Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Howard of Rising and Baroness Wilcox
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the question of who should be able to complain to the adjudicator has been discussed extensively: in consultation, at pre-legislative scrutiny, at Second Reading and in Committee. Along with most noble Lords who have spoken on this issue, the Government consider that the adjudicator should be able to consider evidence from any relevant source when deciding whether to commence an investigation.
The ability of the adjudicator to consider evidence from any source has been described by supplier groups as essential to the adjudicator’s operation. Furthermore, it simply makes sense. If the adjudicator has reasonable grounds to suspect a breach of the code, he or she should be able to initiate an investigation, no matter where the information came from.
My noble friend Lord Howard of Rising has explained that his concerns are motivated in part by the possibility of vexatious or malicious complaints and that is the issue behind Amendments 19 and 20. The Government certainly have some sympathy with this concern. No one wants to see the adjudicator’s time wasted or businesses put under a burden due to vexatious complaints. However, it is important that in the wording used we take into account what is customary as well as the need not to scare off legitimate complainants. As I said in Committee, this is intended to be a strong test directed at irresponsible complaints rather than simply erroneous or weak ones. I note also that the discretionary power to recover costs currently applies to the recovery of costs from both retailers and complainants. There seem to be few grounds for strengthening the requirement on one side without similarly strengthening it on the other. In either case the Government consider that the discretion provided by the word “may” allows the adjudicator to treat each case on its merits. The Government therefore consider that the Bill as it stands provides a necessary deterrent against vexatious complaints. The adjudicator can consider imposing costs on a complainant whose complaint is vexatious or wholly without merit but we do not think it should be mandatory or near-mandatory.
Regarding the amendment to produce an additional annual report, that would be an unnecessarily burdensome piece of bureaucracy. In paragraph 15 of Schedule 1 the adjudicator is already required to keep proper accounts and prepare a statement of accounts each year. These accounts would need to include any costs recovered from retailers or complainants. The application of the power to recover costs could be included in the annual report prepared under Clause 14. I therefore ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Howard of Rising
I thank the Minister for her remarks and all other noble Lords who have spoken. I just want to point out that it is normal that there is an imbalance between the person paying and the person receiving the money. Why there should be protection in this case I do not know, even though it would be to my own personal benefit. Amendments 19 and 20 come into effect only if the system of complaints is being abused. I cannot see that charging those who have committed the abuse for the cost they have incurred can in any way be unfair. Indeed, it is unfair the other way because it is the people about whom they are complaining who have to pay all the costs. That said, I will not pursue the matter further and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the question of appeals is important and I can fully understand the desire of my noble friends Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Eccles to return to it at this stage of the Bill. However, although we have considered the matter carefully, the Government’s position remains unchanged.
Financial penalties clearly deserve a full merits right of appeal and the Bill provides for this. However, the other sanctions, including the requirement to publish information, have no direct legal consequence against a retailer. A recommendation is just that and is not binding, and a requirement to publish is essentially simply about distributing and sharing information which will, in all likelihood, be in the adjudicator’s investigation report. For this reason, therefore, judicial review is sufficient.
Although a judicial review will not normally involve a reconsideration of all the factual evidence, it could consider whether the adjudicator had reached a decision which was not supported by the facts, or had taken into account irrelevant facts or had failed to take account of relevant facts. I draw a comparison with the Financial Services Authority. Under the terms of the Financial Services Bill currently proceeding through this House, the FSA—or, in future, the Financial Conduct Authority—may issue public warning notices about a specific firm. Before making such a notice, it must give the firm the opportunity to comment, but there is no right of appeal before publication. Issuing a public warning notice in this way is, given the potential impact on reputation of the financial services firm in question, similar in consequence to our requirement to publish information which also has the benefit of warning those who deal with a retailer that they have been found in breach of the code. The requirement to give the firm the opportunity to comment is similar to that provided in Clause 5(4) of this Bill. This is similar to what the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, has also said on this point.
Furthermore, as I said in Committee, a full right of appeal, requiring the repetition of a detailed fact-finding exercise, could seriously delay the requirement to publish and so substantially diminish its impact. In particular, we expect a full merits appeal of this kind normally to take significantly more time than a judicial review because it involves a reconsideration of all the facts. Taking these matters into account, the Government consider that a full right of appeal is needed only against financial penalties, and that otherwise the possibility of judicial review by the court would be sufficient.
On whether appeals should be in the CAT or the High Court, this is a finely balanced question and I have written to Peers on this matter already. We do not think it would be wrong for either the CAT or the High Court to hear such appeals, nor do we think there is likely to be a significant difference in speed. However, on consideration, we do not think using the CAT would make the best use of its expertise, which is, of course, in competition matters. This is because, although introduced on competition grounds, the context of the adjudicator’s functions concerns contractual and commercial relationships between retailers and suppliers. The expertise needed to address these practices can be found in the High Court, or the Court of Session in Scotland. We do not think that the particular specialist expertise of the CAT is needed in order to consider the adjudicator’s decisions.
A further practical issue is whether, if the CAT were to hear appeals against financial penalties, appeals against costs or judicial reviews of all decisions of the adjudicator were also to be referred to the CAT. To the extent any appeals or reviews remained in the High Court, one could see two separate appeals or reviews on related subjects being taken forward in different fora at the same time. On the other hand, if they all took place in the CAT, this could lead to the CAT making rulings on matters even further from its core competition remit. That is a difficulty which is avoided by the Bill as we have it now. Therefore, in conclusion, we consider that appeals should most appropriately be to the High Court. I therefore ask the noble Lords to consider withdrawing their amendments.
Lord Howard of Rising
I thank the Minister for her remarks. I accept that the High Court would be as good a place as the Competition Appeal Tribunal. However, if an appeal is acceptable for a financial penalty, surely an appeal should also be acceptable for naming and shaming. It seems to me that fair play is the objective of this Bill, so surely there should be fair play in the application of the code by the adjudicator. Fair play surely would mean the right of appeal if someone thinks that the adjudicator has got it wrong.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for his support and I endorse his comment that, if there is to be no right of appeal, there should be an opportunity for the retailers’ arguments to be included with any report produced by the adjudicator. Having made those points, to which I hope that the Minister will listen, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord True
My Lords, I intervened briefly in Grand Committee to support my noble friend on part of the amendments in this group. I think that he has already implied the following point in what he said. Clause 12(3) states:
“The Adjudicator may publish guidance about … steps that large retailers need to take in order to comply with the Groceries Code”.
I believe that the adjudicator must give such guidance; otherwise the position would be nonsensical. In Committee I gave the possible example of my local authority publishing a parking order but not putting up signs to say during which hours the parking scheme would operate and with people having to apply to find out that information.
With respect to my noble friend, I think that his amendments are probably rather widely drafted. Looking at the phrase, “may publish guidance about any other matter relating to the groceries code”, I can understand why my noble friend on the Front Bench might want to resist it. However, it might be a fruitful course, between now and Third Reading, if the Government thought about the more confined area to which my noble friend referred. It would seem to offend against natural justice not to tell people the steps they must take to comply with a code which could lead to their being fined, named and shamed or whatever. I hope the Minister will consider that specific point which arises from my noble friend’s Amendment 22 in this group.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, I have sympathy for the spirit of all three amendments. On Amendments 21 and 22, we certainly consider that an important role of the adjudicator will be to provide advice and guidance. That is why we have included these clauses. It is clearly better if the adjudicator can encourage compliance with the code through light-touch means, such as advice, rather than by enforcing it after a breach has been committed through sanctions. However, as I think my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising would concede, we cannot make these provisions mandatory. The adjudicator must be able to prioritise his or her workload and cannot be required to give advice in all circumstances to any of the 10 retailers or thousands of suppliers who might have a question. Even limiting the “must” to the retailers, could be open to abuse by one retailer at the expense of others.
I ask noble Lords to keep in mind here that the adjudicator will be a public authority and will be required to act reasonably in responding to requests for advice. In that context, some discretion for the adjudicator is appropriate. Equally, while guidance is crucial, I would emphasise that the adjudicator is already required under Clause 12(1), to publish guidance about how he or she will carry out his or her core operations. It would not be meaningful to have a mandatory requirement for the adjudicator to publish guidance on “any other matter relating to the groceries code”. Again, there has to be some flexibility for the adjudicator.
On the other hand, the Government certainly consider that the adjudicator would normally answer reasonable requests, and should normally provide advice where this would aid in the core objective of encouraging compliance with the code. Similarly, sufficient guidance should be provided to ensure that retailers and suppliers have the clarity they need to interact effectively with the adjudicator. This is similar to the expectation that we would have of a local authority. If the adjudicator was not acting appropriately in giving advice and guidance, I am sure that the Secretary of State would take steps to remedy this by issuing guidance to the adjudicator under Clause 15(8). The adjudicator has a statutory obligation to take account of such guidance in carrying out his or her functions, which I hope offers some reassurance to my noble friend Lord Howard.
On Amendment 24, although again I can sympathise with the principle behind the amendment, I do not consider it necessary. This is because the Bill, in Clause 12(4), already requires the adjudicator to consult any persons whom he or she thinks appropriate before publishing guidance. In the vast majority of circumstances this would include the retailers. In the unlikely event that the adjudicator did not consult the retailers before publishing guidance, in a case where it was clear that he or she should have done so, there would be the possibility of judicial review. The adjudicator will be very aware of this, meaning that Amendment 24 is not necessary. I would, therefore, ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Howard of Rising
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her remarks, disappointing as they are. Of course, the point is that it is always the adjudicator who chooses what advice to give whereas there may be some area that is in doubt which the large retailers would like to know about. Perhaps they will be comforted by the Minister’s remarks, and by the fact that any future Secretary of State will be able to read in Hansard what is expected and call the adjudicator to order. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Eccles are ones that we have discussed before. As I said in Committee, the Government’s intention to fund the adjudicator via a levy is clearly set out in the Bill and in previous policy statements, so I see no need to require an order to be made first.
Regarding the suggestion of consultation on any increase of the levy, my worry is that this would add unnecessary bureaucracy and inflexibility. The adjudicator’s workload will vary depending on the number of complaints received. In some years, it may have very few, in which case the levy needed would be small. In other years, it may carry out major investigations requiring considerable resources, and I remain convinced that the safeguard of requiring the Secretary of State’s approval is the best way to balance flexibility and accountability.
On the subject of flexibility, my noble friends have also tabled an amendment regarding the returning of any unused funds to the retailers. While I believe that “may” adds helpful flexibility, I can assure them that any unused funds would certainly be taken into account when calculating the size of the next levy, so that no more was raised from the retailers than was absolutely necessary. I would therefore ask the noble Lords to withdraw those amendments.
With regards to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Razzall and Lord Teverson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, in Committee, I indicated that the Government were sympathetic to an amendment along these lines. The Government have always stated that the intention should be that as soon as he or she has sufficient experience, the adjudicator should move to a differential levy. After consideration, it therefore seemed unnecessarily bureaucratic to require an order to be passed before this could be done and I am grateful to the noble Lords for bringing forward this amendment.
The fact that individual levies would still need to be approved by the Secretary of State will provide an adequate safeguard against abuse. Furthermore, the ways in which the levy can be raised are clearly specified. The levy must be the same for each retailer or else based on criteria broadly intended to reflect the expense and time the adjudicator expects to spend in dealing with matters relating to each retailer. It could not, for example, be proportional to turnover as that would not fit these specifications.
Noble Lords have said that they wish to see a system in which those who behave badly pay more. The Government concur with this sentiment and I am therefore happy to accept this amendment.
Lord Howard of Rising
I am grateful to my noble friend for indicating that the surplus in one year would be set off against the next year. I am completely gobsmacked at getting some support from the noble Lord, Lord Knight. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Howard of Rising and Baroness Wilcox(11 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Baroness Wilcox
I think that I may have an answer for the noble Lord now, but as we will be discussing this further we will come back to it. The requirement to publish needs an enforcement mechanism. We should not oust the rights to judicial review and therefore we need both. That is the answer that I am giving now. We shall take it into consideration with everything else. I want at least to be sure that I am giving an explanation that is clear. In the mean time, I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Howard of Rising
I thank noble Lords for their support, which is something that I am not really used to but is nevertheless very welcome. The essential difference is between financial penalties and naming and shaming. Those of us who are old enough to remember a certain gentleman referring to his jewellery being cheaper and not quite as good as a Marks and Spencer sandwich will know that that was the end of his business. It was finished. The businesses that we are talking about are very susceptible to reputation. They work on very thin margins and do not need many people to move for those to be affected. I am very grateful to the Minister for agreeing to look at the issue. When she does so, she will need to look at two or three ancillary points as they all tie in together. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Howard of Rising
I will not keep the Committee long as I am mindful of the 7 pm deadline. The idea that the adjudicator might have a surplus is a triumph of hope over experience, rather like divorcing and getting married again. However, if there is a reasonable surplus—there should probably be a minimum above which this does not have to operate—it should be returned to those people who have paid it or, the following year, they should have a corresponding reduction. I beg to move.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the Government’s intention in giving the adjudicator discretion over whether to repay retailers at the end of the year is to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy where the adjudicator is required to repay retailers before then immediately raising further funds from them. I believe that noble Lords on all sides of the House are supportive of the adjudicator being able to carry on his or her work with as little bureaucratic burden as possible, especially as in this case the burden would fall on the retailers as well as the adjudicator. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, if he feels that this is a good explanation.
Lord Howard of Rising
I thank the noble Baroness. I suggest that if there is a large surplus, it should be deducted from the following year. That would save the bureaucracy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, this is the first time that I have had occasion to respond to the noble Lord, Lord True. I know the noble Lord to be an elegant wordsmith with a passion for our beautiful language, so I would not, therefore, take lightly anything that he has said, even if he feels that he has had to be a little briefer than he would have wished.
Regarding the points that the noble Lord has raised, they are both interesting and technical. They are points on which I will seek legal advice, and I will make sure that when I return he is a happier person than he is today. I am happy to speak to him about this before the next stage of the Bill, and I therefore wonder if he would be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Howard of Rising
Could I just point out to the Minister that this is as much a point of principle as it is of detail? The point of principle should be addressed, and that is not necessarily something that concerns only lawyers, but Members of this House and Members of Parliament in general.
Baroness Wilcox
My Lords, the Government in general support the use of sunset clauses to avoid the risk of overregulation and to ensure that regulators remain in place only where they are strictly needed. However, the Bill already contains provision for sunset and review, in that the adjudicator must be reviewed every three years and can, following such a review, be abolished if the Secretary of State considers it appropriate. Many noble Lords have expressed their desire to ensure that any power of the Secretary of State to amend the adjudicator’s powers or functions should be subject to proper scrutiny, and the Government believe that the Bill provides for that. To remove the same scrutiny for the cessation of the Act would therefore be disproportionate.
The Bill is fully in line with the Government’s broader policy on sunset and review. Therefore, I think that the job is done and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.