Privileges and Conduct Committee

Debate between Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Monday 17th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

I wish to address the House for a few minutes only on a subject to which many noble Lords have alluded, which is cross-examination. I cannot claim the 50 years of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, but I can claim 40 years at the Bar. During that time, I guess that I have spent hundreds of hours in adversarial proceedings cross-examining witnesses myself or watching co-defending counsel or opposing counsel cross-examining. That has been the greater part of my professional life.

Many noble Lords in this debate and in the debate last month have reminded the House of the famous dictum that cross-examination is the greatest legal engine for the discovery of truth ever invented. Of course it can be, and I have seen it so. I have seen liars unmasked, fraudsters exposed and terrorists cross-examined into confinement for decades. But my years of experience have also taught me that, like most aphorisms, this one is not able to paint the whole picture. Cross-examination can, of course, uncover the truth, but it can also obfuscate. It can advance a false prospectus, and it can intimidate. In adversarial proceedings, especially where freedom and forced confinement are in issue, its essential combativeness is indulged, but always and only under the watchful eye of a trained, professional judge.

I am sure that cross-examination can be one way to get at the truth, but I have never believed that it is the only way. In particular, I have never doubted that a diligent and fair inquiry by a competent tribunal, taking the necessary evidence, examining the relevant issues and asking the proper questions, is also capable of uncovering the truth. Tribunals proceed in this way every day, in this country and in other fair-trial jurisdictions around the world. The questions asked by a tribunal are, of course, a form of cross-examination in themselves, but cross-examination conducted in a more neutral, more objective manner, perhaps better suited to the inquisitorial style.

It is clear to me from the papers in Lord Lester’s case, which I have read, that the commissioner asked the complainant about all of the primary matters that might have been put in cross-examination: “Why did you go back to Lord Lester’s house?”, “Why did you dedicate the book to him in the way that you did?”, and so on. And the commissioner got her answers. It is true that these questions were asked in a gentler, more neutral way than might have been expected from a robust cross-examining lawyer, but there is no harm in that. Indeed, there are many situations in which this sort of low-key approach is more likely to get at what really happened, precisely because it occurs in a gentler, less aggressive environment. In my judgment, a disciplinary hearing, particularly where sensitive allegations of sexual misconduct are being aired, is certainly one of those situations.

Your Lordships could have mandated an adversarial disciplinary regime. I would not have recommended it, but you could have done so. This House could have mandated an inquisitorial system in which the participants were lawyered up, including for the purposes of cross-examination. Again, I would not have recommended this, but it could have been recommended. Even though both these things could have been done, they are emphatically not a pre-condition for a fair process. On the contrary, in my judgment, the process that your Lordships alighted upon was, for all the reasons that other noble Lords and the committee have set out, reasonable and fair.

Let me address one final thing on this subject, the standing of the commissioner. Lucy Scott-Moncrieff is a figure of the highest reputation in the legal world, a solicitor with a distinguished practice, a past president of the Law Society and a founding member of the Queen’s Counsel appointments panel. This House could hardly have selected someone more suited to the difficult task in hand, or more deserving of our trust. Your Lordships devolved to her the power to inquire fairly and thoroughly into the circumstances of Lord Lester’s case and to come to her reasonable conclusion on the evidence. That was her warrant. In my judgment, she discharged it faithfully.

Before I sit down, I wish to say one other thing briefly. During my five years as a public servant, as a prosecutor, my colleagues and I struggled endlessly against the sort of insidious stereotyping that bedevilled sex crime prosecutions. “Why didn’t she report it sooner? Why didn’t she distance herself more? Why was she wearing this? Why was she drinking that?”. In the end, we believed that we were making some progress, as judges repeatedly warned juries about the dangers of making stereotypical assumptions about the way that traumatised people react to the source of their trauma, warning them that they should not allow what may be little more than prejudice to cloud their judgment of the fact that an injustice has been done. Let us not find ourselves, in this House, moving backwards.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My Lords, I was at the debate last month. I do not know if any of your noble Lordships have seen “Groundhog Day”, but this has similarities. We are going over the same ground again. I should like to make two points. First, I support the Committee for Privileges and Conduct. Its robust response to the November’s debate was superb. I was furious during the debate; I walked out at one point, because I was so angry with a Peer who was speaking. The report is fantastic and obviously I will vote for it if anyone decides to divide the House.

Secondly, I never thought these words would pass my lips, but the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is wrong. He was wrong to press the amendment last time and he would be wrong to push it today. He talks about fairness all the time. Was it fair to divide the House when there was no expectation of a vote and many Peers had gone home because the debate went on for much longer than expected and they had trains to catch? As I see it, fairness is not playing a full part in this process.

My last point is a question for the Senior Deputy Speaker. Lord Lester has resigned rather than been suspended. Does that mean that he maintains his rights and privileges of access here in this House, such as eating here and so on? I am sure that many of us will feel that natural justice would suggest that he should not.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose the amendments for many of the reasons outlined here today. First, they are unnecessary. We have heard a lot about gaps, targeted and not blanket surveillance and bringing things up to date. This is, of course, absolute nonsense. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the Met and presumably the other agencies already have the powers they need—powers that, I suggest, go far beyond what they need. We heard a lot today about Paris and Lee Rigby, but in fact all my information says that the shortcomings of the pre-investigation in Paris and in the Lee Rigby tragic murder were due not to a lack of surveillance but to a lack of good police work. That is what was fundamentally missing. It was not about not having enough recordings or surveillance. It was about a lack of information and a lack of talking to marginalised community groups. The cross-party committee which reported in November on the handling of the Lee Rigby killers exposed major internal failings in the way that agencies pursue leads. It found that both men had been known to the agencies for years—one had even been considered a priority—but basic issues such as delays, poor communication and bad record-keeping caused the problems, not the surveillance of the suspects.

Although these amendments are obviously within the letter of the law, they seem to me to be fundamentally undemocratic in the way that they are being brutally pushed into our parliamentary process. This seems to me a way of short-circuiting real scrutiny. It is great that they were looked at before, but they still need looking at again; if they are—I hope the Minister is listening—they absolutely must be looked at by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It should look at these amendments before there is any more discussion in either of these Houses.

For me, this snoopers’ charter reduces our rights, and surely that is exactly what the terrorists are after. Terrorists want to impact on our society and on every single person who does not believe the way that they do. That is what we are letting happen here. It is absolutely mad. The Mayor of London recently referred to “this civil liberties stuff” in the most dismissive way, as if that is negotiable—that civil liberties are not terribly important when we compare them with the threat of terrorism. That is exactly when we need our civil liberties. That is what we in the West should be known for.

There is also the cost. My experience of the Met over the past 15 years is that it cannot deal with the data that it already has. I have asked many questions about its databases and the information that it gets from them. The Met does not know how many databases it has—it cannot tell me how many to the nearest hundred. Also, it often cannot search its databases. For example, I had the dubious pleasure of being on its domestic extremist database, I think under the regime of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I hope that I am not on the database anymore—the Met has changed its definition of what a domestic extremist is—but who knows because I cannot get the information. However, the Met cannot search that database for serious criminal activity. Because the definition was changed to relate to serious criminals, if you ask, “Can you look through the database and find out how many serious criminals you have?”, you will be told, “Oh, we haven’t logged that, so we can’t do that”.

Not only are we expecting the Met staff to deal with more data when they cannot sort and file the data that they already have, but, I would argue, they have enough powers. The noble Lord, Lord Blair, talked about some very tragic incidents where more surveillance might actually solve a crime or find a lost child. In fact, the police already have these powers. They have them under RIPA and, in my view, they are already misusing them. Under RIPA they do not have to go to a judge to ask if they can put surveillance on somebody; they just have to go to a chief inspector in a nearby unit and ask, “Could you sign this for me? It’s surveillance on somebody or other”.

We should not be thinking about giving more powers to our spies and to the police. We should be very careful about this. We should think about taking back some of those powers and making sure that we persist in keeping our civil liberties and human rights and do not let the terrorists take them away from us.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I was surprised that at an early stage in his speech the noble Lord, Lord West, suggested—until he revised the figure—that communications data were employed in some 95% of criminal cases. My experience from the years when I was responsible for prosecuting serious crime and terrorism was that the figure was 100%. I cannot remember a serious criminal case, and I certainly cannot remember a terrorism case, in which communications data were not used. Of course, there is a difference between data which are employed to detect terrorism and data which are then used as part of a prosecution to convict terrorists. Certainly, so far as the latter is concerned, there was a vast amount in every case.

The noble Lord, Lord Evans, will remember some of those cases which occurred when he was director-general of the Security Service. The men who tried to commit mass murder on London’s Underground are serving long prison sentences. The men who wanted to detonate a bomb containing radioactive material in Oxford Street are serving long prison sentences. The men who wanted to put a bomb in Bluewater shopping centre at half-term when it would be particularly busy are serving long prison sentences. In the case of the men who wanted to put a bomb in a nightclub—the Ministry of Sound—two were recorded by members of the noble Lord’s service. The leader of the gang said to one of his colleagues, “No one will be able to criticise us for blowing up a nightclub; all those slags dancing around”. This is material which is of the utmost importance in criminal prosecutions.

It is also true, of course, that technology is changing and our capacity to monitor this sort of material must change with it. I accept that, but I do not believe that these amendments are the right vehicle for achieving that change. These amendments suffer from the deficiencies which the original Bill suffered from; in particular, they are insufficiently specific. I agree with everything that the noble Lord said in his compelling speech a few minutes ago. These amendments are deficient for the same reasons that the original Bill was deficient and I shall not support them. This is not, as my noble friend Lord Carlile said, a party political matter. It is a matter of analysing the material and determining whether it is fit for purpose. With respect, I do not agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones that we must do something. We must do the right thing and I do not think that this is the right thing. In everything, we must maintain balance and proportionality. No one has argued in this debate that we should not have a mechanism whereby the security services can access material of this sort. The question is what sort of mechanism.

The security services in recent years, and perhaps in years long gone by, have been led by people who understand the tension between security and rights. When I was DPP and the noble Lord was the director-general of the Security Service, I enjoyed the discussions we had on this topic. Sometimes we disagreed about precisely where the line was drawn, but we agreed that there was a line. One of my fears about these amendments, as with the draft Communications Data Bill, is that they draw the line in the wrong place. One result of that would be an adverse impact on our great security institutions. There is no doubt that the security services in this country enjoy enormous public support, which is unfamiliar even in democracies such as France. It is clearly understood by people in this country that the security services are after “them and not us”. In other words, they are interested in targeting those individuals who are trying to do us wrong rather than the rest of us. The danger of breadth in legislation of this sort is that, if the idea gets about that the security services are interested in everybody’s communications, not just the material of those subject to investigation who are being targeted because it is believed that they are involved in crime, then the sense which the British people have of their security institutions will begin to alter in subtle ways, and not for the good. I would caution those who argue that legislation of this breadth is needed because it is future-proof. We must take great care with legislation that is enacted in the context of the sort of public confidence issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, indicated.

People are interested in these issues. They express their interest in different ways, but there is a feeling abroad that the Government and the security services are becoming nosy. I do not believe that that is true, but if we enact legislation that appears to people to be unnaturally broad, we run the risk of feeding that monster. I shall oppose the amendment.