Judicial Independence

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Wednesday 7th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the noble Lord is tempting me to comment on things that it would not be appropriate for me to comment on.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that I have tried twice to find out from the Government whether there is guidance as to what Ministers should do in performance of their Section 3 duty to uphold judicial independence? On the last occasion, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, directed me to the Cabinet Manual, but it gives no guidance except a reference to judicial independence. Will the Minister ask his colleagues to give some written guidance to themselves about how they should comply with their Section 3 duty—and, in doing so, will he advise his colleagues to reject the idea in today’s Daily Mail that we should take the American practice of electing judges instead of the practice that, for example, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, very clearly instituted in the past?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord would expect me to comment on what appeared in the Daily Mail today, and I have no intention of doing so. But I shall note what he said about guidance to Ministers and pass it on to my right honourable friends.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I assure my noble friend that I will always reflect on all points that are put to me in the course of these debates between now and Report. I appreciate the intention behind the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, which is simply to create stronger links between the ISC and other committees. I appreciate that he has discussed this matter with former chairmen of the Home Affairs Select Committee such as Chris Mullin, whose diaries I have recently been reading and greatly enjoyed, as I imagine all of us have.

It is certainly our intention that the ISC should be a strong and effective committee and cover in its work matters of public and parliamentary interest and national importance relating to the agencies. Equally, an important feature of the committee is that it is party, as I have said on many occasions, to the most sensitive material and will scrutinise matters that are secret, some of which Parliament and the public will not have sight of for very good reasons.

While on the face of it the proposed changes seem helpful, I have some concerns about them. At the moment, obviously it is open to any Select Committee to write to the ISC and request that it focuses its work on a particular area. There is nothing in the new arrangements to prevent it from doing so and I am sure that the ISC will continue to take any such requests seriously, particularly if the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, was a member of the ISC, although I imagine it would be equally true with any other membership of that committee.

My concern is really about the idea of creating a formal statutory mechanism for making and considering these requests, with a requirement on the ISC to report on its decision-making process, which is what the noble Lord is seeking to do. I will give three very brief reasons why I do not think it is necessary to create a formal process, although, as I say, we shall take this away and consider it. First, I am concerned that the ISC could become overwhelmed with the number of requests to report on particular matters. If it acceded to all requests, its programme of work could be overwhelmed with matters that are of interest to other committees, taking its focus away from its core work of scrutinising matters that it alone should identify itself with.

Secondly, there is the question of what the ISC would be able to say in response to those requests, given the highly sensitive nature of the agencies’ work. Thirdly, if the ISC did not accede to all requests from Select Committees, tensions could develop between the ISC and those committees. That could undermine and damage the ISC’s reputation when the reality is that the ISC is carrying out important scrutiny, determining the priorities for that scrutiny in the light of its expertise and access to the relevant information in line with its remit.

With my assurance that other committees are welcome to make requests to the ISC, along with my explanation as to why I do not think it is necessary to make this into a statutory obligation and the fact that I have concerns about setting it down in that way, I hope that the noble Lord will be more than happy to withdraw his amendment. However, as I said at the beginning in response to my noble friend, we are always prepared to reflect on such points.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I quite understand the Minister not wishing this amendment to be in statutory form, but would it be beyond the wit of man or woman to embody the idea behind these amendments in a protocol, a memorandum of understanding or something of that kind? I have in mind just such an agreement between the Law and Institutions Sub-Committee of the European Union Select Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights as to how one deals with overlaps and so on. Could the Minister perhaps reflect on whether there are other ways of achieving this aim that are not simply an assurance from him but something short of statute?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I have served on one of the two committees that the noble Lord refers to—and felt considerably out of my depth—but not on the other. I note what he says about the memorandum of understanding between them. This might be something that the ISC and other committees could reflect upon between themselves and decide how they want to proceed. Again, however, I do not think that this is best set out in statute, although obviously we will reflect on these matters. That is the point of this House and why we are going through a Committee process. I have set out why I do not think that this is the best way of going about it, but I shall listen to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and trust that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment at this stage.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I understand all of that in the context of sub-paragraph (3)(a), which is carefully drafted and limited. However, I do not understand how it applies to the sub-paragraph that has been questioned by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, because that does not deal with sensitive information as defined in sub-paragraph (4) but simply states that,

“it is information of such a nature that, if the Minister were requested to produce it before a … Committee … the Minister would consider (on grounds which were not limited to national security) it proper not to do so”.

Unless I am completely wrong, that seems entirely subjective. It certainly would not be subject to judicial review. It is a Humpty Dumpty: when I use a word it means whatever I say it means, nothing more. To use an example from Ring Lardner: “‘Shut up’, he explained”. It is standardless and would cover anything the Minister thought about propriety. Surely that cannot be a proportionate way of having a safeguard.

[Lord Henley]

I do not think that the noble Lord, dare I say it, listened to what I was saying earlier about this amendment. It may be that we need to look at the drafting. I have given a commitment to the Committee that we will deal with that in due course and look to see whether we have got it right. As I explained—I have to go back into my speech—I think that that is probably the right way to proceed. If the noble Lord is accusing me of taking a Humpty-Dumpty approach, well, Humpty Dumpty was not always that wrong with some of these things; certainty in terms of when one is speaking at the Dispatch Box and defining what words mean. Anyway, if I say it means that, that is what it does mean—that, I think, is what the Humpty-Dumpty approach is.

I do not think that I can add much more to my response to the noble Lord and other noble Lords. I appreciate the intention behind Amendment 25. I appreciate what my noble friend is doing but I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment at this stage.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I will be here.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is waiting for some later amendments beyond Part 1, so I am sure that he will be here for the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I can advise the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that Amendment 37 is the one that he should stay for.

We have eight amendments in this group, which all deal with the power of Ministers to withhold information from the ISC. It might be helpful if I start by going back to where we are now. Currently, the agency heads can make a decision not to disclose information to the ISC on the basis that it is sensitive information which they consider it would be unsafe to disclose to the ISC. Information which agency heads consider should be withheld on this basis must, none the less, be disclosed if the Secretary of State considers disclosure to be desirable in the public interest. It is a matter for the agency heads, but the Secretary of State can order the disclosure if she thinks it is in the public interest.

The Justice and Security Bill removes the ability not to disclose from the agency heads; this will now rest solely with the appropriate Secretary of State according to specific conditions. Where the information in question is held by a government department, as opposed to the agencies, a Minister of the Crown—rather than a Secretary of State—will be able to withhold information on the same specific grounds applied to agency material. In other words, the Bill makes the decision on withholding information from the ISC one exclusively for democratically accountable representatives.

In passing, I shall deal with the question about Ministers of the Crown, rather than Secretaries of State, being referred to in paragraph 3. This is purely to deal with the question of the Cabinet Office, which noble Lords will be aware does not have a Secretary of State. Therefore, it would be down to one of two Ministers in the Cabinet Office to make that decision. If noble Lords look at paragraph 3(5), they will see that the,

“‘relevant Minister of the Crown’”,

will, in due course, be,

“identified, for the purposes of requests of that description, in a memorandum of understanding under section 2”.

We discussed the memorandum of understanding at Second Reading and noble Lords will be aware that we hope that that, or a draft of it, will be available at a later stage.

I now turn to Amendment 18. It is appropriate to go through the amendments in slightly more detail. This will have the effect that if any of the three heads of the intelligence and security agencies are asked by the ISC to disclose any information then, as to the whole or any part of the information, that person may arrange for it to be made available to a security-cleared adviser to the ISC who may then provide advice to the ISC on the information, including written material in redacted form. It is worth stressing the importance of the provisions in the Bill governing when information may be withheld from the ISC. These powers will be used sparingly only in very exceptional circumstances. It is important that we retain those safeguards. The ISC routinely sees very sensitive information, including that at the highest levels of classification. It would not be able to fulfil its oversight role if it did not. It is not clear from the amendment to whom the noble Baroness intends the term “advisers to the ISC” to apply. Does she have in mind the current staffing of the ISC or perhaps a completely new role? The type of material that a Secretary of State may decide cannot be shared with the ISC—a good example would be the names of agents—is likely to be of such a sensitive nature that, if the Secretary of State has made a judgment that it cannot be shared with the ISC, then it would not be possible to share it with “advisers to the ISC” either.

We should also think about the practical difficulties posed by an amendment of this nature. That is Amendment 18. The amendment is likely to lead to circumstances where an adviser to the ISC has access to information which he or she cannot share with the ISC. This could place the adviser concerned in an impossible position of conflict of interest. When next called on to advise the ISC, that person may know information relevant to the advice that he or she is being asked to give, which, because they cannot share it with the ISC, they have to try to put out of their mind. If harm to national security can be avoided by providing information requested in a redacted form, then the existing provisions of the Bill oblige the agencies to provide it in that form; that is the effect of including the words,

“or any part of the information”,

in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1. I hope that describing the way in which the ISC and its secretariat presently operate assists the Committee and explains why the Government resist Amendment 18. In short, the amendment seems to contemplate an intermediate level between disclosure to the ISC and non-disclosure, which I hope I have shown, in practice, does not usefully exist.

The effect of Amendments 19 and 20 would be that the Government would never be able to withhold information from the ISC, whether it is held by the agencies or a government department. As I have already said, the powers to withhold information in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 have been used very rarely in the past, and we would expect the equivalent powers in the Bill also to be used sparingly, and only in exceptional circumstances. However it is important that those safeguards are retained. In particular, although the ISC will clearly be a body that sees a great deal of very sensitive material, there will be circumstances in which it is not appropriate for even the ISC to see that information on the grounds of national security. For example, there may sometimes be information that is so sensitive that national security demands that it be shared only with a small number of people within the agencies, let alone with the ISC. This is why the sensitive information ground for withholding information is expressed in the Bill in the way it is. It is not enough that the information is sensitive; it must be in the interests of national security for that sensitive information not to be disclosed to the ISC.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

The noble Baroness knows that my legal knowledge is equally limited but my understanding also is that this is a relatively simple tidying-up amendment, and I congratulate my noble kinsman on doing it. If I have understood him properly, he is trying to clarify that certifying a decision under Section 96 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 has no effect on any pending appeal. If that is correct, we would want to look at it. If he is willing to withdraw his amendment I am more than happy to consider the matter further and to report back to him in advance of the next stage. Because of the timing of this Bill we are in the very happy position of having some months, even with party conferences, between this stage and the next stage of the Bill—although, sadly, some of us might miss our own party conference because of the date of the next day in Committee on the Bill. We will look at this and if my noble kinsman is prepared to withdraw it, I will get back to him and see what we can do.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Perhaps I may ask the noble Lord a question. I have been following these debates as best I can. I have been at the Bar for a very long time. My wife is an immigration and asylum judge. I note that the Court of Appeal has begged the Government to codify and simplify the morass of unintelligible legislation which only my noble friend Lord Avebury truly understands. Is there any hope that once this Bill becomes law the Government will heed the court’s plea—to which I would add people such as my wife who, as a judge, has to interpret and apply this law—so that even if ordinary men and women cannot understand it, at least ordinary lawyers may be able to do so?

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I start by saying to my noble friend Lord Marlesford and other noble Lords that I am grateful for the fact that he acknowledges that we are at least on the same side in that we seek to reduce the number of powers of entry and make sure that existing powers of entry have the appropriate safeguards where necessary.

I begin with a very brief history lesson. At the time when the noble Lord, Lord Butler, was Secretary to the Cabinet, I can remind him and the House that we had something of the order of 500 or 600 powers of entry. As my noble friend Lord Selsdon said, it was difficult to know exactly how many there were. Over the years, mainly after the noble Lord ceased to be Secretary to the Cabinet, we saw a rather dramatic growth in the number of powers of entry. Something of the order of about 700 new powers of entry crept in between 1997 and 2010. I am sure that there were very good reasons for many of them and that all of them went through both Houses of Parliament, because all of them would have needed primary legislation in one form or another to get them.

It might be that Parliament nodded in its duty and did not provide the appropriate safeguards and checks and balances when considering all those powers of entry. Because of the dramatic growth that we saw over those 13 years, the new coalition Government in 2010 made a commitment that we would review all existing powers of entry and do what we could to reduce those that were unnecessary, bringing in appropriate safeguards—a warrant or consent—where necessary. That is why we brought forward the provisions in this Bill in Clauses 39 to 46.

I make it clear to the House that those proposals were in respect of the existing stock of the 1,300 or so powers of entry that we had. On top of that, there is always the danger—because Governments do this—that new powers might creep in. That is why we brought in the new gateway approach in the Home Office, to be adopted by all other departments, to look at any new powers of entry that might come in and make sure that they were properly scrutinised and that Parliament looked at them appropriately as they came through in Acts of Parliament. I am grateful that my noble friend Lord Marlesford at least commended that gateway approach to the new powers, but we are largely talking about the existing powers and how we want to look at the existing stock and do what we can to reduce it.

My noble friend brought forward his amendment before. It went to the Commons, where they looked at it—and I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Neill, that they did not look at it with a lack of respect. They gave it a very good hearing and debated it for some 45 minutes, and the fact that they did not divide on it was obviously a sign that they thought that there was sufficient agreement. It is not for the Government to decide whether matters are divided on. Certainly, considerable respect was shown to the amendment and it was debated in considerable detail in another place.

My noble friend in his amendment seeks to create a blanket approach to what should be dealt with and then accepts that that approach is wrong—and he admits it is wrong because he then brings in a blanket exemption, which surely contradicts the whole point of what he is trying to do. We are trying to conduct a review of the whole process, which will closely examine all the powers that we have and those that are necessary while adding further safeguards to others. That is the important thing. There might be some powers that we do not need—right, we will get rid of them. There might be some that we do need but which do not have the appropriate safeguards, and in that case we will look at them. We have made it clear that in conducting our review the default position will be that any powers that require entry to people’s homes must require their consent or be by warrant only. This amendment provides only a blanket rule across the board, which we do not think is the right approach.

I accept that there have been criticisms—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Can the Minister confirm that we are not in a vacuum while the review is taking place in that, if there were unnecessary and disproportionate searches or seizures, the Human Rights Act would require our legislation to be read properly to prevent them from being classified as unlawful searches or seizures?

[Lord Henley]

My noble friend is a great expert on the Human Rights Act and the House always defers to him when we discuss such matters. If there was a case of the sort that he implies, I am sure the courts would look at it in a manner that he thinks appropriate.

I am trying to make clear that we want to conduct a review over two years. I accept that there has been criticism from a number of colleagues, including my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who asked whether we could do it more quickly. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lord Lawson also implied that we should do it more quickly. We will try to do it as quickly as possible but, as my honourable friend said in another place, we will also update Parliament on a six-monthly basis about how we are getting on. We think that this approach is the better one—to go through all the powers one by one, from department to department. Obviously, some departments will have a bigger workload than others. I understand that my old department, Defra, has rather a lot of powers. No doubt we will encourage them to work harder, and I and my colleagues in the Home Office will encourage them to do that. I think that is the better approach, and my noble friend’s approach—to bring in a blanket approach, accept that it is wrong and then bring in blanket exemptions—is not the right way forward.

“Honour-related” Violence

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Tuesday 14th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, before I came here, I wrote down honour-based violence and put inverted commas around “honour”. The noble Lord has made the point exactly for me. It is a strange use of the expression “honour”, but it is the one we have at the moment. Possibly, as the noble Lord says, we ought to find a better expression.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, my interest in this comes from originating the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act. We have plenty of criminal law already, and we should be careful before we add any more crimes to the statute book since that could lead to people not coming forward to report these evil and barbaric practices, but does the Minister agree that there might be a case for strengthening it where there are breaches of the forced marriage protection orders?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am aware of my noble friend’s interests in these matters. He will also be aware of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister’s desire to make the breach of a forced marriage protection order a criminal offence. I also understand what my noble friend says about the dangers of adding crimes to the statute book. We should bear that in mind. He will be aware that a consultation is in progress on this subject, which finishes, I think, some time in March. At the end of that period, we will consider the appropriate options.

Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011

Debate between Lord Henley and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I confirm again to my noble friend that that is exactly what I said. Section 202 inserts an amendment into the 2004 Act but it is equally true that it is in the Equality Act; it is a vehicle for this. It is proper to say that it is Parliament’s intention that that is the position. I do not think I can be any clearer than that.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, since I raised the matter of Pepper v Hart—