Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage
Monday 29th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I too believe that the Government have made the right choice in going to 75 in one go, as my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton put it. We have to bear in mind that what is being suggested is a maximum; I think my noble and learned friend Lord Brown was making that point in passing in what he was saying a moment or two ago.

I am not sure that the examples that my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton gave of people going on until 70 is a very sound guide as to how people will behave if the age is raised to 75, for the very particular reason that a factor that someone has to bear in mind in choosing the age of retirement is whether he has served long enough to earn the full judicial pension. In my day, you had to serve for 15 years; now, you have to serve for 20. For those who have gone on to the Bench in their early 50s, the age of 70 does not give them long enough. When they reach the time when they have achieved that, they may well take the decision to go then, rather than going on for the extra few years, because they have actually earned their full pension. So we are, to a degree, in an area of speculation. We are having to consider human behaviour and how people will behave in view of the two choices of age that we are being given.

We are also contemplating human behaviour in the problem of diversity. I pay tribute to what my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton was saying about the need to increase diversity at all levels on the Bench. I had the responsibility for a while, as Deputy President of the Supreme Court, of being on a commission considering applicants for the position of justice. One of the issues that concerned us at the time was the lack of diversity in the applicants coming before us—a point that I think has been hinted at by my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Again, we are trying to speculate about human behaviour. There is an immense amount to be said for the diversity element, but I do not think one can be sure that choosing 75 instead of 72 is going to be as damaging as has been suggested.

As for the in-one-go point, I think my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton was referring to me when he mentioned someone who said at Second Reading that the opportunity to legislate on this issue comes quite seldom. I would be concerned, if we were to settle on 72 this time, as to when one would ever get back to the age of 75. As it happens, the Bill has enormous importance behind it because of the need to deal with pensions, which is a pressing issue. It has been possible to bring in the retirement age element and other parts of the Bill because the Bill is already there and the issue fits quite neatly with its broad aim and subject matter. How soon could we be sure that we could ever get back to this issue? For that reason too, the in-one-go point has a lot to commend it.

There is even more to be said for the points made by my noble and learned friends and the point that we are dealing here with an element of speculation, since we are setting a maximum age, not a compulsory one, and it will have the benefits that have been referred to. I believe the Government have made absolutely the right choice here.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I am in the rather unusual position of having brought the judicial retirement age down, all those years ago, to 70 from 75. Your Lordships will remember that 75 was a fairly recent innovation because, originally, judges were appointed for life, and if they did not care for resignation, that sometimes meant fairly long periods in office.

I am very given to wishing for diversity on the Bench, and I realise what the authorities responsible for appointments have done over the past few years. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, can be sure that if they get 72 instead of 75 there will be an increase in diversity on the Bench. I had a great deal of experience—it is a long time ago—of trying to work with the ethnic minorities to improve their chances of getting to the top. Indeed, the death of one of those appointments—Mr Kadri, the first Muslim Silk who originated from Pakistan—was reported just the other day. During my time in office, I struggled to bring up the standards of ethnic minorities at the Bar because I felt that was the way to build up a chance of diversity. One of the difficulties in doing that was getting the arrangements needed for that purpose. I was of the view, and am still, that the best chance for ethnic minorities is not Chambers that are entirely of an ethnic minority but diverse Chambers with people from different backgrounds. That has happened to a considerable extent in recent times. It has produced some ethnic-minority members on the Bench, although nothing like as many as I would have liked.

I am convinced that the situation is very different now from what it was 27 years ago, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said. Just after the Supreme Court was set up, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, and I wrote to the then Lord Chancellor suggesting that the age limit for Supreme Court judges should be raised to 75 from 70 to accommodate for a reasonable length of time some of those who were there and had the potential to be very good examples of service in the Supreme Court. I am not sure that diversity has necessarily increased very much since then. It is perhaps worth my commenting that the President of the Supreme Court and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court are from Scotland. That is a very important move, although it is not in the way of diversity. It shows that those making the appointments are doing their best to secure the best quality they can at this time. However, it is important to do everything we can to raise the quality of those who are thinking of going to the Bench.

I do not know on what basis the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, whose experience and position is a matter of great importance so far as I am concerned, know that if this is left at 72 there will be greater diversity than now. The people making appointments are as keen on diversity as we are, but they find it difficult in the context in which they are working to bring it forward. I do not believe that it is at all likely that 72 will be more fruitful in that respect than 75. There is no doubt in my mind that going to 75 will increase the possibility of people in senior positions at the Bar taking the appointment. That is one of the things that I realised. The reason is simply that, as has been pointed out, the pension is important in these situations. People who are at the top of the profession are rather unwilling to take a judicial appointment unless they have a pension that encourages them to leave the Bar, with what they are making. I support this move to 75 very strongly, although I know it reverses what I did all those years ago.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage & Report stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I have some difficulty in understanding what exactly the amendment is trying to achieve. I have the greatest respect for all four noble Lords who have tabled the amendment, but to take the point on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, I do not think that the amendment meets the terms of the article. It seeks to address the position when the sentence was imposed, whereas Article 7 refers to the situation at the time when the act that gave rise to the criminal offence was committed. It is worded in such a way that the individual should have been aware at the time of his conduct what sentence he was likely to receive. The amendment does not address that, as it is not addressed to that point in time. On Article 7, it misses the point, and does not achieve anything.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said that the convention was a sideshow. That brings me to the other point, which I think I do understand, on the value of retaining the Parole Board at halfway through the sentence, partly for the reason that changing the system for those who have already been sentenced seems instinctively rather unfair to them. It also has a value in getting the Parole Board in as early as possible, because the longer it has to assess the element of risk, the greater the possibility that it can achieve something useful at the end. To shorten it, which seems to be the effect of the Government’s amendment, reduces the opportunity for the board to get into the depths of the mind of the individual and to see what it can do about the risk. If that is the purpose of the amendment, why not have the same rule for everybody? It is accepting the Government’s amendment for the newcomers—those who have not yet been sentenced. It would be more logical to apply the same rule throughout.

That goes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, when he asked what the change from a half to two-thirds would achieve, given that the Parole Board will be involved anyway. If it comes in halfway through, there is no question of the prisoner being released until it is safe for them to be released, which could well be right up until the end of the sentence imposed by the judge. Logically, it would be sensible to have the same rule for everybody, rather than split it up. The other point, which is worth emphasising, and perhaps an answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is that a great deal has been said about automatic release, but it is not unconditional release. This point was made very effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, when describing the deficiencies of the Parole Board system.

When the original scheme was devised with release subject to conditions, it was understood that these conditions meant something. I remember cases in which I was involved where people were returned to custody because they had breached their conditions. It was not just a day in custody; they were in for a substantial time until it was regarded as appropriate for them to be released again. In the case of life prisoners, sometimes they went backwards and forwards because they had breached conditions, and they went back in again. This is what we have lost, I am afraid. It bears thinking about that the release halfway through is not unconditional; it is a conditional release subject to the licence terms. That has a bearing on whether this is something that attracts the Article 7 attack in any event. For the reasons I have indicated, I am slightly puzzled by the amendment, and I am not sure that I would support it.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I will not apologise to your Lordships for not speaking at Second Reading. It is, rather, a matter for congratulation—noble Lords have not had to listen to me twice.

The situation is one of severe crisis in respect of the damage that has occurred as a result of the release of persons described in this Bill. That is a matter of the utmost importance for Her Majesty’s Government, because if any human right is vital it is people’s right to be protected against danger, by their Government. That danger has been illustrated vividly by these two incidents.

I do not imagine for one minute that anyone thought that the man involved in the London Bridge incident was going to do anything like that. One of the people murdered was doing his best to look after him and to bring him into ordinary life in a good way, yet that man was struck down. I do not believe it is possible to discern who is dangerous and who is not, because the problem with this type of danger is that it is not necessarily there when the man or woman is originally sentenced. It is danger that, to a great extent, seems to have arisen as a result of the experience in prison, and that is most unfortunate.

On the other hand, if you had an opportunity to ask somebody to change his mind, you may find it difficult if he has a religious persuasion. The people trying to get rid of this danger in prison are finding that it is very difficult to succeed and mightily difficult to know when, if at all, the attempt has succeeded. The concentration therefore has to be on the circumstances in which one of these people is released. One way of dealing with that, to get a bit of time, is to postpone the release. That is what is done in the move from half to two-thirds. Of course, there is still a third of the sentence left.

The second point that has been made clear is that there is a substantial number of convicted prisoners up for release quite soon. The Parole Board’s investigations are quite substantial, and I do not believe it would be possible for the board to deal with a large number of these satisfactorily in a very short time. We have to remember the decision the board is going to take. Personally, I would not like to be a member of the Parole Board taking that responsibility. I am glad to say that there are people who do that and who have the skills to do it properly. On the whole, the Parole Board’s decisions have been pretty well received. One or two—I remember one in particular—have been by no means well received, but generally they have been. So it is important that it gets a proper opportunity to carry out its task.

The rule is to be that when the two-thirds is up, the prisoner is released or not according to whether the Parole Board is satisfied that it is safe for the person to be released. That seems the best possible solution to a mighty difficult problem. However, it is only a temporary solution, because when the sentence is fully served, the person is to be released in any case, without anything from the Parole Board. That matter must be dealt with in the Bill that is to come. In the meantime, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I cannot see any justification for dividing up the original division with this amendment. The Bill would be better without the amendment.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

If a defect was pointed out in a statutory instrument, I would consider that a matter for stopping it going forward. Most of the arguments I have heard in recent times do not point to any mistake in an instrument. They are more theoretical. I do not wish to examine them in detail—I have done that once—but it is important. That is what was proposed when these instruments were originally laid. It is much easier to amend an instrument by taking it back and starting again than with an Act of Parliament. That is the appropriate procedure for correcting a defective instrument, and it happens, not necessarily formally, but quite often instruments are withdrawn when a mistake is pointed out; they get round to writing it again and hopefully the second time it is improved.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, it is perhaps worth mentioning Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, which was covered by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, because he directs our attention to a quite extraordinary provision. On page 3 of the Bill at line 40, we are asked to approve Clause 5(3), which allows regulations to be made amending, repealing or revoking,

“primary legislation … for the purpose of conferring functions on the Secretary of State or on any other person”.

That is extraordinarily wide. I can understand conferring powers on the Secretary of State but why “on any other person”, given that the subsection then adds “(including conferring a discretion)”? That really is the most extraordinarily broad provision, which should be looked at very carefully.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, my amendment relates to the personal injury discount rate, which is the subject of Part 2 of the Bill. Clause 10(1) provides for new Section A1 of the Damages Act 1996. Two of its provisions are important to what I am about to say. One directs the court to apply a rate of return, as may, from time to time, be prescribed by an order made by the Lord Chancellor. The other, which I am concerned about, is new Section A1(2), which states:

“Subsection (1) does not however prevent the court taking a different rate of return into account if any party to the proceedings shows that it is more appropriate in the case in question”.


The Minister will recall that I raised this issue on Report when I moved what was then Amendment 50 on the Marshalled List. That amendment sought to tailor the wording of subsection (2) to address a problem that had been the subject—the result, I should say—of decisions in the Court of Appeal in the cases Warriner v Warriner and Warren v Northern General Hospital Trust, following the House of Lords case in Wells v Wells in 1999.

The problem that has arisen as a result of those cases in the Court of Appeal, which was expounded with some care by Lord President Carloway in his judgment in Tortolano v Ogilvie Construction Ltd in 2013, is that there is a very tight straitjacket on any use of subsection (2) in the Damages Act 1996, which is the predecessor of the provision in this Bill in cases where people seek a different rate of return from that prescribed due to the circumstances of the particular case.

Each of these three cases, the two from the Court of Appeal and the one from the Court of Sessions in Scotland, involved injuries of maximum severity—perhaps a prime example of cases where litigants would wish to have a more generous rate of return. However, in each of these cases, it was said that that could not be done on the ground that there had to be an exceptional case-specific factor before this could be achieved.

I was concerned that the provision in the Bill simply reproduces the language of the 1996 Act without any attempt to suggest that the approach the courts have mandated should be any different in this case. I was seeking a relaxation to allow a case where, if the court felt that the award was less than adequate after applying the prescribed discount rate, it could be altered to allow a better rate of return in recognition of the compensation needed to meet the loss incurred or to be incurred during the rest of the claimant’s lifetime.

The noble and learned Lord may recall that in our discussion on Report, reported in Hansard on 12 June, he said that he wished to give further consideration to the matter I had raised so that he could come to a view on whether something might be done to tailor the wording of the provision to address what he described as “the almost complete guillotine” that is in place as a result of the two Court of Appeal decisions. As he put it, there was a balancing act to be achieved and he undertook to look at that.

It is fairly plain from the fact that there is no government amendment on this issue at Third Reading that he and his team have not been able to come up with a form of wording that would address my point without undermining the policy that underpins the scheme which this part of the Bill seeks to lay down. I am grateful to him and his team for meeting me to go over this point last week so that I could understand the position he has adopted, which I fully appreciate. It is a very difficult issue on which to find a form of words that would achieve what I sought to achieve. In the course of that meeting, I suggested that in view of that position it might be better to delete this subsection from the Bill altogether, which is what my amendment would do.

To elaborate a little more on the reasoning behind the amendment, the phrase which the noble and learned Lord used—“almost complete guillotine”—describes the situation very well, although in rather brutal language. I do not criticise that, because the Court of Appeal in its decision was building on what this House said in Wells v Wells in 1999. In that case, we said that the aim of the solution that we adopted in finding an appropriate discount rate was to create as much certainty as possible. Lord Steyn said that only in exceptional circumstances should a party be entitled to reopen the debate. The idea was to close down the expensive and time-consuming business of trying to present a different rate of return from that laid down by the court, the House or the Lord Chancellor.

The problem is that what such exceptional circumstances might be nobody has been able to discover in almost 20 years of the provision’s existence. Any idea that they could be founded on the nature or gravity of the injuries seems to have been completely cut off by the Court of Appeal. My point is that it is very difficult to see what value, if any, can be achieved by retaining this provision if there is to be no change to its wording. It has been a dead letter for some time and it seems rather a pity to reproduce a dead letter in fresh legislation. Indeed, retaining it risks raising false hopes of achieving something that it cannot achieve—indeed, according to the Government’s policy, something it ought not to be able to achieve—which is altering the discount rate in these cases. My suggestion, which I made at our meeting last week, was that it might be better to face the fact now and to delete the provision. Having made that suggestion, I thought it right to table the amendment for discussion so that the Minister could at least report to the House on the view he now takes, having had time to think about my suggestion.

It is right to draw attention to the fact that the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers has circulated a briefing among some of your Lordships in which it indicates that it opposes the amendment. As I understand its letter, that is for two reasons. One is that a court should retain the ability to apply a different discount rate, particularly in cases of injury of maximum severity. That is an example of wishful thinking in view of the decisions I referred to. It is clear that any attempt to do that in that kind of case will not succeed, which is why I am so concerned about the repetition of this amendment in the Bill.

The other reason is rather more fundamental. If I might read what the association says, it puts it this way:

“The ability for a judge to apply a different discount rate is an appropriate safeguard against any abrupt changes in the financial market. While the proposed legislation provides for regular reviews of the discount rate, a scheduled review could be too late if there is a sudden change in the market. The discount rate could be too high, and it could be years until the next review when the rate could be corrected. In the meantime, injured people will be undercompensated, and will be in fear of what happens when their money runs out”.


As I understand the system that Part 2 of the Bill seeks to lay down, it is intended to have the process reviews carried out at regular intervals, with a view to having certainty between each review that the courts would be obliged to apply, subject to the provision I am concerned about. With respect, the Government have to consider very carefully whether the point the association raises is one they would be willing to accept—in other words, that it should be open ground for parties to seek to attack the prescribed discount rate between reviews because of changes in the market. We would get back to the kind of uncertain situation that we were so concerned about in Wells; we did our best in the reasoning in that case to address our seeking certainty and to have the matter addressed in only exceptional circumstances.

For what it might be worth, the wording of subsection (2) does not permit an across-the-board change to the discount rate because it talks about a different rate being taken if a party can show that it is,

“appropriate in the case in question”,

which suggests that one is taking a particular case out of the generality that deserves special treatment, rather than something across the board, which is what I think the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers is addressing.

I have said enough to indicate that there are reasons for concern as to why this provision is still in the Bill, and to ask whether it should still be there and possibly whether, as the Bill proceeds through the other House, further thought might be given to its wording or its presence in the clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, it is fairly plain that this phrase was used by me more than once around this time. One area in which it was used was fixed sentences in criminal cases, because there was a feeling that laying a particular sentence or assigning a particular rate tended to deprive judges of their inherent discretion.

In the two judgments referred to, the Court of Appeal indicated that it felt it was given no discretion. It was enough to get me through the difficulties that I had at that time. Therefore, whether it should remain is a question I find rather difficult. I am not keen to remove anything that gives the presiding judge in a particular case some degree of discretion. If the courts have held that such sentences do not give that, it is rather difficult. I cannot think of a better phrase; needless to say, it occupied my attention quite a lot at the time and was hotly debated. Obviously, my noble and learned friend the Minister has given the phrase consideration and I would be interested to hear what he has to say.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, the Act which this Bill amends gave the Lord Chancellor this power. I suppose that, at that time, the Lord Chancellor had intimate relations with the judiciary—but he also had the responsibility of accounting to Parliament if there was a question about the matter. The connection between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary has somewhat diminished since that time, but the Lord Chancellor still has a primary duty in relation to the judiciary that other members of the Government do not.

It is also important to have accountability in this matter. As my noble friend has just said, if the Lord Chancellor ignored the advice of the panel, he might have good reason for doing so, but it would be very difficult for him to explain it, because one would assume in this case that he or she would accept the judgment of the panel and he or she would be answerable to Parliament.

I share my noble friend Lord Faulks’s difficulty in relation to medical help. It is for the judge to decide on the length of time or the nature of the requirements for care, treatment and so on that a person may have. This particular exercise is primarily for those expert in the matter of investment.

I have perhaps interpreted the new schedule to which the amendment applies rather too generously. I assumed that there would be different rates of return fixed for different classes of case and that it might therefore be possible to change them on review—for example, to have no rate of return for a particular class or to enlarge the class that another rate of return applied to. It would be extraordinary if one could abolish this duty by the exercise of paragraph 8(2)(a). I do not think that that was intended—but my noble and learned friend may say that it was.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a footnote to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in favour of the Lord Chancellor having the decision. Paragraph 6(2) of the new schedule, on the way in which the panel is supposed to work, states:

“In the event of a tied vote on any decision, the person chairing the panel is to have a second casting vote”.


We then look at who is to chair the panel and see that it is the Government Actuary. I would much rather the Lord Chancellor assumed ultimate responsibility than the matter be determined in the event of a tied position by the Government Actuary. So the structure as set out supports the line taken by the noble Lord.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I can see that. On the other hand, it is sometimes wise to be prepared if you can foresee a thing that is required and have it ready. We also have the scope to discuss it in this Bill, whereas I imagine the discussions on the withdrawal agreement Bill will be pretty complicated—I assume the latter will be a good deal more complicated than this Bill, and if it is going to require the sort of consideration that this Bill has had it will take some time. There is something to be said for trying to prepare, but of course it is necessary to ensure that the preparations are adequate—that is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, deals with.

I am conscious that we may be trying to regulate the House of Commons a bit. I have never had the honour of being a Member of the House of Commons, as so many of your Lordships have, but my impression is that the House of Commons has plenty of powers to control what the Government do. Of course, if necessary, it has a very extreme power in that connection.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I mentioned on Monday that an aspect of Clause 9(2) is of concern to the devolved Administrations. How does the Sewel convention fit into the scheme which Clause 9(2) sets out? If one were making the amendments which are being contemplated by an Act of Parliament it would be plain that the Sewel convention, with its effects, would apply to that statute—and the Government have always shown their willingness to follow the convention according to its terms. But if a Minister makes a provision by delegated legislation then, as I understand it, the Sewel convention does not apply, because Sewel was talking about primary legislation. Is the Minister prepared to undertake that the principle of the Sewel convention will apply to an order made with reference to Clause 9(2), which makes a provision that would otherwise be made by an Act of Parliament?

The importance of this question has been highlighted, if I may say so, by the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, because by necessity this would have to deal with legislation which affects the devolved Administrations in areas devolved to them. The ordinary rule is that that would not be done without their consent. Clarification is needed. The Minister may feel that she cannot give me a clear answer today. If she cannot give the undertaking that I am looking for, I would be very grateful if she would write, because this affects the way I would view any vote on this issue. It may also affect what we talk about on Report.

This is a very important matter. The issue has really been thrown up by the way in which the clause has been drafted—and it has no doubt been drafted in this way for good reasons, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has explained. If one is to have this clause, clarification is required.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, think that it would be possible to deal with his point by amending the memorandum of understanding so that it meets a new situation?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I can see the force of that, but I do not know whether that option is available in the present climate. As regards reassuring the parties in Cardiff and Edinburgh, something in the Bill is looked for. Again, it is a matter of trying to find a way to soften the atmosphere, which is highly unfortunate at the moment. I deliberately have not discussed Clause 11, because that is quite a different debate. However, the more we can do to clear the air by getting these points out of the way before we get into Clause 11, the better, and that is the basis on which I have moved this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I think that is meant to be an intervention, because I have not quite finished. The situation is that the British courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have discretion to look at any judgment that they wish, and to raise any question they wish in these judgments. There is nothing in the present Bill that impedes that, except in respect of questions of European law, because the courts themselves, and the members of the Supreme Court, have been anxious that if they paid too much attention to the European court after Brexit, they might be accused of being involved in politics. They have sought a direction from Parliament on this matter, and that has been attempted, and I hope it is successful.

I personally do not share the animosity that exists in some quarters towards the European Court of Justice. It is over 30 years now since I often appeared before them, and I have nothing but praise for the way in which they do things. They do things very differently to us. There are far fewer oral hearings—at least, there were when I did it, which was a long time ago. There is much less oral pleading than there is in our courts. Actually, our courts have moved slightly in that direction in recent years, since I was last involved with them—and in some cases quite far in that direction.

The respect I have for the European Court is of the highest order, but I do think there is a difficulty because, after Brexit, no judges or advocates-general of the British Bar will be members of the court or advocates-general in the court. That is an important factor to be taken into account in the arrangements. I am not part of the negotiations—I have nothing to do with them—but I do believe that that point has to be taken into account. There is a usual rule that the people administering justice are the people who are in accordance with the arrangements between states. International courts, for example, may not have representatives from all the states that appear before them, but there is a question to be considered in that connection, because the Court of Justice referred to in the amendment will not be the Court of Justice as it is now.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.

There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.

The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.

In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.

In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I do not regard them as alternatives; rather that Amendment 12 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, is absolutely essential. The other form of wording, that it,

“shall not be questioned in any court of law”,

comes from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, would be a possible alternative. But something of this kind is in my view absolutely essential if we are setting out in statute a restriction on the power of the United Kingdom Parliament to legislate.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, the problem with the term “Sewel convention” itself seems to beg a question as to exactly what it covers. The word “normally” is not the only problem in that respect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I think I should thank the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for his kind words. The amendments improve the intelligibility of these provisions. It is important that the system work as smoothly as possible, so I am extremely grateful.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I am glad that these amendments have been made. Of course, I understand that they will require approval by the House of Commons in due course.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I absolutely understand the force of the points that have been made by the noble Lord opposite, and particularly the impressive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, but I wonder whether the mechanism that this amendment seeks to use to solve the social problems that have been talked about is the right one. It would put a duty on the Charity Commission and expresses that duty in the widest possible terms without qualifying the charities being talked about, the nature of the compulsion that they face or what the assets are that are sought to be disposed of. It is not a targeted amendment in the sense of dealing specifically with the point about the right to buy and interference with the assets of charities in the social housing field; it is entirely general.

I have no remit for the Charity Commission, and I am not advocating anything on its behalf on instructions, but one advantage of the procedure that was used before the Bill was introduced into this House was the pre-legislative scrutiny through the Joint Committee. This issue was not raised in the course of the Joint Committee’s proceedings. That is a pity because among those who gave evidence were representatives of the Charity Commission itself, who had an opportunity to comment on the various amendments to the Bill that are being proposed and to suggest improvements, as indeed we are discussing first thing at this stage.

I do not know what the commission’s position is on this clause but I suspect that it would be extremely concerned about being faced with a duty in these very broad terms and its ability, given the resources that it has to deploy right across the charitable sector, to do what the amendment requires. So, without commenting on the underlying substance, I respectfully suggest that this is not the right mechanism, and that the wording of this amendment is certainly far too wide to address the particular problem that has been discussed so far.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I will raise a question in relation to this amendment which has nothing to do, primarily, with the issue that has been raised, and which will come forward in another Bill. One of the problems for charities is that from time to time they are subject to compulsory acquisition. For example, if a charity owns property which is required for a road or something of that sort, the authority that has compulsory powers in relation to that will be able to acquire it. I am not clear that this amendment is consistent with that possibility, because the Charity Commissioners would find it impossible to block a compulsory acquisition if it was made within the terms of the particular statute which authorises the acquisition.

As your Lordships will know, there are many statutes which authorise compulsory acquisition. However, an important aspect of compulsory acquisition is that the acquiring authority has to pay the full value of what is required. I do not know what the Government’s proposals will be in relation to this other matter, but all I can say at the moment is that the amendment does not seem properly to recognise the possibility of charitable property being acquired by compulsory acquisition under one of the compulsory acquisition statutes. I would be glad if the noble Baroness would deal with that.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hope of Craighead

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am not sure if I am allowed to speak again on Report but I am challenged here. The words in the amendment are “social problem”, not social harm. I think that may be an answer to the noble Lord. They are different phrases, with different meanings.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I have no particular difficulty with the first amendment concerning “synthetic”, and I think I indicated that to the Minister some time ago before it was actually formulated as an amendment.

However, I have considerable difficulty with the second amendment and how it is going to work. If somebody produces this material and that production is to be a crime, in the general view I have about the law he must at least have the means of finding out whether what he is doing is criminal. The difficulty that has been expressed before in relation to these psychoactive substances is that they are produced so quickly and changed so quickly and the harm is done so quickly that the Misuse of Drugs Act can hardly catch up with them. That is a very serious problem.

I agree very much with what the inspector has said in his report about the difficulty of prisons. Indeed, I have been told before that there are considerable difficulties with the input into prisons, by whatever means, of these legal highs. They certainly seem to have the effect of producing considerable violence, which is undoubtedly a social problem if ever there was one. How is this to work? The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs will have to give advice. Will that not create exactly the same difficulty as the attempt to use the Misuse of Drugs Act to control these legal highs has proved to have in the past? That is the need and reason for the production of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, said that the definition is very wide. My view is that, on the whole, the legal effect of a definition is rather more related to its precision than to its particular width. In some cases, the definition of what is made criminal is very wide indeed—as undoubtedly it should be to encompass many methods of carrying out the offence. I cannot see how the mechanism suggested here is going to be capable of working, given the problems that exist. I have been trying to think of how this could be modified but so far without too much success, except that something depends on the intention of the laboratories producing these substances. What are they doing it for? Are they intending to help people to sleep well or behave well and so on? I think they are probably not.

The purpose for which these substances, which may be synthetic, are produced seems highly relevant but it is quite difficult to get at defining an offence by reference to that. However, if the purpose for which the substance is produced is something that the state considers should be criminalised, that is a possible way to define an offence. That would at least have the effect of it being decided in relation to the time of production. It might not be possible to prove it immediately but the essence of it would be something that has happened before that production was put into the hands—or the body, one way or another—of the person receiving it, which is part of the crime that the Bill seeks to establish.