Investigatory Powers Bill
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(7 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Paddick (LD)
I shall speak briefly to the amendments set out by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about co-operation with companies based oversees. A real concern to multinational companies is a conflict of law between the country in which they are based and the UK. That concern has been expressed to us as well. As we go through the Bill, we will see that co-operation between countries is increasingly important. As communication moves from cellular communication to communication using the internet, many of the companies that people use to communicate with each other—Facebook, WhatsApp and other platforms of that sort—are based in the United States. The more warrant authorisation processes are harmonised, the more there can be international agreements between countries and the more success we will have in securing communications data and intercept evidence as a result of people moving from cellular to the online environment. I generally support what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said about the importance of resolving these issues and forging as many agreements as possible with countries, particularly those where these widely used communications platforms are based.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I shall begin by addressing the amendments which relate to the serving of warrants and the giving of notices to overseas telecommunications operators. The first, Amendment 63, appears to remove the ability to serve a warrant outside the United Kingdom when the United Kingdom has entered into an international agreement with the country where that person or company is established. Perhaps that was not the intention. It seems counterintuitive to prohibit the service of a warrant on a person outside the United Kingdom when they are based in a territory with which the United Kingdom has an agreement which expressly provides for the service of warrants overseas. I wonder whether it was intended to do the opposite and provide that a warrant might be served on a person outside the UK only pursuant to a relevant international agreement.
In any event, it is important to remember that, although discussions are ongoing, there is currently no international agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States. As the Home Secretary has previously stated, the UK and United States Governments have begun considering a framework under which US-based communications service providers could disclose data directly to the United Kingdom for serious criminal and counterterrorism investigations in response to a UK order requesting the content of the communications—that is, a warrant. We are eager to press forward with developing an agreement. In response to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I can say that timetabling will depend on changes to the relevant US domestic legislation, a matter to which the United States Attorney-General recently referred. But it is not possible to give a more exact timetable so far as that is concerned.
Taking up the point of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of course it would be beneficial to all concerned that we should achieve some form of international agreement with regard to these matters, and it is hoped that the agreement with the United States might provide a template to take this forward. But let us accept that we are at a very early stage.
It is important to be clear that any company complying with warrants under an international agreement will not face enforcement action. I am perfectly content to put that important point on record for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who opened by explaining that these were essentially probing amendments, and I appreciate that. However, it is also important to explain that such agreements will not by themselves require a company to comply with a United Kingdom warrant. Even when an international agreement is in place, it remains vital that the Bill continues to exert extraterritoriality in relation to interception warrants. This also provides the legal certainty that some companies have been asking for.
Amendments 64 and 65, made to Clause 41, would set out that it would not be reasonably practicable for an operator outside the United Kingdom to comply with a warrant if that involved acting contrary to any laws or restrictions in the jurisdiction in which its principal office is located. These amendments are unnecessary because subsection (5) already makes it clear that, in determining whether it is reasonably practicable for a company to comply with a warrant, any requirements or restrictions under the law of the territory in which it is based must be taken into account. I do not want to quote the matter at length, but I will just refer to the relevant provision. In Clause 41(5), the matters to be taken into account include,
“any requirements or restrictions under the law of that country or territory that are relevant to the taking of those steps, and … the extent to which it is reasonably practicable to give effect to the warrant in a way that does not breach any of those requirements or restrictions”.
Therefore, it appears that this issue is already addressed. Indeed, what is said in the Bill replicates the existing position under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as amended by the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014.
I believe that the intention of Amendment 65A is to provide additional protections for staff employed in the United Kingdom by telecommunications companies whose principal offices are established overseas. Again, this additional language is unnecessary, and I will seek to explain why. In respect of interception warrants, the Government have already amended the Bill in response to concerns from overseas companies to make it clear that a warrant must be served in such a way as to bring the contents of the warrant to the attention of a person who is capable of providing assistance in relation to it. Clearly, an employee based in the United Kingdom who has no access to relevant information would not be such a person, as they would not be capable of providing the assistance required. The concern that enforcement action will be taken against junior local employees is also misplaced, since it is the telecommunications operator, rather than any individual, who is subject to the duty to provide assistance. I also make the point that it would not be in the interests of the relevant agency to serve a warrant or a notice in such a way that meant it could not be complied with quickly and efficiently. But the broader point is that if there is a conflict between United Kingdom law and the internal authorisation processes of an individual company, then of course United Kingdom law must always take primacy.
Amendments 104 and 105 would permit a person not to comply with a technical capability notice if the notice would require the person to act in a way contrary to any law or restriction in their country or territory. This amendment reads across provisions from other parts of the Bill—those relating to interception warrants and targeted communications data requests, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, noticed—but it does so inappropriately.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 26 to 31 in this group. Under Amendment 31, we have concerns about the breadth of warrants. These warrants are described as targeted interception warrants or targeted examination warrants. Noble Lords will no doubt recall that targeted examination warrants relate to where a bulk interception has resulted in coming across content that belongs to a UK citizen and, therefore a targeted examination warrant is required in those circumstances. Clause 17(1)(a) provides that a targeted interception warrant or a targeted examination warrant may relate to,
“a particular person or organisation”.
An organisation could cover hundreds, if not thousands, of people. I am indebted to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who tells me that it could, in fact, relate to the National Trust—I am not sure about horticultural terrorism, but they have more than 1 million members. We are probing whether it is appropriate to have a targeted interception warrant that is targeted at an organisation, particularly when in Clause 17(1)(b), it says that such warrants can only apply to,
“a single set of premises”.
The potential contrast between the number of people who might be affected in terms of an organisation being targeted by a targeted interception warrant but only a single set of premises seems stark.
Similarly, Clause 17(2)(b) says that such a warrant may relate to,
“more than one person or organisation”,
so again it is very broad. The number of people––potentially innocent people––caught up in such a targeted interception could be extremely large.
Amendment 27 relates to Clause 17(2)(a), whereby,
“a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity”,
can be targeted by an interception warrant. To narrow the potential for this to affect a large number of individuals, the amendment would require each person to be named or identified using a unique identifier. While we accept that with, for example, members of a gang involved in drug dealing, one may not know the names of the individuals concerned, one might from surveillance footage be able to accurately describe the individual whom one wants to target by means of that warrant. A similar argument is suggested by Amendment 29 in relation to Clause 17(2)(b).
Amendment 30 relates to Clause 17(2)(c) and queries the issuing of warrants for “testing or training activities”. While Clause 17(3) defines what such activities are, it does not seem clear to us why it would be necessary to issue a targeted interception warrant to test equipment or train individuals in its use. One would have thought that, if it was a training or testing exercise, it could be done with the consent of whoever is being targeted by the training or testing activities. Amendment 31 therefore suggests that Clause 17(3), in relation to “testing or training activities” be deleted. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, some of these amendments were discussed in the other place. They would remove the ability of the warrant-requesting agencies to apply for a warrant against an organisation; they would require a warrant to name or identify each individual involved in an operation, and they would remove warrants for testing and training activity.
As was set out in the other place, it is important that those responsible for keeping us safe have the powers they need. We consider that the amendments would undermine those necessary powers, but I appreciate that the noble Lord is advancing essentially probing amendments and I respond in that spirit.
Let me start with the amendment regarding unique identifiers. As was explained in the other place, it is not always possible at the outset of an investigation to know or have identified all the individuals who may be subject to a warrant during that investigation. When a warrant is granted against a kidnap gang, for example, the Secretary of State may not know that there are four members of the gang rather than three. The ability to grant a warrant against the gang to establish its size and to identify co-conspirators is precisely why RIPA provided for so-called “thematic” targeted warrants. They are an invaluable tool in allowing the agencies to investigate complex or fast-moving threats, and it is important that we do not undermine their ability to use that tool.
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the Bill already provides at Clause 29(8) that the warrant has to specify, for example, the phone numbers to be intercepted. Furthermore, Clause 29(4) provides a safeguard for warrants that relate to a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on a particular activity—for example a paedophile network—by requiring that the warrant must name or describe as many of those persons so far as is reasonably practicable. I am afraid that I do not accept the analogy with the National Trust—I do not consider it apposite at all.
It is already the case that the warrant will name or describe particular people whose communications are to be intercepted as they become known over the course of the investigation. This is an important safeguard that will assist the oversight of thematic targeted warrants. It is therefore in these circumstances that I suggest that the amendment is not necessary.
Perhaps I may move on to the amendments that seek to remove the ability to grant a warrant against an organisation. Such a change would be operationally damaging and is, moreover, unnecessary. The Bill and the statutory code of practice impose strict limits on the issue of warrants, including in relation to organisations. Such warrants are not open-ended. Their scope must be sufficiently limited that the Secretary of State can properly assess the necessity and proportionality of the interference. Further, under the Bill a judicial commissioner will need to approve the Secretary of State’s decision. In those circumstances the Bill will not allow for overly broad warrants to be issued.
I turn finally to testing and training warrants. The amendments would remove the ability to apply for a warrant for testing or training purposes. Again, I suggest that that would be damaging operationally and would result in a consequent reduction in safeguards. It is vital that those who are authorised to undertake interception are able to test new equipment and to make sure that those responsible for using that equipment are properly trained in its use. Of course there is an element of systems here in the context of the equipment. While it is possible for some testing of equipment to take place in a controlled environment, it is sometimes necessary to test equipment outside of controlled environments to ensure that it will work in real-life situations. There are therefore strict controls which govern the handling of material obtained in this way during such tests. However, we believe that it is right that it should be possible to test this equipment in scenarios where it can be checked that it is working effectively and to help ensure that the users are operating it correctly. Without the ability to test equipment, we will increase the risk of mistakes being made where individuals are not able to receive adequate training in the use of equipment.
The warrant application process in these circumstances allows the Secretary of State to understand the potential risk that communications will be intercepted incidentally to the purpose of the testing or training, and to agree the measures to be taken to reduce the chances of communications being accidently intercepted. There are clear safeguards in place to protect the privacy of citizens. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I should mention that this subject was covered extensively in the Joint Committee on the Bill. It seems that the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that in order to be able to monitor a gang when we do not know if it is made up of three or four people, the language of the clause should be this open. Perhaps I may quote from some of the evidence that was given to the committee. The clause fails to,
“exclude the possibility that everyone who belongs to a certain trade union, political party or book club; visits a certain shop; attends (or has friends or family members who attend) a certain house of worship; subscribes to a certain publication; participates in a lawful and peaceful demonstration; celebrates or may celebrate a certain religious or national holiday”,
and so on and so forth. All those activities seem, perhaps as an unintended consequence, to be swept up by this provision. Recommendation 38 made by the committee states that,
“the language of the Bill be amended so that targeted interception and targeted equipment interference warrants cannot be used as a way to issue thematic warrants concerning a very large number of people”.
Lord Keen of Elie
A thematic targeted warrant will be granted only in circumstances where the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate. None of the examples cited by the noble Lord comes within a hundred miles of that.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation and I am reassured to some extent by, for example, some of the provisions he highlighted in Clause 29(8) and (4). I understand that in fast-moving situations such as a kidnapping it may be necessary to add people to the warrant or to encompass additional individuals who are not specifically named on the warrant. However, I wonder whether some safeguards can still be provided in slower-moving situations, or whether, as in the case where there are provisions for the urgent issuing of warrants, those provisions could be used in these cases.
As for the strict limits on the targeting of organisations, I accept, as I notice the Labour Front Bench also accepts, that these warrants must be necessary and proportionate, and that they provide some safeguards against overreaching in the use of these warrants. I am still puzzled about training and testing warrants. I accept that new equipment and individuals need to be trained in real, live situations, but I am a little concerned about who the individuals and organisations are that might be targeted in these training exercises, bearing in mind that the whole suggestion is that the normal provisions of proportionality and necessity, in terms of suspicions that these individuals are up to no good, would not apply in these situations. Therefore, what is learned? What privacy is being intruded into in the course of these training and testing activities?
My concerns remain about some of those areas, but I am reassured by other things that the noble and learned Lord has said and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 37, 121, 153 and 161 in this group. Basically, these amendments relate to Clause 20, “Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State”. We suggest an additional paragraph, where a warrant is issued for the purposes of preventing or detecting a serious crime, or in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK,
“only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”.
I refer to the briefing provided by Liberty, which points out that one of the greatest problems, recurrent in every power in the Bill, is the lack of a reasonable suspicion threshold for surveillance warrants to be authorised for the purposes of preventing and detecting crime. It states that:
“Intrusive powers can be authorised in order to ‘prevent and detect serious crime’, or even (in the case of communications data) to collect tax, prevent disorder, or in the interests of public safety. However, these general purposes are left wide open to broad interpretation and abuse without requiring a threshold of suspicion”.
The briefing says that a requirement of reasonable suspicion, when the purpose to prevent and detect serious crime is invoked, would prevent the potential abusive surveillance of law-abiding citizens that has regrettably been seen in the past.
The threshold of reasonable suspicion has long been an important safeguard for citizens and law enforcers against the risk of arbitrary use of police powers. The necessary and proportionate standard invokes an important assessment of the extent of the intrusion, but it does not, as we read it, require a burden of proof. Perhaps the Minister could explain how or why the “reasonable suspicion” test should not be applied to the various powers covered in our amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained, these amendments seek to provide that certain authorisations can be given only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been, or is likely to be, committed. It is almost like trying to compare apples and oranges. The construct of the Bill is not around reasonable suspicion. It is around necessity and proportionality. They achieve the same goal, but in different ways. These amendments are not necessary and, in the case of communications data, would undermine the ability of law enforcement and other public authorities to catch criminals and to keep the public safe. First, let me assure the Committee that for a warrant to be issued for the prevention or detection of serious crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required; a speculative warrant could never be approved under Clause 20. The same is true for authorisations to obtain communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. So these amendments respond to a concern that, I suggest, is misplaced.
Lord Pannick
Can the Minister give the Committee a practical example of where it would be necessary and proportionate—the test that he emphasises—to exercise these powers where there is not, to quote the amendment,
“a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”?
Lord Keen of Elie
I think the noble Lord helpfully makes my point for me. As I said at the outset, we are dealing with apples and oranges. We achieve the same objective by different routes, but I am obliged.
Lord Pannick
I am sorry to prolong this but I am not agreeing with the noble and learned Lord, I am asking for a practical example of why the Government are not prepared to accept a “reasonable suspicion” test.
Lord Keen of Elie
For example, in the case of a missing person there may be no reasonable suspicion but it may still be necessary and proportionate to grant a warrant in those circumstances. I hope that that is concrete enough.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister. While I accept that there are some cases where the test of reasonable suspicion is not required—he gave the very good example of a missing person—I still wonder why the Government are averse in all circumstances to having a “reasonable suspicion” test. If I understand what he is saying, I accept that it is implicit in the necessity provision of issuing a warrant. At this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Immigration Bill
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(8 years ago)
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“Duty to arrange consideration of bail
(1) Subject as follows, the Secretary of State must arrange a reference to the First-tier Tribunal for the Tribunal to decide whether to grant bail to a person if—
(a) the person is being detained under a provision mentioned in paragraph 1(1)(a) or (c), and
(b) the period of six months beginning with the relevant date has elapsed.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1)(b) “the relevant date” means—
(a) the date on which the person’s detention began, or
(b) if a relevant event has occurred in relation to the person since that date, the last date on which such an event has occurred in relation to the person.
(3) The following are relevant events in relation to a person for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b)—
(a) consideration by the First-tier Tribunal of whether to grant immigration bail to the person;
(b) withdrawal by the person of an application for immigration bail treated as made by the person as the result of a reference under this paragraph;
(c) withdrawal by the person of a notice given under sub-paragraph (6)(b).
(4) The reference in sub-paragraph (3)(a) to consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to a person—
(a) includes such consideration regardless of whether there is a hearing or the First-tier Tribunal makes a determination in the case in question;
(b) includes the dismissal of an application by virtue of provision made under paragraph 9(2).
(5) The reference in sub-paragraph (3)(a) to consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to a person does not include such consideration in a case where—
(a) the person has made an application for bail, other than one treated as made by the person as the result of a reference under this paragraph, and
(b) the First-tier Tribunal is prevented from granting bail to the person by paragraph 3(4) (requirement for Secretary of State’s consent to bail).
(6) The duty in sub-paragraph (1) to arrange a reference does not apply if— (a) section 3(2) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (persons detained in interests of national security etc) applies to the person, or
(b) the person has given to the Secretary of State, and has not withdrawn, written notice that the person does not wish the person’s case to be referred to the First-tier Tribunal under this paragraph.
(7) A reference to the First-tier Tribunal under this paragraph in relation to a person is to be treated for all purposes as an application by that person for the grant of bail under paragraph 1(3).”
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I shall also speak to my Motion D.
It is clear that both the Government and noble Lords who supported this House’s amendment in respect of a time limit on immigration detention have a common purpose—to prevent the detention of individuals for any longer than is absolutely necessary. As the Government have stated previously during the passage of this Bill, I can reassure the House that individuals who are removed will be detained only for that purpose and only where there is a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable time.
We all also agree on the need to ensure that any decision to deprive someone of their liberty must be subject to careful consideration and scrutiny, taking into account an individual’s circumstances. Work on a wide package of reform, which was announced in the response to the review by Stephen Shaw of the welfare of vulnerable people in detention, is already under way. This reflects the seriousness with which the Government regard these issues.
The Government have made clear previously their rationale for opposing general time limits on immigration detention—that they would be arbitrary, that they would not take account of individual circumstances, and that they would encourage individuals to seek to frustrate the removals process until the time limit is reached. I fully respect the views of those noble Lords who voted in favour of a time limit but the Government’s strong view remains that a time limit would have a negative impact on their ability to enforce immigration control and, consequently, to maintain public safety.
However, the Government have considered the views expressed by many noble Lords that there should be a greater level of judicial oversight over detention. That is why the Government tabled a Motion in the other place, the effect of which would be that individuals would be automatically referred to the tribunal for a bail hearing six months after their detention began or, if the tribunal has already considered whether to release them within the first six months, six months after that consideration. The individual would then receive further referrals at six-monthly intervals calculated from the point of the last consideration. This referral requirement will ensure that individuals who do not make an application themselves, for whatever reason, will have independent judicial oversight of their ongoing detention.
Individuals will still be able to make an application themselves at any time. They will be made aware of and have access to legal advice to support them in making challenges to immigration detention and in making applications for bail. This will be another important safeguard which will complement the wider reforms that the Government are putting in place in response to Stephen Shaw’s report.
The adults at risk policy will strengthen the existing presumption against detention of those particularly vulnerable to harm in detention. A new gatekeeper function will provide additional oversight and scrutiny to ensure that detention is the appropriate option for those entering the detention estate. Furthermore, a new approach to case management with a clear focus on removal plans and panel reviews on at least a quarterly basis will ensure that only those who should be detained remain detained. As the Government have already made clear, they fully expect these reforms to result in fewer people being detained and for a shorter period.
Six months is a proportionate approach. It will ensure that an adequate safeguard is in place to protect individuals who have been detained for an extended period and have not made their own application for bail, while not imposing unreasonable burdens on the tribunal and on the Home Office. Earlier referrals might result in mandatory work for the tribunal and the Home Office whereby individuals would be referred for bail hearings at the very time when their removal from the country is planned and imminent. This is not a good use of taxpayers’ money or of the tribunal’s time. Together with other reforms—the gatekeeper role, the adults at risk policy and the new casework management system with frequent internal reviews—this amendment will provide adequate oversight of detention.
Amendment 85A requires the Government to issue guidance to those making decisions on the detention of individuals for the purpose of immigration control where issues of vulnerability are raised. This relates directly to the adults at risk policy announced in a Written Ministerial Statement on 14 January as part of the Government’s response to Stephen Shaw’s report. The amendment reinstates the clauses as agreed in this House on Report. The reinstatement removes the amendment agreed to by this House at Third Reading, the effect of which would be to place an absolute exclusion on the detention of pregnant women.
The Government have been considering this matter since they received Stephen Shaw’s review and have also listened carefully to the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, who tabled the amendment, and those of Peers who voted in favour of it. As the House will be aware, the Home Secretary announced just last week that the Government plan to end the routine detention of pregnant women. This would be similar to the arrangements put in place as part of the ending of routine detention for families with children in 2014, a reform which demonstrates the Government’s commitment to balancing proportionate immigration controls with safeguarding vulnerable people. The Government have listened carefully to the concerns expressed on this issue in both this House and the other place.
The Motion agreed in the other place yesterday would put in place a statutory time limit on the detention of pregnant women for the purposes of removal. The effect would be that pregnant women could be detained only for up to 72 hours, for example, immediately prior to a managed return or to prevent illegal entry at the border where a return can be arranged quickly. This could be extended up to a maximum of seven days in total, but only with ministerial approval. That could be appropriate where, for example, a removal has failed due to a cancelled flight and where arrangements can be made for a new flight within the seven-day period. Finally, as a further demonstration of how seriously the Government take these matters, we plan to invite Stephen Shaw to carry out a further short review to assess progress in relation to key actions identified in his original review in the context of these new measures. I am sure that we are all in agreement that our focus should be on striking the right balance between protecting pregnant women and maintaining effective immigration control, and we believe that this amendment achieves that.
Motion D1 seeks to place a statutory requirement that detention powers should be used only in the most exceptional circumstances. Current policy is that pregnant women may be detained in very limited circumstances where there is a clear prospect of early removal or otherwise in very exceptional circumstances. Motions D1 and D2 would restrict that even further to only the most exceptional circumstances, which would almost certainly prevent detention to support removal, including immediately following arrival at the border and foreign criminals facing deportation. This would also require the Home Office to set out what the most exceptional circumstances are. This would be overly prescriptive and would not allow officers to respond to the individual circumstances presented by a varied group of people. Placing such a prescription in statute would provide no further safeguards. Courts can and do hold the Home Office to account based on published policy and guidelines, as well as the facts of individual cases.
The amendment also seeks to set the clock on the time limit running from the point of detention rather than the point at which the Secretary of State is satisfied that a woman is pregnant. The amendment is unworkable for a number of reasons. While there are circumstances where it is obvious that a woman is pregnant, there may be many instances where it is not immediately apparent, and the woman may not inform immigration officers of her condition. This is of particular concern where women are detained at borders without the facilities to conduct pregnancy tests, unlike at immigration removal centres. That could lead to instances where the Home Office becomes liable for unlawful detention because it was not aware that the woman in question was pregnant and the time limit has already expired. It could also prevent removal of pregnant women, as the Home Office would have to release a woman if she was found to be pregnant and had already been detained for 72 hours. This, in turn, could disrupt travel and removal plans.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)
My Lords, will the Minister clarify for my benefit a matter which concerns me? Does he agree that the writ of habeas corpus referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, would not be of any use in the circumstances that we are discussing because the return to the writ would simply show that there was lawful authority for the detention? If that is right, does he agree that the right to liberty could be relied upon only by reference to the Human Rights Act and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which would mean that any statutory provision that we approve would have to be read and given effect in accordance with the convention right to liberty?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, on the last point, in respect of any answer to a writ of habeas corpus it would be possible to rely upon lawful detention, but the relevant lawful provision would have to be in compliance with the convention.
I turn to notice, a point that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, when he was referring to the matter of bail. He spoke of the default position. That is very important. It is a matter that was pointedly not addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who said repeatedly that it was only after six months that there would be any judicial oversight of detention in the context of immigration. That is not the case. Once a person is detained, it is open to them to make an application for bail. That application is made to a judicial tribunal and will therefore be the subject of judicial determination. The onus will rest very firmly, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, made clear, upon the Home Secretary to justify the detention or continued detention in those circumstances. So it is not a question of judicial oversight arising only after six months: it is available from the outset. What we are providing for is the exceptional case in which an application is not made or is refused and, after a delay of time, should be reviewed.
Lord Keen of Elie
How prescient I have been, it would appear.
In those circumstances, I respectfully suggest to this House that the Government have responded in a reasoned, reasonable and proportionate way to the issues that have been raised, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his response and to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate.
Referring first to the Minister’s comments I would say yes, of course it is open to a person to ask for bail. What I sought to illustrate was that although that may be so in theory, in practice many of them simply do not know what to do. I accept that there have been many applications for bail. However, just out of interest, I would like to know at what period in their detention those people made the bail application and how long they had been there. In report after report of inspections of immigration detention centres, both the Chief Inspector of Prisons and the chief inspector of immigration have pointed out the absence of interpreters and legal advice and the fact that they were approached by many detainees asking how they could get help. We will not resolve this situation in this House tonight, but it is clearly unsatisfactory as seen through the eyes of the people on the ground, who are making the applications. I absolutely accept that the 1999 automatic bail provision was repealed because it was unworkable, but I am just interested that automatic bail should be substituted for it.
If I might refer to the comments of my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I never said that immigration detention should be limited to 28 days. What I said was that nobody should be submitted to administrative detention—that is, detention ordered by civil servants—without judicial oversight of that detention within the shortest time possible. A period of 28 days is entirely reasonable. It was the decision taken by the commission which the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, and I, were on, and which was agreed to by the other place in a debate last September. Bringing in judicial oversight of immigration detention as quickly as possible must be the aim of any system. Yes, it is said the expert advice is available, but it is not in fact, as I have tried to illustrate.
My contention is that a principle is at stake here. If we wish to remain a civilised country, we cannot go on with a system in which civil servants are allowed to put people in immigration detention for unspecified periods which, as we all know, have stretched to months and even years. Anything longer than a month, in circumstances which I inspected for a long time—I think I know a little bit about them—is not successful. Therefore, without more ado, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Immigration Bill
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I understand fully that the intention of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, is to reflect the recommendation from Stephen Shaw that pregnant women be absolutely excluded from detention. On this point, I reiterate what I made clear on Report and set out in my letter to the noble Baroness and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. While the Government agree that it is not right to detain pregnant women unless there are exceptional circumstances, it does not consider that an absolute exclusion would be workable.
As has been explained in this House and in another place, it is important that the Government are able to detain, for a short period, those with no right to be in the United Kingdom who refuse to leave voluntarily. For example, if an immediate removal is planned, a short period of detention may be appropriate to facilitate a safe departure where there are absconding risks or other public protection risks to be considered. Furthermore, exempting from detention an individual who has arrived at the border with no right to enter the United Kingdom and who can be put on a return flight quickly would allow pregnant women access to the United Kingdom regardless of their immigration status.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, mentioned that 99 pregnant women were detained in Yarl’s Wood in 2014 and that this number had reduced to 69 in 2015. I am advised that there is, at present, one pregnant woman in Yarl’s Wood. She is a foreign national offender who recently completed an 18-month prison sentence and was detained there on 9 February. A deportation order was signed and removal directions were in place for 3 April. These were later brought forward to 26 March but then deferred because of an asylum claim being made. I am advised that there has now been an application for judicial review as well. Taking that case as an example, if removal ceases to be imminent there is every prospect of release subject to conditions. This is what frequently happens in these circumstances and goes some way to explain why only a small proportion of those actually in detention are subsequently removed from detention and deported. Many are released under condition and their asylum or immigration status is determined subsequently and the matter disposed of in that way.
I stress that we are dealing with cases in which there are exceptional circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, observed that uncertainty over immigration status could itself be a source of stress and anxiety for a pregnant woman. That may very well be the case: who could dispute it? But she went on to say that they can be detained for not very good reason. We cannot accept that. Our policy and guidelines are very clear: pregnant women are to be detained only in exceptional circumstances. There is a requirement for that detention in particular and exceptional circumstances.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, will be aware that, on Report, I stated that the Government intended to reflect on the detention of pregnant women and would have a considered position by Third Reading. I apologise to the House for the delay in completing that consideration. This is a complex issue and the Government continue to give it serious thought in the context of the work that is under way in developing policy on adults at risk in detention and the further implementation of Stephen Shaw’s report and its recommendations. That is taking time to finalise because the Government do not want to rush what is and is recognised to be a highly important issue. But I assure the noble Baroness and the House that the Government will be making a formal announcement on this matter very shortly. Indeed, the Government expect to make such an announcement in a matter of days.
The announcement will not involve an absolute prohibition on the detention of pregnant women. It will, however, set out a very clear and limited time for detention, only in exceptional circumstances, as it may be applied to pregnant women.
Lord Alton of Liverpool
I wonder if the Minister can explain to us why, if it is possible for the Government to make a statement in a few days, it is not possible to make that statement today.
Lord Keen of Elie
If I was in a position to make the statement today, I am sure the noble Lord appreciates that I would do so. He may be familiar with the wheels of government and with the requirement for these matters to be approved at various levels before a final statement is made. If I was in a position to make that statement, I reassure the noble Lord that I would not hesitate to make it.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
But this is Third Reading. Is there not a sense of urgency in these matters?
Lord Keen of Elie
There is certainly a sense of urgency in this matter and that is why I expressed my apology to the House and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I had indicated that by Third Reading I would be in a position to confirm the Government’s position on this. However, it is a matter that requires detailed consideration. It is a matter that has ramifications. It is a matter that has to be considered in conjunction with Home Office guidelines. It is a matter that must be consulted on and finally approved before issue, and it is for that reason that, regrettably, there has been a period of delay in respect of this point.
I underline that it will not involve an absolute prohibition. It will, however, involve a very limited power of detention to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and for a very limited period. That is what is anticipated at present. As I sought to point out on Report, it is simply not practicable to have an absolute bar in respect of pregnant women. There are circumstances in which, for example, a pregnant woman arriving at an airport or a port, clearly with no right at all to enter the United Kingdom, may present either a security risk or a risk of absconding, and without any power of detention it would be quite impossible to arrange her return at that time of arrival. Therefore, in these circumstances, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. Many have spoken so eloquently, drawing attention in particular to the implications of this for unborn children, and have made the case very strongly.
I realise that the Minister is in a difficult position in that he is not able to make the statement to which he referred. I asked him for reassurance that the new policy will mean that pregnant women are detained genuinely in the most exceptional circumstances because the current policy is that they should be detained only in the most exceptional circumstances. While the hint of a time limit is encouraging, I have heard nothing to reassure us that the new policy will be different from the old policy.
I quite understand that it is not the Minister’s fault—if that is the correct word—that he is not able to make the statement today. But Stephen Shaw delivered his report to the Home Office on 24 September. The Government have had over six months to consider this crucial issue, which they know many people—organisations, individuals who gave evidence to Shaw and individuals who gave evidence to the inquiry—feel very strongly about. They must have known that people would want a clear answer on this by now and I am afraid that clear answer has come there none. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Lord understands why it is not good enough to say, when this is the last chance we have to discuss it in this House, that we should wait for a few days because the Government have not managed to get their act together to enable him to make the statement today.
Given that every noble Lord who has spoken did so very strongly in support of this amendment, I feel that I have no choice other than to test the opinion of this House.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Amendments 7, 10 and 11 are all relatively minor and somewhat technical in nature. Clause 63 ensures that a person may be on immigration bail when they are liable to detention, even if they can no longer be detained, and subsections (3) and (4) apply this to people who have been released on bail under the current provisions of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. Amendment 7 to Clause 63(5) removes the reference to an amendment being made by subsection (3). This is because, in an earlier draft of the clause, subsection (3) contained an amendment to Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, but subsections (3) and (4) no longer use that construction.
Amendments 10 and 11 to Schedule 10 ensure that any cross-references in other legislation to immigration bail granted, or a condition imposed, under Schedule 10 will include the rare circumstance when bail is granted by the court, just as if it were granted by the tribunal. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation but, on Amendment 7, it seems to me that we have never really had an explanation of why it is necessary for these provisions to be made retrospective. The Constitution Committee raised the matter in its report to the House on the Bill, and referred to the Government’s acknowledgement of retrospectivity in the Explanatory Notes, which said:
“This clause is retrospective in its effect because it is intended to clarify the law following a recent Court of Appeal judgment”.
Having read on in the Constitution Committee’s report, I wonder whether “clarify” is the right term. I do not think one can talk about correcting a Court of Appeal judgment, but that is the flavour of what the Constitution Committee had to say. The Government’s response to the committee was that the clause has been remodelled, which does not seem quite to take the point. Could the noble and learned Lord assist the House by explaining why this does not broaden the scope of the Bill and why it is appropriate?
My first reaction on reading Amendments 10 and 11 was to wonder whether the draftsman could not have made a real effort to make them really opaque and difficult to follow. After that rather flippant comment, the serious point is that, as I understand the issue, the Secretary of State is now to have powers over courts as well as the tribunals. The noble and learned Lord is shaking his head, so I look forward to his refuting that. We are bothered, as we have been concerned before, about not respecting the independence of the judiciary. What if a tribunal judge thinks that it is contrary to a person’s human rights to impose the electronic monitoring condition, and the Secretary of State says that it is not contrary to do so? The judge is very conflicted there. What if he or she wants to impose a condition, and considers that it would be practicable to do so, but the Secretary of State says that it is not practicable, so the judge cannot impose the condition? If that meant that the judge did not grant bail to that person, this would be a considerable—and, I think, unwarrantable—interference with the person’s right to liberty. Would the noble and learned Lord expand a little on his explanations?
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I support the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in relation to the first amendment and retrospection, which was addressed by the Constitution Committee, and to the other two amendments and the extent to which they do or do not mean that the Secretary of State could dictate to a criminal court, including a court of criminal appeal. I am afraid I did not see the Minister shake his head when the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made that comment, but I hope that, if that is the position as far as the Government are concerned, it does not mean that the Secretary of State will in any way be able to dictate to a criminal court and that the Minister will set out very clearly in his response why it is incorrect to draw that inference or assumption from these amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie
I shall begin with the observations made with regard to alleged retrospective effect in the provisions in Clause 63. Reference was made to a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of B v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Before that decision, which is subject to an appeal that I will come back to in a moment, it was widely—indeed, universally—understood that individuals could be released on immigration bail in circumstances where their detention was no longer lawful under the Hardial Singh principles; that is, there was no reasonable prospect of their deportation and they therefore had to be released. That understanding was shared by the relevant tribunals: the First-tier Tribunal and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Indeed, it was the decision of the president of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission which was overturned in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, that determined that if detention was no longer lawful under the Hardial Singh principles, it would follow that bail could not be granted and, in particular, that bail could not be granted subject to conditions. As one might imagine, that had wide-ranging implications for the purposes of security, particularly in the case of B, who appeared to be an established Algerian terrorist who was at risk of carrying out terrorist activities to assist others in Algeria and elsewhere. The decision of the Court of Appeal has been suspended pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, which is set down to take place in December. However the Government’s position is that the position prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal was correct and it should be reinforced by statutory provision. It is for that reason that Clause 63 is in its present form. I understand that the appeal to the Supreme Court will proceed in any event, but it is essential, particularly in a matter that impacts on our security, that there should be no doubt or difficulty and no gap in our legislation so far as that is concerned.
Turning to Amendments 10 and 11, the test of practicability is for the Secretary of State, not the court, but there is no question of the Secretary of State usurping the functions of the court. It may be recollected that for that reason an amendment was made to Schedule 10 at an earlier stage to make clear that the Secretary of State could not usurp or overturn any decision-making power of the court or tribunal in these circumstances. That remains our position with respect to Schedule 10, as amended.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
Once again, my Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment. With her usual lawyer’s quickness, she picked up the point that I raised on Report. As I said then, it is a point that was raised with me by an organisation local to me in the East Midlands, Baca. It was worried because it could not understand why that wording was there. It is perhaps not surprising if groups are worried and perhaps slightly cynical when they come across measures that they do not understand, given that there is so much in legislation that they do not like. So I am delighted that, at the last minute, the letter from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—not the noble Earl—made it very clear that the definition, as in the amendment, is,
“separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so”.
It is helpful to have that in Hansard because of course your average punter cannot read the letters sent between Ministers and Members of your Lordships’ House. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will repeat that for the record. Also, like the noble Baroness, I would appreciate an explanation of why this clause is necessary, given that this is, as the letter says, the,
“established definition in the Immigration Rules”,
and it is accepted by the UN. I am glad that through this organisation raising this matter with me, we have some clarity on what is meant by it.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister. As they have observed, there is already an established definition of “unaccompanied” in the present context. It is not in guidance alone; it is in the Immigration Rules, and that is important. The definition states that an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child is someone who—perhaps I may, as suggested, read this into the record—is under 18 years of age when the claim is submitted, is claiming asylum in their own right, is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so.
Following the commitment given by my noble friend Lord Bates on Report to explain how the definition would operate, I wrote to the noble Baronesses—albeit, as they observed, at the last minute—to confirm that there is no intention of altering the definition of “unaccompanied” as set out in the Immigration Rules for the purposes of the transfer provisions in the Immigration Bill. Furthermore, defining particular categories in primary legislation is not always desirable or even necessary. As your Lordships will appreciate, there are times, particularly in the context of the current migration crisis, when the Government need to respond quickly to changing circumstances.
I should make it clear that at present we have no intention of amending the definition of “unaccompanied”. We would do so only in response to a significant change in circumstances, but it is important that in such circumstances we are able to react swiftly and efficiently. Clearly, regulations subject to parliamentary scrutiny are a more appropriate way to achieve that result than placing something on the face of this Bill.
I reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, that safeguarding and promoting the welfare of vulnerable children is at the forefront of the Home Office’s work with the Local Government Association and the Department for Education to develop a transfer scheme for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I understand the concerns about the definition of “unaccompanied”—it may have unintended consequences and inadvertently place children in the hands of traffickers—but immigration officials working with these vulnerable children are trained to be alert to any signs that a child is at risk of harm or abuse or may have been trafficked. Where an asylum-seeking child is accompanied by an adult who is not a parent or a relative, Home Office officials work with local authority children’s services to verify the identity of the adult and establish the true relationship with the child. If that relationship cannot be verified or there are ongoing welfare or safeguarding concerns, the child will be treated as unaccompanied.
In the light of those points and our recent correspondence confirming that we have no intention of amending the already established definition of “unaccompanied” for the purposes of the transfer provisions, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is reassuring. It is difficult to imagine how urgent the circumstances might be that would require a swift change of the definition. However, I am very glad to have the assurances about the position on the record in Hansard, which, as the noble Baroness said, is most easily accessible by those outside this place. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.