Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Katz Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

I look forward to hearing the response of the Minister to the cut-and-paste threat which has been put upon him. I hope that there is a satisfactory answer that will make me smile. If it does not, then maybe there is a point to be made somewhere.

I echo the point the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made about Amendment 209. It has been a promise to this House from many reports—from legislation committees and from the Constitution Committee—that, where there is a matter of seriousness and public interest, the affirmative process should be used to bring these matters before the House. The current arrangement is for a police constable, authorised by a superintendent, but there is an openness for Ministers to extend these powers. You might say that it does not matter to whom they give the powers and, if anybody feels really upset about it, they could pray against the Motion, which is a very rare thing in this House and in the House of Commons. What it means is that the Government are not prepared to allow that public scrutiny to ensure that they have got the matter right.

It would be a sensible approach to follow the pattern that the Lords committee responsible for these matters has laid before us and to change this from a negative to an affirmative procedure when regulations are brought forward to extend the list of people who will have these powers. I also take note of the interesting comment from my noble friend about who in the Home Office will supervise whom about what access anybody can have. I would like to know a little about the chiefs and the Indians if possible, please.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the thoughtful contributions made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord German. Amendments 68, 69 and 209 raise important questions about the scope, application and oversight of the powers in the Bill.

I will address the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, around Clauses 20 to 23 being lifted from the Illegal Migration Act. The noble Lord, Lord German, is smiling already; maybe he anticipates a cracking punchline—but there is not one. It is a simple fact that, clearly, one of the chief intentions of this legislation is to replace the Illegal Migration Act. It was deemed easier in drafting terms to do that and then include certain sections that were deemed worthy of keeping in this Bill, rather than simply have to go back and unpick the Illegal Migration Act in different parts of the Bill. It was felt that this was a cleaner way of doing it. I am not sure if that has made the noble Lord, Lord German, smile; it has not particularly raised a laugh with me, but there we go.

While I recognise the intentions behind each proposal, I will respectfully set out why the Government do not support them. In each case, the current drafting of the Bill is deliberate and proportionate and designed to ensure operational effectiveness, legal clarity and appropriate safeguards.

Amendment 68 seeks to limit Clause 19 by removing what is perceived to be a retrospective effect. I want to be clear that Clause 19(2)(a) does not operate retrospectively in the way suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The powers in the clause come into effect only after the Bill receives Royal Assent. The clause has been carefully drafted to ensure that powers apply regardless of when an individual entered or arrived in the UK before that date.

This is not retrospective legislation. Individuals who entered the UK without leave did so in breach of immigration laws that were already in place at the time of their entry. The clause does not impose a new penalty for past conduct. Instead, it enables the powers to be used from the moment they come into force, provided that the individual still meets the relevant criteria at that time. This approach ensures that the law can respond effectively to ongoing encounters of individuals who have already arrived illegally in the UK and does not create loopholes that could be exploited by those who may look to take advantage of immigration controls.

The amendment, while well intentioned, would narrow the scope of Clause 19(2)(a) and undermine its operational effectiveness. It would create a two-tier system, in effect, treating individuals differently based on the timing of their entry or whether they are subject to a deportation order, and result in missed opportunities to gain valuable information to stop organised immigration crime groups. In summary, the clause as drafted strikes the right balance: it is not retrospective in its legal effect, and it is forward-looking in its application. It ensures that the Government can act decisively to protect the integrity of UK borders and uphold the rule of law.

I turn now to Amendment 69, which proposes to broaden the definition of a “relevant article” to include any article containing information on the commission of an offence under any of the immigration Acts, as defined in Section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007. While I understand the desire to ensure comprehensive coverage of immigration offences, I must respectfully oppose this amendment too.

The current drafting of Clause 19 is deliberately narrow and targeted. It focuses on offences under Sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971, offences that relate specifically to facilitating unlawful immigration and assisting illegal entry. These are the offences most relevant to the operational intent of this clause: to disrupt organised criminal networks and protect the integrity of our borders. Expanding the definition to include all offences under the immigration Acts risks capturing a wide range of minor or administrative breaches, such as overstaying or failing to comply with conditions, which are not the intended focus of this power. Our concern here is that such a broad approach could undermine the proportionality of the measure and expose it to legal challenge.

Amendment 209 seeks to amend Clause 60 so that regulations made pursuant to Clause 25 are subject to the affirmative procedure, as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German, and recommended by the Lords Constitution Committee. While we fully respect the committee’s role in scrutinising delegated powers, we respectfully disagree with the necessity of this amendment and the affirmative procedure.

Clause 25 does not create new powers; rather, it allows for the extension of existing powers to a broader cohort of authorised officers. The use of the negative procedure in this context is appropriate and proportionate. Moreover, Clause 25(3) provides an important safeguard that the Secretary of State is required to include such safeguards as they consider necessary. This ensures that any extension of powers is accompanied by appropriate checks and balances. The negative procedure is appropriate for this type of technical and operational regulation, which ensures agility without unduly compromising oversight. Regulations made under the negative procedure are still laid before Parliament and subject to annulment, providing a clear route for scrutiny while avoiding unnecessary delay in operational matters. Conversely, requiring the affirmative procedure in this case would introduce unnecessary delay and complexity into what is a targeted and operationally focused provision that must be able to respond agilely to any challenges. The negative procedure strikes the right balance between parliamentary oversight and practical implementation. For these reasons, I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, seeing the back of the Illegal Migration Act will be a great pleasure. I am with the noble Lord on it being better to have an easy-to-read version of this Bill, including provisions, rather than having to refer back to another piece of legislation. I do not think that is entirely the case throughout the Bill, but there we are.

On the retrospectivity amendment, I am not sure that I have followed the argument, since the wording of the clause is

“whether before or after this section comes into force”.

I thought the Minister was talking about a distinction being made because the clause would need to come into force before it had any effect, but I will have to read what he has to say.

The Minister says that Amendment 209 is not necessary, but I think that depends on your point of view. The checks and balances are better scrutinised through the affirmative procedure than through the negative procedure. I have heard what he has to say and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group speak to the important principle that, if we are going to do something serious about this issue, we need to make sure those who will be undertaking that vital work are given all the tools they need.

Amendment 72 removes the restriction under Clause 20 that a person may be searched only once. That limitation is both arbitrary and impractical. In the real world, people arriving in the UK illegally may conceal items, documents, electronic devices and false identification, only to reveal or discard them later. Preventing further searches, even when officers have fresh grounds for suspicion, is not a safeguard; it is a gift to traffickers and smugglers. This amendment would correct that mistake and restore operational flexibility where there is lawful cause. Indeed, we need look no further than the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for precedent and recognition of this fact; it permits multiple searches of a person if there are reasonable grounds. This is a commonplace power and we must ensure that it is incorporated in the Bill if we are to effectively tackle this sort of criminality.

Furthermore, Amendment 73 removes the requirement that a person must have been on the premises before a search can take place. Criminal organisations are constantly adapting their tactics, using safe houses, transferring items between locations and avoiding detection by not being physically present. By tying an officer’s hands to whether a suspect was on the premises at a precise moment, we risk losing vital evidence and allowing dangerous networks to evade accountability. This change would ensure that we are not outwitted by legal technicalities.

Furthermore, Amendment 74 removes unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles that require prior authorisation from an inspector and notification to a superintendent for a constable to conduct a search. Amendment 78 applies this principle to the seizure of relevant articles. Of course, oversight is vital, but we must not confuse oversight with obstruction. Our officers already operate within a strict legal framework and we are of the view that adding yet another layer of sign-off, particularly in time-sensitive operations, risks slowing down action, delaying disruption and missing crucial opportunities to intercept criminal activity. Officers need to be able to respond quickly, flexibly and effectively if we are to stand up to those who violate our borders. Indeed, constables are not subject to this requirement to seek permission to conduct a search under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and in Section 18 of that Act, police offers are only required to inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector as soon as is practicable after they have conducted a search, not before. This provision to seek permission is therefore unnecessary and not in line with the relevant existing legislation.

These amendments are about restoring operational realism and strengthening our capacity to protect. If we are serious about securing our borders, cracking down on illegal entry and dismantling the networks that exploit vulnerable people for profit, we must give our officers the clear, workable powers they require. These amendments are sensible proposals that would cut back bureaucracy and allow us to get on and deal with this problem more effectively.

Finally, Amendment 91 would remove the requirement that a constable must obtain authorisation from an inspector and that the inspector must notify a super- intendent before accessing, copying or using information from a relevant article seized under Clause 23. We need to be clear on this. Clause 23 deals with information that may relate to the commission of serious immigration offences. In such cases, time is not a luxury. It is often the difference between success and failure—between a dismantled network and a missed opportunity. Indeed, this issue runs through all the amendments that I have spoken to in this group.

The current drafting imposes a two-tier authorisation system before any such information can even begin to be examined. The requirement to obtain inspector-level authorisation for each individual access, and then to escalate that to a superintendent, adds a bureaucratic burden that could hinder fast-moving investigations, especially when such information could reveal links to other suspects, routes and wider criminal infrastructure. Our amendment would ensure that our officers have the practical powers they need in a way that means they can be exercised with urgency and purpose. The constable will still be required to act lawfully, proportionately and within the scope of the clause, but removing these layers of procedural delay would ensure that our enforcement efforts are not undermined by red tape.

We cannot, on the one hand, claim to be taking a tough stance on illegal immigration and organised criminality and, on the other, design a framework that ties the hands of those trying to enforce the law. Amendment 91 works alongside our other amendments in this group to correct that imbalance. It would strengthen our operational capability while retaining the legal and ethical standards we rightly demand. I urge the Committee to support these amendments, and I beg to move.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I rise to speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench. As we have heard, Amendment 72 proposes to remove the requirement for an authorised officer to ensure that a person has not previously been searched using these powers. I respectfully but robustly oppose this proposed change. These are intrusive powers that allow for the physical searching of individuals who are not under arrest and could be victims or witnesses. To apply such powers multiple times to the same person without any procedural check not only is disproportionate but risks undermining public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of our system. We must remember that this safeguard was introduced for good reason. It was informed by lessons learned from previous misuse that led to legal challenge. Its inclusion has helped to address legitimate concerns about the potential for abuse of power.

Amendment 73 proposes removing the requirement that the relevant person must have been on the premises when, or immediately before, they were encountered by an authorised officer. We respectfully oppose this change. This safeguard is essential. It ensures that there is a clear and direct link between the individual suspected of possessing a relevant article and the premises being searched. Without it, the power becomes too broad, allowing searches of premises even when there is no reasonable basis to believe the person was ever present. The presence of the individual is often the only factual basis upon which an officer can form reasonable grounds to suspect that a device or article is located there. Removing this requirement risks turning suspicion into speculation.

Amendments 74, 78 and 91 propose removing the requirement for police constables and National Crime Agency officers to obtain authorisation from an inspector or equivalent grade before exercising powers under Clauses 20, 21 and 23. Furthermore, the amendments would remove the requirement that an inspector notifies a superintendent or equivalent grade as soon as reasonably practicable. We strongly oppose these proposed changes. These are significant intrusive powers, and the current authorisation process is not an administrative burden. Rather, it is a vital safeguard to ensure the powers are applied with proportionality, due process and respect to the legal system. It ensures that decisions to use the powers where we are obtaining personal data and privacy are subject to senior oversight and scrutiny, helping to prevent misuse and maintaining public confidence and trust in those who use the powers and in the Government.

Unlike immigration officers, who may use these powers more routinely, police and NCA officers may not exercise them as frequently. That makes the case for retaining oversight stronger, not weaker. Removing this safeguard risks inconsistent application of the powers and undermines the legal and ethical standards we have worked very hard to uphold. Again, we want the system that we are introducing to command confidence across all of society. That means that we have to balance powers given to the authorities with safeguards and proportionality. We must ensure that these powers are used lawfully, proportionately and effectively. Retaining the requirement for senior authorisation is an essential part of achieving that balance.

For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, at the heart of this group of amendments lies the proposition that, if we are to confront the scale and complexity of illegal entry into this country, and indeed the criminal networks that are facilitating it, we must empower those on the front line to act swiftly, decisively and within a framework that reflects operational reality, not burdensome bureaucracy.

We on these Benches have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, but I am afraid that I have heard no compelling justification for why officers should be constrained to a single search, even in circumstances where new evidence arises, nor have we been given assurance that the narrow drafting of the premises clause will not impede investigations where criminal activity is thought to be located. I say to the Minister that those who orchestrate illegal crossings are not bound by procedure or protocol. Current legislation with regard to searches does not require such restrictions, so why should it apply here?

Under the current drafting of Clauses 20 to 23, the Bill proposes the imposition of a procedural bottleneck on our officers, who are working under pressure, often with incomplete information and in fast-moving, high-risk environments. We expect these officers to deliver results. Indeed, the Minister and his Government have staked a huge amount of political capital on these officers delivering results. Therefore, we need to make sure that we take decisions in this place so that those officers are equipped and empowered to get the job done.

These amendments would not lower standards; they would reduce delay and would not undermine safeguards. They would ensure that the law serves those it is meant to protect, not those who seek to exploit its gaps. If we are truly committed to securing our borders, upholding the rule of law and dismantling the infrastructure of exploitation that underpins these crossings, we must match the rhetoric with reality. These amendments certainly speak to our ambition, which is to give the officers the tools they need to do their jobs effectively.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 84 and 90, tabled by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. These amendments raise a serious and important concern that we believe merits the attention of the Committee. It seeks to ensure that, where personal belongings are retained by the authorities under Clause 23, particularly in the case of potential victims of modern slavery, those items and the information they contain are preserved in a manner that allows them to be relied on as part of a national referral mechanism determination.

For many victims of trafficking, the evidence contained on a mobile phone or similar device may be the only proof they possess of their exploitation, whether that be messages, photographs or location data. To risk the loss, corruption or mishandling of that data would not only undermine the pursuit of justice but could place the individual concerned at even greater risk. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. These protections are vital.

That said, we also recognise that many of these safeguards may already be provided for under the existing statutory framework, particularly under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which governs how evidence is secured and handled. But I accept what my noble friend said earlier about retention by police in some cases. If the Minister can offer the Committee reassurance that those protections already apply in the context of Clause 23 and that the rights of potential victims are adequately safeguarded in practice, that will be most welcome. This amendment raises a proper, necessary point of clarification and we hope the Government will respond accordingly.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, in addressing Amendments 84 and 90 proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, I first take the opportunity to pay tribute to her work in this area, particularly as chair of the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, and indeed I acknowledge and pay tribute to her continued dedication to protecting vulnerable individuals. However, having said that—there is always a “however”—we feel that the amendments that she has tabled are not entirely necessary.

The amendments seek to introduce a statutory requirement to protect seized or surrendered items so they may later be used as evidence in court or in the national referral mechanism. Although obviously we agree with the intention behind them, we believe that they are unnecessary. The policy objective underpinning this measure is to ensure that the United Kingdom has the necessary powers to search for, seize, retain and use information from electronic devices belonging to irregular entrants or arrivals in relation to facilitation offences. These powers are vital to disrupting the operations of organised crime groups that exploit vulnerable individuals. It is essential that the focus of these powers is not changed and that authorised officers are fully equipped to use them effectively.

First, the current legislative framework already provides robust safeguards for the handling of personal property—notwithstanding the exchange with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson, which I am afraid I was not in the Chamber for, on the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The Bill ensures that any electronic devices seized are treated appropriately and that any data they contain is preserved and processed in accordance with data protection laws, evidentiary standards and human rights obligations.

Safeguards are particularly important in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where, as we have heard, victims may be in possession of devices that contain sensitive personal information, indeed evidence of exploitation, or communications with support services. The Bill ensures that such material is handled with care and integrity, protecting both the individual’s privacy and the integrity of any ongoing investigation.

We recognise the importance of timely access to personal devices, particularly for victims of modern slavery, who may rely on them for communication, evidence or support. If we are able to successfully download relevant data from a device, we will return the phone to the individual at the earliest opportunity. If the device is still required for the purposes of investigation, we will retain it for only as long as is reasonably necessary. If the device must be retained, we can provide the victim with any downloaded material they may need to support a national referral mechanism application or to access support services.

As I said, the Bill makes it clear that devices and other personal property will be retained only for as long as necessary. Once they are no longer required for the purpose for which they are seized. they must be returned to the individual as soon as is practicable. This approach, we feel, strikes the right balance between empowering law enforcement to act decisively against organised immigration crime and trafficking networks, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals, particularly those who may be victims of modern slavery. Given that, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)]

My Lords, I am not at all surprised by the response the Minister has given me. I continue to be concerned to make sure that people have access to this information and these articles for their national referral mechanism cases to be considered. I will reflect further on what the Minister has said, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.