Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, before I make my few remarks, I also congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady White, on her most excellent maiden speech. I declare my interest as a trustee and a director of pension funds for a number of years. I acknowledge that this Bill is, in general, a good idea; however, as has been said by many people—I hate to repeat it again—it is a complex multifaceted set of proposals, and the devil is in the details. As I said, I have read this in almost every report so far at this stage of the Bill.

To most working people, their pensions are prospectively there simply to support them when they retire. Good employers, whether in the public or private sector, know that pension provision is often measured carefully when job opportunities are considered. Whether it is a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan is quite often a matter of good luck rather than good management and is often determined as a result of historic tradition in the particular industry or business.

In this legislation, the Government have the good general intentions of assisting members in DC schemes, including the enhancement of opportunities to get better returns through increasing the size of schemes and returning surpluses to employers. They also want to encourage schemes to invest in UK asset classes, thus hoping to help the economy, which I am sure is a laudable aim, particularly at present. All well so far, but let me at this early stage of our deliberations just put down one or two markers for later debate.

Increasing DC schemes to £25 billion—an arbitrary figure—has some real downsides. I suspect that this will reduce competition due to consolidation, leaving less choice and barring entry for new schemes, and will increase vulnerability, especially to cyber attack. DC schemes have been the preferred formula now for over 20 years and master trusts for only about 10 years and, of those, only a handful have achieved that magic £25 billion.

Next is the question of surpluses in DB funds. When interest rates were low, many employers put billions into schemes to repair a large number of deficits. They became less competitive than employers who did not have any DB schemes. I therefore hope that, in the Bill’s changes, we might find ways in which some of these surpluses could be returned to be utilised to fund capital expenditure, and I hope the Minister might be able to agree to that.

There are examples of surplus sharing and, in that context, I mention the Aberdeen Group’s adoption of the Stagecoach pension scheme less than two weeks ago—perhaps already mentioned by noble Lords. Members there will get two-thirds of future surpluses and Aberdeen one-third. I have no doubt that this will give great pleasure to bus drivers all over the UK but, like so many other aspects of pensions, there must be safeguards. It is the trustees who must always decide to distribute surpluses and they must act independently of employers, remembering that the basic principle is always to act in the best interest of the members. The intentions in the Bill for the allocation of surpluses in DB schemes seem to extend quite widely and to include enhancement of contributions in DC schemes. This crossover needs some care and further explanation.

Superfunds should be respected as an alternative destination, but advisory costs can be enormous. Also, actuaries must follow their obligations under Technical Actuarial Standard 300 and give advice on alternatives when consideration is taking place to transfer pension scheme obligations to insurers under buyout contracts. Improving the superfund regime is all well and good, but the Government must deal with the barriers around adviser intransigence and those potentially enormous costs. Without that attention, the idea of growing superfunds is a non-starter, as is evidenced by there being only one such fund in the UK at present.

Regarding encouragement to invest in UK assets, I also retain great reservations on mandation powers. As I said at the beginning, in theory it is a good idea that investing to help the UK should be given greater priority, but I remain concerned about the conflict of interest that might arise. This issue was raised by my honourable friend Mark Garnier at Second Reading in the other place. I go back to the strict obligation on trustees to always perform their role in the best interests of beneficiaries. That might suggest a new concentration on UK investment, but not necessarily. We need some more help for trustees for this responsibility. In response, the Minister in the other place suggested an opt-out if there were to be material detriment to members in taking such preferential decisions. I suggest that that would not satisfy the need for trustees to consider a wide list of things in determining those best interests of members.

On the powers for the ombudsman, we need to delve further into the intentions of the Government. Moving the ombudsman to become a form of court or tribunal changes to some extent the nature of its work. The relationship between the regulator, trustees and the ombudsman is currently very clear. We need a better explanation of their future respective roles and powers. My experience is that, although the Pensions Regulator imposes and controls duties and reminds pension trustees of their obligations, it is always, of course, ultimately up to the trustees themselves to decide what they believe is a proper course. Putting the regulator or the ombudsman into an enhanced role will not only diminish the absolute responsibility of trustees; it could also put those bodies into invidious situations of decision-making between themselves. No doubt there are also substantial resource issues to consider.

Lastly, I mention the pensions dashboard to the Minister, which has no doubt been referred to. A progress report would be welcome, as would an assurance that, as was clearly stated by the Minister at Second Reading in the other place, it will be completed and ready by autumn next year.

No doubt we can perfect matters as the Bill proceeds, as is the way with this House. The intentions are fine; the logistics and implementation to meet those intentions may well take quite a lot of work.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

My Lords, I am not entirely certain that I am wholly in favour of the concept of a clause at the beginning of a Bill that sets out its purpose in the way that the noble Viscount has set down, but I appreciate the opportunity to speak to one of the points that it makes.

First, I am not sure whether it is a declarable interest but I will declare it anyway: I am a trustee of the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund, for which I do not get remunerated—none of us does. As far as I am aware, nothing in the Bill affects that scheme, and therefore I am declaring it just in case. Secondly, I apologise for not having been here at Second Reading. I had to attend something extraordinarily rare: a hospital appointment in Inverness. I am afraid that not even I could get from Inverness to here in the required time for the Second Reading. I apologise for that, but I have read the Second Reading debate and was very taken by what was said.

The specific point that I want to come to is the point that the noble Viscount makes in proposed new subsection (1)(h) and his reference to

“responsible and innovative use of pension scheme surplus”.

What does he mean by an innovative use of the surplus? When the Minister comes to respond, will she say what the Government’s purpose was behind what they are doing on surpluses? I know we will come to that in much greater detail later on.

It seems to me that two things are behind this. One is doing something with a surplus, which begs the question: how much of a surplus should actually be taken? Also, how is that surplus calculated, bearing in mind that a range of actuarial factors—including the strength of the employer covenant, the level of risk of the investment, the actuarial factors regarding life and death, and so on—go into making up a surplus? All those factors can, at each valuation, move the surplus considerably. Therefore, how much is considered surplus surplus, as it were, as opposed to prudent management by the trustees?

The second thing is, I think, the underlying thought that the money given back to the employer will be used for investment. I see no evidence to suspect that will be the case. I have a horrible suspicion that, although we might have a desire to have more money for companies to invest, with the best will in the world, it is more likely that they will take the money, run it through the P&L and use it to pay dividends.

Those are the two issues I am looking at: the quantum of surplus and, in general terms, the principle behind that; and, secondly, the extent to which the Government expect it to be used for investment. If they do expect it to be used for investment, how do they hope that will happen?

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a current member and director of a pension trust. I want to take us back to the amendment for a moment. I shall refer to the reference to surpluses made by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, because it is an indicator of how this Bill is going to move; I suspect we shall get a surplus of comments about surpluses.

I go back to the amendment. We are starting to hear remarks suggesting that this amendment is critical. I do not criticise it at all because this is an enormously complex and comprehensive piece of legislation. Bringing our minds closely to the purpose of what we are going to debate, if ever a piece of legislation required it, this amendment is an essential ingredient. I fully support all parts of this amendment, which seem to encapsulate all the different areas to which we shall give more detailed consideration as we proceed.

However, I want to refer briefly to something already referred to: the matter of pension scheme surpluses under subsection (1)(h) of the proposed new clause to be inserted by Amendment 1. I referred to this at Second Reading; I will not repeat word for word what I said then—that would not be appropriate—but I want to probe my noble friend and, in particular, the Minister on this matter a little.

We all know that, historically, when we had low interest rates in this country, deficits often used to be repaired with any surpluses that might occur in schemes. As a result, employers that did not have DB schemes were obviously at a disadvantage. I am interested in how we might deploy surpluses in future. For instance, will they be deployable for capital expenditure? That seems quite desirable, particularly looking at the economy at present.

My second point concerns crossovers, referred to here, enhancing the contributions that already exist in DC schemes. How on earth can crossovers be legitimately and properly handled? That seems rather difficult to me.

Finally, I turn to surplus sharing. There is a case going on at the moment; I referred to it in my speech at Second Reading so I will not go back to it now. The encouragement of surplus sharing between employers and between members is terribly important. How can that be done fairly and equally? Will we be able to rely—as we should, I believe—on the powers of trustees always to do everything in the best interests of members? Pressures from employers, for instance, must be curbed when it comes to those decisions that might be taken.

It is a difficult area. I know that we will look at it in more detail, but it is worth mentioning at this starting point because this list is perhaps another example of how complicated things are and how we need to get a grip. Whoever has been responsible in the past for legislation in this field, this is an ideal opportunity, which I greatly support, for us to get this right. I therefore fully support Amendment 1 and hope that, as we move forward, we will use those objects as the basis for our discussions.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I apologise that I, too, missed Second Reading, for reasons outside my control. When you are in a party with two or three Members, it is very difficult to spread yourself in all directions. I have an interest in this area going back to when I was a trustee of the National Assembly’s pension scheme some years ago and, before that, I had involvement as financial controller of the Hoover Company and with Mars Ltd, which is one of the foremost companies in these islands.

I want to flag up one point as we look at the generalities in this comprehensive umbrella amendment—the position of employees such as those of Allied Steel and Wire in Cardiff in 2002, who found themselves on their backs without adequate safeguards for the pensions that they had. Over the almost quarter of a century since, those still surviving did not get justice out of the system. Whatever balance we have to strike in terms of risk—which is inevitably part of the equation—benefits, security and the longer term against the shorter term, we must also have some safety nets for those who fall through, through no fault of their own, as did the employees of Allied Steel and Wire.

I commend the Government for the steps they have taken for the coal miners, who have been in a difficult position, but if the coal miners were justified so are the workers at Allied Steel and Wire. I draw to the Government’s attention that the First Minister of Wales, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke about this last month and called on them to take action to recompense those who have lost out so badly.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

This group raises important issues about the purpose of these proposed changes to the legislation on pension schemes. I am going to move my Amendment 23 and speak to my Amendments 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30—and I thank the Chairman for the correction. I look forward to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on his Amendment 26, which on the face of it asks a perfectly valid question.

The main amendment in this group, Amendment 25, seeks clarification from my noble friend the Minister about the purpose of Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Bill. This chapter is headed

“Powers to pay surplus to employer”.

Other than that, the Bill and the Explanatory Notes are silent on why the law is being changed. I will come back to that, but first I will address my Amendments 23, 27, 28, 29 and 30, which simply seek a change in the terminology used in the Bill, leaving out the word “surplus” and inserting the word “assets” instead.

I make no apologies for what may appear a pedantic point. Words are important. Later amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would also change the wording, so I think that there is an understanding that words are important, but what do I mean in this specific case? Let us consider the difference from the point of view of a scheme member between being told that their employer has taken some surplus from their pension fund and hearing the statement that their employer has taken some assets from their pension fund. I believe that the latter statement is a much better reflection of what is happening. “Surplus” suggests that the money is not needed, which is never true in a pension scheme; “assets” suggests something far more concrete.

It is worth emphasising that there is no certain meaning of what constitutes a surplus. It is not a technical term in actuarial speak; it was not a word that I ever used when devising pension schemes as a scheme actuary. It is widely used in general conversation—I sometimes use it myself—but it does not appear in the technical actuarial guidance, except as required by a cross-reference to legislation on surpluses. I suggest that using the word “assets” is a much clearer and more honest reflection of what is happening and I urge my noble friend the Minister to accept the change.

Amendment 24 was tabled to make it clear that the intended purpose of releasing assets is to be for the benefit of scheme members as much as for the benefit of scheme sponsors—if not more, in my view. As mentioned, there is no indication in legislation of why scheme assets might be released. What are the purposes for which surplus assets will be released? What is the purpose of the change in legislation and the facilitation of such release? It is left entirely in the hands of scheme trustees exercising their fiduciary duty. Government Ministers during the passage of the Bill have made reference to that on numerous occasions.

However, I believe that this is highly problematic. Experience tells us that we cannot rely on all trustees to interpret the appropriate purposes of the release of assets. It has to be in the Bill. The title of the chapter,

“Powers to pay surplus to employer”,

illustrates the problem. I have been advised by the clerks that it is not possible to amend those parts of the Bill, but it simply reflects the content of that particular chapter. As I said, this illustrates the problem. It only talks about the employer but says nothing about scheme members.

The absence of any reference to scheme members in the Bill contrasts with what Ministers have told us on numerous occasions. There has been a consistent message from Ministers throughout the passage of this Bill that the change will be of benefit to members. On the release of surplus, ministerial statements have suggested consistently that it is intended that members will share in the benefits of releasing assets. For example, my noble friend the Minister said at Second Reading,

“the Bill introduces powers to enable more trustees of well-funded defined benefit, or DB, schemes to share some of the £160 billion of surplus funds to benefit sponsoring employers and members”.

So it is not just about employers. In the Government’s own words, it is about members as well as employers. My noble friend went on to say:

“The measure will allow trustees, working with employers, to decide how surplus can benefit both members and employers, while maintaining security for future pensions ”.—[Official Report, 18/12/25; col. 875.]


Scheme members hearing this must assume that, if the employer benefits from a release of assets, they will as well. But there is nothing in the Bill that will make that happen. The Minister for Pensions made a similar statement many times. He has argued consistently, and rightly, that the release of assets—surpluses, if you will—is not just about employers but about delivering better benefits for scheme members.

Look, for example, at the Government’s road map for pensions. It states under the heading “Surplus flexibilities”:

“We will allow well-funded … pension schemes to safely release some of the £160 billion surplus funds to be reinvested across the UK economy and to improve outcomes for members”.


But there is nothing in the Bill that delivers on that promise. The DWP press statement about the Bill said:

“New freedoms to safely release surplus funding will unlock investments and benefit savers”.


Again, there is nothing in the Bill.

Then we find a statement by the Minister for Pensions on 4 September during Committee on the Bill in the Commons:

“It is crucial that the new surplus flexibilities work for both sponsoring employers and members”.—[Official Report, Commons, Pension Schemes Bill Committee, 4/9/25; col. 130.]


Yet again, there is nothing in the Bill. I could go on—there are plenty of examples—but I hope that I have made the point.

If that is the case and the intention is that members as well as scheme sponsors are expected to benefit when assets are released, this objective should be set out clearly in the Bill. This is particularly important because the Bill, as drafted, removes the existing requirement on trustees only to release surplus where this is in the interests of members. We will come to this again when we reach Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso. I will support that amendment, but I think that it would be better to put the requirement for members to benefit as well as employers clearly and unambiguously in Clause 9. A defined benefit scheme is a joint endeavour, involving both employees and employer. They should be treated on an equal basis. I ask my noble friend the Minister to accept the point and bring forward a suitable amendment on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I will briefly intervene because the probing amendments here are important to how we look at the precise nature of surpluses. Clearly, the principle of making it easier to return a genuine pension scheme surplus to employers is worthy of support, particularly given how much has historically been paid by employers into DB schemes, often at the expense of capital investment. But safeguards are absolutely critical—this is the point I want to make about the relationship between employers and trustees in this area. It must be a trustee decision to distribute surplus, and trustees must be required to consider how the surplus has accumulated, as was touched on by the proposer. Was it due to employer contributions, member contributions or strong investment returns?

Under the proposed legislation, employers will no doubt apply immense pressure to steer the distribution towards them and not the members. In exercising their discretion, trustees must be unencumbered, properly advised and protected from the undue and inappropriate pressure that sponsoring employers will no doubt place on them. That is a real concern to me. We must be wary of employers exercising their powers to put in place weak trustees, who will not act in members’ best interests. We must also be wary of making it harder for trustees to distribute surplus to members in favour of employers.

Surplus distributed to members through increased benefits will directly improve the position of the real economy through increased domestic expenditure and of course increased tax receipts. If we are to restrict the use of surplus assets away from scheme memberships to employers, we must ensure that surplus distributed to them is used for reinvestment in the UK economy through capital expenditure. I would like to hear the Minister’s view on that.

On what a surplus is, the changes made by the Pensions Regulator to the DB funding code of practice in November 2024 have codified the requirement for pension scheme trustees to fund DB pension schemes very prudently—I think that those are the words that he used. Further, the investments that trustees are strongly encouraged to hold, through that code of practice, mean that the investment strategies are usually much lower risk than the insurance companies that many pension schemes are now being transferred to en masse under bulk annuity contracts.

In June 2025, the Pensions Regulator issued guidance that suggested that excessive prudence or hoarding of surplus could be considered poor governance by trustees. If we are to make it easier to distribute surplus from pension schemes, the bar for that should not be so low that the security of member benefits is weakened and it should not be so high that it requires schemes to be excessively funded. The current bar of buyout funding is, in my opinion, far too high.

Safeguards are important. It is absolutely critical that trustees are required to take appropriate advice and that actuarial advice is compliant at all times with the relevant technical actuarial standards. Trustees must be able to make informed, evidence-based decisions, unencumbered by the interests of the insurance industry and free from undue employer pressure. That particular relationship concerns me most in our probe into the functions of the surpluses. I hope that the Minister can give reassurances about the position of trustees—how they will be protected and by whom—in this particular contest or area of decision-making.

[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

My Lords, we come to three groups of amendments. The next two deal with what you might do with the surplus, and I have amendments in those. This group deals with the principle of what a surplus is. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving us the chance to consider that.

--- Later in debate ---

Increasingly, industry feedback shows trustees may well want to negotiate benefit improvements. Recent industry publications, which the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, has probably seen, show a strong appetite among trustees to ensure that members benefit. Brightwell research, for example, indicated that over 40% of employers intend to share any DB surplus with members. It also found that 49% of 100 finance heads surveyed would reinvest in the UK business. I see that the noble Lord is itching to get up.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I raised the question of safeguards. There is a lot of evidence in the industry that there is a lot of pressure. The Minister talks about the driving seat, but the actual installation of the driver into the car is at the behest of employers. It seems to me that there is likely to be some pressure here, perhaps more pressure than before. I just want to be sure that the safeguards are in place—we are perhaps going to be discussing these later—including safeguards for the trustees, who have the basic obligation of doing the best for the beneficiaries of the scheme. To what extent are they going to be protected in circumstances like that?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am coming on to that, but I am grateful to the noble Lord for pressing me on it. All trustees are bound by duties which will continue to apply when making decisions on sharing surplus. They have to comply with the rules of the scheme and with legal requirements, including a duty to act in the interests of beneficiaries. If trustees breach those requirements, the Pensions Regulator has powers to target individuals who intentionally or knowingly mishandle pension schemes or put workers’ pensions at risk. As the noble Lord knows, that includes powers to issue civil penalties under Section 10 of the Pensions Act 1995 or in some circumstances to prohibit a person from being a trustee.

The key is that the Pensions Regulator will in addition issue guidance on surplus sharing, which will describe how trustees may approach surplus release, and that can be readily updated. That guidance will be developed in consultation with industry, but it will follow the publication of regulations on surplus release and set out matters for trustees to consider around surplus sharing, as well as ways in which members can benefit, including benefit enhancement. That guidance will also be helpful for employers to understand the matters trustees have to take into account in the regulator’s view. I hope that that helps to reassure the noble Lord.

We will come on to some of the detail in later groups around aspects of the way this regulation works, but I hope that, on the first group, that has reassured noble Lords and they feel able not to press their amendments.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

I also agree with the title of Clause 42, “Regulations restricting creation of new non-scale default arrangements”. Again, I find that very strange; the legislation should encourage the creation of new arrangements to widen choice. Throughout all this, I reiterate that any attempt to interfere with the absolute fiduciary duties of the trustees of pension funds is damaging and very hard to accept. I do not believe it is the right way to achieve the Government’s perfectly valid and admirable intention to increase the amount of pension funds invested in UK infrastructure, but it has to be entirely left to the decision of the trustees of the pension funds. I therefore support my noble friend in her amendment.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I just want to touch on some basic principles here. As we go through the Bill in Committee, I go back to look at the whole basis of what the Government are trying to do, which I broadly support.

However, it essentially says here that members should benefit from these reforms and get better outcomes and greater value for their pension and invested funds. Therefore, although in general I agree with the first of these amendments, if one looks further into Amendments 172, 173 and 174—which I want to concentrate on here—they remind us of the interesting power balance we seem to be developing. I am somewhat concerned, as a trustee of a fund, that my accountability has always primarily been to the members, to achieve the outcomes that the Bill suggests should be achieved.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke a few minutes ago about responsibility of government. Of course, the responsibility of trustees has been enormous, and is very important as a protection for members but also as a barrier between the way investments take place and the way regulation takes place. I was investigated myself when I first became a trustee because I was appointed by a company and under Section 72—I think it was, at that time—of the Pensions Act, the regulator checked to see whether I was too closely connected to the company. It is true that I was a good friend of the company directors and so on, but I had to prove that I would act in a dispassionate manner and that I would do the very best for members at all times.

Of course, however, in doing that chore, I have had issues regarding the position of the regulator and the relationship between the regulator and the PPF in determining the nature of investment the trustees have made. The balance of trustees’ investments has always been a critical factor in reporting—as has been necessary—to the regulator and to the PPF. This is all essential stuff. Therefore, in view of the mandation proposals and looking at Amendments 172, 173 and 174, all of which refer to important elements, I have one question. How will this future relationship be in existence for the benefit of the members? Amendment 172 talks about informing members, and one of the criticisms of trustees—sometimes coming from members, or sometimes from the regulator—has been that not enough information has been provided to scheme members for things that have been done on their behalf. Is the process we are now looking at really going to allow for that information to be objective and put to the members appropriately by the people who ought to do it—the trustees?

Value for money for anything that is mandated is a decision to be made, and we had that debate in the last group. I am concerned about that, too.

Finally, on the question of the reduction of members’ choices—trustees inevitably inform their members of the options available to them—a genuine and legitimate choice must be available to members at all times. If that is not the case, it is very difficult for trustees to perform their duties and not fall foul of what will still be a very heavy set of regulations on the choices that they make.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, one of the astonishing things about the Bill is that it not only stops choice but puts under statute a connivance between the regulators and that old boys’ club of large operators that run investment money in London.

The effect of this connivance is to weaken returns, increase costs, damage competition among funds and weaken the UK economy. It does that because—although you would not know from the Bill—the City of London is, by any measure, one of the world’s top three financial centres. That did not happen by itself. Three hundred years of innovation, progress, capital and scale, starting in Lloyd’s Coffee House in the 1700s, and continuing with the Rothschilds and the big bang 40 or 50 years ago, made the United Kingdom and the City of London a financial powerhouse. It created a tax gusher. That happened because people were able to use their intellect and talents to innovate to turn small acorns into large oak trees in so far as financial management is concerned.

All that is at risk. That is why I welcome the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes, which would re-establish the principle that you have to allow the creative destruction in a market economy to advance returns and service and add competition, all of which this Government would sweep aside. It is that sort of macroeconomic approach.

Of course, it also fetters people’s ability to make their own decisions in an adult way. I accept that after someone’s house, their pension may be their second largest asset. But that is not the same in every case, and there are people with sophisticated needs and requirements who ought to have that choice. That choice should not be foisted upon them, because it gives you those weaker returns, increased costs and damaged competition.

I am entirely in favour of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes and, once again, I call on the Government to have a fresh look at this, not least because the Prime Minister has identified fintech and all those sorts of innovative sectors—those start-ups in Shoreditch—as one of the large opportunities where this country can show competitive advantage. That would be snuffed out if these provisions in the Bill were implemented through regulation or other methods.