that he must be warmly congratulated, not least for the wide-ranging speech with which he opened the debate.

If nuclear disarmament discussions between the nuclear weapons states, the P5, often resemble a dance of the seven veils, it should be recognised that China has not, as yet, shed much in the way of those veils—fewer than most of the other nuclear powers. Its statements of nuclear strategy, which have just been referred to, are cast in the most general of terms and are bereft of any of the specifics that would be needed to provide the transparency required if genuine steps towards disarmament were to be achieved. That may not have mattered much, so long as China’s nuclear arsenal was pretty small and so long as the US-Soviet and, subsequently, the US-Russian strategic weapons negotiations were effectively the only game in town. However, given that China is reportedly alone among the P5 in still adding to its arsenal, and with the need for negotiations outside that original duo becoming more pressing, that is no longer the case.

Moreover, in the context of verification processes, to which in general terms China has always shown itself to be remarkably allergic—that was as true in the discussions on climate change as it is of nuclear disarmament—China will surely be a necessary component of any steps towards wider nuclear disarmament. China’s firm support for bringing the comprehensive test ban treaty into force, which will require its own ratification but which has not taken place, will be an important element of any renewed effort to get the United States Senate to ratify that treaty. There is therefore plenty to discuss with the Chinese, even if they were not the closest allies of two extraordinarily problematic possessors of nuclear and weapons, Pakistan and North Korea, and a crucial component in the international efforts to head off a third, Iran.

Fortunately, there already exists one forum for such discussions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Browne, made reference, in the shape of the regular, if so far pretty infrequent, consultative meetings between the P5—the five nuclear weapons states recognised as such under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The discussions, for which the noble Lord, Lord Browne, deserves a share of the credit, were initiated a few years ago. What is needed now is for those meetings to become more frequent, and for them also to become more operational and less academic. For example, those consultations could, first, make progress towards defining the terms of a fissile material cut-off treaty that would be supported by all five of the recognised weapons states, if ever Pakistan’s veto on even beginning the negotiation of such a treaty in the conference on disarmament could be removed or circumvented. Secondly, a better understanding could perhaps be reached in that P5 forum on how verification measures could be achieved without the risk of proliferation, and draw on the experience of the Anglo-Norwegian research project, known as VERTIC. Thirdly, consideration could be given on how to handle multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among a wider group of countries, should a further round of US-Russian nuclear weapons reductions make that a realistic possibility.

There is a compelling case, too, for a much more intensive bilateral discussion between Britain and China on nuclear matters than has hitherto taken place. I hope that the Minister will say something about that and will commit the Government to stepping up those exchanges. They may not be likely to produce instant results but they could contribute to establishing greater confidence and understanding between the two parties, which will be an essential component of success in any future, wider negotiations.

Any dialogue with China on nuclear matters will need to address also the issues raised by the cases of North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. If North Korea is to be brought back into the six-nation talks, and if these are to make progress, China will need to play a more proactive role in its bilateral dealings with North Korea than it has done hitherto. Let us hope that the new leadership in Beijing will be prepared to look at that and will recognise and respond to the need. Then if Iran’s nuclear ambitions are to be brought back firmly within the ambit of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the potential disastrous outcomes of either a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or of hostilities in that region are to be avoided, China will need to give wholehearted support to the twin-track policy of sanctions and the offer of serious negotiations to which—it must be faced—it has not up to now given wholehearted support. Thirdly, if the conference on disarmament is not to lose all its not very abundant credibility as a forum for negotiation, China will need to help persuade its ally Pakistan to cease blocking negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

In conclusion, we should face up to the obvious facts. China’s role as a global actor in pretty well every sphere of policy is on the rise. Clearly that goes for nuclear policy, too. The case for intensified discussions, both multilateral and bilateral, between this country and China is unanswerable—but is it going to be answered?

EU: Repatriation of Powers

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 6th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the problem of creeping competence has been there for some time. I remember a pamphlet published 10 years ago by a rather bright young man, whom my wife once taught, called Nick Clegg on doing less better. That is what many of us want to achieve in Brussels. We all know that the Commission sometimes wants to take powers over everything. I regretted that there was a report the other week from this House’s EU Committee on Commission proposals for closer co-operation on grass-roots sport. It seems to me that grass-roots sport ought to be left to the grass roots and that sport at the international level should be dealt with by the EU. That is a reasonable, long-term proposal. Liberal Democrats have held that view for a long time and continue to hold it, perhaps against the centralisers at the European level within the Labour Party. I see the noble Lord shaking his head.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, what would the Government’s response be if, in the intergovernmental conference about to meet, a member state other than Britain were to introduce a proposal for the repatriation of some portion of the single market?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I am happy to say that that is extremely unlikely. We are some way off an intergovernmental conference. The German Government believe that we can have a very short IGC next March and hope that ratification of limited treaty change can then take place by the end of 2012. The position of Her Majesty's Government is that treaty change is not necessary, as we argued when ratifying the Lisbon treaty and again on the EU Bill. The Lisbon treaty has an enormous amount of headroom under which powers can be taken, and we think advantage should be taken of that, rather than getting into the messy, unavoidably uncertain and long process of treaty change.

Palestine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 5th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, a great deal of unhelpful statements are being made on both sides. It was brought to my attention that one British national newspaper the other week published an advertisement by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism that showed the state of Israel as including Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights. That is not entirely helpful for an agency of the state of Israel, either. There are real problems, and both sides recognise that. If we concentrate on the problems on both sides, we will not get back to negotiations, which is, above all, what we need to do.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, if the matter were to come before the United Nations General Assembly and the proposition was that Palestine should be given a status higher than its existing one, and one that has been used in the past by sovereign independent states such as Switzerland, would we in that circumstance be able to vote for it?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, there is not yet a proposition before the General Assembly. When that emerges, we will take our decision in the light of our commitment to make sure that everything that is done promotes negotiation between the two parties.