(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for both outlining the statutory instrument and explaining my amendment to decline to approve it. I am going to structure my speech in an unconventional manner, starting with the points that I know the fewest people in this Chamber will agree with, moving backwards through the order in the amendment to the point that I believe that most people in this Chamber, particularly the Benches to my right, might be persuaded to agree with. I will finish not on points about animal testing or the right to protest, but on the basic constitutional understanding that statutory instruments are a way in which the law can be illegitimately extended well beyond the original intentions manifested when it was democratically debated, pored over and scrutinised, in both your Lordships’ House and the other place. This statutory instrument is a notable and dangerous piece of legislative overreach.
I start with animal testing, the phasing out of which, as the amendment says, is not going nearly quickly enough under the replacing animals in science strategy. Why do I argue that this is too slow? It is for morality and for efficacy. There is public revulsion, yes, which results in widespread peaceful protest about the treatment of more than 2.5 million animals a year used in medical research here. More than that, there is a recognition of the inadequacy of animal testing, the “valley of death” that sees drugs apparently showing promise in animals failing to work in humans. Animal Free Research UK reports that that is the case for over 92% of drugs, and that failure makes up 75% of the cost of drug development. As an entire edition of the journal Frontiers in Immunology published in 2024 points out, there are 90 million years of evolution between humans and rodents.
However, there are alternatives. Our Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Vallance of Balham, said last November:
“Now, new advances in technology—particularly AI and genomics, but also organoid and 3D cell systems—finally allow us to see a path to changing our reliance on animals in science”.
But this SI will be an active discouragement to the commercial companies to push on in this direction, the direction in which the Government say they want to head and for which public pressure—democratic forces—is clearly important.
My second argument, to quote the amendment, is that the SI reflects
“a further restriction on the democratic right to peaceful protest”.
That was the key concern in the debate on the SI in the other place of many of the 26 Labour MPs who voted against it. The Mother of the House, Diane Abbott, was among the 110 “no” tally. Among the Labour opponents were Stella Creasy and Kerry McCarthy, former Shadow Minister of State for Defra and a former Minister for Climate. As was suggested after the debate by Neil Duncan-Jordan, the Labour MP for Poole:
“This proposal treats private, often American-owned companies the same as airports, motorways and utilities. It shields private profits from fair criticism and puts them above our right to protest. That is not right”.
Protest is part of our political system, and it is a crucial part of delivering democracy. The Minister suggested that recent developments in protest had demanded that this SI be brought in. I can go back to the 19th century, when the UK was a leader in protest movements, such as anti-vivisection, through the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876.
I have circulated two briefings to noble Lords. One of those represents some 21 signatories, among them Protect the Wild, Camp Beagle, Medicine Without Cruelty and the Network for Police Monitoring, known as Netpol. It says that some 30,000 emails have been sent to noble Lords; I apologise to the many who have written to me personally, but I do not have the capacity to respond individually. Together with the other briefing written by Naturewatch Foundation, and supported by 26 other signatories, including Cruelty Free International, Wildlife and Countryside Link, Lush cosmetics and the Animal Law Foundation, this indicates that the SI in question represents a significant and unprecedented expansion of public order powers—already some of the most far-reaching protest-related restrictions in recent UK law—and would extend them to a broad and very loosely defined sector. When it comes to animal testing, the Government have failed to demonstrate why existing laws covering harassment, obstruction, criminal damage and public order are not already sufficient.
I turn to what I believe is my point of broadest appeal, and an appeal of considerable constitutional significance. I thank Jennifer Scotney, our staff member, for going through all the debates on the original Bill. In the Commons Public Bill Committee, the right honourable Kit Malthouse stated:
“The offence will cover major roads, railways, airports, harbours, and downstream oil and gas infrastructure”.
The Explanatory Notes to the Bill list transport and energy, and add newspaper printing infrastructure, but Parliament did not scrutinise life sciences as key national infrastructure. Its later inclusion relies solely on delegated powers and was not the original legislative intent. KNI was identified as specific, identifiable physical systems whose operation underpins daily life. Life sciences, by contrast, is a broad sector, operating largely on private land, consisting of thousands of sites of varying importance. To quote the right honourable Kit Malthouse again:
“Minor infrastructure such as undesignated roads and small-scale power stations will be out of scope”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 14/6/22; col. 134.]
If minor or diffused infrastructure was deliberately excluded, a whole commercial research sector cannot logically fit within the definition. The National Police Chiefs’ Council testified that it would have concern about an explicit duty being placed on policing to deal with an activity on private land.
Emergency services, health, and food services were explicitly rejected as not being suitable for inclusion in the Bill; Ministers said that they were not in scope. In Committee in the Commons, Sarah Jones MP proposed adding emergency services; this was rejected by the Minister. The response in the Commons to a proposal suggesting adding farms and food production was that this would
“significantly increase the scope of the Bill”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/10/22; col. 606.]
In our own House, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, the then Conservative Minister, said
“we do not believe it is necessary to add … into the list … at present”.—[Official Report, 16/11/22; col. 936.]
referring to other sectors. If ambulances, hospitals and food supply were excluded for being too expansive to be included in the Bill, life sciences represent a clear shift beyond Parliament’s stated limits for the Bill.
Ministers justified the secondary legislation power on the basis that new forms of infrastructure might emerge, or novel protest tactics might target previously unforeseen sites. Protests at animal testing and life science facilities, however, are long established—going back to the 19th century, as I said—well known and were explicitly referenced during the passage of the Bill. Martha Spurrier of Liberty, at the Commons Committee stage, said:
“If someone locks themselves to an animal testing centre … the police have to work out at what point that person’s right to”
protest
“becomes an infringement of other rights”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 09/06/2022; col. 72.]
Parliament was already aware of protests at animal testing facilities and discussed them as part of the existing protest landscape, managed under existing regulations and human rights law, not as a justification for redefining infrastructure.
I come to the broader position in which we are debating the SI. The Public Law Project website says that
“for as long as delegated legislation has existed there have been concerns about the way it is used. Sometimes the Government leaves difficult and controversial matters of policy to Statutory Instruments so that the Government can avoid the difficulties of having to pass a law”.
I posit that this is happening here.
I have been in your Lordships’ House for more than six years, so I have heard many debates along the lines of a 2014 report from the Hansard Society titled: The Devil is in the Detail: Parliament and Delegated Legislation. That report says, and this is the key part of my argument, that:
“The House of Lords should make greater, albeit judicious, use of its power of veto”
when referring to SIs. I put it to the House, and particularly to the Conservative Benches, who I know in general are extremely reluctant to vote for fatal Motions, that this would be a judicious—indeed, a critically important—use of their vote on this occasion, a vote for something we often hear championed from those Benches for free speech.
I state only the obvious when I say that politics is now in a great state of flux and the future is highly uncertain. The principle of far extending the original intentions of a Bill—which could be stopped through a mechanism that His Majesty’s loyal Opposition have in their hands but decline to use—could, in the future, be a far graver threat to the nation’s liberty than even what we have before us today. Does Parliament make the law, or have the Executive morphed into a monstrous Henry VIII hologram, saying that the law means whatever they say it means? In this age, particularly, that is a very dangerous precedent to set. I beg to move.
I did not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, about Just Stop Oil blocking motorways and I do not agree with her now about animal testing, which must be carefully controlled but is still essential, but I come to the same conclusion as she does for the constitutional reason that she gave as the last of her indictments.
I strongly agree with the Government about the importance of the life sciences sector. I was chairman of Imperial College; I know a bit about it. The point where I disagree with the Government, and strongly agree with the noble Baroness, is on whether a research laboratory can properly be designated as key national infrastructure under the 2023 Act.
Section 7 of the Act makes it an offence to interfere with the
“use or operation of any key national infrastructure”.
It defines key national infrastructure rather precisely, as the Minister read out. There are eight categories; seven are to do with transport and the eighth, rather oddly, is about the production of newspapers—presumably the connection is communication. Section 7(7) of the Act permits the Secretary of State to add further infrastructure. Hence this SI.
In all our debates, no one ever mentioned laboratories. When we were passing this Act, animal welfare did not come up. We thought we were dealing with oil, gas, rail, road and air, because that is what Ministers and the Bill said. If we were thinking of what extra—
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe strongest argument, apart from the legal and moral arguments, is the practical one that has just been made. How do you persuade victims of slavery to come forward and assist in a case if, when they do so, they are declared inadmissible and dispatched abroad? It is simply counterproductive and destructive of the whole basis of the Modern Slavery Act.
I would like to start as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, did, by pointing to the Government’s announcement last week—there seemed to be some other things going on at the end of last week. It would have been better to make the announcement in this House, but it slipped out that the two-tier system for handling asylum introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act was being abandoned. We spent weeks pointing out that it would not work. However, better the sinner that repenteth, and I warmly welcome the Government’s decision to drop it. I think they were absolutely right.
The asylum queue now, at about 178,000, is 20,000 longer than when, with objections, we passed the Nationality and Borders Bill. A principal reason for it getting longer is the two-tier system that was introduced, which is administratively unworkable. I warmly welcome the Government changing their mind, but it is a shame that it remains a stain on our statute book—a clear breach of the UN refugee convention, as the UNHCR confirmed at the time. Of course, it was a smaller breach of the refugee convention than this Bill, as the UNHCR has confirmed.
If I could have the Minister’s attention, I ask him to at some stage correct the record on the UNHCR’s role in these matters. In the first day in Committee, asked about its views on the Bill, he acknowledged:
“Some parts of the UNHCR have views on the Government’s position”
but said that the UN
“is not charged with the interpretation of the refugee convention”.—[Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 968.]
He might want to reconsider that. Under Article 35 of the convention, the duty is laid on the UNHCR of supervising the application of the convention and all parties to it have an obligation to co-operate with the UNHCR. As for “some parts” of the UNHCR commenting on the Government’s position, it has published and formally conveyed to the Government its formal position and legal observations on the Bill in the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 35. That is what it is required to do and what it has done. To suggest that criticisms of the Bill come from “some parts” of the UNHCR but are not its institutional view is wrong.
I come back to the modern slavery amendments. Mine was taken in the middle of the night, unbeknown to me as I rashly went home shortly before midnight. One of the charms of being a Cross-Bencher is that you never have the faintest idea of what is going on. The usual channels rarely have a tributary around these parts. My amendment was crucial, but it would be out of order for me to speak to it now. However, I can praise the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its magisterial report that came out over the weekend. Its conclusion on the clauses we are looking at is exactly the same as that which the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, came to:
“It is, in our view, wholly inappropriate to categorise victims as a threat to public order by the mere fact that they arrived … through an irregular route”.
It says—correctly—that Clause 21 breaches Article 10 of the convention against trafficking and formally recommends that it should be removed from the Bill. I agree. It seems to me that that is what we should do, so I shall support the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, when we consider whether it should stand part.
My general view is in line with that of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack: I do not like this debate, for a number of reasons, partly because the best debates have two sides to them. This is tennis with nobody on the other side of the net and I am fed up with it.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I agree with him about that form of tennis and, seriously, about both the timing of the Government’s announcement of their plans for the Nationality and Borders Act and the fact that this is a U-turn that needs to be applauded. If the Government point themselves in the right direction, people should not jump up and down and point a finger and go “U-turn, U turn”. It is better than not U-turning. We have heard many powerful speeches in this debate, but I think the Committee will join me in commending all Members on the Government Benches who have shown both courage and compassion in getting up and opposing the Government’s plans for victims of modern slavery.
I agree with both the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that the whole Bill should go, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that all these clauses should go, but I actually signed a number of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—a package which has helped us interrogate what the Government are now doing and the impact that it will have. In that light, I shall ask the Minister three specific questions that in some ways draw on what has been said before, but also go in slightly different directions.
My first question concerns the situation if the provisions under the Bill, as the Government plan, essentially end the protection for victims of modern slavery. Imagine a police officer now, crouching down beside, say, a frightened young man who has been forced to work in an illegal marijuana farm, behind locked doors where the whole thing could have caught fire and killed him at any moment; a young woman forced by threats to stay in a nail bar; a young man who has been trapped for months in horrendous conditions at a hand car wash; or indeed a young woman who has been forced into sexual exploitation. Currently that police officer can crouch down beside them and say, “It’s all right, you’re safe now”. What does the Minister think a police officer would be able to say if the Bill goes through as drafted? What could that police officer say to the victim of modern slavery? I ask the Committee to think how the police officer might feel about being in that situation.
My second question concerns one of the things that that police officer would probably do, perhaps not immediately but soon after that. They would start to say, “Can you tell me what is happening here? Please, tell me what is happening. A bit down the track, would you think about testifying against the person who put you into this situation?” If we think about even the intelligence gathering, let alone the prosecution, what would the passing of this law do?
My third and final question is: have the Government really considered this? Let us think about the kinds of illegal operations I referred to—illegal enterprises that are a stain on our communities, that compete with and thrust out honest, decent businesses, that are a rotten core in the community and have all sorts of nasty effects. What will allowing those operations to continue, which is what the Government’s plans would do, do to our communities?