Hinkley Point C

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord King of Bridgwater

Tuesday 26th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, again, there is no lack of clarity on this. The Statement made five years ago—“all those years ago”, as the noble Lord put it—made it absolutely clear that the approximately £128 million which was likely to come through business rate retention would come after the plant became operational. Meanwhile, there will be the benefits that I enunciated, which will come through the company building this project. On top of what I already mentioned, there is the spend it is making down the supply chain in the west of England—£450 million so far. So considerable benefits are already on their way, but business rate retention does not come into play until later.

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

My noble friend will be aware that this is taking place in my former constituency. It is one of the largest construction projects in Europe. People there are already facing fantastic lorry traffic: a figure I saw recently was 750 lorries a day going along not entirely ideal road routes. The local community is already making a substantial contribution by tolerating this terrific volume of construction traffic and all the work involved in it. My concern—the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, made this point—is that I understand that the real community benefit does not kick in until 2025. Actually, the community is making its contribution now. A lot of people do not have jobs there and will not be working there—some will, but only a relatively small number. We ought to find some way to ensure that the community benefit takes place at the time when the community is really suffering as a result of the present commotion and activity.

[Lord Henley]

My noble friend, with his local knowledge as the former Member for that area, knows exactly what his former constituents are going through, and he is right to address those points. All sites of this sort go through a rigorous planning process. In that process, it is possible for the planning authorities to grant planning permission through a Section 106 agreement, looking to get benefits from the developers in that area. That has been dealt with by the local authority in that process.

On top of that, as I made clear in earlier answers, there are also the advantages to the area through spend in the area—I mentioned the spend directly on the site, on the roads and on other things, the contribution that EDF is making, as well as the spend on the supply chain in the entire south-west region.

GKN/Melrose Takeover: Update

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord King of Bridgwater

Tuesday 27th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

My Lords, the House will recognise that this is a very serious announcement about a major British company that is obviously facing some difficulties in its present operation and is now the subject of this takeover bid. It is extremely worrying that this has occurred at a time when, obviously, the future prospects for our economy are far from certain in the present Brexit developments. The Secretary of State was absolutely right to ask for the clearest undertakings, although, as the noble Lord from the Front Bench said, it has come rather late. I do not understand at all the idea that the Secretary of State has up to four months in which to intervene in something that may have already taken place. However, he does recognise that it is not just a matter of national security: the Secretary of State says he has a wider concern that the takeover should not act against the interests of the economy. He asked for undertakings from Melrose Industries plc, but I find them extremely inadequate. The company says that it is prepared to give an undertaking to maintain its UK listing and UK headquarters for five years, and to,

“ensure that the Aerospace and Driveline divisions retain the rights to the GKN name”.

However, it goes on later to say that if a strategic purchaser comes forward with an investment proposal prior to 2023, it hopes that it would be allowed to consider that. It goes on to add:

“Unfortunately, as a result of the nature of the transaction, we have not had access to the information we would expect in order to make detailed commitments”.


By the end of that, I wonder just what commitments are being given. This is a very serious matter and the Government need to think very carefully indeed. I pay tribute to Melrose, which is obviously an extremely successful company, whose business will be to acquire it and to sell it on. No doubt it will make a great success of that, and full marks to it for its approach. Whether or not it is appropriate in this situation, a heavy burden is on the Government to get far clearer and far more binding undertakings that will give some form of security to an essential part of the UK industrial economy.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I note exactly what my noble friend has said. As he said, my right honourable friend has up to four months to consider these matters, depending on the advice he receives from colleagues in the Ministry of Defence. I am also grateful to my noble friend for referring to the response from Melrose. It is not for me to say whether that is a good or bad response; I just note that, ultimately, it has to be a matter for shareholders and others. But parts of that, as I made clear—the letter is now in the public domain—will be enforceable commitments, albeit some of them for only five years, and another part will be undertakings of a less enforceable nature. It is not for me to defend or attack that letter. I have simply set it out as the response that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State received from Melrose following his letter, in which he set out, first, his legal obligations under the 2002 Act—which gave him a relatively limited power to intervene, which is quite appropriate. Secondly, however, he stressed—I am grateful to my noble friend for underlining this—the wider interests he has as Business Secretary and the wider interests that the directors have under Section 172 of the Companies Act as regards what they must look at. In the end, the shareholders will have to take a view on that matter. As I said, it is possible that my right honourable friend will have to make a decision in a quasi-judicial manner. He must await advice on that, and at that stage, if appropriate, he will intervene.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord King of Bridgwater

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, I will deal first with Amendments 35 and 38 standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Lothian, supported by noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, described these amendments as purely drafting amendments. My noble friend, a self-described simple Scottish lawyer, thought that they went beyond that. I take his point in that one of the points of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is that using “draft” in Clause 3(3) could be seen to impugn the independence of the committee. I give some assurance that we will look at that in due course and whether “draft” is necessary. However, it might be worth my setting out the current arrangements and then the arrangements in the Bill

Under the current reporting arrangements, I think that I can give my noble friend Lord King an assurance that “draft” does not appear in the Intelligence Services Act 1994.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

It does.

[Lord Henley]

It does appear in it. Well, I got that wrong. Under the existing Intelligence Services Act, the ISC makes an annual report on the discharge of its functions to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister lays before each House of Parliament a copy of that report, together with a statement as to whether anything has been excluded from it by the Prime Minister on the grounds of its sensitivity. Under the Bill, the ISC will for the most part report to Parliament but will still be able to report to the Prime Minister on matters that would be excluded from any report. It would remain for the Prime Minister to decide whether grounds exist for excluding matters from the report after, of course, consulting. That is the important thing: the consultation with the ISC. That will continue to happen.

If, as I said, the word “draft” is not appropriate, I am sure that we can make arrangements. I am obviously not a draftsman. One way of doing that would be just to delete subsection (3) from Clause 3. We will have a look at it. We have, as we know, any amount of time because we have a long summer ahead of us with other matters to deal with.

The second amendment in this group of three, Amendment 36, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, changes the criteria—or definition, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, put it—whereby the Prime Minister might exclude any matter, if that report without that matter excluded would contain sensitive information as defined in Schedule 1, or information which should not be disclosed in the interests of national security.

The ISC must be able to report candidly to the Prime Minister on sensitive matters. Inevitably, the full contents of its reports cannot always be published because of the nature of the material contained within them. We are all agreed on that; it is quite clear. It follows, therefore, that there must be an ability to redact information before the ISC reports can be published or laid before Parliament. I must make it clear that the test in the Bill is modelled on the one in the 1994 Act. That has worked well and it is well understood by both the committee and by the Government. It has allowed material to be excluded where it should be excluded but it has also allowed the Government and the ISC to ensure that as much of the ISC’s reports that can be published are published. I do not believe that it is overly restrictive but it does cover certain categories of information which would not be covered were the Bill to be amended as is suggested in the noble Lord’s amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, from a sedentary position, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, have put this point. They want to know why the criteria are different. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will explain that in due course. There is no need for him to make an intervention as he has already asked that point. The ISC needs to know what can be published and there are two different tests—one for publication and one for disclosure to the ISC. The tests therefore should be different. Tests for withholding from the ISC should be at a much higher threshold.

As both noble Lords will be aware, the functions of the agency are not solely exercisable in the interests of national security. It also has functions exercisable in the interests of economic well-being, United Kingdom fraud protection or prevention of serious crime. For those instances where including a matter in an ISC report to Parliament could cause prejudice to those functions of the agency but not to its functions in relation to national security, the existing Clause 3(4) would give the Prime Minister the power to require that that matter should be excluded from the ISC’s report whereas, unless the information in question fell within the definition of sensitive information under paragraph 4 of Schedule 1, the formulation of the clause proposed by this amendment would not.

With that, the noble Lord’s amendment is not necessary and in fact would not take us much further. I hope therefore that he will consider not moving it when it is called. I trust that my assurance that we will consider Amendments 35 and 38 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Lothian will enable the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord King of Bridgwater

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

The view about a Select Committee is rather easier to hold if you are in opposition than if you are in government. The history of this was that the entire shadow Cabinet in 1989 voted in favour of it. When the prospect of office loomed, Jack Straw, who was then I think shadow Home Secretary, was asked the same question and was much more cautious about the whole matter. Of course, when they came into government there were no moves to introduce a Select Committee. However, times have moved on and I hope that there will be moves in that direction.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, obviously my noble friend is right to say that times have moved on. All of us can remember as far back as 1989. Things have obviously changed since then. I was merely trying to tease out the official view of the Opposition at this stage, but it does not matter because as we all know, and as a very distinguished Cross-Bencher, the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, made clear, we are all heading in the same direction and at least trying to make sure that we achieve the right thing—a committee that has the appropriate degree of public confidence.

I do not want to re-emphasise what I said earlier about the ISC being appointed by Parliament rather than the Prime Minister, and about its members being free to choose their own chair. That will be debated later, in the context of another amendment tabled by the noble Lord. In parallel with these statutory changes, it is the Government’s intention that the ISC will be funded and accommodated by Parliament. The amendment sets up the ISC as a Select Committee of Parliament. The noble Lord could have achieved that by the simpler means of leaving out the whole of Part 1 and making sure that the appropriate authorities in another place created the Select Committee—but he went down a different route and we are having this debate for the very good reasons that all speakers in the debate made clear.

I will explain why we believe that the ISC should be created by statute. It is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information. Therefore, the Government do not consider it appropriate for that body to be a full Joint Committee established merely under the Standing Orders of each House, as other Select Committees are.

I hope that the Committee will bear with me if I expand on those reasons. First, in that scenario, the Government would not have a statutory ability to prevent the publication of sensitive material. There are two main problems with this. The risk of disclosure of information that might damage national security could be increased. This might lead to a situation where agency heads find it hard to reconcile their duty to protect information with their duty to facilitate oversight. This could lead to a sharing of less sensitive information and therefore a corresponding reduction in the effectiveness and credibility of oversight.

Secondly, it would not be possible for the most sensitive information to be withheld from the Committee. It is important that safeguards exist so there is adequate provision for those exceptional circumstances where the disclosure of information, even to the Chairman of the Committee, would be damaging to national security and/or would jeopardise vital agency operations or sources of information. The equivalent grounds on which information can be withheld from the Committee under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, have been used very rarely, as those former or current members of the Committee will know. We would expect the similar powers in the Bill also to be used sparingly—only in exceptional circumstances.

Thirdly, there is the appointments process. Again we will deal with that in greater detail later on. Here the Prime Minister has a role, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, in a later amendment proposes a much stronger role for him. That role is important. The ISC is unique in that members of the Committee have access to very important and extremely sensitive information, and it is important that the appointments process has sufficient safeguards to ensure there is as little risk as possible of unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information and the consequences that could do significant damage to national security.

The effect of the noble Lord’s amendment to create a Select Committee is not clear to me. He says it could take evidence under oath. In the Bill, even if we were to accept all the noble Lord’s amendments, the ISC would still be created by statute and safeguards would still exist to protect national security in those three areas I have listed, although admittedly altered to some degree. Unless the noble Lord pursues this suggested alternative policy of deleting the whole of Part 1, his amendment would not create a full Joint Committee because that can be done only by the Standing Orders of each House. It would create an entirely novel body, a Select Committee established by statute.

To what extent would such a body share the characteristics of the other Select Committees? The Bill makes it clear that, even were it amended in other respects according to noble Lords’ wishes, the ISC is different from other Select Committees in fundamental respects—for instance, in relation to appointments and reporting. That being so, I believe it is unclear whether or to what extent changing the ISC in this way would give it the other characteristic of a Select Committee. Indeed, I believe the risk is that describing the ISC as a Select Committee when it has characteristics not shared by other such committees could positively mislead as to the ISC’s true character.

I hope that that explanation is sufficient for the noble Lord. I wait to see what he says. This has been a useful debate and there will no doubt be further discussions on this matter, but I believe that it is appropriate for the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I am trying to remember how many new Members came on to the committee. There was a big upheaval. I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, for example, was a member of the previous committee; he was whisked off to be a Minister. It was a pretty major change of cast. With great respect to my noble friend, who says that new members of the committee might be expected to know about these things, a number of them might have had no previous experience whatever of the committee.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will look very carefully at the point that my noble friend has made and at the statistics relating to 1997 in particular, which was one of those years in which there would have been a big upheaval, with that particular new Parliament. Off the cuff, I do not know who was on the committee and who came on, although perhaps my noble friend can remember. But in the main, with the relatively experienced parliamentarians who will be on this committee, I think that it is well suited to making the decision itself.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I start by being faintly flippant. I remind my noble friend that the quorum for this House and this Committee is only three—one to speak, one to listen and one to sit either in the Chair or on the Woolsack. Even with the crowded House that we have at the moment, we represent probably well below a third or even a tenth of the membership of the House. I should also remind my noble friend that my understanding is that it is the practice of most Select Committees to have a quorum of three or a quarter of the committee’s membership. Three is therefore the number that we have picked. Bearing in mind that the ISC is a relatively small committee with a membership of only nine, three represents a third of the membership.

Having said that, one should take my noble friend’s amendment seriously but we have not, as far as I am aware, had any problems with the quorum. A quorum of five might be overly restrictive, particularly if you take the view that the function of a quorum should be to provide protection against the possibility of a small number of persons on a body taking actions or decisions that could be unrepresentative of that body as a whole.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I think it fair to say that this is a Committee that, quite exceptionally, has a remarkably high attendance level, and this is something we are quite proud of and which, I am sure, has continued. I do not ever recall any problem about a quorum. In fact, I recall very few occasions when the whole Committee was not on parade and, as anyone familiar with House of Commons Select Committees will know, that is often far from being the case.

[Lord Henley]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving me that assurance. I remember when, many years ago, I was first put on a Committee—the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, possibly the outer Siberia of committees. I think there were seven Members from each House and a quorum of two from each House. On a committee of that sort it was often quite difficult to reach the quorum of both Houses, but some of us manfully attended week in, week out, to preserve it. I am very grateful to my noble friend for making the more serious point that the Committee does, in the main, have not just a quorum but is normally fully attended by virtually all Members; that really answers the points of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams.

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[Lord Henley]

I stand corrected by the noble Baroness, but it makes little odds; Crown servants are in fact at Permanent Secretary-level, although I accept that rebuke.

The recruitment process is therefore expected to follow the process for the appointment of Crown servants of such seniority. I could go through the details of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, but I can give an assurance that they are exempt from that. They will necessarily follow the spirit of the civil servant recruitment principles, which we consider to be the best process. We do not consider it to be the appropriate mechanism for recruitment to public bodies, whether the process is conducted in public or in private. It might be appropriate for the other posts that I mentioned but not for the public bodies that we are talking about.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I apologise to the Minister for intervening, as he has been extremely co-operative with the Committee in every respect. It seems to me that, on the whole principle of this pre-appointment hearing—we left open the question about public or private hearings—it is an important asset for the person about to be appointed if he has a successful hearing before the committee. It reinforces his position at the start of his work if the principle is accepted elsewhere.

We then have the argument about Crown servants and their exact role, and we go through a range of bodies, including Ofcom. I do not even know what Ofcom’s position is—whether it is in government or outside it—and exactly what its relationship is. However, I think that the principle of holding hearings has merit, and—to use a phrase I have used before—I have a feeling that they will come.

[Lord Henley]

I am afraid that on this occasion I have to disagree with my noble friend. There it is quite a distinction between Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary or the chair of the Social Security Advisory Service on the one hand and, for that matter, the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office or the Permanent Secretary of any other department on the other. We suggest that the heads of the intelligence and security agencies fit in more appropriately with that later group rather than with the former group.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord King of Bridgwater

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, that was a rather savage attack on the Government, which was not entirely justified. I thought there was a general recognition in the House that what the Government are doing in this clause is recognising the situation that has already developed. The ISC started with a fairly limited remit under the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Progressively, through such things as the DIS in the Ministry of Defence, JIC and access to JIC assessments, bringing in the Comptroller and Auditor-General to assess the financial operations of the agencies—a whole lot of different ways—the committee expanded its role and activities in a way that was entirely sensible, in which people collaborated, and which was accepted by the agencies and the Government.

I do not know whether there is something frightfully subtle in the amendment that the Opposition have tabled and how far it is significantly different from what the Government have already put in the Bill. The Government are recognising, and it seems quite fair that it is set out in a memorandum of understanding, just what the area and remit of the committee will be. Certainly, in the end—I think it was the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, as well——whatever we sought to look into and in the range over which we sought to expand our activities, I do not recall any area in which we were significantly frustrated.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, this is the first of a number of amendments that deal with a memorandum of understanding. I start by apologising to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who makes attacks on the Home Office for being somewhat remiss in the slowness with which it produces things, particularly in relation to the framework document. As the noble Lord is aware, I have promised that we will have a draft or an outline of that framework document before we get to Report stage of the Crime and Courts Bill. Since that is unlikely to take place in this House before the end of October, we have a certain amount of time.

On the memorandum of understanding, as set out in the Bill, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord King on this. It is right that the memorandum of understanding should spell out the precise remit of the ISC in relation to bodies other than the agencies, because the memorandum of understanding can make provision at a level of detail that is not appropriate for primary legislation. This is particularly important because parts of government departments engaged in intelligence and security activities may well be engaged in other activities besides, which would not properly fall within the remit of the ISC.

Clearly, things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions done by one department one year may be done by another the following year. The noble Lord will remember when his party was in Government, how frequently they changed the names and the functions of departments. I have completely lost track of the number of changes there were to departments. One of the things we did very firmly when we came back into office was not to change the names or functions of departments, except in the most marginal capacity.

I believe the intelligence world is no different to any other part of government. For example, as with the recent Levene report, we could find that future reorganisations of defence may change organisational boundaries that affect the MoD’s intelligence activities. A memorandum of understanding is a flexible document. It can be changed much more easily than primary legislation. It will enable the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and, more importantly, in the future should they change. The amendment seeks to limit that. For that reason I cannot offer any support to the amendment. I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw it.

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[Lord Henley]

I apologise to that extent if I have misunderstood what the noble Lord was getting at in his amendment and I hope that I did not mislead the House in so doing. The Government’s intention, on that memorandum of understanding, which has to be agreed by the Government and the ISC, is that it will be the appropriate vehicle for agreeing the process to ensure that the information is provided to the committee in an appropriately prompt manner.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, would remove one of the key restrictions on the ISC’s new power to oversee agency operations, namely the requirement that its oversight of operations should be retrospective. The extension in the Bill of the ISC’s statutory remit into the agencies’ operational work is a significant deepening of the committee’s powers. While the ISC has in the past conducted inquiries into operational matters with the agreement of the Prime Minister, such as its inquiries into the London bombings of 7 July 2005 and into rendition, the provisions in the Bill provide a formal remit for the committee in this area. We anticipate that the new ISC will provide such oversight on a more regular basis.

We have worked with the current ISC to develop the new arrangements, and the committee agrees with the Government that its oversight of operations should be retrospective in nature. In other words, the ISC should not oversee operations that are ongoing. There are a number of very good reasons for this.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

This is my concern about the drafting: what is an ongoing operation? Is it 7/7 and the follow-up; or is it the jihadist threat that exists and which we think possibly continues to exist at this time, with the Olympics coming up and the heightened security alert that will continue afterwards? What is an “ongoing” security operation?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am not sure that the word “ongoing” has actually been tested in the courts. It is in the Bill, which is why I make this point. We have no judicial interpretation of “ongoing”, but I hope the courts would understand and interpret it as the words appear in the Bill.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, first, I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—who is great on drafting. She has picked out another word—envisaged—which she has not come across in legislation before. We will add that to “ongoing”. I suspect that, like her, I am probably an old fogey on these matters. These matters are new to drafting but develop in the way that they do. We will consult the draftsman on whether he is happy with “envisaged” or whether some other word could do it.

It would probably be helpful if I first explain the purpose of the memorandum. We believe that it will be an important document in the relationship between the ISC and the Government. It will define the precise extent of the ISC’s oversight of parts of the intelligence community other than the agencies. It will set principles or other criteria that must be met before the ISC can consider particular operational matters. It will describe the arrangements by which the agencies and other intelligence bodies will supply information to the ISC. We expect that it will also cover matters such as: the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a particular operational matter which the ISC might wish to consider is ongoing, current—or whatever word we particularly wish to use—and/or of significant national interest; a description of the arrangements by which the ISC will request and hold information, including the circumstances in which the ISC will be able to access primary source materials; a description of the role of investigative staff in the ISC’s work; and a description of the process for producing an ISC report. That is what we intend that it should cover. There will no doubt be other matters that will also need to be covered.

The memorandum of understanding in the Bill must be agreed between the Prime Minister and the ISC and it can be altered or replaced at any time by agreement. It is intended that the first memorandum of understanding will be agreed immediately on the coming into force of the relevant provisions. As I said, however, we hope that we can give some idea of what it is going to look like by the time we reach Report.

As is usual for a memorandum of understanding—this is not an unusual procedure—there is no parliamentary approval procedure. This was looked at by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and it was perfectly happy with this. While the memorandum of understanding itself will be an unclassified document which will be published and laid before Parliament, its precise terms are very likely to be shaped by matters which are sensitive in terms of national security and which therefore cannot be made public. In these circumstances, it is particularly appropriate that the memorandum of understanding can be concluded without the need for parliamentary approval.

Of course the terms of the memorandum of understanding must be agreed with the ISC. The Bill makes that clear—it is agreed between the Government and the ISC. The ISC, we must always remind ourselves, is a committee composed of parliamentarians—nine from both Houses. It could be eight members from this House and one from another, but it might be some other arrangement, as it is at the moment—seven from another place and two from this House. As a result of the changes that the Bill will bring about the committee will be appointed by and accountable to Parliament. In some ways, requiring these parliamentarians to seek the approval of the rest of Parliament is a restriction on the independence of the body. I think that it would be unusual for Parliament to have such control over the detailed way in which what amounts to a Select Committee—as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is looking for—has decided to conduct its business.

We have not yet published the memorandum for the simple reason that the memorandum of understanding does not exist. We are starting the process of agreeing this document with the ISC and will do so in parallel with the Bill’s passage through Parliament.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, I am a little confused about the memorandum of understanding. We seem to have slipped into an issue that arises in the second part of Clause 2: operational matters. The memorandum also refers to overseeing other activities of Her Majesty’s Government in relation to intelligence and security matters. I understand that that is a reference to the Ministry of Defence, to the CDI—who used to appear before the Intelligence and Security Committee—to the Home Office and to other people who gladly came and gave evidence. Presumably that is part of the memorandum of understanding. There is nothing controversial about this; it merely legitimises and puts into statute a situation that already exists.

If I understand correctly, the Minister is now saying that the memorandum of understanding will not appear before the end of the parliamentary process, and that then it will not be subject to any further parliamentary approval. While I entirely understand that necessarily secure issues in the memorandum may have to be dealt with separately, much of what is in the legislation and the memorandum of understanding are the rules under which the ISC will operate and the access that it will have. The Minister is very nobly taking on the first cut of the Bill, if I may put it like that. The memorandum of understanding will have to be looked at again. If it covers the first part of what I am talking about, certainly it should be available to Parliament. Either it should be under consideration while we debate the Bill or it should come up at a later stage, subject to parliamentary approval if it is subsequent to the passage of the legislation.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, again I do not think that my noble friend followed what I said. We will not agree the final memorandum until after the Bill has completed. However, I make it clear that we want to produce a draft of it at an earlier stage as we complete our discussions with the ISC. Once we have an agreed draft, it is our intention to publish it to help inform debate. I hope that this will happen before Report. The Bill is only just starting in this House. It has to go through another place as well. As discussions on this will be ongoing—I must not use the word “ongoing”—as the Bill is considered by Parliament, it would not be appropriate to share the first draft before at least it has been agreed by both parties.

My other point is what I said at the beginning of my remarks: the memorandum of understanding, having been agreed by the Prime Minister and the ISC, can be altered and replaced by agreement at any time. Since it is a working document that can move on and be altered and agreed by the two parties, it would not be appropriate to constantly put it back to both Houses of Parliament for debate and agreement. That is not the position with other memorandums of understanding. Normally there is no parliamentary approval process. That is why I mentioned that this had been to the Lords Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee, which, as far as I know, is perfectly happy with the process.

Abu Qatada

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord King of Bridgwater

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not know how and why Abu Qatada ever came into this country, but I will no doubt make inquiries for the noble Lord and let him know. Having said that, there are aspects of our policy of allowing asylum to certain people of which this country should be proud. I do not know whether that is how this particular gentleman, as the noble Lord described him, got in. It would have been better if he never had come in—I agree with the noble Lord on that—but I do not think that we necessarily want to pursue a policy whereby no one could come in at all. We want to have the appropriate strict controls; that is something that my right honourable friend has always made clear and some thing that we are tidying up after the mess of the past 15 years.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

The last two questions indicate two major issues. One is that extremist preachers in this country have access to exceptional measures of communication that never previously existed and that have become available to many impressionable young people, creating an extremely dangerous situation. The point made by my noble friend of ensuring the total efficacy of the prohibition of access to those means of communication is very important. Secondly, although here we are dealing with Jordan, from which I understand acceptable undertakings have been given by a responsible Government, is it not increasingly the case that there are a huge number of countries of which it is easy for anybody arriving in this country to claim that they will be in danger if they are asked to return there? Finally—and this applies to this case alone—what might be the overall cost incurred by this country, with the number of people that we cannot remove who should properly be removed? Presumably, we are carrying costs that we carried for Abu Qatada while he was in jail—and presumably he is on benefit and carrying further costs as well.